Stakeholder collaboration in United Kingdom (UK) Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) social infrastructure provision by McErlane, Andrew
  
 
STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION IN UNITED KINGDOM (UK) PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS (PPP) SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION  
 
 
 
 
ANDREW MCERLANE 
BSc. (HONS) QUANTITY SURVEYING AND COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT (DIS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACULTY OF COMPUTING, ENGINEERING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT OF ULSTER 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PhD) 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
i 
 
 
 
Declaration 
I confirm that the word count of this thesis is less than 100,000 words excluding the title 
page, contents, acknowledgements, summary or abstract, abbreviations, footnotes, 
diagrams, illustrations, tables, appendices, and references or bibliography.  
I hereby declare that with effect from the date on which the thesis is deposited in Research 
Student Administration of Ulster University, I permit 
1. The Librarian of the University to allow the thesis to be copied in whole or in part without 
reference to me on the understanding that such authority applies to the provision of 
single copies made for study purposes or for inclusion within the stock of another library. 
2. The thesis to be made available through the Ulster Institutional Repository and/or EThOS 
under the terms of the Ulster eTheses Deposit Agreement which I have signed. 
 
IT IS A CONDITION OF USE OF THIS THESIS THAT ANYONE WHO CONSULTS IT MUST 
RECOGNISE THAT THE COPYRIGHT RESTS WITH THE AUTHOR AND THAT NO QUOTATION 
FROM THE THESIS AND NO INFORMATION DERIVED FROM IT MAY BE PUBLISHED UNLESS 
THE SOURCE IS PROPERLY ACKNOWLEDGED. 
  
ii 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisors; Prof. Martin Haran, Dr. Sharon McClements and Dr. 
John McCord for guiding me through the completion of this PhD as well as for their valuable 
input into the development of this research. I would also like to extend gratitude to Prof. 
George Heaney for his earlier involvement.  
For those who participated in the survey, I am grateful. Also, to Rory McClelland, I thank you 
for your valuable insights into the PPP concept.  
To my research colleagues in 1K07 for always lending an ear, I thank you and wish you all the 
best of luck in your future endeavours. 
Finally, to my family, I thank you for your patience and fortitude over the previous three and 
a half years. 
“Strength and growth come only through continuous effort and struggle” - Napoleon Hill. 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Declaration ................................................................................................................................ i 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. ii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ x 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... xii 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................... xv 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 2 
1.1. Background to Research .......................................................................................... 2 
1.2. Aim and Objectives .................................................................................................. 3 
1.3. Research Methodology ............................................................................................ 4 
1.4. Research Contributions............................................................................................ 5 
1.5. Thesis Structure ....................................................................................................... 7 
1.6. Summary ................................................................................................................ 10 
2. An Appraisal of the ‘Infrastructure’ Concept ................................................................. 13 
2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 13 
2.2. Conceptualising Infrastructure .............................................................................. 13 
2.3. The Salience of Infrastructure Provision ................................................................ 15 
2.3.1. The Socio-economic Implications of Infrastructure Development ................ 16 
2.4. The Infrastructure Investment Paradigm .............................................................. 19 
2.4.1. The Paradigm Shift – From Public to Private Financing ................................. 22 
2.4.2. Infrastructure Project Financing .................................................................... 22 
2.4.3. Project Debt Financing Developments .......................................................... 25 
2.4.4. Project Equity Financing Developments ........................................................ 27 
2.5. Better Infrastructure Provision .............................................................................. 29 
2.6. United Kingdom Social Infrastructure Investment ................................................ 31 
2.6.1. ‘More and Better’ United Kingdom Social Infrastructure Provision .............. 38 
2.7. Summary ................................................................................................................ 39 
3. An Evaluation of the Public-Private Partnerships Framework ....................................... 42 
3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 42 
3.2. Conceptualising Public-Private Partnerships ......................................................... 43 
3.3. Public-Private Partnerships in the United Kingdom .............................................. 46 
3.3.1. Public-Private Partnerships Project Lifecycle ................................................. 49 
3.3.2. Partnering for ‘More and Better’ Social Infrastructure Provision ................. 53 
iv 
 
 
 
3.4. An Overview of United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships for Social 
Infrastructure Provision ..................................................................................................... 55 
3.4.1. Building Schools for the Future ...................................................................... 57 
3.4.2. Local Improvement Finance Trust and Express LIFT ...................................... 58 
3.4.3. The Demise of the Private Finance Initiative ................................................. 59 
3.4.4. A New Approach to Public-Private Partnerships ........................................... 61 
3.4.4.1. England................................................................................................... 61 
3.4.4.2. Northern Ireland .................................................................................... 63 
3.4.4.3. Scotland ................................................................................................. 63 
3.4.4.4. Wales...................................................................................................... 64 
3.5. Inefficiencies Confronting United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social 
Infrastructure Provision ..................................................................................................... 65 
3.6. Summary ................................................................................................................ 73 
4. An Examination of the Partnership ................................................................................ 76 
4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 76 
4.2. Public-Private Partnerships Partnership Boundary Specification .......................... 77 
4.2.1. Stakeholder Theory ........................................................................................ 80 
4.2.1.1. Defining Stakeholders ............................................................................ 82 
4.2.1.2. Understanding Stakeholder Involvement .............................................. 84 
4.3. Identifying Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure Stakeholders .......... 85 
4.3.1. Public-sector Authority .................................................................................. 87 
4.3.2. Private-Sector Special Purpose Vehicle and its Constituent Members ......... 87 
4.4. Assessing the Partnership Boundary Specification ................................................ 90 
4.4.1. Inter-sectoral Partnership .............................................................................. 90 
4.4.2. Intra-sectoral Partnership .............................................................................. 91 
4.5. Critical Examination of the Partnership Boundary Specification ........................... 94 
4.6. Summary .............................................................................................................. 100 
5. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration............................................... 102 
5.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 102 
5.2. An Overview of Collaboration .............................................................................. 102 
5.3. Defining Collaboration ......................................................................................... 104 
5.4. Motivations to Collaborate .................................................................................. 105 
5.5. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration....................................... 108 
5.6. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Attributes ..................... 111 
v 
 
 
 
5.6.1. Accountability .............................................................................................. 111 
5.6.2. Agreement of Project Brief .......................................................................... 112 
5.6.3. Appropriate Risk Sharing ............................................................................. 112 
5.6.4. Authority Experience ................................................................................... 113 
5.6.5. Authority In-house Resources and Skills ...................................................... 113 
5.6.6. Balance of Stakeholder Needs and Expectations ........................................ 113 
5.6.7. Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................ 114 
5.6.8. Clear Governance Structures ....................................................................... 114 
5.6.9. Collective Stakeholder Planning and Decision-Making ................................ 114 
5.6.10. Conflict Resolution Structures ..................................................................... 115 
5.6.11. Contract Flexibility ....................................................................................... 115 
5.6.12. Early Establishment of Collaboration ........................................................... 116 
5.6.13. Early, Defined and Collective Stakeholder Involvement and Consultation . 116 
5.6.14. Effective Communication ............................................................................. 116 
5.6.15. Financial and Technical Exchange and Support / Stipend ........................... 117 
5.6.16. Identifying Individual and Shared Objectives .............................................. 117 
5.6.17. Information Sharing and Transparency ....................................................... 117 
5.6.18. Information Technology ............................................................................... 118 
5.6.19. Innovation .................................................................................................... 118 
5.6.20. Knowledge Retention................................................................................... 119 
5.6.21. Power Sharing .............................................................................................. 119 
5.6.22. Processual Change ....................................................................................... 119 
5.6.23. Skilled Leadership ........................................................................................ 120 
5.6.24. Social Capital / Inter-personal Relationships ............................................... 120 
5.6.25. Project Company Experience ....................................................................... 121 
5.6.26. Stakeholder Commitment ............................................................................ 121 
5.6.27. Trust and Respect ........................................................................................ 122 
5.7. Summary .............................................................................................................. 125 
6. Research Methodology ................................................................................................ 127 
6.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 127 
6.2. The Research Paradigm ....................................................................................... 128 
6.2.1. Research Philosophy .................................................................................... 128 
6.2.1.1. Epistemological Consideration ............................................................ 129 
6.2.1.2. Ontological Consideration ................................................................... 130 
vi 
 
 
 
6.2.1.3. Methodological Reasoning .................................................................. 130 
6.2.2. Research Strategy ........................................................................................ 131 
6.2.2.1. Quantitative Research ......................................................................... 131 
6.2.2.2. Qualitative Research ............................................................................ 132 
6.2.2.3. Mixed-Methods Research .................................................................... 132 
6.2.3. Research Methods ....................................................................................... 133 
6.2.4. Built Environment Research Designs ........................................................... 134 
6.3. Contemporary United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure 
Market Analysis................................................................................................................ 136 
6.4. Development of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Survey 137 
6.4.1. Survey Questionnaire................................................................................... 139 
6.4.2. Stakeholder Identification ........................................................................... 139 
6.4.2.1. Population ............................................................................................ 140 
6.4.2.2. Sample.................................................................................................. 143 
6.4.3. Bias ............................................................................................................... 145 
6.4.4. Determining Social Infrastructure Stakeholder Participants ....................... 145 
6.4.5. Questionnaire Design and Format ............................................................... 146 
6.4.6. Questionnaire Administration ..................................................................... 147 
6.4.7. Pilot .............................................................................................................. 148 
6.4.7.1. Pre-Test ................................................................................................ 149 
6.4.7.2. Pilot Scheme ........................................................................................ 150 
6.5. Statistical Data Analysis ....................................................................................... 150 
6.5.1. Relative Importance Index ........................................................................... 151 
6.5.2. Kruskal-Wallis H Test .................................................................................... 151 
6.5.2.1. Dunn’s Test .......................................................................................... 153 
6.5.3. Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance .......................................................... 153 
6.6. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Framework Development
  ............................................................................................................................. 155 
6.6.1. Application of Principal Components Analysis ............................................ 156 
6.6.2. Sample Size .................................................................................................. 157 
6.6.3. Eigenvalue .................................................................................................... 158 
6.6.4. Scree Test ..................................................................................................... 158 
6.6.5. Component Variance ................................................................................... 158 
6.6.6. Component Rotation ................................................................................... 158 
vii 
 
 
 
6.6.7. Component Scores ....................................................................................... 159 
6.6.8. Reliability of Principal Components ............................................................. 159 
6.7. Summary .............................................................................................................. 160 
7. United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure Market Analysis .. 163 
7.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 163 
7.2. Twelve-Year Overview of United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social 
Infrastructure Investment ................................................................................................ 164 
7.3. United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure Sectors ........ 166 
7.4. United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Jurisdictional Markets .................. 168 
7.4.1. England ........................................................................................................ 170 
7.4.2. Northern Ireland .......................................................................................... 171 
7.4.3. Scotland ....................................................................................................... 173 
7.4.4. Wales ........................................................................................................... 174 
7.5. Financial Structure of United Kingdom United Public-Private Partnerships Social 
Infrastructure Transactions ............................................................................................. 175 
7.6. Reflection on the Key Findings of the United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships 
Social Infrastructure Market Analysis .............................................................................. 178 
7.7. Chapter Summary ................................................................................................ 180 
8. Analysis of Survey Questionnaires ............................................................................... 182 
8.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 182 
8.2. Response Rate...................................................................................................... 182 
8.3. Stakeholder Demographic ................................................................................... 183 
8.3.1. Respondent Experience of Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure 
Sectors  ..................................................................................................................... 183 
8.3.2. Respondent Experience of Public-Private Partnerships Modalities ............ 184 
8.3.2.1. Private Finance Initiative...................................................................... 186 
8.3.2.2. Building Schools for the Future ............................................................ 186 
8.3.2.3. Local Improvement Finance Trust / express LIFT ................................ 186 
8.3.2.4. Private Finance 2 .................................................................................. 186 
8.3.2.5. Priority School Building Programme .................................................... 186 
8.3.2.6. Non-Profit Distribution ........................................................................ 187 
8.3.2.7. Scottish-Futures-Trust Hub Initiative ................................................... 187 
8.4. Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure Provision ................................ 187 
8.4.1. United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Macro-environment ............. 187 
viii 
 
 
 
8.4.2. The Public-Private Partnerships Concept .................................................... 188 
8.4.3. Social Infrastructure Sectors Conducive to Public-Private Partnerships 
Provision  ..................................................................................................................... 188 
8.4.4. Future Use of Public-Private Partnerships ................................................... 190 
8.5. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration....................................... 190 
8.5.1. Conduciveness of Public-Private Partnerships Frameworks to Collaboration
  ..................................................................................................................... 191 
8.5.2. Salience of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration ............ 191 
8.5.3. Analysis of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes
  ..................................................................................................................... 192 
8.5.3.1. Ranking Salience of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder 
Collaborative Attributes ........................................................................................... 192 
8.6. Statistical Testing of Collaborative Attribute Perceptions Between Social 
Infrastructure Stakeholder Groups .................................................................................. 201 
8.6.1. Analysis of Variance ..................................................................................... 201 
8.6.2. Kendell’s Coefficient of Concordance .......................................................... 207 
8.7. Summary .............................................................................................................. 208 
9. Development of the Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Framework
  ..................................................................................................................................... 211 
9.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 211 
9.2. Determining Data Suitability ................................................................................ 211 
9.3. Principal Components Analysis - Extraction of Public-Private Partnerships 
Collaborative Attributes ................................................................................................... 212 
9.4. Identification of Principal Components for Public-Private Partnerships 
Collaborative Attributes ................................................................................................... 215 
9.5. Analysis of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaborative Principal 
Components ..................................................................................................................... 216 
9.5.1. Component One ........................................................................................... 218 
9.5.2. Component Two .......................................................................................... 219 
9.5.3. Component Three ........................................................................................ 220 
9.5.4. Component Four .......................................................................................... 221 
9.5.5. Component Five ........................................................................................... 222 
9.5.6. Component Six ............................................................................................. 223 
9.6. Reliability and Validity of PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Components ............. 224 
ix 
 
 
 
9.7. Development of the Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration 
Framework ....................................................................................................................... 225 
9.7.1. Initiation ....................................................................................................... 225 
9.7.2. Procurement ................................................................................................ 226 
9.7.3. Commissioning and Contract Management ...................... 228_Toc525986055 
9.8. Summary .............................................................................................................. 235 
10. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 237 
10.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 237 
10.2. A Reflection on the Key Findings from the Research........................................... 237 
10.3. Knowledge Contributions and Research Implications ......................................... 243 
10.4. Application of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Framework
  ............................................................................................................................. 246 
10.4.1. Policy ............................................................................................................ 246 
10.4.2. Industry Practitioners .................................................................................. 247 
10.5. Recommendations ............................................................................................... 247 
10.6. Limitations ........................................................................................................... 249 
10.7. Further Research .................................................................................................. 249 
References ........................................................................................................................... 251 
Appendix A – Table of SIS Identification Summary .............................................................. 277 
Appendix B – Electronic PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Survey ......................................... 278 
Appendix C – Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance ............................................................ 283 
Appendix D – Survey Principal Components Analysis Data ................................................. 284 
Appendix E – List of Publications from the Research .......................................................... 291 
 
  
x 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 3.1: Inefficiencies Confronting ‘More and Better’ UK PPP Social Infrastructure Provision
 ............................................................................................................................................... 72 
Table 4.1: Proposed SIS in Literature ..................................................................................... 79 
Table 4.2: PPP SIS Taxonomy ................................................................................................. 87 
Table 4.3: PPP SIS Collaboration Gaps ................................................................................... 99 
Table 5.1: PPP SIS Collaborative Attributes ......................................................................... 124 
Table 6.1: Fundamentals of Research Design ...................................................................... 132 
Table 6.2: Identified SIS Sample........................................................................................... 144 
Table 7.1: Sector Breakdown of Regional UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity .... 169 
Table 7.2: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Debt-Equity Composition ......................... 175 
Table 7.3: Sectoral Breakdown of Debt-Equity Financial Structure According to UK PPP Social 
Infrastructure Regional Market ........................................................................................... 178 
Table 8.1: SIS Response Profile ............................................................................................ 183 
Table 8.2: SIS Experience of UK PPP Modalities .................................................................. 185 
Table 8.3: SIS Perceptions of Sectors Conducive to PPP ...................................................... 189 
Table 8.4: Ranking of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes ........................................ 193 
Table 8.5: Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality ........................................................................... 202 
Table 8.6: Kruskal-Wallis H Test ........................................................................................... 203 
Table 8.7: Dunn’s Test for Identifying Individual and Shared Objectives ............................ 204 
Table 8.8: Dunn’s Test for Innovation .................................................................................. 205 
Table 8.9: Dunn’s Test for Skilled Leadership ...................................................................... 205 
Table 8.10: Dunn’s Test for Trust and Respect .................................................................... 206 
Table 8.11: Results of Kendall’s W Test of PPP Collaborative Attributes ............................ 207 
Table 9.1: KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity of Collaborative Attributes ..................... 211 
Table 9.2: Communalities of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes ............................. 212 
Table 9.3: Total Variance of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes .............................. 214 
Table 9.4: Rotated Component Matrix for PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes ....... 216 
Table 9.5: Extracted PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Principal Components ...................... 217 
Table 9.6: Reliability Analysis of PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Components ................... 224 
  
xi 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the Thesis ......................................................................................... 10 
Figure 2.1: Typical Project Financing Structure ..................................................................... 23 
Figure 2.2 Public-Sector Gross Investment and PFI Investments of the Past 50 Years ......... 32 
Figure 2.3: Total Monthly A&E Attendances in England from 2012 to May 2017 ................ 34 
Figure 2.4: Permanent Dwellings Completed in the UK from 1949 to 2016 ......................... 36 
Figure 3.1: Past and Future PFI Forecasted Unitary Charge Payments ................................. 47 
Figure 3.2: Typical PPP Organisational Structure .................................................................. 48 
Figure 3.3: Typical PPP Project Lifecycle ................................................................................ 49 
Figure 6.1: Population and Sample Selection Flow Chart from 2005 to 2016 ..................... 140 
Figure 7.1: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Capital Value and Deal Number
 ............................................................................................................................................. 164 
Figure 7.2: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market by Capital Value ...................................... 167 
Figure 7.3: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Sectoral Distribution by Capital Value ................. 168 
Figure 7.4: Regional UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Capital Value .......... 169 
Figure 7.5: English PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Capital Value .................. 170 
Figure 7.6: Northern Irish PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Project Value ....... 172 
Figure 7.7: Scottish PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Project Value ................. 173 
Figure 7.8: Welsh PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Project Value ................... 174 
Figure 8.1: SIS experience of PPP in Sectoral Terms ............................................................ 184 
Figure 9.1: Scree Plot of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes .................................... 215 
 
  
xii 
 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
3PD   Third-Party Development 
A&E   Accident and Emergency 
ADB   Asian Development Bank 
AUDE   Association of University Estate Directors 
BIM   Building Information Modelling 
BN   Billion 
BSF   Building Schools for the Future 
BuildCo   Construction Contractor 
CBA   Cost Benefit Analysis 
CHP   Community Health Partnerships 
CPPIB   Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board 
CSF   Critical Success Factor 
CSP   Corporate Social Performance 
DCSF   Department for Children, Schools and Families 
EBRD   European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
EFA   Education Funding Agency 
eLIFT   Express Local Improvement Finance Trust 
FA   Factor Analysis 
FMCo   Service Provider 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GFC   Global Financial Crisis 
GWI   Global Water Intelligence 
HBOS   Halifax Bank of Scotland 
HS2   High Speed 2 
HubCo   Hub Company 
IADB through its MIF Inter-American Development Bank through its Multilateral 
Investment   Fund 
ICT   Information Computer Technology 
IEA   International Energy Agency 
IFU   Infrastructure Finance Unit 
IJ   Infrastructure Journal Online Database 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
xiii 
 
 
 
IMR   Infant Mortality Rate 
IPA   Infrastructure and Projects Authority 
IPD   Integrated Project Delivery 
IRR   Internal Rate of Return 
IsDB   Islamic Development Bank 
IT   Information Technology 
ITF   International Transport Forum 
JV   Joint Venture 
KMO   Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
LEP   Local Education Partnerships 
LIFT   Local Improvement Finance Trust 
LLTI   Limiting Long-Term Illness 
M   Million 
MGI   McKinsey Global Institute 
MIM   Mutual Investment Model 
MLA   Mandated Loan Arranger 
NAO   National Audit Office 
NHS   National Health Service 
NI   Northern Ireland 
NIPD   National Infrastructure Delivery Plan 
NIPSA   Northern Ireland Public Service Alliance 
NPD   Non-Profit Distribution 
OBC   Outline Business Case 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OGC   Office of Government Commerce 
ONS   Office for National Statistics 
PA   Project Agreement 
PAIDF   Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund 
PCA   Principal Components Analysis 
PF2   Private Finance 2 
PFI   Private Finance Initiative 
PFP   Private Finance Panel 
xiv 
 
 
 
PfS   Partnerships for Schools 
PIP   Pension Investment Platform 
PPIAF   Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
PPP   Public-Private Partnerships 
ProjCo   Project Company 
PSBP   Priority School Building Programme 
PSC   Public-Sector Comparator 
PUK   Partnerships UK 
RBS   Royal Bank of Scotland 
REIT   Real Estate Investment Trust 
RFP   Request for Proposal 
RFQ   Request for Quotation 
RICS   Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors 
RII   Relative Importance Index 
RM   Relationship Management 
SDS   Sustainable Development Strategy 
SFT   Scottish Futures Trust 
SIS   Social Infrastructure Stakeholders 
SPSS   Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
SPV   Special Purpose Vehicle 
S&P   Standard and Poor’s 
TN   Trillion 
UK   United Kingdom 
UNESCAP  United Nations Economics and Social Commission for Asia and the 
    Pacific 
US   United States 
VfM   Value for Money 
WA   Weighted Average 
WBG   World Bank 
WWII   World War II 
  
xv 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This research investigates stakeholder collaboration in Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for 
the provision of ‘more and better’ social infrastructure in the United Kingdom (UK). 
Infrastructure development has been targeted by governments internationally as a vehicle 
for national growth. However, as economic infrastructure provision continues to dominate 
investment discord, there are ‘signposts’ pointing towards the need for social infrastructure 
provision particularly in Western Nations. The UK has suffered from a legacy of 
underinvestment. Moreover, as the UK continues to undertake protracted austerity policies 
to address the implications of the Global Financial Crisis and growing national debt, there is 
appetite for greater private-sector participation in the provision of social infrastructure. This 
is to serve the bilateral purpose of levering alternative sources of capital into infrastructure 
as well as to enhance investment impact through greater efficiencies in provision 
frameworks. This has re-stimulated debate over the viability of cross-sectoral initiatives such 
as PPP.  
PPP has already been pivotal in UK social infrastructure provision. However, the previous 
framework; the Private Finance Initiative, has been discredited and lambasted for delivering 
poor Value for Money (VfM), with the partnership being identified as a primary source of 
poor project performance. This research addresses this knowledge gap. Using a bi-
quantitative research methodology comprising a quantitative assessment of datasets 
sourced from Infrastructure Journal (IJ) Online Database as well as survey questionnaires, 
this investigation contributes: a contemporary analysis of the UK PPP social infrastructure 
market; defines the PPP social infrastructure partnership boundary specification; determines 
the ranked salience of PPP stakeholder collaboration attributes identified from literature; 
empirically extracts six PPP stakeholder collaboration components premised on best-
practice exemplars; and applies these findings to the PPP project lifecycle to produce a PPP 
stakeholder collaboration framework which can be used to provide meaningful inputs to 
inform policy, industry practitioners and future academic investigation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background to Research 
The salience of the infrastructure concept as a premise for socio-economic development has 
been well documented and in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), its pertinence 
appears to be more profound now, perhaps than ever before. As governments continue to 
position infrastructure investment central to their mandates, Inderst and Stewart (2014) 
estimate that baseline future infrastructure outlay equates to $80trillion (tn) over the next 
two decades. Economic infrastructure development has been identified as a catalyst for 
economic prosperity and in this regard its provision has dominated infrastructure investment 
discussion boards. Notwithstanding the salience of economic infrastructure, as the nature of 
the infrastructure investment paradigm continues to evolve commensurate with societal 
needs, social infrastructure investment has grown in prominence particularly in Western 
nations.  
Set against a legacy of underinvestment, in the United Kingdom (UK), there are now 
pronounced ‘signposts’ indicating the need to upgrade and replace social infrastructure 
facilities. Yet, as the UK government continues to implement its protracted austerity policies 
to reduce public-sector debt, a gap has manifested between infrastructure investment 
demands and capital supply.  
To bridge this gap, there is greater appetite for private finance to fund infrastructure 
provision. Furthermore, in the current economic context, the UK government now requires 
better impact from their investments. Therefore, the UK government is now confronted with 
a bi-lateral infrastructure provision challenge comprising the need to identify and lever 
alternative sources of capital to provide ‘more’ social infrastructure, as well the task of 
improving efficiencies within infrastructure procurement frameworks and strategies for 
‘better’ infrastructure provision to enhance investment impact 
A procurement framework which has been extolled as a vehicle for ‘more and better’ social 
infrastructure provision is Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). PPP utilises private financing 
and expertise. Moreover, many have argued that the private-sector is characteristically more 
proficient than the public-sector in the provision and delivery of infrastructure services 
premised on superior management skills and resources (IMF, 2015; PwC, 2017). Considered 
one of the pioneers of partnering initiatives through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
already PPP has been instrumental in social infrastructure provision in the UK and indeed 
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where offering best Value for Money (VfM), PPP will to continue to be a viable mechanism 
for social infrastructure development.  
Notwithstanding this commitment to partnership-based procurement, the PPP provision 
mechanism has lost traction. The previous framework; the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has 
been discredited and lambasted for delivering poor VfM for the taxpayer. Consequentially, 
there has been low confidence in PPP which has culminated in the UK government 
undertaking a policy reformation to address inherent inefficiencies of these frameworks as 
well as to stimulate wider alternative sources of capital beyond government funding capacity 
(HM Treasury, 2012). Despite these reformations, the UK PPP market has failed to return to 
activity levels exhibited prior to the GFC. Curtailed levels of market activity have resultantly 
engendered uncertainty around to the future of PPP. Furthermore, this has prompted some 
to query whether the changes implemented through these nuanced modalities have 
legitimately addressed the inherent inefficiencies of PFI.  
Grounded in a cross-sectoral partnership, for some time, collaboration has been 
acknowledged as a cornerstone of the long-term sustainability of these frameworks (Latham, 
1994; Duffield, 2006; Smyth and Edkins, 2007; Zheng et al., 2008; Constructing Excellence, 
2011; HM Treasury 2012; Waring et al., 2013; Burke and Demirag, 2017). Furthermore, as 
nascent alternative sources of capital continue to enter the PPP space, there is a need for 
greater collaboration to unlock these additional sources of finance. Nevertheless, despite 
the importance of collaboration, literature identifies that the ethos of these arrangements 
has been a contractual outsourcing arrangement as opposed to a collaborative partnership. 
Consequentially, many in PPP literature point toward the partnership as a primary source of 
poor performance (Zou et al., 2013; Jefferies et al., 2014; Jefferies and Rowlinson, 2016; 
Burke and Demirag, 2017; O’Nolan and Reeves, 2017). Against this backdrop, it is argued that 
there is a forthcoming knowledge gap pertaining to stakeholder collaboration in ‘more and 
better’ UK PPP social infrastructure provision. 
1.2. Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to critically investigate stakeholder collaboration in PPP, for the 
provision and delivery of ‘more and better’ social infrastructure in the UK. To achieve this 
aim, this thesis has strategically determined the following research objectives: 
1. To critically appraise the infrastructure concept as a premise for socio-economic 
development; 
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2. To critically evaluate the role of PPP as a vehicle for ‘more and better’ social 
infrastructure provision in the UK; 
3. To critically examine collaboration between stakeholders within UK PPP social 
infrastructure projects; 
4. To identify the salient attributes of stakeholder collaboration in PPP in the provision, 
delivery and management of UK social infrastructure; and 
5. To develop a stakeholder collaboration framework for application in UK PPP frameworks. 
 
1.3. Research Methodology 
This investigation undertook a bi-quantitative research methodology. This was comprised of 
a contemporary analysis of the UK PPP social infrastructure market as well as electronic 
survey questionnaires. 
Premised on datasets sourced from Infrastructure Journal (IJ) Online Database, this research 
undertook a quantitative assessment of the UK PPP social infrastructure market. This was to 
offer contemporary insights into the current marketplace in the absence of publicly available 
centralised or standardised datasets. IJ depicts global PPP activity from 2005 to present day, 
therein supplying details on capital value, financial structures, Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
details and key actors. Data was downloaded and interrogated using Microsoft Excel and was 
profiled in terms of deal number, transaction capital value, sector activity, regional market 
activity and financial structure. Access to these datasets required an annual subscription and 
was obtained for this research in the period spanning 31/05/2017 to 31/05/2018. Data, for 
this market investigation, was downloaded on 31/06/2017. 
Holding a positivist epistemological and objectivist ontological stance; in addition to the 
market investigation, the research also undertook a quantitative survey with electronic 
questionnaires as the research instrument. The survey was hosted by SurveyMonkey and 
was issued to key social infrastructure stakeholders (SIS). A population of 522 SIS 
organisations was determined from two sources, namely, IJ and HM Treasury PPP summary 
data. From this population, a sample was selected using a purposive random sampling 
technique. In total, 220 organisations were invited to partake in the survey; 109 responded 
and 36 were incomplete culminating in 73 completed and useable responses. From a sample 
of 220, 73 completed surveys equated to a 33% response rate. Participants were asked to 
provide information on their background to offer opinions on UK PPP social infrastructure 
provision as well as perceptions of stakeholder collaboration inherent to these frameworks. 
Questions were asked by means of closed-questions, using a five-point Likert scale to allow 
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for consistency and generalisability. The principal purpose of the survey was to have 
respondents evaluate a list of 27 PPP stakeholder collaborative attributes which were 
identified as part of the literature review.  
With the collated responses, the research conducted a Relative Importance Index (RII) to 
rank the attributes in terms of their importance. This was complimented with the Kruskal-
Wallis H test which was conducted to determine differences between groups. Following this, 
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance was carried out to establish statistical significance and 
levels of agreement among respondents. Having satisfied these tests, a Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) was undertaken to reduce the larger number of 27 PPP 
stakeholder collaboration attributes into smaller, more meaningful constructs which are 
more easily understood. The research tested the accuracy and reliability of the PCA sample 
through the application of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sample adequacy and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The PCA employed an eigenvalue of one, stipulated a component 
variance benchmark of 70%, adopted an orthogonal varimax rotation and any component 
scores below 0.45 were suppressed. Ultimately, the PCA identified six principal components; 
dynamic partnering, partnership core values, formal governance structures, risk 
management, Authority leadership and mission statement. To validate the components, 
Cronbach’s alpha was applied. The purpose of this was to examine the levels of variance 
within components and covariance between components. A value of 0.78 was determined 
which satisfied this test. Components were then contextualised to the PPP lifecycle to 
develop the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework and components were named in 
accordance with their loading variables which was informed by literature. 
Chapter six provides further discussion on the research methodology.  
1.4. Research Contributions 
This section presents a summary of the key contributions to knowledge derived from the 
research. More on these contributions is further detailed in chapter ten. 
The research made six fundamental contributions to knowledge. Firstly, the research has 
added to the infrastructure stock of knowledge. While many continue to consider 
infrastructure investment through the lens of economic infrastructure provision, this 
research has alternatively identified, considered and promotes the need for ‘more and 
better’ social infrastructure investment in the UK. As the demographic of the UK population 
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changes, significantly, this research highlights the importance of providing social 
infrastructure commensurate with these socio-economic demands. 
Utilising IJ datasets, the research has contributed a contemporary analysis of the UK PPP 
social infrastructure market. By doing so, this added timely credibility to the investigation. 
The research profiles the UK PPP social infrastructure market. This provides value insights 
into transactional trends in terms of deal number, capital value, sectoral spend, regional 
markets and financial structure. This fills a knowledge gap which is not available in public 
forums which is important set against the backdrop of market uncertainty and the future use 
of PPP. 
In literature there remains discourse as to who should be considered a PPP social 
infrastructure stakeholder (SIS). This is also coupled with an absence of defined systems to 
understand how PPP SIS are involved in these partnering frameworks. This research 
addresses this knowledge gap. Grounded in stakeholder theory, the research has contributed 
a PPP SIS boundary specification framework. Premised on the attributes of legitimacy to 
identify PPP SIS as well as power and urgency to understand how they are involved, this 
research has contributed a PPP SIS framework that advantageously accounts for changes 
over time as opposed to a definitive list which runs the risk of excluding future unknown SIS. 
Furthermore, by grounding the framework in theory, this framework can be imported into 
economic PPP as well as into other international jurisdictions. Therefore, this framework is 
applicable both in the UK as well as internationally.  
Premised on the findings of an assessment of this PPP SIS boundary specification, the 
research has also undertaken a critical examination of literature to identify 23 inherent PPP 
stakeholder collaboration gaps. Combined with this list of collaboration gaps, the research 
undertook an analysis of additional PPP research and collaboration literature to ultimately 
identify 27 PPP stakeholder collaborative attributes. This list of PPP stakeholder collaborative 
attributes was subsequently evaluated by SIS organisations as part of the survey 
questionnaires. Empirically, through the application of the RII and the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
the research has presented a salience list which ranks these attributes in terms of their 
importance for PPP stakeholder collaboration. Equally, it was identified there were disparate 
opinions between SIS groups in regard to four of the collaborative attributes. This has made 
an original contribution to knowledge.  
While the list of 27 attributes in and of itself is valuable, it can be difficult to interpret these 
findings, therefore this research additionally undertook a PCA to refine this list into smaller, 
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more meaningful constructs for easier interpretation. Through the application of PCA, this 
thesis has determined six principal components of PPP stakeholder collaboration and therein 
made an empirical contribution. These components were: dynamic partnering, partnership 
core values, formal governance structures, risk management, Authority leadership and 
mission statement. By simplifying this framework, beneficially the findings of this 
investigation can be used to inform policy-makers as well as industry practitioner business 
models to enhance collaboration among SIS for improved project delivery.  
Finally, the research has made an important contribution to knowledge by contextualising 
the PCA extracted components to the PPP project lifecycle to produce a PPP stakeholder 
collaboration framework. In doing so, the research has delineated best-practice 
recommendations premised on the research findings. Originally, this offering accounts for 
the dynamic nature of collaboration as well as the transformational boundary specification 
across the duration of the project.  
1.5. Thesis Structure 
This thesis comprises ten chapters. The order and layout of these chapters is delineated in 
figure 1.1 together with how they correspond to the research methodology and the 
objectives of the research.  
Chapter one introduces the research. It offers insight into the background and pertinence of 
this investigation. As well as this, chapter one identifies the aim and objectives of the study, 
the adopted research methodology, the thesis structure and the ultimate contribution to 
knowledge.  
Chapter two considers the infrastructure concept to fulfil objective one of the research. In 
the context of this research, the infrastructure concept encompasses defining infrastructure, 
an analysis of the socio-economic implications of infrastructure provision and consideration 
of the infrastructure investment paradigm. Thus, chapter two considers the role of 
infrastructure investment in a functioning and vibrant society. Moreover, it considers the 
scale of the infrastructure provision challenge ahead and therein identifies how social 
infrastructure investment has been eclipsed by economic infrastructure development in the 
UK. Chapter two then reviews social infrastructure investment in the UK before critically 
examining the potential of private-sector participation in providing ‘more and better’ social 
infrastructure. Finally, this chapter recognises the increased appetite for PPP thereby 
providing the link between chapters two and three.  
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Chapter three conceptualises PPP. It considers PPP literature to offer a definition and 
evaluation of its growing popularity internationally. Chapter three also examines PPP in the 
UK and considers how PPP can provide ‘more and better’ infrastructure. The research 
appraises the key stages in a PPP project before finally undertaking a critical examination of 
literature to identify 19 challenges confronting the provision of ‘more and better’ UK PPP 
social infrastructure. Ultimately, the research determines collaboration is a pertinent 
knowledge gap, worthy of further investigation. 
Chapter four assesses the PPP partnership boundary specification in preparation for the 
collaboration investigation. This encompasses identifying who is involved in the partnership 
and understanding how they are involved in the PPP project. To do this, the research 
deliberates on stakeholder theory and extracts the attributes of legitimacy, power and 
urgency to produce a boundary specification framework which is subsequently applied to 
the PPP project lifecycle. Premised on these findings, this chapter conducts a critical 
examination of this boundary specification and therein identifies 23 PPP stakeholder 
collaboration gaps.  
Chapter five is centred on PPP stakeholder collaboration. This chapter considers the 
collaboration concept and examines collaboration theory to conceptualise how collaboration 
can improve PPP frameworks. Chapter five defines collaboration, identifies the motivations 
to collaborate and ultimately, consolidates the findings of the literature review to determine 
a list of 27 attributes necessary for PPP stakeholder collaboration. This list is a culmination 
of the PPP stakeholder collaboration gaps identified in chapter four, attributes identified in 
PPP literature, as well as additional attributes discerned specifically from collaboration 
theory. This list therefore provides the foundations for the empirical investigation.  
Chapter six of this investigation outlines the research methodology by which to develop the 
PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. Adopting a positivist epistemological and 
objectivist ontological stance, this chapter delineates the bi-quantitative research 
methodology to be undertaken comprising a contemporary analysis of the UK PPP social 
infrastructure paradigm coupled with an electronic quantitative survey questionnaire 
design. It identifies the data analysis techniques employed to interrogate the survey 
responses before delineating the PCA design undertaken for the development of the PPP 
stakeholder collaboration framework.  
Chapter seven consists of the contemporary analysis of the UK PPP social infrastructure 
market. It reflects on the transformations of the UK PPP markets and provides contemporary 
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context for the research. Data is considered according to project capital value, deal number, 
sectoral activity, jurisdictional market and financial structure. From this analysis, the 
research identifies that Health and Education continue to be the two preferred social 
infrastructure sectors which utilise PPP. Furthermore, of the four jurisdictional markets, all 
have been acutely impacted by the GFC. Furthermore, it was found that despite policy 
reformations, activity remains relatively muted; though there are burgeoning signs of growth 
in Scotland. 
Chapter eight consists of an analysis of the SIS survey questionnaire responses. It reflects on 
the findings of the survey regarding UK PPP social infrastructure provision in addition to 
respondent perceptions of PPP stakeholder collaboration. Following this, the study applies 
the RII to determine the salience of the PPP stakeholder collaborative attributes to fulfil 
objective four. These findings are considered according to the weighted average (WA) of the 
respondent group, while the research also analyses the findings to discern nuances between 
SIS groups according to the Kruskal-Wallis H test. Having determined the salience of the PPP 
stakeholder collaborative attributes, chapter eight examines the statistical significance of the 
response cohort through the application of Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance in 
preparation for the PCA.  
Chapter nine constitutes the development of the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework 
through the application of PCA to the survey responses. The PCA determined six PPP 
stakeholder collaborative components which are then contextualised to PPP literature. In 
doing so, the research presents a PPP stakeholder collaboration framework which delineates 
the dynamics of PPP stakeholder collaboration across the differing phases of the project 
lifecycle. By doing so, this chapter meets objective five of this thesis and offers a meaningful 
contribution to knowledge. 
Finally, chapter ten reflects on the key findings of the research. It deliberates on the 
implications of the thesis and considers its contribution to knowledge. Following this, 
chapter ten reviews the relevance of the research findings and offers recommendations for 
enhanced performance in UK PPP social infrastructure provision. In concluding, chapter ten 
presents the limitations of the study before identifying areas for further research.  
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the Thesis 
1.6. Summary 
This chapter, chapter one, has outlined the framework for this thesis. It has considered the 
background to the research, determined the gap in knowledge pertaining to PPP stakeholder 
collaboration and established the pertinence of the study. To address this knowledge gap, it 
has identified the research aim and objectives as well as delineated the research 
methodology to be undertaken to address this information void. Furthermore, this chapter 
has summarised the contents of each chapter, identified how the research fulfils the 
research objectives and depicted the structure of the thesis to do so. The research will now 
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progress onto chapter two which introduces the infrastructure concept as part of the 
literature review.  
12 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
AN APPRAISAL OF THE ‘INFRASTRUCTURE’ 
CONCEPT 
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2. An Appraisal of the ‘Infrastructure’ Concept 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the infrastructure concept. It offers a definition of infrastructure and 
examines the important role of infrastructure development in a vibrant and functioning 
society. The research reviews the contribution of infrastructure across the macro, meso and 
micro levels of society and deliberates on its prevailing role in socio-economic development.  
Moreover, chapter two scrutinises the infrastructure investment paradigm. This comprises 
analysis of historical expenditure as well as an examination of projected future needs. It 
examines changes within the infrastructure investment paradigm and identifies the 
increasing prominence of social infrastructure investment in Western developed nations.  
The research considers the appetite for intensified participation of the private-sector in the 
provision of ‘more and better’ infrastructure. To do this, the research considers how private 
financing can be utilised to bridge the funding gap as well as how increased private-sector 
participation in the infrastructure delivery can delivery on improved services provision.  
Finally, chapter two offers insights into social infrastructure provision in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and identifies Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) as a vehicle by which to bridge the 
current challenges associated with infrastructure provision.  
Thus, to fulfil objective one of the research which is centred on the critical appraisal of the 
infrastructure concept as a premise for socio-economic development, chapter two is 
structured as follows: 
• A conceptualisation of infrastructure; 
• Determining the salience of infrastructure as a premise for socio-economic 
development; 
• Analysis of the infrastructure investment paradigm; and 
• Consideration of private-sector participation in the provision of ‘more and better’ 
social infrastructure in the UK. 
 
2.2. Conceptualising Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is integral in the micro, meso and macro levels of a functioning society, yet, 
despite its salience, it is a concept which remains somewhat ambiguous and disparate within 
literature. The term infrastructure emanated out of World War II (WWII) where it was initially 
employed as a military reference to denote ‘underlying’ structures. Subsequently, the 
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infrastructure term was adopted by development economists to describe ‘social overhead 
capital’ and is now a widely-recognised term (Howes and Robinson, 2005).  
Historically, infrastructure has been characterised as capital intensive networks and services 
which are government provided and owned, and accordingly were referred to as ‘public 
infrastructure capital’. Yet, as provision models have matured and developed, many of these 
facilities are now privately provided and paid for. Thus, the implications of this has meant 
this conventional interpretation of infrastructure accounts for only a minor portion of a much 
wider network of services and assets (Howes and Robinson, 2005). It is therefore no surprise 
that many have contended that infrastructure should encapsulate both public and privately 
provided assets.  
In this vein, Rutherford (2002) defined infrastructure as “the basic services or social capital 
of a country, or a part of it, which make economics and social activities possible”. 
Comparatively, Grimsey and Lewis (2002) deemed that infrastructure comprehensively 
includes public services, the economic sector as well as social contributors which influence 
living standards and quality of life. Differently again, Adetola et al. (2011) argued that rather 
than the traditional focus on physical ‘hard’ assets such as roads, ports, communications, 
energy, and water services, infrastructure should now be considered as an umbrella term 
additionally accompanying ‘softer’ services such as information technology and knowledge 
bases.  
Premised on these disparate interpretations, several have attempted to reconcile literary 
differences through systematic classifications or categorisations of infrastructure. Jochimsen 
(1966) classified infrastructure into physical infrastructure such as hospital buildings, 
personal infrastructure pertaining to doctors, teachers and so on, and institutional 
infrastructure comprising financing systems. Alternatively, Beeferman (2008) pioneered a 
morphology and functionality taxonomy.  
Notwithstanding these contributions, increasingly literature has expressed a proclivity for 
the of economic-social infrastructure dyad. Economic infrastructure conventionally 
comprises large natural monopolies such as highways, ports, airports, utilities, power, and 
communications systems (Gramlich, 1994). These are typically long-standing, capital 
intensive, engineering network structures to bolster economic activity. Comparatively, social 
infrastructure is constituted from municipal, leisure, education, emergency services, health, 
housing, justice and recreational assets which facilitate human development, quality of life 
and living standards (Howes and Robinson, 2005). In recent literature, this interpretation of 
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infrastructure seems to have gathered momentum and is now relatively consistent across 
industry, academic and government documentation. Thus, this research will hence adopt 
this systematic social-economic codification of infrastructure.  
2.3. The Salience of Infrastructure Provision 
Socio-economic development, as suggested by the name, is a two-faceted comprisal, 
constructed from ‘social development’ and ‘economic development’. It encapsulates the 
civic and societal, and social and economic needs of a nations population. From a policy 
perspective, this encompasses the development of long-term strategies by which to meet 
these needs in the most practical approach (Palliyaguru et al., 2013). According to Hayami 
and Godo (2005) economic development is the concerted endeavours to improve the 
economic, political and social well-being and quality of life of a community. On the other 
hand, social development is defined by Hasmath and Hsu (2007) as the framework for the 
improvement of individual livelihood. Thus, socio-economic development is effectively a 
conjoined or bilateral approach for the betterment of the lives of people in a social and 
economic capacity.  
Though on the face of it, socio-economic development can be easily defined, its composition 
and measurement is in fact a complexity of indices or metrics; all of which are compounded 
by inconsistencies. Palliyaguru et al. (2013) reviewed four research articles. From these 
offerings, the authors identified an amalgam of 38 unique indices used to measure socio-
economic development. Some of these criterions captured input on Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), infant mortality rate (IMR), environmental degradation, life expectancy and literary 
rates. Alternatively, Stec et al. (2014) premised socio-economic development on ‘synthetic 
measures’ of 27 diagnostics within four themes: demographic potential and labour market, 
development of social infrastructure, economic potential and development of technical 
infrastructure. In this regard, it appears socio-economic development is now transcending 
beyond the conventional social-economic dyadic themes. This is now apparent in Eurostat 
(2017), who as part of the Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) calculated socio-
economic development through a culmination of economic development, innovativeness, 
competitiveness, eco-efficiency and employment factors. Hence, socio-economic 
development now can be distilled into social, economic, environmental and sustainable 
considerations.  
Evidently, socio-economic development is multi-faceted, complex and dynamic. Yet, within 
this concept, infrastructure is viewed as a cornerstone by which to propagate and empower 
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other societal functions. Infrastructure can be the vector to facilitate urbanisation, generate 
social stability, and mitigate disasters (World Bank, 2014). It is therefore understandable that 
infrastructure investment occupies a pivotal role in governmental national development 
strategies. The research will now undertake an exploration of the social and economic 
benefits derived from infrastructure investment and therein underpin the validity and 
pertinence of this investigation.  
2.3.1. The Socio-economic Implications of Infrastructure Development 
Seminal work by Aschauer (1989a, 1989b, 1990) identified strong positive correlation 
between infrastructure provision and macroeconomic growth in the United States (US). In 
his work, Aschauer considered the relationship between public capital expenditure and 
private-sector productivity. Aschauer identified low private-sector production levels pre-
1989 were attributable to under investment into infrastructure. When deliberating public 
expenditure to promote economic growth and productivity, Aschauer believed further 
consideration should be lent to ‘core’ economic infrastructure such as streets, highways, 
airports and mass transit systems.  
Given the magnitude of Aschauer’s ground-breaking work at that time, a series of studies 
ensued. Numerous empirical papers have exhaustively investigated the association between 
infrastructure investment and economic growth. Notably, several authors have questioned 
the viability of Aschauers work (see Aaron, 1990; Hulten and Schwab, 1991; Jorgenson, 1991; 
Tatom, 1991). They opined results displayed spurious correlation, were consequent of 
causation running in opposing directions and that estimates were too fragile. Addressing 
many of these criticisms, Munnell (1992) reiterated Aschauers previous findings; 
infrastructure investment increases economic growth and productivity. To do this, Munnell 
produced a summary of findings illustrating positive and statistically significant parallels 
between infrastructure investment and economic growth. Although the magnitude of 
Aschauers earlier findings were reduced, ultimately, the studies reaffirmed the relationship.  
Consequent of these earlier studies, voluminous research has further deliberated on this 
relationship. Devarajan et al. (1996) found negative correlation between public capital 
expenditure and economic growth in developing nations. This may be resultant of 
overprovision of services, therefore reducing the productivity. Oppositely, Egert et al. (2009) 
contended economic infrastructure positively impacts growth. Furthermore, the level of 
effect was deemed to vary across sector, time and country. Egert et al. (2009) also identified 
over investment as possible which may result in inefficient use of infrastructure. Srinivasu 
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and Srinivasa (2013) performed a summation of the literature to date. They identified de la 
Fuente and Estache (2004) as important research. De la Fuente and Estache (2004) evaluated 
102 countries over a period of 15 years. They found that in the main studies identified 
affirmative correlation between the impacts of infrastructure on growth. Similarly, Straub 
(2008) explored 30 macroeconomic papers. Spanning 1989 to 2006, over half the studies 
found positive and significant results forming corresponding conclusions, 38% found no 
significant effect and 6% identified negative effects. Moreover, more contemporary research 
continues to reaffirm and validate earlier investigations. 
On the basis there is wide spread acceptance that infrastructure correlates to positive 
growth, more recently the debate has evolved. Parallel to investigating the nexus between 
infrastructure and economic growth, some have attempted to quantify this correlation. By 
measuring the increase in GDP resultant of each dollar spent on infrastructure, several 
models have been formulated to assess the multiplier effect of government infrastructure 
investment on the economy. While there persists consternation over the accuracy of using 
GDP, in the main, it remains the most widely used form of measurement.  
Within literature, the numerical value of the multiplier effect varies substantially. This may 
be explained by differences in country, policy and economic environment (Yanusevsky and 
Yanusevsky, 2014). Generally, the effect does not rise above 2.5, though there are some 
exceptions. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) examined the government purchasing 
multiplier effect in OECD countries1. Findings revealed the multiplier effect measured as high 
as 2.5 and tended to be greater in a recession. Christiano et al. (2010) argued that the 
multiplier effect can be as much as 4 when nominal interest rates are constant whereas 
Ramey (2011) contends the figures are probably closer to between 0.8 and 1.5. Although no 
collective nor definitive conclusion has been categorically agreed, predominantly findings 
have confirmed positive and statistically significant findings. 
In addition to a macro-economic approach, others have undertaken meso and micro-level 
investigations. Prud’Homme (2005) asserted that between one third and one half of 
infrastructure services are for final household consumption, particularly water, energy and 
telecommunications. In this context infrastructure is integral in social development. 
Infrastructure can influence working conditions, education provision, health levels, social 
                                                          
1 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental 
orgnisation with 35-member states including from North and South America, Europe and the Asia-
Pacific region (OECD, 2017). 
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connections, quality of life, well-being, the environment and, civic engagement and 
governance (Sartori and Catakano, 2013). Discussing the importance of rural transport, 
Fouracre (2001) stated access to markets and farms, education, employment, and health and 
welfare were all dependent on access to transportation infrastructure. Furthermore, 
facilitating social cohesion to family, social or political gatherings, transport improved social 
well-being. In agreement, Gannon and Liu (1997) claimed transport facilitates other services, 
enabling wider civic growth rather than just economic benefits. 
Other notable research such as the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (Aos et al., 
2004) estimated that for every dollar invested in early childhood education, the cost-benefit 
ratio to the economy exceeds US$2. The same study also recorded over US$11 returns per 
dollar invested in youth development programmes. The RAND Corporation projected, for 
every dollar invested in pre-school education, there is a net-return of US$2.60 (Karoly and 
Bigelow, 2005). Similarly, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) found returns to both social 
and private capital in OECD countries ranging from 8.5 to 13.4% as a direct result of 
education investment. Education provision also has wider long term, tacit advantages. 
Schultz (1975) and Welch (1970) argued education is fundamental in the development of 
skills and scientific knowledge incumbent for the long-term betterment of wider societal and 
technological advancement. Likewise, Brenneman and Kerf (2002) maintained, education is 
integral in the advancing and progression of other infrastructures such as road networks and 
energy systems.  
As well as education, access to other social facilities and assets are important. The UK Office 
for National Statistics (White and Edgar, 2010) found statistically significant differences 
between social class and Health Life Expectancy (HLE) in England. Those with a lower social 
class were found to typically exhibit a shortened HLE. White and Edgar (2010) also claimed, 
socially disadvantaged were more likely to develop a limiting long-term illness (LLTI) and 
increased mortality rates (White and Edgar, 2010). Bebbington and Bajekal (2003) and Rasulo 
et al. (2007) correlated poorer general health, both in absolute and relative terms to social 
deprivation. Likewise, according to Aguilera and Marrufo (2007), over 70% of infant 
mortalities occur inside hospitals, therefore, by improving hospital quality through 
infrastructure provision, IMR may decline. In line with this, Leipziger et al. (2003) estimated 
that by improving a country’s infrastructure index by as little as 10%, child mortality may be 
reduced by 5%, infant mortality by 3.7% and maternal mortality rate by 7.8%. 
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Increasingly, in literature there is greater awareness for a cohesive community. Indeed, over 
a decade ago Casey (2005), citing Marmot and Wilkinson (2001) estimated that for every 
US$1 invested in community facilities, US$10 could be saved through reduced crime, better 
employment opportunities and so on. Moreover, infrastructure provision creates 
employment opportunities. In the 2011 Northern Ireland (NI) census, almost 31% (213,352) 
of the national workforce were employed in the public-sector. Over 68,000 worked in 
education and 117,201 in health and social work (AgendaNI, 2017). Canning (1998) described 
infrastructure as the ‘glue which holds communities together’. Equally, Casey (2005) 
discussed the importance of social infrastructure in fostering social capital. Social capital has 
been instrumental in achieving increased economic success, improved school performance, 
decreased crime, and all round better health and well-being. Furthermore, social capital has 
been correlated to lower levels of depression, reduced crime and reduced rates of suicide 
(Putnam and Feldstein, 2000). 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident infrastructure provision is integral to all aspects 
of societal functioning. There are both explicit benefits and implicit externalities derived 
from its provision. Fundamentally, infrastructure systems are convergent and are 
interdependent and this nexus should be reflected in government development strategies. 
Against this backdrop, the research will now explore into the infrastructure investment 
paradigm to offer insight into current state of infrastructure and the scale of the challenge 
ahead.  
2.4. The Infrastructure Investment Paradigm 
The infrastructure investment paradigm, over the previous ten years, has undergone a 
resurgence in terms of attention for socio-economic development to the extent that it is 
arguably more pertinent now, than it has been at any point before in history. Albeit a decade 
ago, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had an unprecedented impact on the infrastructure 
landscape. As a response to economic contraction, infrastructure investment was used as a 
catalyst by governments as part of stimuli packages to reignite economic growth, both in the 
short term through job creation, but also long term, as a mechanism to unlock greater 
business activity as well as a premise by which to entice inward investment (PwC, 2017).  
Since then, the GFC has tacitly served to underpin and re-popularise the salience of 
infrastructure investment. Fundamental to a vibrant society and thriving economy, 
nationally and internationally, policy-makers are now positioning infrastructure investment 
central to their political mandates (RICS, 2013). Thus, as the salience of infrastructure, and 
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the so-called ‘infrastructure investment challenge’ continues to be promulgated across the 
public and private-sectors, many have forged attempts at quantifying the scale of the 
challenge ahead.  
One of the foremost barriers when investigating the scale of infrastructure investment is the 
absence of standardised and reliable data. Allied with this, these data deficiencies are 
compounded by inconsistent methodological frameworks. While some have approached the 
data utilising top-down approaches, others have preferred to conduct bottom-up 
assessments. Also, set against the need for economic growth, many have exhibited a 
proclivity for economic infrastructure quantification. These forecasting frameworks, 
although theoretically robust, have resultantly rendered significantly disparate projections.  
Notwithstanding these caveats, perhaps the most widely quoted appraisal of historical 
infrastructure outlay has been that of McKinsey Global Institute (MGI, 2013). McKinsey 
Global Institute (MGI, 2013) estimated that between 1992 and 2011, on average, 3.8% of 
global GPD was spent on infrastructure. Pertaining explicitly to economic infrastructure, this 
equated to an annual average of US$2.4trillion (tn). Over this timeframe, PwC (2014) 
estimated that there has been a paradigm shift in developed and developing markets. 
Spending in advanced economies has markedly contracted from around 3.6% of GDP in the 
1980s to just 2.8% in 2008. Consequentially, this downward shift has culminated in socio-
economic signals indicating the necessity to upgrade and replace old infrastructure systems 
as well as the need to supply new developments.  
Furthermore, greater salience has been attached to social infrastructure provision. 
According to Inderst (2013), though transport continues to dominate capital outlay, social 
infrastructure expenditure now accounts for around 1% of GDP in Europe, the US and Japan 
alike. Evolving from heavy industrialised economies centred on traditional manufacturing 
skills to technological, services-based, knowledge intensive economies, developed nations 
are prioritising access to public services and social infrastructure (PwC, 2014). Comparatively, 
emerging markets, premised on economic growth, have calibrated their capital investment 
strategies toward economic infrastructure development. Indeed, figures indicate in 
developing regions investment outlay has shifted from around 3.5% of GDP to 5.7% driven 
mainly by the Chinese economy (PwC, 2014).  
Against this backdrop, combined with the vacuum of standardised data, some have forged 
ahead in attempting to quantify the scale of the investment challenge ahead. Collating data 
from multiple sources, in 2013, MGI (2013) proposed that to maintain economic growth 
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consistent with projections up until 2030, baseline figures of US$57.3tn will be required for 
future infrastructure delivery2. This equates to an increase of almost 60% over that already 
spent over the preceding 18 years (US$36tn). Appropriating around 3.5% of global GDP to 
the provision of transport (road, rail, ports and airports), power, water, and 
telecommunications, it should be noted that these trajectories do not account for the 
backlog of underinvestment, the need for more resilient infrastructure to defend against 
climate change, nor do they take into consideration social infrastructure. Since this popular 
contribution, MGI (2016) has recalibrated their projections. Estimates have systemically 
climbed to circa 3.8% of GDP, equating to around US$S3.3tn annually.  
Other prognosis conducted by the OECD (2006) valued future infrastructure needs at 
US$53tn, equating to 2.5% of global GDP until 2030. Akin to MGI, these projections 
constituted road, rail, telecommunications, electricity and water.  
Comparatively, utilising Oxford Economics data sets, PwC (PwC, 2014) reviewed 
infrastructure spending trends until 2025. PwC reported infrastructure outlay must increase 
from US$4tn per annum in 2012 to over US$9tn by 2025, equivocal to US$78tn globally 
between 2014 and 2025. These figures were based on an annual growth rate that was 
predicted to rise to 7.5% by the middle of the decade, but slowly retreat, levelling off at 6.5% 
around 2020. Inderst and Stewart (2014) also appraised infrastructure requirements 
proximal to US$80tn. Accounting for the limitations of the MGI report, Inderst and Stewart 
included social and green infrastructure in their estimates. Resultantly, projections increased 
from US$3.5tn annually to US$5tn per annum, equating to US$80tn of investment by 2030.  
From these findings, it seems that while comprehensive consensus may be absent from the 
above assessments in terms of exact quantities, it is nonetheless apparent benchmarked 
infrastructure investments needs are on an unprecedented scale. The research has also 
found that despite the paradigm shift towards social infrastructure provision in developed 
economies, economic infrastructure outlay continues to dominate investment literature. 
These findings are pertinent when set in the context of section 2.3 which acknowledged the 
interconnected nature of infrastructure networks.  
While it is agreed that there is an important argument for economic infrastructure 
investment, predicated on the earlier findings, it is also suggested that the infrastructure 
                                                          
2 MGI (2013) sourced infrastructure investment data from the OECD, International Energy Agency 
(IEA), International Transport Forum (ITF), Global Water Intelligence (GWI) and MGI Analysis.  
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investment paradigm should be considered holistically instead of unilaterally. In this respect, 
research should also server to offer greater consideration to social infrastructure provision.  
2.4.1. The Paradigm Shift – From Public to Private Financing 
Infrastructure investment can be sourced from either public or private options. The 
government may generate capital through taxes, or borrow directly from local and non-local 
institutions. The state may also lever infrastructure financing from the private-sector (Della 
Croce et al., 2015). Predominantly, the government has provided most of the funding for 
infrastructure provision either through taxes or borrowing warranted by the perceived socio-
economic benefits.  
However, in more recent years, in the current economic context, and the associated 
governmental capital retrenchment, there has equally been a paradigm shift in that there is 
appetite for greater mobilisation of private finance to alleviate the infrastructure financing 
gap. Advantageously, private finance can negate budgetary pressures on public capital and 
provide a means to overcome funding shortfalls on the part of the public-sector. 
Furthermore, it can act as a conduit for greater investment diversification of national 
investment portfolios as enables capital flow into sectors which may not be available 
elsewhere (Pisu et al., 2015).  
Private capital can be channelled into infrastructure through two forms; corporate financing 
and project financing. Project financing is a subsect of corporate financing though there are 
distinguishable characteristics. Corporate financing constitutes a private operator funding a 
project on-balance sheets (World Bank et al., 2016). In contrast, project financing typically is 
formulated from limited-recourse lending directly to a project (Gardner and Wright, 2011). 
Of the two financing mechanisms, corporate finance has historically been the preferred 
option. Instrumental in the provision of utilities and other regulatory services, private 
investment has a long track record in infrastructure provision (Della Croce et al., 2015). Still, 
against the backdrop of acute fiscal downsizing, project financing has garnered favour on the 
basis it is an additional capital source that can be used to bridge the infrastructure financing 
gap (KPMG, 2015). Predicated on this burgeoning interest, the research will further consider 
this form of private finance.  
2.4.2. Infrastructure Project Financing 
Though there is no conclusive definition of project financing, generally it is characterised as 
non-or limited recourse lending for the development of a large, highly specific, capital 
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intensive projects. Lending directly to the project by means of a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV), the assets of the SPV are leveraged as collateral for the loan with the liability being 
limited to the invested capital. Loan amortisation is dependent on internally generated 
project cash flows which commence post construction completion (Gardner and Wright, 
2011). Risk sharing mechanisms are contingent on the wherewithal of project partners which 
are typically enforced through covenants imposed on the SPV by debt funders (Tan, 2007).  
 
Figure 2.1: Typical Project Financing Structure (adapted from Tan, 2007) 
Figure 2.1 is a typical project financing arrangement as per Tan (2007). Principally, project 
financing capital can be framed as debt or equity and different degrees of competencies are 
required to determine the appetite for risk / return profiles (Della Croce et al., 2015). These 
arrangements are typically highly leveraged with debt constituting around 70-90% of the 
investment. This high gearing is premised on several factors including the low volatility of 
cash flows because of low-to-manageable levels of risk particularly in the operational phase. 
Moreover, the high leveraging is warranted by the long-term necessity for infrastructure 
services as well as the high capital-intensive nature of these investment (Beeferman and 
Wain, 2012). Although project lending is capital intensive, debt financing is an attractive 
instrument for many reasons such as it is usually tax deductible and it can be kept off the 
balance sheets (Tan, 2007).  
Typically characterised as fixed-income, project debt financing can be distilled into either 
greenfield or brownfield investments: 
• Greenfield debt is normally supplied in two forms: project loans or project bonds. 
Conventionally, most of the debt instrument has been supplied in the form of project 
loans provided by commercial banks who are willing to absorb construction risk in 
exchange for a higher rate of return (Gardner and Wright, 2011). A single bank may 
supply all capital requirements or alternatively, if the scale of the loan is beyond the 
capacity of a solitary bank or if the lender wishes to spread risk, loans can be 
syndicated by a Mandated Loan Arranger (MLA) to comprise layered or mezzanine 
financing which typically offers higher interest rates and increased equity rates (Tan, 
2007). By profiling the debt, mezzanine or subordinated debt can provide additional 
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capital support to senior debt. The debt instrument is arranged and serviced from 
senior to junior and loans and bonds are considered as the most senior tranches. 
Ranked lower, mezzanine and subordinated debt tranches can insulate senior debt 
from loss which in turn raises the quality of the senior debt issues. Furthermore, by 
ranking the debt instrument, this offers different risk/return profiles which may be 
more attractive to other investor profiles such as those with higher risk appetites 
and more content with higher returns (Ehlers, 2014).  
• Comparatively, brownfield debt is usually post construction completion where other 
entities such as institutional investors, real estate investment trusts (REIT) and 
sovereign wealth funds can invest into long-term bonds issued by the SPV after the 
asset has been commissioned. With lower risk tolerance than commercial banks, 
these nonbanking institutions prefer to enter post construction completion where 
the risk profile has been reduced and typically seek stable, medium to long term 
assets to diversity equity holdings (Della Croce et al., 2015).  
Project financing can equally be suppled in the form of equity. Typically, project ‘sponsors’ 
have been responsible for the capitalisation of project financing in the form of equity to the 
SPV. These are often organisations which are involved in the management and the provision 
of the infrastructure facility (Tan, 2007). Equity generally accounts for around 10 to 30% of 
the finance though this can change in dynamic economic environments. Project sponsors are 
exposed to significant asset-specific risks which in turn incentivises improved project 
performance. In this regard, the management and sharing of risks are fundamental as returns 
are predicated on the project success. While having the greatest exposure to risk, equity 
contributors correspondingly also expect to have the highest internal rate of return (IRR) on 
their investment; for this reason, infrastructure equity has emerged as an attractive 
proposition for other external institutions.  
Third-party investors are now actively participating in infrastructure investment by providing 
a portion of the equity capital. These have tended to be insurance companies, pension funds, 
wealthy individuals and trade union funds who have a portfolio of assets and participate with 
the intention of diversifying risks (Tan, 2007). Advantageously, in markets where risk/return 
profiles are increased, the equity instrument can be an important avenue for capital 
provision where it may be more difficult to secure debt financing premised on unstable or 
unpredictable cash flows (Della Croce et al., 2015).  
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Having established debt and equity as the instruments which constitute infrastructure 
project financing, the research will now consider the contemporary developments in the 
project financing market. 
2.4.3. Project Debt Financing Developments 
According to Della Croce and Gatti (2014) project financing lending initially emanated out of 
the US in the 1930s as part of developments in the oilfields before later being adopted in 
Europe in the 1980s, systematically employed for large-scale infrastructure projects. Since 
then, the mobilisation of project financing loans in infrastructure has been expanded, 
peaking in 2008 with a global market value of US$247bn.  
Whereas the GFC had major implications on the availability of public capital, it also served 
to engender profound changes in the infrastructure project financing landscape. Proceeding 
the investment high leading up to 2008, much like the wider financial community, appetite 
for infrastructure lending was seismically curtailed in 2008 and the short term thereafter, 
That said, more contemporary data indicates the market has displayed noteworthy growth. 
Predicated on Thomson Reuters Project Financing International league tables, as of 2015, 
the debt lending market was valued at US$277.7bn representing a significant growth of 
23.3% from 2013 at US$204bn (Thomson Reuters, 2016). Lending has now transcended 
multiple borders and is present worldwide with activity concentrated in Western Europe, 
North America, Africa and the Middle East and South Asia. In terms of sectoral breakdown, 
2016 figures show that deal flow has been prevalent in power, oil and gas, as well as 
transport, though notably, project debt lending filtration via the Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPP) mechanism for the supply of social infrastructure is also intensifying (Thomson Reuters, 
2016).  
Comparatively, project bonds continue to hold a marginal presence in the debt market, 
though provision in this form has been ramping up following the GFC as a result of the mass 
exodus of conventional debt lenders from the project financing market. According to Della 
Croce et al. (2015), banking institutions conventionally have been responsible for providing 
most of the lending to infrastructure projects. However, premised on the introduction of 
Basel III3 in 2010, coupled with the capital retrenchment implications induced by the GFC, 
traditional sources no longer had either the capital availability nor risk appetite for project 
lending. Subsequently, because of capital illiquidity, a gap emerged for new investor types 
                                                          
3 Basel III was introduced in an effort to strengthen banking resilience and risk management when 
exposed to significant economic stresses through greater regulation of capital (Geetika, 2016). 
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and in the five-year period from 2007 to 2012, the compiled value of SPV issued bonds 
multiplied three-fold from US$8.5bn to US$27bn (Della Croce and Gatti, 2014). Continuing 
to exhibit growth in 2015, the total project bonds market was estimated to be worth 
US$50.3bn equating to almost a quarter of the debt financing market. 2016 statistics suggest 
there has been a constriction which has been expressed through a 30% drop to US$35.3bn, 
though this can be attributed to aggressive lending on the part of commercial banks in 
response to the growing strength of the project bonds markets as well as a reaction in the 
bond market to tightening credit conditions (Thomson Reuters, 2016). Nonetheless, despite 
this very recent retreat, project bonds now occupy a significantly larger space in the project 
financing debt sphere. In the main investment has been levered into utilities and social 
infrastructure services centred in North American and Western European jurisdictions (Della 
Croce and Gatti, 2014).  
Along with this expansion in bond finance, increasingly there has also been wider appetite 
for institutional investor participation. Seeking long-term, predictable and stable cash flows, 
infrastructure investment via project bonds offers attractive investment characteristics 
which predominantly align with institutional investor investment profiles (Ehlers, 2014). 
Preqin (2013) found that 58% of institutional investors were considering increasing their 
exposure to infrastructure financing. This would potentially transpire in an additional 
US$2.5tn of capital being channelled into infrastructure investment (MGI, 2013).  
Notwithstanding the synergistic commonalities between infrastructure and institutional 
investors, there are several barriers which have served to disconnect the free-flow of private 
capital into project bonds. With banks, conventionally having undertaken the syndication, 
due diligence and arranging responsibilities, institutional investors in the main do not 
possess the expertise to organise this type of debt provision; at least not on this scale (Read, 
2013). In an effort to  unlock institutional investor capital, new innovative models such as 
the ‘originate-to-distribute’ framework has emerged onto the market which is a 
collaborative model between banks and institutional investors for debt capital supply. 
Highlighted by Della Croce and Gatti (2014), within this model, there are three innovative 
structures: the partnership/co-investment model; the securitisation model; and the debt 
fund model and direct origination. However, with limited operationalisation and information 
available, it is yet unclear how these collaborative investment vehicles are performing.  
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2.4.4. Project Equity Financing Developments 
Just as the project financing debt market has undergone acute transformations, so too has 
the project financing equity market. Conventionally, most of the equity tranche has been 
sourced from project sponsors responsible for the facility provision, i.e. design and build, and 
operation and maintenance contractors. Ideologically, this was tied to the performance-
based payments premised on the principle that this arrangement would safeguard the 
quality of the service delivery through threat of financial penalisation (Gardner and Wright, 
2011). However, around the middle of previous decade, the dynamics of equity investment 
changed as investment funds exhibited nascent interest. Using datasets from Probitas 
Partners, Della Croce and Gatti (2014) determined that private equity contributions 
proliferated in the three-year period from 2004 to 2007 at US$2.4bn to US$39.7bn. 
Preferring to enter the project after construction completion in the presence of a reduced 
risk profile, these funds have tended to concentrate their investments on brownfield projects 
in mature markets such as Europe and North America (Della Croce and Gatti, 2014).  
Advantageously, equity infrastructure investment enables these third-party funds to 
diversify their investment portfolios. Moreover, the increased returns from equity outlay has 
further supported this form of investment as an attractive proposition. Resultantly, over the 
previous two decades, increased attention for infrastructure has led to the separation of 
‘infrastructure assets’ from the ‘alternative investments’ category and instead, it is now 
considered an asset class with its own distinct investment characteristics (MGI, 2016).  
Equity investors can access infrastructure either through listed or unlisted instruments. Still, 
as new types of investors have entered the project financing equity market, so too has the 
number who have chosen to gain exposure to it in the form of unlisted assets (Ehlers, 2014). 
Insurance companies, pension funds and other private equity funds are now actively 
investing in unlisted infrastructure equity. The long-term investment horizon of these 
investors suggests they are a natural match to the infrastructure asset class. Furthermore, 
inflation tied assets can be exploited to hedge against future liabilities (Ehlers, 2014). 
However, with only a smaller number of larger institutions with the wherewithal to directly 
invest, for those smaller funds, to gain access, often this has been via pooled investment 
vehicles. Yet, the mismatch between investment tenors and vehicle life, the high investment 
and management fees, in addition to the highly geared leveraging arrangements have 
collectively acted as barriers (Della Croce and Gatti, 2014).  
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Despite the enthusiasm on the part of institutional investors, a recent survey found that only 
a minor portion of assets under the management by the top 100 alternative investment 
managers has been allocated to infrastructure; circa US$120.6bn out of a potential US$3.2tn 
(Della Croce and Gatti, 2014). To circumvent this barrier, several initiates have been 
conceptualised to attract wider institutional investor participation. In the main these 
developments have derived out of this purported mismatch between fund managers and 
fund owners. Instead, to unlock these nascent investors, there is a need for better alignment 
between investor profiles with investment opportunities on the grounds asset funds are 
reluctant to contribute unless the investment fund matches their expectations. In this 
respect, there is a need for collaboration between the investment community and 
infrastructure providers to engineer attractive investable opportunities. Literature suggests 
through greater dialogue stakeholders can help infrastructure organisations have their 
viewpoints understood and their project expectations be managed accordingly (RICS, 2017). 
Notably, many of the larger investment funds are also now developing their own initiatives 
with the intentions of directly investing into unlisted assets to circumnavigate the costs 
associated with fund managers. This has manifested in the emergence of new collaborative 
in-house investment / co-investment platforms which enable investors with aligned interests 
to pool their resources (Della Croce et al., 2015). Noteworthy examples include the Pension 
Investment Platform (PIP) in the UK and the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) 
in Canada which operate a syndicated style model. Other pertinent innovations include the 
arrangement of public and private partnering co-investor funds such as the Pan African 
Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF) and the Marguerite Fund. These platforms are 
somewhat akin to the investment platforms in that they pool resources from multiple 
sources but are equally distinct insofar as they transcend the public-private boundary (Della 
Croce and Gatti, 2014).  
At this juncture in chapter two, the research has identified that there is a compelling case for 
private capital in infrastructure investment. Utilising private capital, infrastructure financing 
can serve to alleviate budgetary constraints by freeing up public-sector resources that can 
be used elsewhere. Moreover, the long-term asset life of infrastructure places it as an 
attractive proposition for institutional investors and other alternative sources of capital. 
Notwithstanding these converging qualities, the main barrier prohibiting the flow of private 
financial resources appears not to be the case of where the capital will derive from, but 
rather, how can it be unlocked and levered more freely into infrastructure projects. In 
response, several collaborative investment vehicles have emerged onto the market. Even so, 
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the disconnect between the investors and infrastructure community has meant the 
movement of capital into infrastructure assets has not been quite as forthcoming as was 
previously anticipated.  
2.5. Better Infrastructure Provision 
While there is no doubt that there is a need for alternative sources of capital, to simply 
ascribe all infrastructure investment shortcomings explicitly to the curtailed availability of 
capital would be remiss. In addition to the need to lever alternative sources of capital in 
infrastructure, there is equally now the recognition that governments require greater impact 
from their investments in the current financial paradigm. RICS (2017) suggests that inherent 
inefficiencies within existing provision frameworks as well as shortcomings in strategic 
policies have undermined the impact of infrastructure development in the past. These 
inherent inefficiencies have coalesced in many lambasting the public-sectors ability to meet 
the needs of the society (PwC, 2017). As a result, governments are now confronted with a 
bilateral challenge of identifying more alternative sources of financing as well as the need to 
deliver better investment impact through greater efficiencies and performance in provision 
frameworks. The research will therefore now examine the need to improve provision 
frameworks and investment strategies as part of the bilateral challenge of ‘more and better’ 
infrastructure investment.  
The wider infrastructure development community is now confronted with emerging 
economic, social, political, environmental and sustainability challenges. In a recent UN 
report, it was determined levels of urbanisation are to grow significantly over the coming 
decades (EY, 2017). Increased urbanisation will compound the demands for affordable 
housing in tandem with additional pressures being exerted onto existing services such as 
healthcare and education. Evolving population demographic indices signify people are living 
longer. Healthcare provision policies will need to reflect these manifestations through 
innovation and flexibility commensurate with health life-expectancies. Similarly, as the 
awareness of resilient and sustainable communities intensifies, globalisation has transpired 
in increased diversity and broader social ethnicity. These factors, coupled with concerns 
relating to reduced carbon emissions, climate change and technological advancements have 
forced policy strategists to reconsider their strategic investment pipelines (ULI, 2016). 
History suggests that decision-makers have, and in the main, continue to operate in a 
vacuum from peers with a siloed mentality and a singular vision of the future demands 
(KPMG, 2017). However, identified in section 2.2, infrastructure systems are symbiotic. 
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Realising the shortcomings of historical infrastructure investment frameworks, it is argued 
policymakers must now redress previous policy deficiencies through renewed vigour 
attached to integrated approaches for future public services to all members of society. 
Fundamentally, investment pipelines and priorities must be aligned with the socio-economic 
needs of a society driven through wider engagement and dialogue with the public and 
industrial practitioners (KPMG, 2017).  
Yet, just as policy-makers should undertake decisive actions to address the shortcomings in 
strategic capital policies, in the current economic landscape, there is now equally the 
realisation that capital investments must go further and ultimately deliver better investment 
impact than that which has been available previously through procurement frameworks. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2015) estimated poor performance in provision 
frameworks has transpired in value leakage of up to 30% of investment and accordingly there 
is now a forthcoming argument that infrastructure mechanisms must be recalibrated to 
bolster productivity.  
MGI (2016) argued that enhanced productivity from better provision frameworks could 
derive benefits of up to US$1tn per year internationally and in this regard, as critics of 
conventional provision strategies continue to question the efficacy and aptitude of the 
public-sector to deliver infrastructure programmes, seemingly many are now intent on 
augmented private-sector participation in infrastructure provision. PwC (2017) argued that 
private-sector provision could foster efficiency savings of up to 33% above by adopting a 
long-term outlook from project conception to completion therein deploying a holistic 
perspective to performance and value creation. Furthermore, the alignment of incentivised 
management frameworks to long-term performance measurement can render additional 
efficiencies. Consequentially, the nature of infrastructure investment is evolving as public-
private collaborative initiatives are increasingly being prioritised (ULI, 2016).  
Emanating out of these policy shifts, a mechanism which continues to be extolled as a vehicle 
for ‘more and better’ infrastructure provision is PPP. Grounded in a cross-sectoral 
partnership, PPP mobilises private financing and is conducive to the current financial 
landscape. PPP also utilises private-sector resources and management skills to develop and 
operate public infrastructure. Distinct from conventional procurement frameworks, PPP is 
characterised by a whole life-cycle approach, harmonising what has traditionally been 
heterogeneous projects phases into a single long-term bundled solution (Roehrich and 
Caldwell, 2012). Indeed, it has been reported in the UK; a pioneer of PPP, that PPP 
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outperformed traditional procurement models with 69% of PPP projects having met 
construction timetables, 65% were financially on target, and 99% of projects were either of 
fairly good (46%) or very good quality (53%) (NAO, 2009). Liu et al. (2014) reviewed a number 
of articles which evaluated PPP in terms of cost and time. Predominantly, these papers found 
PPP offered superior performance than traditional approaches. Predicated on this superior 
service provision, coupled with the potential for PPP to channel private financing into 
infrastructure, it is therefore unsurprising these partnering frameworks have now 
permeated more than 40 national borders (Haran et al., 2013) and are being promoted as a 
viable mechanism in the current ‘more and better’ infrastructure investment environment.   
The research has considered the infrastructure investment paradigm. It has identified future 
infrastructure provision is on an unprecedented scale and that infrastructure pipelines 
exhibit a greater propensity for economic infrastructure provision predicated on its 
economic implications. However, as the demands for better public services and social 
infrastructure continue to intensify in Western developed nations, there is a compelling 
argument now for greater social infrastructure provision. In addition to this, in the current 
financial landscape, there is now greater awareness of the increased role private financing 
could play in funding infrastructure provision. Likewise, there is appetite for increased 
private-sector participation in infrastructure provision in order to improve the efficiencies of 
procurement frameworks and provision strategies. Thus, governments are now confronted 
with the bifurcated challenge of providing ‘more and better’ infrastructure.  
A framework which has been promoted for the delivery of ‘more and better’ infrastructure 
is PPP. Already these partnering frameworks have been an instrumental investment 
mechanism in the UK. Moreover, there is now strong argument for social infrastructure 
investment in the UK. The research will now therefore consider this region.  
2.6. United Kingdom Social Infrastructure Investment 
According to Rhodes (2014) the UK has long-suffered from underinvestment; however, in 
the absence of consistent data, like most other nations, it is difficult to accurately quantify 
the true extent of previous capital expenditure. Notwithstanding this vacuum, there are 
several converging articles which point towards a significant downward trajectory of total 
capital outlay; both in terms of economic and social infrastructure. 
Pollitt (2002) claimed UK infrastructure investment has transcended three major milestones:  
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I. In the 1970s, the completion of a number of housing schemes to address demands 
post WWII resulted in a decline of public spend;  
II. Later, the Thatcher privatisation of a number of public services was responsible for 
the transfer of around 7% of GDP from the public-sector to the private-sector; and 
III. Thirdly, the introduction of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has culminated in 
significant private financing of public services. 
 
Figure 2.2 Public-Sector Gross Investment and PFI Investments of the Past 50 Years (NAO, 
2015) 
Depicted in figure 2.2, UK public investment peaked around 1965 to 1975 averaging around 
10% of GDP. This acute expenditure was a response to reconstruction demands post WWII. 
However, following on from this period of investment high, the UK experienced a substantial 
decline in infrastructure spend (Pollitt, 2002). Clark and Root (1999) determined in the period 
from 1977 to 1994, UK investment levels fell short of comparable and similar sized European 
countries in addition to baseline international standards. Predicated on OECD statistics, 
according to Clark and Root (1999), by the 1990s, it was progressively evident UK 
infrastructure lagged its competitors particularly regarding housing, health, education and 
transport. In response to this, PFI was introduced. PFI was a vehicle capable of levering 
private capital into what had conventionally been publicly sponsored infrastructure services. 
All in all, according to the UK National Audit Office (NAO, 2015) PFI accounted for around 
10% of additional infrastructure investment on top of public investment. Illustrated in figure 
2.2, since then, publicly financed infrastructure in the main has continued to decline and has 
subsequently investment bottomed in 2000 at 1.7% of GDP before gradually levelling off at 
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an average of 2.5% (Hare, 2013; NAO, 2015), Generally, UK infrastructure investment has 
remained below OECD averages, and unsurprisingly the UK has been unable to close the gap 
between itself and other major nations (Hare, 2013).  
More recently, infrastructure investment has become a focal point in the UK; both in 
mainstream media discussions as well in the political arena premised on its strategic 
importance. In 2010, infrastructure development was mobilised as part of a stimulus package 
to combat the implications of the GFC; in the short-term through job creation, as well as in 
the medium to long-term predicated on its socio-economic benefits (HM Treasury, 2010). 
This constituted a strategic pipeline of infrastructure needs which were delineated through 
the National Infrastructure Delivery Plan4 (NIPD). This was a part public, part private financed 
programme consisting of £200bn to be channelled into economic infrastructure over the 
following five years (HM Treasury, 2010). Economic infrastructure was to act as an anchor 
for inward business investment and a catalyst for economic prosperity (HM Treasury, 2010). 
Ranked 33rd out of 144 nations, indeed there were and still are forthcoming indicators 
signifying the necessity to upgrade and replace UK economic infrastructure (WEF, 2010). 
Similarly, others propagated the benefits of economic infrastructure investment to the UK 
economy (see CEBR, 2013; CBI, 2014). Collectively, this culminated in the expansion of the 
infrastructure pipeline with the latest edition of the NIPD (2016) outlining a £483bn 
commitment as the UK government5 prioritises a long-term strategy over short-term 
decision-making. 
While economic infrastructure investment has occupied much of the spotlight, this research 
argues this has served to eclipse the need for significant investment into social 
infrastructure. In part, this preference for economic infrastructure can be attributed to the 
lack of awareness of the benefits derived from social infrastructure investment which has 
manifested because of difficulties in identifying and quantifying the benefits of its provision 
(Casey, 2005; McClements et al., 2016). But also, the array of research which has analysed 
and confirmed the nexus between economic infrastructure investment and economic 
prosperity has meant governments naturally have exhibited greater appetite of economic 
infrastructure development.  
                                                          
4 The 2010 National Infrastructure Plan was the first in a series of reports produced by the UK 
government for the purpose of identifying future economic infrastructure development, regionally 
and nationally. Since then, these plans have been updated annually and now include social 
infrastructure (HM Treasury, 2010; HM Treasury, 2016). 
5 The latest WEF (2016) rankings reveal UK economic infrastructure has climbed to 24th. 
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As the population demographic of the UK continues to transform, so too will the need for 
social infrastructure and public-services. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) indicates the 
UK population will continue to exhibit marked growth over the coming decades. In the ten-
year period from 2010 to 2019, it is anticipated this decade will be the largest period of 
expansion recorded yet. By the 2020s, the UK population is expected to reach an 
unprecedented 67 million (ONS, 2016), before increasing to 74.3 million by 2039 (ONS, 
2015)6.  
 
Figure 2.3: Total Monthly A&E Attendances in England from 2012 to May 2017 
(QualityWatch, 2017) 
As well as population size, ONS (2015) data reveals the average age of the population is rising 
and people are living longer. In the four decades from 1974 to 2014, the median age of the 
population increased from 33.9 years to 40.0 years and this trend is expected to continue to 
rise. The proportion of the population who are 65+ has consistently increased from 1974, 
and it is anticipated it will continue to climb until 2039 (ONS, 2016). Worryingly, this growing 
and aging population; and, an increased elderly population, will add to existing pressures on 
public services. It is estimated by the Department of Health, the cost difference between 
                                                          
6 These projections were made prior to the “Brexit” referendum. “Brexit” was the British-exit of the 
European Union, decided in a UK referendum on 23rd June 2016. Article 50 was triggered on 29th 
March 2017 which signified the activation of the official leaving process which is expected to span 
two-years. 
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providing health services to a person aged 65 years compared to someone of 85+ years is 
three times higher (ONS, 2015). Already, long-term health conditions account for around 
70% of the total health and social care expenditure in England. These projected patterns 
indicate the population demographic will add to fiscal pressures which will be compounded 
by a decline in the working population.  
This emerges at a time when existing services are currently struggling to keep pace with 
capacity demands. Displayed in figure 2.3, waiting times are already consistently increasing 
in Accident and Emergency departments (A&E). In 2016, an average of 1,477 people per day 
had to wait over four hours for admission into A&E daily across the UK. This is concerning 
when compared to 2010 figures where this number averaged 270 per day (Baker, 2017). 
National Health Service (NHS) England (2017) statistics reveal that the number of patients 
waiting more than 12 hours to be admitted into A&E is also steadily climbing. In the first 
quarter of 2015 numbers peaked at 113,664. This is a marked increase from the lowest 
figures for this 12-hour juncture which was recorded between July and September in 2005 
at 6,835; this represents an increase of 106,829. Several studies have already confirmed that 
A&E overcrowding leads to poorer outcomes for patients, for example, QualityWatch.org.uk 
(2014) estimated that for every one percent above occupancy capacity, this translates to a 
0.3% decline in service performance. 
The same report identified that in some instances, hospitals were operating at 190% 
capacity, suggesting around a 30% decline in hospital care. Yet, despite these statistics and 
the growing need for hospital care, Roberts et al., (2014) found that the number of major 
A&E units across the UK has in contrast declined by 8% since 2003.  
In addition to A&E, other health services are being exposed to mounting pressures. Cancer 
Research UK (2017) estimates that one in two people born after 1960 will be diagnosed with 
cancer in their lifetime. Equally, the Mental Health Foundation (2016) warned over 
manifesting mental health problems. Contemporary data reveals almost half of adults 
(43.4%) now think they have had a diagnosable mental health problem at some point in their 
life. Almost a fifth (19.7%) of the population over 16 in the UK have exhibted signs of 
depression or anxiety. These increasing pressures require new facilities to support treatment 
which has culminated in a strategic overhaul. Policy-makers have shifted the emphasis of 
service provision away from hospitals toward homecare treatment conducted through 
community practices and bundled services (Thompson, 2016; Welsh NHS Confederation, 
2016). To meet these demands, all this will require significant investment and state-of-the-
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art services to keep pace. Also, despite this policy reformation, there is no available data 
which indicates this is serving to alleviate the current pressures placed on the health system. 
  
Figure 2.4: Permanent Dwellings Completed in the UK from 1949 to 2016 (Department for 
Councils and Local Government, 2017) 
Health infrastructure are not in a vacuum. There is a chronic shortage of housing in the UK. 
The Town and Country Planning Association (2013) estimated that between 2011 and 2031 
around 240,000 to 245,000 dwellings are needed per year to catch up with demands. Shown 
in figure 2.4, figures from the Department for Councils and Local Government (DCLG, 2017) 
indicate that there has been an overall decline in housing supply from 1949 to 2015. Peaking 
in 1968 at 425,460 dwellings provided in a year, more recently, public authority appetite for 
housing provision has been tapered by regulations on public borrowing. Likewise, housing 
associations have been undermined by the government’s decision to implement reduced 
social rents, which has transpired in an acute decline in housing provision, compounded by 
a failure of the private-sector to compensate for this shortfall (House of Lords, 2016). A paper 
produced by the House of Lords (2016) encouraged for greater partnering with institutional 
investors on the grounds they can benefit from long-term funding rates and therein 
challenge the stronghold a small oligarchy of housebuilders currently has on the housing 
market. In the absence of adequate housing supply, in tandem with an increasing population, 
an Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR, 2011) report calculated that if concerted efforts 
were not made to reconcile supply deficiencies, demands would outstrip supply, 
engendering a gap of 750,000 per year by 2025. Consequentially, as the demands for housing 
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continue to intensify, according to Niemietz (2016), housing prices have unprecedently 
multiplied by a factor of 4.5 after inflation; incomparable to any other OECD nation.  
As well as health and housing, there are symptoms of a struggling educational system 
indicating the need for upgaded educational infrastructure. The Education Funding Agency 
(EFA, 2015) surveyed the condition of 18,830 schools in the UK across all educational stages. 
This accounted for 85% of the national schools in England, constituting an examination of 
59,967 academic buildings. The survey presented worrying findings. This assessment found 
that 25% of the physical estate dated to the era between 1945 and 1966 and a 23% was 
supplied from 1967 to 1976. As part of this condition survey, it was found that only 5.1% was 
considered of grade A quality and was performing as intended and operating efficiently. The 
report identified school facilities were in the worst condition in the East of England and 
inadequate facilities were prevalent across all stages of education. Unsurprisingly, school 
facilities that were provided in the timeframe immediately post WWII are in the worst 
condition. Even so, primary and secondary education continues to be under funded and 
under invested. Instead, the authors of a building.co.uk (2014) white paper identified that 
much of the recent activity in the education sector has been driven through higher and 
further education. This has been to address the backlog of under investment dating back to 
the 1960s. The Association of University Estate Directors (AUDE, 2008) estimated that the 
conservative cost to replace university buildings equates to around £11bn. However, the 
provision capacity of these institutions has been dampened by capital spending reductions 
as resources curtailed in the 1970s. Resultantly, many are turning to the private-sector to 
bridge this funding gap as public sources dry up.  
In addition to public services, there is now greater appreciation of the salience of community 
infrastructure facilities. A notable example is NI where there has been promotion of social 
infrastructure to bridge the divide between Catholic and Protestant communities. To 
cultivate social capital in an effort to address the legacy of the ‘Troubles’, infrastructure has 
been earmarked to plan an integral role as part of the ‘Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and 
Integration’ and the ‘Together-Building a United Community’ projects. These schemes 
comprise developing ten new shared education campuses, establishing ten new shared 
housing schemes, and developing urban village schemes, amongst other facilities (Potter, 
2016).  
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2.6.1. ‘More and Better’ United Kingdom Social Infrastructure Provision 
While in the context of this PhD it may not be possible to identify every indicator, from this 
discussion, it is nevertheless apparent that there is a need for social infrastructure 
investment across all regions of the UK. As these extenuated demands continue to intensify, 
this has coincided with the realisation that the public-sector no longer possess’ the appetite 
to supply all social infrastructure needs.  
The UK, like many others, was profoundly impacted by the GFC. As a result of the 
interventionist regime implemented to ‘bail-out’ the banking sector, borrowing levels in the 
UK grew unabated from 33.7% in January 2007 to 62.9% by January 2010. In response, the 
government imposed a series of austerity measures to redress these impacts through 
reduced public expenditure in what was termed as the ‘age of austerity’ (Cameron, 2009). 
This was a succession of concerted fiscal policies designed to impose a systematic period of 
curtailed public spending equating to £40bn (TheGuardian.com, 2010). Initiated as part of 
the 2010 budget, these expenditure measures were intended to eradicate the budget deficit 
within a cyclically-adjusted five-year programme by 2015-16 and thereafter make substantial 
inroads toward reducing the national debt as a percentage of GDP (HM Treasury, 2010). The 
five largest departments; Transport, Education, Health, Justice and Communities and Local 
Governments all experienced notable capital retrenchment constituting a reduction from 
£39bn in 2009/10, to £28bn in 2013/14. The Department of Education budget was reduced 
by 55%, Local Communities and Government experienced downsizing circa 62%, and Health 
was also constrained by around a quarter (NAO, 2015).  
Still, falling short of their economic policy objectives, this period of austerity was extended 
and the ‘goalposts’ were shifted as the UK government announced in 2016 recalibrated 
targets of a budget surplus by 2020. More recently however, amidst the uncertainty of Brexit, 
these plans again have been reconsidered. Intent nonetheless on the continuation of this 
austerity policy, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, has reaffirmed the 
Conservative government’s commitment to fiscal economising until the next election. This 
has been reflected through further annual public spending reductions by one percent in real 
terms, as well as an additional three to six percent cut to departmental budgets for the fiscal 
year of 2019-20 delineated in the 2017 manifesto (IFS, 2017). By May 2017, ONS figures 
indicate national debt equates to 87.4% and is expected to peak at 88% which has been the 
highest level since 1966.  
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According to a recent Institute of Fiscal Studies report, the UK has the fifth-largest deficit out 
of 35 advanced economies and the six-largest debt out of 26 advanced economies (IFS, 
2017). Subsequently, in-spite of the pronounced signs for ‘more and better’ social 
infrastructure provision, concerns encircling public-sector debt, coupled with austerity 
measures have served to engender an acute financing gap between infrastructure demands 
and capital supply. Worryingly, a failure to reconcile this gap may result in the ‘bottlenecking’ 
of social infrastructure provision and ultimately a moratorium on socio-economic 
development.  
A model which has been endorsed in the current financial landscape is PPP. Indeed, private 
financing and PPP provision of public services and social infrastructure is not a new 
phenomenon in the UK. Already, private financing accounts for around 10% of infrastructure 
funding and PFI7 has been an instrumental provision mechanism in the UK over the previous 
three decades. Consequentially, the UK is considered to be one of the most sophisticated 
and mature private financing and PPP markets internationally (KPMG, 2015). Thus, the remit 
of the next chapter will be to critically examine PPP as a vehicle for ‘more and better’ social 
infrastructure in the UK. 
2.7. Summary 
Infrastructure can be categorised either social or economic facilities and assets. Yet, in spite 
of this categorisation, in fact, infrastructure systems are interconnected. A plethora of 
research has confirmed the correlation between infrastructure provision and socio-
economic development and in the wake of the GFC, its pertinence appears to be more 
profound now, than perhaps ever before. Even so, a review of literature undertaken in this 
chapter found that future planned outlay is acutely imbalanced in future infrastructure 
provision pipelines. Economic infrastructure development has been prioritised premised on 
its extolled economic benefits. Nonetheless, infrastructure provision strategies should be 
reflective of societal demands. Moreover, premised on the convergent nature of 
infrastructure, it is argued there is a need for greater priority to be afford to social 
infrastructure investment particularly in developed Western nations.  
Still, in the current economic landscape, there has been a paradigm shift from public capital 
to private financing of infrastructure provision. Private financing can bridge the 
                                                          
7 The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has been the predominant Public-Private Partnerships model in 
the UK. Subsequently, the terms are commonly used interchangeably in reference to the same 
infrastructure investment concept. These frameworks are discussed in depth in chapter three. 
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infrastructure investment gap; though, more recently, acute transformations in the project 
financing market has culminated in greater interest for new investor types, namely; 
institutional investors. Even so, with relatively limited exposure to the infrastructure 
investment market, these new organisations bring with them new expectations and project 
objectives. The research identified that there is a need for greater collaboration between 
these financial institutions and the infrastructure community to align investor needs with 
project objectives in an effort to generate investable opportunities which are equitable to all 
involved participants. In addition to new sources of investment, the study determined that 
there is a need to improve efficiencies and the performance of procurement frameworks and 
national policies. Predicated on access to more productive management skills and resources, 
some have asserted that the private-sector can offer superior efficiencies in provision 
frameworks, and therein enhance investments. Together, these considerations have 
transpired in a bifurcated ‘more and better’ infrastructure investment paradigm.  
A provision framework which has been promoted for ‘more and better’ infrastructure 
provision is PPP. Already, PPP has been an instrumental mechanism in the UK. Moreover, 
there are now pertinent ‘signposts’ pointing towards the need for social infrastructure 
investment in the UK. However, derived from a prolonged period of austerity policies 
imposed following the GFC, capital budgets continue to be constrained as the UK 
government continues its austere policies to alleviate public-sector debt and reduce the 
deficit. Therefore, the next chapter, chapter three of this research will critically evaluate PPP 
as a vehicle for ‘more and better’ social infrastructure provision in the UK. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
AN EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS FRAMEWORK 
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3. An Evaluation of the Public-Private Partnerships Framework 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter two considered the infrastructure concept. It determined infrastructure can be 
categorised as social and economic; however, despite this categorisation, it was found that 
infrastructure systems and networks are interconnected. Infrastructure development is a an 
important vehicle for socio-economic development and it is a cornerstone of a functioning 
and vibrant society. Even so, despite its importance, there is consensus internationally that 
governments have failed to keep pace with the requirements of society. It was found that 
future capital outlay is on an unprecedented scale. It was also determined in chapter two 
that infrastructure investment patterns are shifting. There is a need for greater social 
infrastructure investment particularly in Western nations. Yet, as governments continue to 
position economic infrastructure investment central to their political mandates to stimulate 
economic growth, social infrastructure has been eclipsed.  
Despite the surge of interest in infrastructure investment, it was discerned in chapter two 
that there is now intensified appetite for increased private-sector participation in 
infrastructure delivery. Theoretically, this will serve two purposes: firstly, in the current 
financial landscape, private finance can bridge the gap between investment needs and 
capital outlay. Secondly, some have argued that the private-sector can provide better 
investment impact through better performance by addressing inherent inefficiencies in 
existing provision frameworks. This has been reflected through an investment paradigm shift 
as procurement policies have gathered traction for increased private-sector participation 
through cross-sectoral initiatives.  
A provision framework which has been extolled as a vehicle to deliver ‘more and better’ 
social infrastructure is Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). PPP channels private financing and 
is a fulcrum to lever alternative sources of capital into public services. Also, PPP benefits from 
private-sector management skills and resources. Already, PPP has been an instrumental 
provision framework in the United Kingdom (UK) over the previous three decades. The UK is 
subsequently considered a pioneer for these partnering frameworks; however, more 
recently they have lost traction. Nonetheless, there are now pertinent indicators delineating 
the need for increased social infrastructure investment in the UK. These indicators, set in the 
context of a protracted period of UK austerity has meant that there are pertinent grounds to 
consider PPP as a viable framework for social infrastructure provision.  
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Thus, this chapter serves to critically evaluate the role of PPP as a vehicle for ‘more and 
better’ UK social infrastructure provision, and therein fulfil objective two. This chapter is 
hence structured as follows: 
• A conceptualisation of PPP; 
• An examination of PPP in the UK for social infrastructure provision; 
• Critical evaluation of UK PPP as a provision mechanism; and 
• The identification of an inherent knowledge gap which is serving to undermine the 
performance of PPP social infrastructure provision. 
3.2. Conceptualising Public-Private Partnerships 
Historically, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), although falling under many synonyms, have 
been instrumental in infrastructure provision. The use of toll concessions for road and bridge 
upkeep has been recorded in 1286; although there are suggestions of private involvement in 
public infrastructure provision as early as the Romans. Noteworthy examples of this were 
recorded by Grimsey and Lewis (2005) who highlighted the use of turnpikes in the UK in 1663 
and the United States (US) in 1785. Water distribution systems were delivered in France in 
the seventeenth century via the PPP concept. In relative terms, the first momentous era of 
private-sector involvement in infrastructure provision was ostensibly the British railway 
construction in the 1840s (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005).  
More recently, the impetus on the use of the PPP terminology has expanded on a global 
platform. ‘PPP’ is a comparatively modern term which gathered momentum in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (Chan and Cheung, 2014). Now, having permeated more than 40 national 
borders and used as part of everyday vernacular (Haran et al., 2013), the PPP concept has 
consequentially become nuanced with many interpretations. Utilised for a variety of 
purposes across diverse markets, globally, PPP has evolved from the conventional 
interpretation as a long-term public-private arrangement for the delivery of public services, 
to manifest in more sophisticated and mature partnering markets as an all-encompassing 
philosophy encapsulating any arrangement between the public and private-sectors (Haran 
et al., 2013).  
Reflective of its malleability, PPP is now being mobilised for a variety of reasons. Differences 
in: government desired control; government capacity to provide a service; private-sector 
capacity; finance availability; and regulations and legislative frameworks (World Bank et al., 
2016) together have culminated in a plethora of PPP characterisations. Subsequently, PPP 
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has been used to develop and manage greenfield infrastructure facilities. Also, PPP has been 
operationalised to renovate and regenerate existing assets and likewise have been adopted 
for brownfield project assets (World Bank et al., 2016). Emanating from this flexibility, these 
partnering initiatives are now integral in energy and power supply, waste and water facilities, 
transportation infrastructure, mining and utilities provision, telecommunications (Akintoye 
et al., 2015), hospital and housing supply as well as school operations (World Bank et al., 
2016). This has transpired in a plurality of conceptual models and it is therefore no surprise, 
on a global scale, there is little consistency when conclusively classifying PPP modalities. To 
reconcile these disparities, several have made attempts. World Bank et al. (2016) suggested 
PPP essentially can be categorised into: 
• Management and Lease: a private-sector entity is responsible for the management 
and operation of a government-owned business. Ownership and investment 
responsibility remains with the public-sector. In a management contract, the private-
sector manages the asset or facility and holds the operational risk. In contrast, in a 
lease contract, the private-sector entity assumes the operational risk. 
• Concessions: a private-sector entity taking over the management of a public 
enterprise. The private-sector assumes the significant financial investment risk. 
• Greenfield projects are new builds. 
• Divestitures: total or partial transfer of a public-sector owned equity to the private-
sector entity which buys a stake in a government enterprise as part of asset sale, 
public offering or privatisation.  
Alternatively, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP, 2011) classified PPP modalities as: 
(i) Supply and management contracts - Part of, or a complete service is managed 
by the private-sector enabling the public-sector to avail of private-sector skills 
for the design, delivery and operation, equipment procurement and workface 
management. Ownership remains with the public-sector and operates typically 
for three to five years. 
(ii) Turnkey contracts - Also known as Design-Build, turnkey contracts are a 
traditional procurement model for infrastructure provision. Contractors are paid 
a fixed fee for project delivery. This is a short-term arrangement with small scale 
investment from the private-sector. 
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(iii) Affermage / lease - The leaseholder, also known as the operator, is responsible 
for the operation and running of already existing infrastructure facilities. 
Normally, as part of this arrangement, the private-sector is responsible for the 
facility and the equipment. The operator does not have any large investments, 
but rather most investment is source from the government who is responsible 
for absorbing investment risk. In contrast, operational risk sits with the operator. 
Typically, this model will be used in conjunction with other models. 
(iv) Concessions - A private company is responsible for the build and operation of a 
facility over a fixed duration. Ownership usually remains with the public-sector 
and payments can be paid through either the user or by the government. These 
are usually long-term arrangements where contract duration typically runs for 5 
to 50 years. 
(v) Private Finance Initiative and Private ownership - The private-sector designs, 
constructs and operates the infrastructure service through the creation of a 
Project Company (ProjCo) or Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with the two terms 
often being used interchangeably. Through a long-term agreement, 
infrastructure services are purchased from the private-sector by the public-
sector. Risks are allocated to the party best able to manage them and payment 
is performance orientated.  
Notwithstanding this evolution of the concept, undoubtedly, the PFI can be considered as 
the archetypal PPP framework; to the extent where the two terms of PPP and PFI are often 
transposed and taken to imply the same mechanism (Fewings, 2013).  
Derived from this array of modalities, this has served to engender challenges when 
comparing PPP on a like-for-like basis. Even so, there are ideological commonalities across 
the PPP spectrum. Generally, PPP is regarded as placing somewhere between traditional 
procurement and full privatisation. Full privatisation conventionally has no input into the 
operations of the service from the government, whereas, traditional procurement projects 
are one-off arrangements between the public and private-sectors to supply services under a 
commercial contract. PPP fits into neither of these categories (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). 
Instead PPP is characterised as an arrangement involving two or more actors; one being from 
the private-sector and one being from the public-sector. Partners share equal power, and 
both can adequately negotiate and participate on their own behalf. The success of this 
arrangement is contingent on the conception of a sustainable partnership between parties 
which spans a long period of time. Each partner must able to bring something to the 
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arrangement and inherent to this, roles and responsibility are shared for improved outcomes 
and performance as opposed to if either organisation were to carry out the work unilaterally 
(Akintoye et al., 2015). Hence, it is the partnering ideology that defines the PPP concept.  
So far, chapter three has identified that PPP is a nuanced concept. These nuances have 
emerged out of PPP’s adaptability to an array of factors, environments and service needs. 
PPP now is instrumental in the provision of facilities across the infrastructure spectrum 
including both social and economic assets. Notwithstanding these differences, ultimately, it 
is the partnership that is the prevailing characteristic of PPP and by virtue of this, it is the 
lynchpin of the mechanism. Having conceptualised PPP, the research will now consider PPP 
in the context of the UK. 
3.3. Public-Private Partnerships in the United Kingdom 
PPP in the UK can broadly be categorised as: private ownership of state-owned businesses; 
PFI and corresponding modalities; and the strategic selling-off of government services to 
either the marketplace or a partnering arrangement (HM Treasury, 2003). Despite these 
three broad definitions, it has been PFI and its corresponding modalities which have 
dominated the UK PPP concept (HM Treasury, 2015). Utilising project financing and having 
been the predominant PPP framework in the UK for social infrastructure provision over the 
previous three decades (NAO, 2018), this research will investigate these PPP frameworks for 
‘more and better’ UK social infrastructure provision.  
UK PPP is defined as a long-term arrangement between the public and private-sectors which 
requires the private-sector to design, build, finance and manage or operate infrastructure 
facilities (HM Treasury, 2012). These long-term cross-sectoral partnerships are characterised 
by joint working and risk sharing to deliver greater efficiencies, incentivised private-sector 
risk management and enhanced time and cost certainty (HM Treasury, 2012). Over the 
previous three decades, PPP has been a fundamental mechanism for infrastructure provision 
in the UK. According to recent NAO (2018) figures, there are currently over 700 PPP contracts 
in operation, constituting over £60 billion (bn)8. This equates to annual charges of circa over 
£10.3bn and a total of over £199bn into the 2040s if no further deals were agreed. Premised 
on its extensive roll-out, UK PPP is a global leader for private infrastructure investment. 
                                                          
8 This figure comprises specifically PFI and Private Finance 2 (PF2) deals and does not include other 
nuanced PFI modalities. Also, it should be noted that this figure is inclusive of both economic and 
social infrastructure transactions. 
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Figure 3.1 below is a depiction of the long-term financial commitments of PFI in the UK, 
equating to around £7.7bn per annum9. 
 
Figure 3.1: Past and Future PFI Forecasted Unitary Charge Payments (NAO, 2018) 
PPP is distinct from traditional procurement frameworks in that rather than purchasing an 
infrastructure facility, in PPP, the government purchases a service and a facility. The private-
sector is responsible for the provision of a service and its facilities across a 25+ year period 
in exchange for a unitary payment (Pretorious et al., 2008). In doing so, this enables the 
private-sector to adopt a long-term bundled strategy. The private-sector partner operates 
through a SPV which is alternatively referred to as the Project Company (ProjCo)10. ProjCo is 
a commercial entity or shell company formed by a private cohort specifically for undertaking, 
financing, developing and managing the project (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). The use of the 
SPV enables the private-sector supplier to compile specific skillsets needed across differing 
phases of the project, Furthermore, for accounting purposes, the SPV acts as the conduit 
between sectors by which to channel capital (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012).  
Figure 3.2 is the archetypal PPP project structure based on a project financing arrangement 
as discussed in chapter two11. 
                                                          
9 These figures comprise both economic and social infrastructure PFI transactions. 
10 This research uses SPV and ProjCo interchangeably when referring to the private-sector shell 
company. 
11 In these arrangements, it is assumed all equity has been contributed by the private-sector. 
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Figure 3.2: Typical PPP Organisational Structure (adapted from Hickman, 2000; NAO, 2007; 
World Bank et al., 2016)  
The diagram shows the contractual arrangements between the organisations involved in the 
project as well as the corresponding internal cash flows. ProjCo directly negotiates and 
enters into a contractual Project Agreement (PA) with a procuring Authority. The PA is 
structured by the Authority and stipulates the rights, roles and responsibilities of the private-
sector cohort (NAO, 2007). Correspondingly, the constituent organisations of ProjCo enter 
into separate collateral pass-through agreements between themselves and ProjCo rather 
than being directly contracted with the procuring client. This enables the private-sector to 
allocate roles and responsibilities, risk, obligations and cash flows (World Bank et al., 2016). 
These will be assigned according to the:  
• Shareholders Agreement;  
• Loan Agreement;  
• Construction/engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) Contract; and  
• Services Agreement.  
Utilising project financing, PPP arrangements conventionally are highly leveraged; circa 
90:10 debt/equity (Gardner and Wright, 2011). PPP operates according to an output 
specification, which acts as the control framework by which to measure the service provision 
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and performance. Typically, at the end of the contractual period, the operations and 
ownership of the infrastructure asset and along with the service returns to the public-sector 
coinciding with the termination of the contract (Pretorious et al., 2008). 
3.3.1. Public-Private Partnerships Project Lifecycle 
According to the World Bank et al. (2016), a PPP project is considered to transition through 
three phases: the initiation phase; the procurement phase; and the commissioning phase. 
Each phase contains two stages12. Figure 3.3 delineates a typical PPP project lifecycle along 
with the key tasks and outputs from each stage. 
 
Figure 3.3: Typical PPP Project Lifecycle (adapted from World Bank et al., 2016) 
I. Initiation phase 
                                                          
12 In 2016, the World Bank along with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank through its 
Multilateral Investment Fund (IADB through its MIF), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), the World 
Bank Group (WBG) and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) produced a 
contemporary PPP guidebook. This guidebook was produced to act as a best-practice knowledge 
capital Centre for efficient and sustainable PPP provision and has been informed from a review of 48 
credible official governmental reports and reputable publishings. As per this guidebook, generally, 
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The initiation phase is composed of two stages. This is the project identification stage, as 
well as the project appraisal and preparation stage. In the initiation phase, the primary tasks 
concern the assessment of the PPP mechanism as a provision strategy and the VfM 
assessment to determine if this provision mechanism is to be implemented. The main 
objectives from the initiation phase pertain to the selection of the appropriate project option 
and an assessment of the suitability and feasibility of the PPP mechanism to the project 
requirements.  
• Project identification and consideration of PPP mechanism - the project 
identification process is a constituent component of all infrastructure provision 
lifecycles regardless of the procurement approach. In the project identification and 
consideration stage, the fundamental outcome of this process is to identify the best 
project option and to assess the viability of PPP; hence, key tasks in this stage 
comprise of activities such as identifying, scoping and determining the correct 
project solution. This typically can be determined through activities such as a Cost-
Benefit Analysis (CBA) or a VfM assessment. At this juncture, with no determined 
provision strategy, the PPP mechanism should be considered along with all other 
procurement frameworks to examine which solution is best suited for the provision 
of social infrastructure. Part of this should include the identification of the socio-
economic implications, an assessment of the viability of each project delivery 
strategy, the technical needs of the project as well as the determination of the 
governance approach to be employed. Usually, the scope of the project will be an 
overview, coupled with an outline feasibility appraisal which can be developed as 
the project progresses. At the conclusion of this phase, the PPP procurement 
strategy; where offering best VfM, will be formally selected and the project will 
progress to the appraisal and preparation stage.  
• Appraisal and preparation of contract documentation - when the project enters the 
appraisal and preparation stage, the remit of this undertaking is to assess the 
viability of the PPP mechanism and to determine if PPP is conducive to the project 
requirements. This is an important stage on the grounds it will define the nature of 
the PPP venture going forward and will establish the tender procedure to be utilised. 
Like the previous stage, this is a constituent element of all infrastructure 
procurement approaches and is not unique to PPP; however, predicated on the scale 
and complexity of PPP transactions, this is typically much more resource intensive 
than conventional procurement strategies. Key tasks in this stage will include 
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refinement of the project scope and the development of an outline business case 
(OBC). Additional work will also be undertaken in regard to the CBA; this may include 
greater scrutiny of the socio-economic feasibility as well as an extensive examination 
of the commercial feasibility. Fundamentally, the purpose of this feasibility 
examination is to establish whether PPP can provide optimum VfM. This is measured 
through a Public-Sector Comparator (PSC) which is a means to compare the cost of 
a PPP deal against a traditionally procured asset. Ultimately, key outputs from this 
stage will culminate in: the production of a VfM report; a refined project scope and 
project objectives; an outline development of the procurement and project 
management plan; and the construction of a preliminary PPP structure.  
 
II. Procurement phase 
In the procurement phase, there are also two stages: the structuring and preparation stage 
where much of the contract documentation is prepared, and the tendering and contract 
award stage where private-sector consortiums compete for the contract. In this phase, the 
private-sector cohorts compete for the project which culminates in financial close as a 
preferred bidder is awarded the contract. 
• Structuring and preparation - as the project progresses into structuring and drafting, 
the main outputs from this will be: the development and finalisation of the financial 
plan; a draft of the contract documentation; and a finalised version of the request 
for quotation (RFQ) and the request for proposal (RFP) documents to be used as part 
of the tendering procedure. Building on the preliminary work from the previous 
phase, in this stage, key tasks will include updating the PSC, finalising the technical 
design, the output design and project requirements. The contract will also be 
developed and refined to consider aspects such as the financial structure, the 
payment mechanism and how risk is to be allocated. In preparation for the tender 
procedure, the RFQ and RFP will be designed to consider important aspects such as 
the qualification criteria, submission timescales, the negotiation and dialogue 
procedures and the award process. Much of the development for this will be 
informed from the previous phase and can therefore only be carried out when these 
tasks have been completed. 
• Tendering and contract award - premised on the procedures defined as part of the 
structuring and preparation, the project will transition to the tendering procedure. 
The purpose of this is to identify the best VfM proposal from the private-sector as 
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part of a competitive bidding process as designed through the RFQ and the RFP. 
Generally, the tendering process is considered to be comprised of four steps: pre-
qualification / shortlisting; bid submission; bid evaluation; and contract signature 
though this may be adjusted contingent on the project requirements. As part of this 
tendering procedure, there will be on-going negotiations between sectors and 
clarification of issues until eventually a preferred bidder is selected. The tendering 
and contract award stage closes as the public and private-sector parties agreeing 
terms culminating in the formalised signing of the contract and financial close.  
 
III. Commissioning phase 
As the project then transitions to the commissioning phase, it is likewise constituted of two 
stages. These are the construction and commissioning stage, where the private-sector 
develops the facilities, and the operations and maintenance whereby the private consortium 
provides and maintains the service. The contract concludes with handback as the operations 
and ownership of the facility and its service is returned to the public-sector. 
• Construction and commissioning - in the construction and commission stage, the key 
output emerging from this is the mobilisation of the project asset. Having achieved 
financial close and signing of the contract, many of the management roles pertain to 
managing risks and potential threats to safeguard the performance of the contract. 
Key tasks in this stage encompass agreement of the solution design; management of 
communication and stakeholders; managing payments, deductions and delays; and 
monitoring the performance and compliance of the private-sector consortium 
regarding their contractual obligations. It is also important that any changes in the 
contract are managed including any amendments to risk allocation. The construction 
stage will end as the project is commissioned and operations of the service 
commence. 
• Operations, maintenance and handback - transitioning from the construction stage, 
the management strategies in principle remain the same. This is the longest stage of 
the lifecycle and it is therefore important to proactively manage the venture to avoid 
disputes and mitigate against risks. Key tasks in this stage comprise monitoring and 
managing the performance of the partnership; managing claims and disputes; and 
ownership transfer of the facility to the public-sector at handback. In this stage, it is 
common for refinancing to occur and for ownership and/or shares to be transferred. 
Thus, this stage of the project has a permeable boundary as organisations may 
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choose to enter and exit the venture. As new unknown stakeholders enter the 
venture, this may influence the performance of the project as each organisation 
carries with it unique and individual project objectives. It is accordingly important 
that there is a proactive partnering management strategy.  
Having examined the PPP lifecycle and determined the key tasks to be completed, the 
research will now consider the attributes of PPP which support the argument that PPP as a 
credible framework for ‘more and better’ social infrastructure provision. These are discussed 
in the following.  
 
3.3.2. Partnering for ‘More and Better’ Social Infrastructure Provision 
The decision to adopt PPP is predicated on Value for Money (VfM). VfM is a combination of 
both the costs of providing the service as well as the quality of the service. According to 
World Bank et al. (2016), PPP can provide better VfM as well as ‘more and better’ 
infrastructure through three principal avenues:  
1. As a financial mechanism and the associated benefits of private finance;  
2. Improved productivity and efficiencies; and  
3. The wider efficiencies offered to governments.  
Beginning with the financial merits of PPP, this can be dichotomised into access to alternative 
sources of capital and access to cash. PPP provides an alternative financing vehicle for 
infrastructure provision. By channelling private financing into infrastructure, PPP can 
expedite infrastructure provision strategies and accelerate capital investment pipelines 
(Demirag et al., 2015). Discussed in chapter two, PPP utilises project financing arrangements 
comprising private debt and equity. Advantageously, the public-sector can avail of social 
infrastructure while repayments of this service are accounted for systematically over the 
operational phase. Repayments do not immediately compromise government budgets and 
for this reason, PPP is particularly attractive in times of fiscal consolidation as alternative 
sources of capital enables infrastructure development continuation in times of constrained 
public budgets (Hare, 2013). Though ultimately the government still pays the cost, the 
government is afforded the flexibility of repaying the capital in smaller payments and thus 
PPP in the main is favourably kept off capital balance sheets. Use of private financing can 
also offer governments greater flexibility in that it mobilises alternative sources of capital, 
frees up public-sector resources to be deployed elsewhere and can be used to compliment 
publicly funded programmes (Della Croce et al., 2015).  
54 
 
 
 
Notably however, the benefits derived from private financing should be concomitant with 
several caveats. Governments must be mindful of accumulating debt imposed by PPP and 
the long-term outgoings as a result (Gardner and Wright, 2011). Also, the efficiencies accrued 
from the project performance should outweigh the additional costs of private financing, and 
therefore should be chosen premised on better VfM over alternative financial mechanisms.  
Another area where PPP has been promoted for its wherewithal to provide ‘more and better’ 
infrastructure derives from its streamlined efficiencies and effectiveness. In essence, better 
efficiencies fall under the categories of: cost management; lifecycle management; reliability 
and effectiveness; innovation, and risk management (World Bank et al., 2016). PPP 
harmonises what has traditionally been heterogeneous projects phases into a single long-
term bundled solution. Theoretically, this holistic perspective enables the development of 
an integrated solution for the duration of the contract which should translate to better 
investment impact than traditionally procured facilities. This should transpire in improved 
overall quality of the service, expedited provision of the facility, enhanced operational 
efficiencies and improved maintainability over the lifecycle (PwC, 2015; KPMG, 2015). This 
bundled and integrated solution design in principle is permitted using an output specification 
which grants the private-sector greater space to innovate, design an optimal solution and 
utilise better technological resources (World Bank et al., 2016). It is also noteworthy, the 
private-sector is not subjected to the same constraints, social pressures and business 
frameworks as the public-sector is. In this context, the private-sector has greater flexibility 
to innovate and manage costs. These benefits are underpinned by the usage of the 
performance-based payments to guarantee these efficiencies (NAO, 2018).  
Others have also argued that PPP offers superior risk management efficiencies. PPP 
advocates claim that the disparity between funding options can be offset through savings 
derived from effective risk management and risk transfer. Being long-term complex 
arrangements, PPP inevitably will be exposed to significant risks. Ideologically, within the PPP 
framework, risks and responsibilities are transferred to the party best able to manage them 
(Pretorious et al., 2008). This allows the public-sector to divert construction, financing and 
operating risks away from the state and onto private organisations. In return, risks are 
quantified, priced and managed through sound private-sector risk management practices. 
The optimal transfer of risk; rather than total, in theory, can produce enhanced VfM above 
and beyond that if the project stages were disentangled and contracted unilaterally 
(Schwartz et al., 2014). Furthermore, bearing the risk of construction, there is a strong 
incentivisation for the asset to be provided on-time and within budget (NAO, 2018).  
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Finally, the third avenue PPP can provide ‘more and better’ infrastructure is by means of the 
overall efficiencies afforded to the government. PPP ensures that there is an up-front 
commitment to the provision of the infrastructure. The funds allocated to the operations 
and maintenance of the facility and service are ringfenced as part of future budgets and 
thereby ensures the reliability of the asset and service (HM Treasury, 2013). Furthermore, 
PPP may pave the way for efficiencies to be adopted and imported into future infrastructure 
provision as well as ensures transparency premised on the large number of organisations 
involved (World Bank et al., 2016). Indeed, while some have been critical of the earlier costs 
of PFI, others have noted how the superior performance of PPP has driven up standards 
across the board in the built environment. 
The research has defined PPP in the UK. It has identified the phases of a typical project as 
well as considered how PPP can deliver ‘more and better’ social infrastructure. The research 
will now review PPP specifically in the context of social infrastructure provision.  
3.4. An Overview of United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships for Social 
Infrastructure Provision 
In the 1980s, against the backdrop of constrained capital finances, the UK government began 
to explore the option of increased private-sector involvement in the provision of public 
services. Many felt the private-sector can deliver better VfM than the public-sector. Equally, 
the success of several early economic infrastructure projects garnered support for private-
sector financing of public services (Pretorious et al., 2008). In 1981, a UK government 
committee, chaired by Sir William Ryrie, was tasked with the responsibility of assessing and 
reporting on the nascent potential of private-sector financing in public services. This 
committee produced the “Ryrie Rules”, providing the basis on which project financing could 
be utilised by the government. One notable stipulation endorsed the testing of a privately 
financed project against a public funded alternative. From this burgeoning landscape of 
infrastructure project financing, several distinguished projects were conceived including the 
Channel Tunnel in 1985, the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge and the Second Severn Crossing in 
1990 (Pretorious et al., 2008).  
By the early 1990s, private financing had been utilised for several transport projects; 
however, it was clear there were comings which needed to be addressed before it could 
permeate other sectors (Pretorious et al., 2008). This changed in 1992. Under the auspices 
of the financially constraint Conservative Government, Norman Lamont, the then Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, announced the launch of PFI in his autumn statement to Parliament. PFI 
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was ‘an initiative to increase the amount of private finance being used to invest in what had 
previously been publicly sponsored infrastructure’ (Carty et al., 2008). Up until then, private 
financing had predominantly been mechanised for economic infrastructure assets, 
nevertheless, PFI enabled greater ‘private financing of capital projects’ in the public-sector 
(Fewings, 2013). Since its introduction in 1992, PFI has been the preferred choice of PPP in 
the UK. Although the term PPP was previously introduced in Australia, in the UK, PFI was a 
precursor to the PPP terminology which correspondingly emerged some years later 
(Cartlidge, 2011).  
After the privatisation of many public-sector services pursued by the Thatcher government 
during the 1980s, for some, PFI was deemed to be a logical continuation of this agenda 
(Cartlidge, 2011). Designed to benefit from private-sector financing as well as private-sector 
skills, resources and experience, it was argued PFI would provide better VfM across the 
whole-life than that which could be attained from the public-sector (Hare, 2013). Between 
1992 and 1997, the Conservative’s PFI policy was shepherded by the Private Finance Panel 
(PFP). This was a department within the HM Treasury comprising representatives from the 
public and private-sectors responsible for guiding the rollout of PFI. Notably, the PFP 
recalibrated the government’s strategy by implementing the policy that capital projects 
would not be approved until a costing had also been explored via the PFI option (Pretorious 
et al., 2008). This profound shift in attitude expedited the expansion of PFI bidding, so much 
so, that any project which could not exhibit VfM or was unsuitable for private financing was 
approved for PFI provision. Eventually, the voluminous number of projects, in conjunction 
with escalating bid costs transpired in the cessation of the previously stipulated testing 
measures. Instead, the public-sector comparator (PSC), a hypothetically costed project was 
implemented; however, not mandatory (Pretorious et al., 2008).   
In 1997, the Labour party replaced the Conservatives in government. As part of their 
mandate, partnering was integral for the modernisation of Britain. In response to escalating 
bid costs, one of the first measures carried out was the appointment of Sir Malcolm Bates to 
review PFI. The so-called “Bates Review” produced 29 recommendations, but also 
importantly, it advocated the continuation of the PFI mandate. Concurrently, the Labour 
Government Treasury Taskforce replaced the PFP. The Taskforce was centralised within the 
government and their remit was to support and advise on best-practice and critical success 
factors (CSF) of this nuanced PFI, reflective of the Bates Review (Pretorious et al., 2008). PFI, 
and project financing, being relatively unexplored phenomena within the context of the 
public-sector meant there was an information imbalance between arrangement counter-
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parties. To strengthen the public-sector position, the taskforce produced extensive 
publications extending from pro-forma policy briefings to detailed case studies and technical 
notes. Emanating from this, there were three noteworthy manifestations: there was greater 
appreciation by public-sector of project risks and their allocation; procurement became 
more unified, standardised and consistent across departments reducing transaction costs; 
and finally, much of this documentation lent to PPP best practice, internationally (Pretorious 
et al., 2008).  
Following a second review of PFI, again by Sir Malcom Bates, Partnerships UK (PUK) were 
founded. PUK replaced the projects division within the treasury taskforce. Similarly, the 
policy arm was exported to the Office of Government Commerce (OGC). PUK cooperated 
with public and private bodies to facilitate deal arrangements. In 2001, PUK became a PPP in 
its own right as a result of the majority sale to private investors (51%). It was primarily 
operated by private-sector procurement specialists including investment bankers, lawyers 
and consultants (Hellowell, 2007). PUK was subsequently dissolved in 2011, with 
Infrastructure UK undertaking the responsibility for stewarding PPP policy (PUK, 2011).  
Despite being a Conservative pioneered initiative, PFI has been considerably expanded under 
the Blair / Brown Labour government. Investment was flourishing by the turn of the 
millennium. Appetite for PPP social infrastructure was at an all-time high, and resultantly, 
several novel PPP innovations were developed to function within the PFI framework, 
permitting other departments to similarly avail of the benefits of PPP and private financing. 
The National Health Service (NHS) Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT), Express LIFT 
(eLIFT), and the Building Schools for the Future (BSF) schemes were the most notable 
programmes introduced to deliver social infrastructure. PPP was thus utilised by a plurality 
of government departments for various ventures but predominantly social housing, 
transportation, education facilities and hospitals (Asenova and Beck, 2015).  
3.4.1. Building Schools for the Future 
The BSF scheme was the 2003 capital investment programme implemented by the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). It was the highly ambitious scheme 
mobilised to transform the capital stock of schooling facilities across England and Wales. The 
plan for BSF was to deliver 250 schools per year until 2020; over half of schools were to be 
rebuilt, a third to be remodelled, and the remainder, refurbished. In addition to development 
works, all schools would be modernised with Information Computer Technology (ICT) 
equipment. In total, the BSF programme was estimated to be worth £55bn, spread over 15 
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years (NAO, 2009). The BSF was unique for other schemes in that it was a hybrid programme; 
part private financed and part public funded. New builds were to be paid for through PFI, 
while the remainder were to be funded through capital budgets (DfES, 2003).  
Predicated on expedited lead in times and cost savings, long-term joint ventures between 
the public and private-sectors referred to as Local Education Partnerships (LEPs) were 
developed to coordinate the procurement and maintenance of BSF schools at the local level. 
These LEPs were overseen and managed at a centralised level by Partnerships for Schools 
(PfS). PfS was a non-departmental national body responsible for driving the implementation 
of the programme. Acting as both the financial gatekeeper as well as providing consultancy 
support to local authorities, PfS was tasked with the responsibility of ensuring projects were 
delivered on time and within budget (NAO, 2009).  
However, preliminary estimations by DCSF and PfS were overly optimistic. By the end of 
2008, only 42 of the planned 200 schools had been delivered. Original estimates, both in 
terms of cost and time had inflated by £10bn and three years, respectively (NAO, 2009). 
Associated with “massive overspends, tragic delays, botched construction projects and 
needless bureaucracy”, under seismic political pressure, ultimately BSF was cancelled in 
2010. The 715 schools which had signed up to the scheme, but yet to achieve financial close, 
were discarded (BBC, 2010).  
3.4.2. Local Improvement Finance Trust and Express LIFT 
The NHS LIFT initiative was introduced in England in 2000 to address the legacy of under-
investment into primary care provision, historically side-lined to hospital provision. LIFT was 
innovative insofar as, rather than forming a project-based partnership, instead, much like 
the BSF, it established a long-term joint-venture (JV) between the public and private-sectors, 
both nationally and regionally. The national JV company was constituted of representatives 
from the Department of Health and PUK (NAO, 2005). This JV operated formally as 
Partnerships for Health; however, in 2006 the Department of Health acquired full 
shareholding and subsequently renamed it Community Health Partnerships (CHP). 
Comparatively, at the regional level, a JV company referred to as a LIFTCo was comprised of 
local health professional representatives, CHP and a private-sector partner. This partnership 
was responsible for the provision of batches of small scale works which theoretically better 
aligned with localised priorities.  
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Under the stewardship of a Strategic Partnering Board which was constituted from local 
health economy stakeholders, LIFT facilitated a long-term investment strategy reflective of 
community needs, coupled with the acquisition of private-sector expertise (NAO, 2005). In 
2008, the eLIFT scheme was launched to replace LIFT. In a change from the predecessor, 
Authorities selected a private partner from a pre-selected list, contingent on a previous 
bidding round. It was expected this would improve delivery times through simplified 
contracts, reduced bureaucracy, and eventually drive down overheads and costs (Asenova 
and Beck, 2015). In total, there are 49 LIFT and eLIFT companies, which have provided 339 
new facilities, accumulating a capital value of £2.5bn (CHP, 2017).  
3.4.3. The Demise of the Private Finance Initiative 
In the period leading up to the GFC, social infrastructure PPP ventures were consistently 
expanding both in terms of numbers and value. However, the 2008/09 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) had a profound impact on the UK PPP marketplace. In fact, a decade on from the 
collapse of the Lehman brothers, the ramifications of the recession continue to somewhat 
resonate through the project financing market. As banks diverged from capital intensive 
lending, discussed in chapter two, conventional sources of debt no-longer had neither the 
wherewithal, nor risk appetite for infrastructure investing. The introduction of Basel III; 
aimed at strengthening banks capital requirements through increased liquidity and 
decreased leveraging (BIS, 2010) made infrastructure investing more expensive in capital 
adequacy terms. This served to curtail the appetite of private-sector creditors, and 
resultantly, banks were no longer lending, at least not on the scale once exhibited (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2013).  
This mass exodus from the marketplace of traditional lenders, in tandem with tightened 
regulatory requirements of those who remain, has posed significant problems for the UK PPP 
social infrastructure market which been manifest as a financial void between needs and 
availability. Reflective of this, in the short-term period after the GFC, the number of 
agreements achieving financial close dropped significantly. Whereas, remarkably, the capital 
value of ventures significantly grew between 2008 and 2009. This can be explained by the 
need to offset high procurement costs against commercially viability (Haran et al., 2013), but 
also fundamentally, PFI was a strategic mechanism by which to insulate industries such as 
the construction sector from the acute effects of the GFC (Asenova and Beck, 2016). The New 
Labour government, declaring its commitment to PPP and PFI, set aside £3bn in 2009/10 to 
provide bridging loans to projects in jeopardy to counter the effects of the banking 
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retrenchment. Through the Infrastructure Finance Unit (IFU) as well as state-owned banks, 
namely; the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), the 
government lent both directly and indirectly to PFI projects. Added to this formal directive, 
in addition to supplying bridging loans, on occasion the state surpassed its remit by 
contributing the full lending amount, as well as underwriting bank loans and providing equity 
bridge loans (Asenova and Beck, 2016). Fundamentally, by doing so, this undermined several 
of the key benefits of PFI: the high costs of private financing which previously had been 
justified through risk transfer had been eroded on the grounds that ultimately the public-
sector was now holding all the risk. Likewise, the ideology that risk transfer would incentivise 
project performance was equally now null and void (Asenova and Beck, 2016). In response, 
the Liberal Democratic and Conservative opposition lambasted the Labour government and 
PFI, questioning its intent, legitimacy and efficacy.  
Notwithstanding these criticisms of PFI induced by the GFC, for some time there had been 
speculation encircling the credibility of these frameworks. Cartlidge (2011) remarked that as 
early as the late 1990s questions were being raised as to how two inherently different sectors 
could tangibly collaborate; this problem being exacerbated by the disparity in skills between 
opposing contractual parties. Furthermore, over-eagerness to deploy PFI on the public-
sector behalf had resulted in PFIs inappropriate rollout in some instances (Cartlidge, 2011). 
Other emergent problems such as the private-sector exorbitant profits during refinancing in 
the secondary market also served to erode confidence in PFI. Notable examples such as the 
Dartford and Gravesham hospital PFI and the Norwich and Norfolk University recorded 
windfall gains of £34m and £115m, respectively (NAO, 2002). Eventually, it was discovered 
average annual equity IRR sales (29%) were twice the rates (12% to 15%) in the business case 
at contract signing (Whitfield, 2012). In the wake of the GFC, these findings were heavily 
criticised set against the poor reputation of the financial sector. 
Following Labours exit from incumbency, being replaced by the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition, PFI, having been heavily criticised, the National Audit Office was 
commissioned to undertake an extensive review of PFI in an effort to determine the true 
delivery of VfM. The key findings from this report were summarised as (HM Treasury, 2012): 
• Insufficient contract flexibility across the operational period when wanting to adjust 
the service so that it is reflective of the Authorities requirements; 
• Excessively slow and expensive procurement process, and ultimately poor VfM; 
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• Insufficient transparency pertaining to future liabilities imposed on the taxpayers 
and investor returns; 
• Inappropriate risk transfer resulting in increased risk premiums being charged to the 
Authority; and 
• Windfall gains made by equity investors has manifest in concerns as to the true 
extent of public-sector VfM. 
 
3.4.4. A New Approach to Public-Private Partnerships 
Despite these findings and the PFI diatribe, in the current financial and political landscape, 
the UK government declared its commitment to PPP and the future mobilisation of private 
financing for social infrastructure provision. Subsequently, across the UK, the PFI framework 
has been overhauled and replaced with several reformed partnering arrangements. 
Principally, these changes have been implemented with the joint purpose of stimulating and 
levering alternative sources of capital into public services as a response to the constriction 
of private capital liquidity, as well as to address many of the inherent inefficiencies of PFI 
(HM Treasury, 2012). Grounded in a cross-sectoral partnership, there is now greater 
appreciation of the importance of collaboration in improving project performance (HM 
Treasury, 2012). Also, determined in chapter two, collaboration has an important role to play 
in facilitating engagement between the PPP community and alternative sources of capital in 
an effort to engineer bankable deals which align to investor profiles and thereby unlock these 
additional financial resources (Della Croce et al., 2015). Hence, nuanced modalities have 
emerged onto the market. The research will now examine the reformed policies of the four 
jurisdictions of the UK to identify the main changes implemented in these reconceptualised 
modalities.  
3.4.4.1. England 
In England, against the backdrop of austere policies to lessen public-sector debt; in 
December 2012, George Osborne announced Private Finance 2 (PF2). One of the principal 
differences between PF2 and PFI has been the introduction of the public-sector as an equity 
co-investor. By directly investing into the project, it is anticipated this will cultivate greater 
stakeholder collaboration reflected through an improved partnership between contractual 
stakeholders. Better objective alignment; greater transparency and information sharing; 
improved risk allocation and management; and joint decision-making, all potentially will 
enable the government to obtain a share of investment returns, reduce project costs and 
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ultimately deliver better VfM. This investment will be managed by a central unit positioned 
within the Treasury and agreed on equal terms to the private-sector (HM Treasury, 2012). 
As well as co-investing, the previous PFI framework has been nuanced to reduce 
procurement timescales, circa 18 months. Soft services have also been removed from the 
contract to facilitate greater long-term flexibility, efficiency and transparency. This will 
equally remove the risk premium which had been previously attached to investments, thus 
ring-fencing excessive profits (HM Treasury, 2012). 
In today’s economic climate, HM Treasury (2012) regards banks no longer as a sustainable 
source of debt provision. Going forward, suggested divergence from conventional funders 
has been expressed through greater weight attached to institutional investor involvement. 
Traditionally, PFI projects have been circa 90:10 debt/equity ratios. However, by reducing 
the gearing ratio to 75:25, it is anticipated this recalibration will ignite greater earlier activity 
in the markets, increasing competition and serving to reduce returns to levels which are 
more reasonable and politically defendable. Furthermore, and arguably more pertinent, this 
new leveraging arrangement will insulate traditionally risk averse institutional investors from 
construction risk exposure. By doing so, there will be less dependence on banks, as well as 
freer, earlier and greater filtration of newer capital sources, resultantly lowering prices on 
less restrictive terms (HM Treasury, 2012).  
While PF2 has seemingly addressed many inherent issues of PFI, its arrival should be 
concomitant with several caveats. Lower gearing will likely increase transaction costs. 
Likewise, there are no guarantees institutional investors will necessarily want to be involved 
any earlier (Read, 2013). Indeed, NAO (2018) identified that out of the six deals signed under 
PF2, institutional investors have not invested into debt. Additionally, Solvency II; introduced 
to reconcile and codify solvency requirements against risk profiles, will possibly limit long-
term investments (Mittnik, 2011). Banks, having historically undertaken the syndicated 
arranging responsibilities, has meant institutional investors do not possess the requisite due 
diligence skillsets; at least not on this scale (Read, 2013). It is therefore no surprise that since 
its introduction, PF2 activity has been muted and has subsequently been used for only a small 
number of projects. Poignantly, a pipeline of PF2 projects which was due to be announced 
in June of 2017 has been abandoned with the future of PF2 still uncertain 
(ConstructionNews.co.uk, 2017). Moreover, there are outstanding concerns regarding 
transparency and performance measurement, flexibility and the underlying motivations 
behind the utilisation of PF2.  
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3.4.4.2. Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland (NI) has also developed its own Third-Party Development (3PD) model 
which utilises a design, build, finance and maintenance contract; though, the 2015 proposed 
pathfinders are yet to achieve financial close (Education Authority, 2015) and it remains 
unclear if they are still in discussion. Notwithstanding the launch of 3PD, PPP in NI has been 
subjected to notable criticism and indeed the Executive his expressed little appetite for PPP. 
A 2009 report disseminated by the then Northern Ireland Public Service Alliance (NIPSA) 
(Hellowell, 2009) heavily criticised PFI in NI. This report, together with other publications, 
this has culminated in PPP being a contentious topic amongst strategic decision-makers 
which has been reflected through sedate market activity. Even so, there is recognition now 
on the part of the NI Executive that if it is to close the gap between itself and competitors, it 
can no longer rely on the lump capital transfer from the UK. 
3.4.4.3. Scotland 
To replace PFI, Scotland has introduced the Non-Profit Distribution (NPD) model. NDP was 
launched to be a more practical and viable alternative to PFI, and in 2015, the NPD 
framework delivered £0.46bn worth of capital projects. While NPD is effectively grounded in 
the foundations of PFI, it additionally includes measures to address many of the criticisms of 
its predecessor. NPD caps excessive private-sector gains; instead, profits are reinvested into 
the public domain. Moreover, the SPV board is steered by subordinated debt-holders, as well 
as a public Authority, charity or community representative. In this regard, NPD has been 
extolled for its capacity to collaboratively facilitate stakeholder engagement in the decision-
making process (Asenova and Beck, 2015).  
Scotland has also developed the Scottish-Futures-Trust (SFT) Hub initiative. The SFT Hub 
resembles other ‘PFI-lite’ schemes such as the BSF and LIFT programmes, so much so, 
according to Asenova and Beck (2015), Hub guidance documentation specifically 
acknowledges the parallels between itself and other existing arrangements in the UK. The 
first Hub project was undertaken in August of 2009 for the provision of social infrastructure 
in the south-east region of Scotland. The project was valued at £64m and comprised the 
provision of health and education facilities. Similar to other PPP programmes, it is a 20-year 
JV partnership between a private partner and public-sector cohort encompassing the SFT, 
local councils and other public-sector bodies within the region. The Hub initiatives key 
objectives are to (Scottish Executive, 2006): 
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I. Improve local services through public-private joint service provision; 
II. Deliver a sustained programme of community infrastructure investment through 
public-private collaboration; 
III. Provide a sustainable and effective procurement model for public bodies; and 
IV. Develop a best-practice framework. 
Like other PFI modalities, a local ‘HubCo’ is allocated the responsibility of designing, building, 
financing and managing a portfolio of projects; however, through greater flexibility and 
community inclusion, it is argued, the Hub will be better positioned to accrue better 
investment impact than that on offer through conventional procurement channels (Scottish 
Government, 2006). Over its initial 10 years, it is expected the Hub will channel £2bn of 
investment into social infrastructure (SFT, 2016). Despite these changes in Scotland, as early 
as 2010, Wamuziri (2010) raised concerns over the timescales and costs incurred to bring 
projects to financial close in this nascent PPP modality. Moreover, concerns have been raised 
in regard to competition and excessive profits closely reflecting many of the inherent 
criticisms of PFI (McCall, 2017). 
3.4.4.4. Wales 
Just as all other regions have reformed their PPP frameworks, so too has the Welsh 
Assembly. In 2017, the Mutual Investment Model (MIM) was announced as a successor to 
PFI. Much like PFI, this is a design, build, finance and management contract between the 
public and private-sectors, though there are distinctions within this framework from PFI. The 
MIM now has a requirement whereby during the development of the facilities, the private-
sector cohort will create apprenticeships and traineeships by which to benefit the 
community (Welsh Government, 2017). Currently, MIM is available for both social and 
economic infrastructure development and it is actively being considered for three projects, 
namely; the Velindre Cancer Centre in Cardiff, the A465, and the 21st Century Schools 
Programme, which collectively comprise around £1bn of investment (Welsh Government, 
2017). The first project is due to come onto the market in July 2018. 
Notwithstanding the introduction of these changed policies, UK PPP has failed to recover to 
the previous levels of activity exhibited prior to the GFC. The latest figures reveal that on 
average, over the previous two years, the total value of UK PPP transactions to achieve 
financial close; comprising both economic and social infrastructure, equates to around a 
tenth (£0.5bn) of those which were agreed in 2007-08 (£5.5bn) (NAO, 2018).  
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NAO (2018) identified that there are still challenges confronting the utilisation of PPP; with 
some questioning whether these new models are in fact rebranded permutations of PFI. NAO 
highlighted concerns over the true extent of VfM and performance efficiencies. Significantly, 
NAO identified how, in 2011, rather than collect data, investigate the lessons to be learnt 
from PFI and apply these findings to the replacement models, the motivations to reform PFI 
were financial driven and implemented in response to: the higher private financing costs; to 
address the public and governmental criticisms of PFI; and to address uncertainty in the 
marketplace (NAO, 2018). Set against these findings, this research argues that these 
modified frameworks have failed to address the inherent inefficiencies of the previous PFI; 
this assertion being ratified by the limited uptake of PPP since the GFC. Hence, the purpose 
of the next section is to investigate the true inherent inefficiencies of UK PPP preventing its 
resurgence to the position where it is a credible vehicle for ‘more and better’ social 
infrastructure provision.  
3.5. Inefficiencies Confronting United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social 
Infrastructure Provision 
PPP is considered more complex than traditional procurement methods which serves to 
exacerbate the complexities inherent to the infrastructure concept. Project financing, long-
term contracts, the need for cross-sectoral governance, balancing stakeholder needs and a 
new involvement capacity for the public-sector, these factors have culminated in a complex 
delivery model. As such, practitioners and participating organisations require a unique set of 
skill-sets which are multi-dimensional across all aspects of infrastructure investment and 
provision. This has meant that often many of the participating organisations of PPP do not 
have the skills in-house and therefore must employ external advisors and consultants to fill 
legal, financial and technical skills gaps. By doing so, this drives up transaction costs, which 
when combined with the costs of bid preparation and an expensive procurement process, 
collectively PPP is associated with high costs. Indeed, Zhang et al. (2012) calculated that on 
average, UK PPP tendering costs equated to 2.6% of the project value and spanned an 
average of 34 months.  
The seismic resource demands associated with PPP has meant private-sector appetite to bid 
on PPP ventures has been curtailed and that that only a limited number of organisations 
have the wherewithal to participate. This has created barriers to entry into the marketplace, 
and therein diminished market competition (DeSchepper et al., 2015). This is an important 
point when set in the context of uncertainty of project progression. Consequentially, this has 
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engineered a highly pressurised environment as SPVs compete for the project and it is no 
surprise that literature highlights that this competitive procurement process has been highly 
contentious. Emanating out of this contentious environment, it has been challenging to 
agree terms which has driven up bidding costs and elongated project timescales 
(DeSchepper et al., 2015; Wong et al., 2015). Some have already identified the procurement 
process as the fulcrum in the PPP lifecycle and in response research has offered contributions 
to address the inefficiencies inherent to this process. Nevertheless, interviews carried out by 
Liu et al. (2016) revealed that the procurement process still requires significant streamlining 
and cost reduction. 
Appetite to participate in PPP has also been impacted by the absence of a defined project 
pipeline. Literature demonstrates that a proactive deal flow has a positive effect on 
competition and project cost, for example Iyer and Sagheer (2012) considered the nexus 
between bid-winning and price increase in the presence of a project pipeline. Xu et al. (2012) 
also in their system dynamics model included competition for pricing ventures. These papers 
found that strategic proactive planning is a central component to stimulating market 
confidence. Equally, Xu et al. (2012) found that statistically, in the presence of an investment 
programme, mark-ups were lower which culminated in reduced private-sector transaction 
costs as well as lower government procurement costs. Accordingly, in the absence of a 
strategic pipeline, there is now an opportunity for greater research into innovative financial 
vehicles capable of levering the requisite capital into the market and proactive strategic 
planning to encourage greater private-sector participation.  
Another inefficiency of PPP has been the cost of private capital. Typically, a government can 
borrow capital at a cheaper rate than private financing offers derived out of the lower risk 
of default (IMF, 2004; Wolf, 2008; OECD, 2008). The Financial Times (2013) estimated that 
the average cost of borrowing from the private-sector equates to around 2.2% more than 
conventional borrowing. When contextualised to over 700 PPP ventures, this poignantly 
equates to around 40 new hospitals.  
Also, change in the markets following the GFC has meant the availability of private capital 
has been acutely reduced. Demirag et al. (2015) identified that financing appetite has been 
curtailed both on the part of debt funders as well as equity shareholders as a result of the 
introductions of Basel III and Solvency II. Basel III has been a watershed for the infrastructure 
lending community as it necessitates greater levels of liquidity and capital availability. This 
has meant that the long-term capital-intensive nature of infrastructure is less attractive as 
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an investment opportunity. Of the investors who have preferred to enter the market via 
project bond instruments, the collapse of the monoline insurance market and the 
evaporation of the wrapping previously offered has also resulted in greater levels of 
illiquidity and restricted capital availability (Della Croce et al., 2015). The situation is much 
the same for equity investment fund managers and other institutional investors which have 
been constrained by the introduction of the Solvency II directive. This has reduced the 
number of private institutions in an already limited market. For those who have remained, 
they are adopting a more cautious approach which is serving to drive up the cost of private 
capital (Haran et al., 2013; RICS, 2013). Moreover, many conventional lenders who 
historically have been willing to provide all senior debt, are now mitigating risk exposure 
through syndicated loans.  
PPP has also become heavily criticised. Referred to as a political football, for some time, the 
increased cost of borrowing from the private-sector has been a source of much political 
condemnation. Also, the windfall profits gained by the private-sector, combined with the 
inefficiencies of PFI has meant there is little appetite for PPP. Instead, some have argued 
there are other superior mechanisms with the wherewithal to provide  social infrastructure 
(Demirag et al., 2015). The politicisation of PPP impacts private-sector appetite by 
engendering uncertainty and thereby adding to the risk profile. If the UK government is to 
lever alternative sources of capital in UK PPP frameworks, there is scope for further research 
to investigate the correlation between political risk, the cost of capital and commitment.  
Literature proposes that the public has been marginalisation in PPP frameworks. This has 
resulted in scepticism and dissatisfaction with partnering frameworks. The argument against 
directly involving the public in PPP decision-making has been premised on the notion that 
these ventures are too complex to be understood by the layman. Instead, the public has had 
to rely on the public-sector Authority to represent their stake. Notwithstanding this, 
Rwelamila et al. (2014) argued that the Authority has failed to represent the needs of the 
public. This poor involvement and engagement has consequentially engendered distrust of 
these frameworks, and ultimately, this has transpired in project failure.  
Risk has been an important justification for PPP mobilisation over conventional procurement 
vehicles. Ideologically, in PPP, risk is allocated to the party best able to manage it. However, 
the residual prevalence of risk in research suggests it remains an outstanding area 
commanding further development. Many have already forged attempts at defining and 
quantifying risk in PPP. Such examples include Chang (2013) who investigated risk allocation 
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in PPP contracts through the lens of transaction cost economics. Cheung et al. (2013) 
assessed risk in a dynamic PPP environment. Whereas, Xiong et al. (2017) approached risk 
management from an ex-post scenario. Despite these offerings, Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016) felt research must offer wider consideration to risk on the grounds construction risk 
no longer is as prominent as once thought.  
Spanning multiple decades, the requirements of a PPP project can change over time. Hertogh 
and Westerveld (2010) suggested that the main sources of change typically are brought 
about by project stakeholders. However, as project dynamics evolve, the incompleteness 
and poor flexibility of PPP contracts is an inefficiency associated with PPP. An example of this 
is the use of the output specification. The output specification is the control framework used 
to measure the service provision. By stipulating the service performance through the output 
specification, it has been suggested that the private cohort is given space to innovate and 
design an optimal solution. Yet, set against the scale and longevity of these contracts, some 
have argued that it is impossible to specify all relevant service requirements and as a result 
this inevitably transpires in required alterations to the services or physical facilities 
(Henjewele et al., 2011). Indeed, a recent NAO (2018) report indicates the poor flexibility and 
incompleteness of the contract is still a major inefficiency in current PPP models.  
Transparency and information sharing have been on-going inefficiencies confronting use of 
PPP. In 2011, NAO was critical of the opaqueness of PFI. This problem has persisted, and it 
was identified as a prevailing concern in an updated NAO (2018) assessment. It was observed 
that in the vacuum of quantifiable data, it has been impossible to accurately assess the 
performance of PPP projects, and as a result, this has compounded concerns over VfM. Poor 
transparency and information sharing has derived from both the public and private-sectors. 
Mukhopadhyay (2016) identified two examples of this. The authors highlighted that despite 
calls for greater transparency from the public-sector from the private-sector, the contractual 
nature of PPP has discouraged ProjCo from sharing project costs particularly pertaining to 
the lifecycle. In much the same way, when private-sector investors have sought greater 
clarification on the performance of other projects on which to base their investments, the 
public-sector has been unwilling to share this information. Transparency is hence a two-way 
channel and has been propagated across literature. The identification of transparency and 
information sharing as part of the NAO (2018) findings indicate there are appropriate 
grounds for research.  
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Transcending multiple phases and spanning several decades, Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016) highlighted the need to develop a strategy to retain experience and knowledge as a 
means to bolster the productivity of these frameworks. Knowledge should be shared within 
projects, across sectors, and inherent to sectors. This can facilitate the development of a 
best-practice framework. Roehrich et al. (2014) agreed, identifying that a failure to centralise 
and retain intellectual capital has meant best-practice lessons from previous ventures have 
not been taken advantage of. This inefficiency has been exacerbated by the high specificity 
and heterogeneity of PPP and infrastructure provision (Pretorious et al., 2008).  
Hall (2015) was also critical of PPP because it enables the private-sector to influence public 
services provision. Hall (2015) felt that by involving the private-sector in public-sector 
decision-making may result in the embedding of commercial values in public services. He 
argued this may transpire in staff downsizing and service cuts, and ultimately, an impact on 
service quality. Hall (2015) based this contention on the grounds that only those projects 
which are the most commercially viable proceed rather than those most in need. This serves 
to crowd out and divert investment away from public services that are not profitable.  
In a similar vein, naysayers of PPP have claimed that the long-term tenor of PPP diverts 
resources away from other public-services. To meet the affordability gap, Hall (2015) claimed 
that resources are often channelled away from other public-sector departments and on 
some occasions the PPP cohort has deliberately reduced the size and availability of services 
which were not financially fruitful to maximise profits. With this in mind, research could 
explore the areas of PPP decision-making, coupled with the relationship between 
stakeholder behaviours and motivations.  
Contractual governance has been identified as an important inefficiency in PPP 
infrastructure provision (Leiringer, 2003; Teisman and Klijn, 2003; Smith and Wohlstetter, 
2006; Waring et al., 2013). Ho and Tsui (2009) suggested that project costs have been 
escalated predicated on contractual governance. Contractual governance has engender 
partnership-based problems; has delayed and aggravated renegotiations; and has 
constituted hold-up problems. Cruz and Marques (2013) argued PPP should adopt a pro-
active governance approach instead of a reactive approach. Nevertheless, the prevalence of 
alternative governing systems in research suggests there is space for further investigation 
into governance protocols.  
In line with collaborative governance, literature suggests collaboration should extend 
beyond key stakeholders and include the supply chain. Comprising a network of both public 
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and private-sector organisations, there is a large matrix of stakeholders in a PPP project; all 
of whom possess different objectives and roles. Many now assert that there is a need for a 
greater alignment of objectives, trust and communication, better stakeholder engagement 
and relational procurement. This requires a fundamental recalibration of the partnering 
ethos. These issues have further been compounded by power asymmetry, skills imbalances 
and opportunistic behaviour (DeSchepper et al., 2013). Against the background of 
contractual governance, research points towards the degeneration of the partnership and 
the stakeholder network as a primary source of poor project performance (Zou et al., 2013; 
Jefferies et al., 2014; Roehrich et al., 2014; Jefferies and Rowlinson, 2016; Burke and 
Demirag, 2017; O’Nolan and Reeves, 2017).  
Indeed, stretching as far back as to the conception of PPP in the UK, there were questions 
asked how the public and private-sectors could reconcile their differences and tangibly work 
together. Resultantly, the notion of collaboration has been a touted as a central component 
of PPP project success; something which continues to be prioritised in newer PPP models in 
order to ensure long-term sustainability. The importance of collaboration, while having been 
recognised for some time, has accordingly gathered momentum lately in PPP discord as a 
concept to bridge the gap between sectors and to address many of the inefficiencies 
identified above.  
It is therefore no surprise that within industry and academia alike, there has been an increase 
in the number of collaborative investigations; case in point, Burke and Demirag (2017) 
investigated how better collaborative relationships can improve risk in PPP. In doing so, they 
determined that collaborative partnering correlated to better risk transfer. Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016), in their PPP roadmap, discussing the contract in PPP, they argued that 
through greater collaboration, as unforeseen circumstances arise, stakeholders are less 
reliant upon the contract to determine the outcome. Instead, issues can be resolved in an 
equitable manner. Similarly, Liu and Wilkinson (2014) determined that collaborative 
governance structures and a partnership-based consortium was instrumental in driving PPP 
project success in their research. Whereas, Walker and Lloyd-Walker (2015) examined 
collaboration in large infrastructure projects. Through 36 expert interviews, they established 
that collaboration was a lynchpin in nurturing trust. Cohen (2010) examined six case-studies 
which undertook an Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) strategy. From their findings, it was 
found that cost and time certainty was improved through greater transparency, as well as 
knowledge and information sharing; all of which was facilitated through greater 
collaboration. Jefferies et al. (2014) reported collaboration as an integral component of long-
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term flexibility in infrastructure provision and an enabler of growth and evolution. 
Furthermore, Ibrahim et al. (2013) recognised that collaboration improved project 
performance in New Zealand infrastructure provision, while Waring et al. (2014) pointed 
towards collaboration as an important concept in bringing organisations together with 
heterogenous project objectives.  
Of the 19 inefficiencies identified above, literature continues to promote collaboration as a 
concept by which to improve PPP project success. Table 3.1 is a matrix which displays the 19 
inefficiencies identified in literature, the corresponding authors who listed these 
inefficiencies, and authors who have promoted collaboration as the concept by which to 
address these inefficiencies. Against this backdrop, this research will therefore investigate 
stakeholder collaboration in PPP for the provision of ‘more and better’ UK social 
infrastructure. 
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Table 3.1: Inefficiencies Confronting ‘More and Better’ UK PPP Social Infrastructure 
Provision 
Attribute Author(s) Collaborative Author(s) 
Complex 
delivery model 
Cantarelli et al. (2012); LAO (2012); 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) 
Cantarelli et al. (2012); Liu et al. 
(2014); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016) 
Contract Henjewele et al. (2011); Roehrich and 
Caldwell (2012); Reynaers (2013); 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016); 
Demirel et al. (2017) 
HM Treasury (2012); Roehrich and 
Caldwell (2012); Reynaers (2013); 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016); 
Demirel et al. (2017) 
Contractual 
governance 
Cruz and Marques (2013); Liu and 
Wilkinson (2014); Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016); Demirel et al. 
(2017) 
Clifton and Duffield (2006); Jefferies et 
al. (2014); Demirel et al. (2017) 
Output 
performance 
specification 
Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2008); 
Henjewele et al. (2011); Javed et al. 
(2014); Lam and Javed (2014); 
Roumboutsos and Saussier (2014); 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) 
Javed et al. (2014); Lam and Javed 
(2014); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016) 
High specificity 
and limited 
repeatability of 
projects 
Pretorious et al. (2008) Pretorious et al. (2008); Buchanan et 
al. (2014) 
High 
transaction 
costs 
Ho and Tsui (2009); DeSchepper et al. 
(2015); Wong et al. (2015) 
Ho and Tsui (2009); Ng et al. (2012); 
DeSchepper et al. (2015); Wong et al. 
(2015); Liu et al. (2016) 
Higher project 
value 
Vecchi et al. (2013) HM Treasury (2012) 
Increased cost 
of private 
finance 
LAO (2012); Vecchi et al. (2013); 
Demirag et al. (2015); Hall (2015) 
Buchanan et al. (2014); Della Croce 
and Gatti (2014); Ehlers (2014); Della 
Croce et al. (2015) 
Long-term 
financial 
commitment 
Vecchi et al. (2013); Demirag et al. 
(2015); Zou and Yang (2016) 
HM Treasury (2012); Della Croce and 
Gatti (2014); Ehlers (2014); Della Croce 
et al. (2015) 
Market 
Competition 
Iyer and Sagheer (2012); LAO (2012); 
Xu et al. (2012); Vecchi et al. (2013); 
Liu et al. (2014); Demirag et al. (2015); 
De Clerck et al. (2016) 
Demirag et al. (2015); De Clerck et al. 
(2016) 
Partnership 
and 
stakeholder 
network 
DeSchepper et al. (2013); Shaoul et al. 
(2013); Zou et al. (2013); Jefferies et al. 
(2014); Roehrich et al. (2014); Jefferies 
and Rowlinson (2016); Burke and 
Demirag (2017); O’Nolan and Reeves 
(2017( 
Smyth and Edkins (2007); Foo et al. 
(2011); Zou et al. (2013); DeSchepper 
et al. (2014); McErlane et al. (2016);  
Politicisation Willems and Van Dooren (2014); 
Asquith et al. (2015); Demirag et al. 
(2015) 
Demirag et al. (2015) 
Poor external 
stakeholder 
engagement 
and 
involvement 
Henjewele et al. (2013); Raynears 
(2013); Tang et al. (2013); Raynears 
aand DeGraff (2014); Ng et al. (2014); 
Rwelamila et al. (2014) 
Foo et al. (2011); Henjewele et al. 
(2013); Ng et al. (2013); Raynears 
(2013); Tang et al. (2013); Zou et al. 
(2013);  
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Poor 
knowledge 
retention and 
management 
Roehrich et al. (2014); Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) 
Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); 
Roehrich et al. (2014); Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) 
Poor 
transparency 
and 
Information 
sharing 
Koontz and Thomas (2014); Hall 
(2015); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016); Mukhopadhyay (2016) 
Liu et al. (2013); Koontz and Thomas 
(2014); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016); Mukhopadhyay (2016) 
Procurement 
Process 
Ng et al. (2012: Zhang et al. (2012); 
Tang and Shen (2013); Demirag et al. 
(2015); Wong et al. (2015); Liu et al. 
(2016) 
Zhang et al. (2012); Tang and Shen 
(2013); Demirag et al. (2015); 
DeSchepper et al. (2015); Liu et al. 
(2016); O’Nolan and Reeves (2017) 
Project 
Pipeline 
KPMG (2010); Iyer and Sagheer (2012); 
Xu et al. (2012); De Clerck et al. (2016) 
KPMG (2010); Xu et al. (2012); De 
Clerck et al. (2016) 
Reconfiguratio
n of services 
Hall (2015) Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Tang 
and Shen (2013); World Bank et al. 
(2016) 
Risk Vazquez and Frederico, (2012); Chang 
(2013); Cheung et al. (2013); Roehrich 
et al. (2014); Demirag et al. (2015); 
Hall (2015); Loosemore and Cheung, 
(2015); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016); Xiong et al. (2017) 
Cannings (2014); Demirag et al. 
(2015); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016); Burke and Demirag (2017) 
 
3.6. Summary 
This chapter has considered the PPP concept to fulfil objective two of the research which 
was centred on critically evaluating the role of PPP as a vehicle for ‘more and better’ social 
infrastructure provision in the UK. It has identified PPP is now a nuanced concept with many 
interpretations and uses. Notwithstanding these differences, ultimately it is the cross-
sectoral partnership which is the defining characteristic of PPP.  
The research has also examined PPP in the context of the UK and determined how it can 
deliver ‘more and better’ infrastructure. It was found that UK PPP has undergone major 
reformations following the GFC. These reformations, theoretically, were introduced for the 
bilateral purpose of addressing the inherent inefficiencies of the previous PFI framework and 
also to identify and lever alternative sources of capital into PPP. Despite these changes, it 
was identified that PPP has lost momentum and there are still inefficiencies confronting 
‘more and better’ PPP social infrastructure. In total, the research identified 19 inefficiencies.  
Grounded in a cross-sectoral partnership, collaboration has been a prevailing theme extolled 
as a mechanism to address the inefficiencies of these frameworks. Moreover, literature 
asserts that collaboration has an important role in encouraging wider participation from 
alternative sources of capital in infrastructure investment. Despite the salience of 
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collaboration, as part of this chapter, it was unearthed that historically UK PPP has been 
contractual, and these arrangements have been more reflective of an outsourcing 
arrangement as opposed to a partnership. It is therefore argued that there is a knowledge 
gap pertaining to PPP stakeholder collaboration. The next chapter, chapter four, will thus 
examine collaboration between stakeholders in UK PPP social infrastructure provision to 
fulfil objective three.    
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
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4. An Examination of the Partnership 
4.1. Introduction 
In chapter two, the study identified that there are pertinent indicators signifying the need 
for social infrastructure investment in the United Kingdom (UK). It also established that 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) is a credible mechanism to provide ‘more and better’ social 
infrastructure in the UK. Still, more recently, UK PPP has undergone profound 
transformations as the UK government has reformed this mechanism to stimulate new 
sources of finance as well as to address many of the inherent inefficiencies within previous 
partnering frameworks.  
Fundamentally grounded in a cross-sectoral partnership, there is now acknowledgement 
that collaboration must play a central role in improving the project performance of PPP as 
well as underpinning the sustainability of the partnership. In addition to this, as alternative 
sources of capital enter the PPP space, there is a need for greater collaboration between 
these financial institutions and the PPP community to unlock these wider sources of finance. 
Notwithstanding the importance of collaboration, determined in chapter three, 
collaborative partnering remains a pertinent knowledge gap.  
The purpose of objective three is to critically examine collaboration in the partnership of UK 
PPP social infrastructure projects. However, despite the prominence of the collaborative 
concept throughout PPP literature, there is much discord in research as to who should be 
included in these partnering arrangements, as well as an information void pertaining to a 
system by which to understand how they are involved. Against this backdrop, in preparation 
for the PPP stakeholder collaboration investigation to fulfil objective three, the research 
must determine the PPP social infrastructure stakeholder (SIS) boundary specification. By 
doing so, this will provide the research with the necessary foundations by which to develop 
PPP stakeholder collaboration.  
To bridge this knowledge gap, this chapter considers stakeholder theory as the framework 
to develop this boundary specification. This constitutes an extensive exploration of 
stakeholder theory to determine the normative characteristics which define stakeholders in 
addition to the mechanisms used to understand them. The findings from this consideration 
will subsequently be applied to the PPP context to identify SIS organisations and assess the 
dynamics of the partnership across the PPP lifecycle. Having done this, the research will then 
undertake a critical examination of this PPP SIS boundary specification to determine the 
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sources of collaboration gaps in preparation for chapter five. This chapter is therefore 
structured as follows:  
• Consideration of the PPP partnership boundary specification; 
• The identification of PPP SIS; 
• An assessment of the partnership boundary specification; and 
• A critical examination of the partnership boundary specification. 
 
4.2. Public-Private Partnerships Partnership Boundary Specification 
Carrol and Buchholtz (2006) explained that during any undertaking, a project will associate 
itself with a number of organisations, which will in-turn present these parties with claims, 
rights and expectations. Being intrinsic to any project, both success and failure are often 
contingent upon stakeholder contributions, therefore the capture of stakeholder input 
should form a critical component of any project development (El-Gohary et al., 2006). 
Huxham and Vangen (2005) agreed, explaining, collaborations are complex structures. This 
complexity is often the source of ambiguity and confusion which historically has served to 
undermine the collaborative dynamics. In this regard, a fundamental cornerstone of 
collaboration is the determination of a ‘boundary specification’. A boundary specification is 
the process of determining who should be included in the collaboration and understanding 
how they are involved. Still, in-spite of the salience of a boundary specification, within PPP 
literature there has been much discord over who is considered as a PPP social infrastructure 
stakeholder (SIS).  
In 2003, Newcombe reported that the structure and nature of the construction industry had 
undergone significant changes over the last 50 years with normative approaches of that time 
being no longer reflective of stakeholder arrangements. He contended that the organisation 
or the project, rather than being a single entity has instead transformed to a pluralism of 
multiple stakeholders with shifting and often conflicting goals. Consequentially, there is now 
a realisation of the importance of deploying a wider, holistic approach to SIS inclusion. 
Chinyio and Akintoye (2008) deemed this transition to a more modern inclusive mind-set to 
have emerged out of the introduction of complex forms of construction procurement; 
particularly that of PPP. 
In PPP literature, the discussion of who are the SIS worthy of inclusion remains topical. 
Subscribing to Newcombe’s standpoint of multiple stakeholders, PPP SIS generically can be 
termed as either public or private derivatives; however, according to Henjewele et al. (2013), 
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a narrow approach has conventionally been undertaken for PPP SIS identification. In view of 
this, this has transpired in little agreement on SIS, which has been expressed through many; 
both in academia and industry, propagating cases for wider stakeholder inclusion.  
In the past, PPP SIS have been determined by their involvement in the project. Foo et al. 
(2011) were of the opinion that logically the decision-makers directly involved in the delivery 
of the infrastructure are the key stakeholders, i.e. those appointed with roles and 
responsibilities. Following this line of thinking, many have embarked upon investigations 
pertaining to the public-sector Authority and the private-sector Project Company (ProjCo) 
and its constituent members (Chinyere, 2013; Zou et al., 2013). Henjewele et al. (2013) 
remarked that the strength of this partnership between these actors is fundamental to the 
project success and felt that the arrangements between these organisations was the 
lynchpin of Value for Money (VfM). Agreeing, others have sought to improve the 
sustainability of these working arrangements (Grubnic and Hodges, 2003; Smyth and Edkins, 
2007; Zou et al., 2013).  
Whereas many consider the Authority as the key public-sector SIS, Patel and Robinson (2010) 
believed consideration ought to be lent to other government bodies such as local councils, 
as well as social and educational institutions. Roehrich and Caldwell (2012) and Henjewele 
et al. (2012) both testified to this inclusion of other governmental departments, although 
differently they maintained approving authorities within the government hold significant 
influence and should be considered SIS. In addition to this, Shaoul (2005) reported that 
government bodies outside the bureaucratic chain including staff of the facility and trade 
unions, despite being critical to the project success, have historically been overlooked, and 
their voices unheard. In a similar manner, others claimed that private-sector consultants who 
are appointed to address complex matters including legal, financial and other specialist roles 
should be included (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Consoli, 2006). Alternatively, some have 
considered wider private-sector inclusion of the supply-chain encompassing suppliers and 
subcontractors as SIS (NAO, 2007; Tan, 2007). Differently again, more recently, it has been 
claimed that the public-sector Authority failed to effectively represent the sentiments of 
society; therefore, it has been argued that further SIS inclusion should be extended to the 
public. Many agreed with Henjewele et al. (2013) who termed the public as the ‘principal 
stakeholder’ constituted from community members, customers, environmentalists, the 
media and other third parties (Foo et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2013; Chan and Cheung, 2014). 
El-Gohary et al. (2006), Henjewele et al. (2013) and Rwelamila et al. (2014), though 
recognising ProjCo and the Authority as the key stakeholders, suggested, failure to include 
79 
 
 
 
wider society has generated scepticism of PPP projects. In line with this, Rwelamila et al. 
(2014) believed the public has been marginalised premised on the assumption PPP is too 
complex to be effectively understood.  
Table 4.1: Proposed SIS in Literature 
Stakeholder Author(s) 
Advisors and Consultants Grimsey and Lewis (2005); Tan (2007) 
Community members El-Gohary et al. (2006); Patel and Robinson (2010); Foo et al. (2011) 
Customer / user El-Gohary et al. (2006); Foo et al. (2011); UNESCAP (2011); Chen et 
al. (2013); Chan and Cheung (2014) 
Employees Patel and Robinson (2010); Foo et al. (2011); Chan and Cheung 
(2014) 
Environmentalists El-Gohary et al. (2006) 
Public Chen et al. (2013); Henjewele et al. (2013); Ng et al. (2013); 
Rwelamila et al. (2014) 
Insurers Grimsey and Lewis (2005); Tan (2007) 
Local councils Patel and Robinson (2010) 
Media representatives El-Gohary et al. (2006) 
Other governmental bodies Shaoul (2005); Tan (2007); Patel and Robinson (2010); Roehrich 
and Caldwell (2012) 
Other third parties Tan (2007); UNESCAP (2011) 
Politicians Shaoul et al. (2013) 
Public-sector Authority RICS (1998); Grimsey and Lewis (2005); El-Gohary et al. (2006);  
Smyth and Edkins (2007); Tan (2007); NAO (2007); Patel and 
Robinson (2010); Blanken and Dewulf (2010); UNESCAP (2011); Foo 
et al. (2011); Chinyere (2013); Zou et al. (2013); Chen et al. (2013); 
Chinyere and Xu (2013); Henjewele et al. (2013); Ng et al. (2013); 
Waring et al. (2013); Chan and Cheung (2014); DeSchepper et al. 
(2014); Rwelamila et al. (2014); Burke and Demirag (2017) 
Ratings agencies Grimsey and Lewis (2005) 
Social institutions El-Gohary et al. (2006); Patel and Robinson (2010) 
Project Company and its 
constituent members; 
Debt Funders 
Construction Contractors 
Equity Shareholders 
Service Providers 
RICS (1998); Grimsey and Lewis (2005); El-Gohary et al. (2006);  
Smyth and Edkins (2007); Tan (2007); NAO (2007); Patel and 
Robinson (2010); Blanken and Dewulf (2010); UNESCAP (2011); Foo 
et al. (2011); Chinyere (2013); Zou et al. (2013); Chen et al. (2013); 
Chinyere and Xu (2013); Henjewele et al. (2013); Ng et al. (2013); 
Waring et al. (2013); Chan and Cheung (2014); DeSchepper et al. 
(2014); Rwelamila et al. (2014); Burke and Demirag (2017) 
Sub-contractors Hickman (2000); NAO (2007); Tan (2007) 
Suppliers Hickman (2000); NAO (2007); Tan (2007) 
 
Against this backdrop, there is evidently much disparity over PPP SIS inclusion. Listed in table 
4.1, literature suggests 21 organisations. To reconcile this disparity, the research will turn to 
stakeholder theory to determine a theoretically robust PPP SIS boundary specification. 
Stakeholder theory has been used in similar research and it has grown in popularity as a lens 
by which to examine business relationships as well as partnering in PPP (see Newcombe, 
2003; Henjewele et al., 2013; DeSchepper et al., 2013; McErlane et al., 2016; Burke and 
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Demirag, 2017). Premised on this popularity, the research will now consider stakeholder 
theory. 
4.2.1. Stakeholder Theory 
The emergence of stakeholders in literature can be recorded back to Stanford Research 
Institute in 1963, appearing in an international memorandum; however, Freeman (1984) is 
often credited with the origination of stakeholder theory into the management domain with 
his seminal publication “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach” (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). According to Moloney (2006) and Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory 
evolved out of corporate social responsibility (CSR), organisation theory, systems theory and 
corporate planning, giving consideration to ethical, social and economic concerns. 
Stakeholder theory is separate from other theories insofar as it considers morals and values 
central to the management of an organisation (Phillips et al., 2003). Freeman (1984) claimed 
stakeholder theory fundamentally is centred on “the principle of who or what really counts”, 
offering approaches for organisational management to consider the interests of other 
parties.  
The introduction of ‘stakeholding’ was predominantly created to differentiate and 
understand business organisations as opposed to the traditional shareholder view. Freeman 
observed that practices at that time were unequipped to deal with the acute changes going 
on in the business environment; particularly with those externally associated with the firm, 
i.e. beyond shareholders. Freeman (1984) conversely felt managers should “take into 
account all those groups and individuals that can affect, or are affected by, the 
accomplishment of the business enterprise”. Accordingly, stakeholder theory attempts to 
categorise stakeholders, understand them and their interests, and forecast their behaviour 
(Freeman, 1984).  
The popularity and realisation of the importance of stakeholders has been steadily growing; 
particularly in the UK. Over the last decade, the UK has been the largest national academic 
producer of stakeholder related literature accounting for almost a quarter (22%) with 
construction being the sector of primary attention (Littau et al., 2010). A potential 
justification for rise in popularity may be due to the practical value in understanding 
stakeholders (Choi and Wang, 2009; Henjewele et al., 2013; DeSchepper et al., 2014; Tantalo 
and Priem, 2014). Further reasoning may potentially be attributed to stakeholder theory’s 
ability to be merged with other fields and theories. Originating in strategic management, 
stakeholder theory has developed and grown, and now is instrumental in various fields 
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including organisation theory (Rowley, 1997) and business ethics (Starik, 1995). Other 
examples include that of Mitchell et al. (1997) who combined stakeholder theory with 
agency, resource dependence and cost transaction theories while others have merged 
stakeholder theory into ‘theory of the firm’ (Bouckaert and Vandenhove, 1998) and principal 
agency theory (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). Carrol (1989) incorporated stakeholder theory 
into organising business and society topics, while Hill and Jones (1992) blended 
‘stakeholding’ with corporate social performance (CSP). Resultantly, stakeholder theory 
extends beyond business and society fields and has been exported into other industries 
including Information Technology (IT), facilities and utilities, process industries, 
manufacturing, agriculture, construction (Littau, 2010), sport and recreation (Mason and 
Slack, 1997) and urban affairs (Friedman and Mason, 2004). 
Despite stakeholder theory’s growing enthusiasm, some have been critical of the approach, 
premised on what Phillips et al. (2003) termed; ‘critical distortions and friendly 
misinterpretations’. Jensen (2000) claimed stakeholder theory is actually an excuse for 
managerial opportunism, asserting that the theory lacks a specific objective function for the 
firm. Others argued that it acts as a barrier to entrepreneurial risk and complicates corporate 
governance (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). Possibly the most significant criticism surrounds 
whether stakeholder theory is a theory in its own right. Jones (1995) reported stakeholder 
theory lacked empirical validation. This argument was reiterated over a decade later by 
Laplume et al. (2008). In line with this, Koschmann (2007) deemed that the theory contains 
little theoretical development in and of itself, but rather most growth has been derived from 
other theories. Rowley (1997) argued that stakeholder theory is in-fact a handmaiden theory 
i.e. one that is used to support the development of other theories, rather than one becoming 
the subject of its own development.  
In response to these criticisms and to nullify these objections, Freeman collaborated with 
Phillips and Wicks (Phillips et al., 2003) to directly respond to these criticisms. Phillips et al. 
(2003) deduced and concluded that these proposed faults were resultant of two widely 
deployed critical approaches i.e. the straw persons and the evil genie arguments, which are 
criticisms apparent in all theoretical approaches. Moreover, Freeman (1984) in his earlier 
work, although acknowledging the importance of empirical development, promoted 
‘conceptual rigor’ as an adequate means of negating a lack of empirical research.  
In their concluding remarks, Laplume et al. (2008) found empirical stakeholder theory 
literature to have ‘plateaued’ in recent years. Freeman et al. (2010) promoted the idea of 
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further investigation into stakeholder interaction, stakeholder relationships over time and 
stakeholder metrics development (Cooper, 2014). Nevertheless, despite these calls for 
further research, stakeholder theory’s ubiquitous arrival into multiple disciplines may 
indicate its proclivity for moral and ethical organisational management.   
4.2.1.1. Defining Stakeholders 
Although now commonly used, the term ‘stakeholder’ remains a word which is not properly 
understood nor completely agreed upon (Friedman and Miles, 2006). Within stakeholder 
literature, Weiss (2006) asserts a ‘stake’ is a share or an interest in an enterprise and 
therefore a stakeholder can be inferred to be an individual with a ‘stake’. According to Littau 
et al. (2010), principally there are two typologies of stakeholder definitions delineated 
throughout stakeholder related literature. The first is those ‘who have a stake’ represented 
by one of the most commonly accepted definitions of a stakeholder by Freeman (1984); “a 
stakeholder in an organisation is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”. His description of 
stakeholders is one of the most widely deployed and accepted definitions appearing in 
management, business, organisational, network, communication and environmental science 
literature. The second typology pertains to those ‘who have a vested interest’ denoted by 
Cleland (1985). Although Littau et al. (2010) acknowledges there are other definitions, they 
are deemed to be either minor or mixed nuances of these two primary pillars of 
classification.  
The deployment of simplified themes i.e. those which can affect or be affected, ostensibly 
facilitates the extensive inclusion of a wider network of stakeholders, for example, 
employees, suppliers, financiers, environmentalists, communities, customers, competitors, 
consumer advice groups and so on (Freeman, 1984). However, the inclusion of multiple 
stakeholder groups has resulted in some considering this approach too broad to be 
effectively helpful in defining stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). Intended to be all-inclusive, 
these broad and simplified approaches are premised upon the assumption that these 
groupings will undergo further break-down (Freeman, 1984); however, some have suggested 
this tactic runs the risk of greater imprecision (Henjewele et al., 2013). By contrast, a narrow 
approach may be undertaken to identify stakeholders. A narrower approach is predicated 
on the idea that pragmatically all claims cannot be managed and hence must be prioritised. 
This approach determines stakeholders by those who have a vested stake, offering higher 
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accuracy and precision but potentially excluding important stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). 
In addition to broad and narrow approaches, other academics have endeavoured to define 
stakeholders through classification into differing typologies. De Kluyver and Pearce (2006) 
organised stakeholders into internal and externals depending on their role in achieving the 
mission statement and the values which they carry with them. Rawlins (2006) presented 
stakeholders as functional, normative, diffused or enabling, while Newcombe (2003) 
reported that conventionally stakeholders have been classified as primary or secondary. 
Primary stakeholders are the integral actors and are directly involved in the survival of the 
organisation; conversely, all others outside this relationship are termed as secondary and 
can either influence or be influenced by the organisation (Clarkson, 1995).  
Literature has equally considered the role of attributes in defining and determining 
stakeholders. Before discussing these attributes, it is pertinent to note that stakeholders are 
not static, but rather, they are dynamic (Freeman, 1984), meaning that their stand-point or 
position can shift over time. This point is relevant when coupled with Savage et al. (1991) 
who believed that to identify stakeholders, they must have an interest in the actions of a 
firm and can influence the firm. Accordingly, several theoretical models have been proposed 
to determine stakeholders and their salience across the life of a project (see Mitchell et al., 
1997; Frooman, 1999). Within these models, the construct of legitimacy is central; however, 
its exactitude and importance are inconsistent. Frooman (1999) questioned the significance 
of legitimacy comparative to other influencer’s ability to affect the direction of the firm. 
Nevertheless, although misaligned, legitimacy remains prevalent in relatively recent 
construction stakeholder literature (Chinyio and Olomolaiye, 2010; DeSchepper et al., 2014). 
Chinyio and Olomolaiye (2010) defined legitimacy as the validity a stakeholder has on the 
claim to a stake. Differently, older research proffered more extensive descriptions. 
Suchman’s (1995) terming of legitimacy as “a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” is popularly cited (Mitchell et al., 1997; 
DeSchepper et al., 2014; McErlane et al., 2016).  
Disagreeing with the foregoing, Freeman (1984) was of the opinion that anyone with a stake 
who can affect the organisation should be regarded as being legitimate, and subsequently, 
is deserved of attention regardless of the nature of their claims. Equally, Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) were of the opinion legitimacy seeks to differentiate between those who can 
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influence, and those who have a moral claim, and indeed, Mitchell et al. (1997) concurred. 
In their offering, Mitchell et al. (1997) noted the centrality legitimacy should play in 
preventing influencers exerting power over legitimate claims. Differently, Philips (2003) 
argued, that by possessing influence regardless of a moral claim, these parties, in line with 
the very notion of stakeholding, cannot be excluded. Rather than discount these actors, he 
proposed a nomenclature of stakeholders consisting normative, derivative and non-
stakeholders. Normative stakeholders 'are those whom the organisation has a moral 
obligation', derivative ‘are those whose actions and claims must be accounted for by 
managers due to their potential effects upon the organisation and its normative 
stakeholders', and non-stakeholders are those who possess neither influence nor a moral 
claim and can be excluded. Yet, just as this approach accounts for those with influence and 
those with claims, Phillips (2003) noted it may be difficult to distinguish between normative 
and derivative stakeholders. 
4.2.1.2. Understanding Stakeholder Involvement 
Just as stakeholder theory has produced many approaches to identifying stakeholders, it has 
also been an influential approach to understanding their involvement. As well as Freeman, 
others have profoundly added to the stakeholder theory stock of knowledge; in particular, 
work of that by Donaldson and Preston (1995). Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) major 
contribution demonstrated that stakeholder theory is principally divided into three 
theoretical taxonomies: 
a. Descriptive - describes and explains the behaviour and characteristics of the 
corporation, their nature, how they are managed, make decisions and operate, as 
well as its perspective to stakeholders.  
b. Instrumental - seeks to verify the linkage between organisations which are more 
responsive to stakeholders and the achievement of corporate objectives such as 
profitability and growth.  
c. Normative - describes the role of the organisation, and the identification of moral 
guidelines for operation and management of corporations.  
In addition to Donaldson and Preston, Mitchell et al. (1997) are often cited for their seminal 
contribution to stakeholder theory. Their paper sought to identify stakeholders and to 
determine their transitional salience. The authors suggest that stakeholding methods were 
too broad at the time and thus a framework was needed to determine who stakeholders are, 
and to what degree they should be afforded attention. Based on the possession of three 
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attributes: power; the coercive, utilitarian or normative ability a party has to impose its will 
on a relationship; urgency; the extent of the claim calling for immediate attention; and, 
legitimacy (see before), stakeholder’s can be identified, and the strength of their 
involvement defined. Emerging from this influential contribution, a number of papers have 
empirically reaffirmed Mitchell et al.’s (1997) findings. Parent and Deephouse (2007) ranked 
power to be the most prevalent attribute, trailed by urgency and legitimacy respectively. 
Driscoll and Starik (2004) questioned the parameters and sustainability of their findings, 
instead proposing for the further inclusion of ‘proximity’.  
In contrast, Frooman (1999) considered the role of resources to determine the nature of 
influence strategies. Applying resource dependency theory, in his research, he suggested 
four types of influence strategies can be identified to explain transitional stakeholder 
involvement: direct withholding; direct usage; indirect withholding; or indirect usage. 
Building on this earlier proffering, Frooman and Murrel (2005) further considered the 
influence of structural and demographic determinants. Despite these contentions, the 
salience framework offered by Mitchell et al. (1997) continues to be the prevailing appraisal 
model adopted in stakeholder assessment frameworks (Yang et al., 2011; DeSchepper et al., 
2014; Yang and Shen, 2014) 
At this juncture, the research has considered the prevalent rudiments of stakeholder theory. 
It has identified that stakeholder theory has tendered several approaches to stakeholder 
identification. Although approaches remain somewhat disputed, the construct of legitimacy 
is commonly central to these frameworks. This research therefore also adopts legitimacy as 
a central construct to identify PPP SIS. Moreover, inherent to the stakeholder concept, this 
investigation has established there have been several approaches by which to understand 
stakeholder involvement. Despite these nuanced strategies, the power/urgency nexus 
proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) remains the prevalent approached in stakeholder and 
construction literature (Newcombe, 2003; Chinyio and Akintoye, 2008; DeSchepper et al., 
2014; Yang et al., 2014; Yang and Shen, 2014). This research therefore will also utilise these 
attributes to delineate PPP SIS involvement. The research will now apply these findings to 
the context of PPP to determine the PPP SIS boundary specification.  
4.3. Identifying Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure Stakeholders 
Identified in chapter three, PPP is unique from other infrastructure provision mechanisms 
insofar as it is a transactional relationship situated between privatisation and traditional 
procurement, and hence displays both public and private characteristics (Grimsey and Lewis, 
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2005; Zou et al., 2013). As a result, structurally, these schemes and the stakeholders involved 
differ from in other procurement models. While stakeholder theory is effective at identifying 
stakeholders in the traditional confines of infrastructure provision, to contextualise 
stakeholder theory to PPP, the fundamentals of this concept must be recalibrated. In 
stakeholder theory, its descriptive stance dictates the 'firm', i.e. the client, is the central 
organisation and thus their perception of others determines the involvement and 
management of these bodies. However, defined as an arrangement for the collaborative 
provision of a public service between the public and private-sectors, organisations inherent 
to each sector share roles, responsibilities and financing which in turn, blurs the conventional 
position of the client as the focal organisation and instead indicates the appointment of at 
least two or more focal partners (DeSchepper et al., 2014). 
With this in mind, returning to Phillips' (2003) notion of legitimacy, DeSchepper et al. (2014) 
adopted the contractual relationship and relationships of the perception of norms, values 
and beliefs as the determinant values in distinguishing normative and derivative PPP 
stakeholders. This research, similarly utilising Phillips' (2003) taxonomy, conversely argues 
that relationships of norms, values and beliefs are subjective on the assertion these 
perceptions will differ predicated on the sectoral position. The private-sector, traditionally 
motivated by returns and profit holds markedly different perceptions to that possessed by 
the public-sector who characteristically pursue improved social well-being (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2005). As a result, the only tangible measure can be the project contract and an 
organisations relationship with it defined in figure 3.2.  
Premised on this understanding of stakeholder theory; and in particular, the construct of 
legitimacy, as per McErlane et al. (2016) this research identifies PPP normative SIS as the 
Authority and ProjCo, and its constituent members13. By contrast, all other organisations can 
be defined as derivative. Having classified these stakeholders, to identify the key SIS, it is 
noteworthy to consider Donaldson and Prestons' (1995) proffering, namely, stakeholder 
theory is fundamentally normative at its core. It is therefore reasoned the key SIS to be 
considered for the development of PPP stakeholder collaboration are the Authority and 
ProjCo, and its constituent members. Contrastingly, it is suggested a stakeholder 
                                                          
13 ProjCo in and of itself is only a shell entity, thus it will enter into direct contracts with other 
organisations to undertake and fulfil duties regarding the supply and delivery of the facility. Being 
directly contracted with ProjCo, these organisations are the ‘constituent members’. 
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management approach may be more appropriate for derivate stakeholders. Table 4.2 
displays this classification. The research will now consider these SIS. 
Table 4.2: PPP SIS Taxonomy  
 Public-Sector Private-Sector 
Normative 
Public-sector Authority Project Company and its constituent members:  
Construction Contractors 
Service Providers 
Equity Shareholders  
Debt Funders 
Derivative Community members Advisors and consultants 
 Customer / user Insurers 
 Environmentalists Ratings agencies 
 Public Sub-contractors 
 Media representatives Suppliers 
 Other governmental bodies  
 Other local councils  
 Other third parties  
 Owners  
 Social institutions  
 
4.3.1. Public-sector Authority  
In PPP,  the Authority is the public-sector organisation directly involved in the delivery of the 
infrastructure asset. It is traditionally driven by VfM, cost savings, improved services 
provision, and social and public benefits14 (Zou et al., 2013). Through defining objectives and 
outcomes, the Authority can ensure the requirements of the project are achieved and thus 
safeguard the interests of the wider public. The Authority will, as Grimsey and Lewis (2005) 
describes, ‘wear many ‘hats’ meaning they will fulfil several roles, including: defining the 
business case, determining output and performance requirements, planning and executing 
the procurement process, govern the contract, liaise with the community and co-operate 
with ProjCo to overcome changes in the project. Notably, despite being directly involved in 
the project delivery, the Authority is ultimately accountable to central governmental 
departments and, by extension, parliament (Shaoul et al., 2013).  
4.3.2. Private-Sector Special Purpose Vehicle and its Constituent Members 
In contrast, the private-sector provider is a consortium of organisations which collectively 
operate through the SPV which in this research is termed as ProjCo. This is a commercial 
entity formed specifically by the private cohort for the purpose of undertaking the project. 
                                                          
14 It is also noteworthy, in a change from the traditional transaction structure of PFI, PF2s initial 
operation in the PSBP will see the central government acts as the Authority, the EFA. 
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ProjCo is responsible for producing, funding and delivering the infrastructure asset (Grimsey 
and Lewis, 2005). ProjCo negotiates and enters into a contractual agreement for the 
financing, designing, building, management and operating of the facility with the Authority. 
It thereafter discharges roles and responsibility to constituent members who enter separate 
contracts between themselves and ProjCo. In doing so, this allows ProjCo to bundle together 
solutions and specific skillsets needed across differing phases of the project (Roehrich and 
Caldwell, 2012). Moreover, this facilitates the achievement of economies of scale, innovation 
and risk sharing among other benefits. This consortium is traditionally commercially driven, 
seeks profitability and increased revenue (Zou et al., 2013). Typically, it is comprised of 
financiers and infrastructure delivery organisations: 
• Debt Funders are commonly sourced from financing institutions such as banks, 
infrastructure funds or institutional investors (Della Croce et al., 2015). Their 
interests are centred on consistent returns.  
• Equity Shareholders may comprise two forms of investors. Typically, ProjCo 
members, for legal and accounting purposes appointed with the responsibilities for 
the development and operation of the facility will invest as equity sponsors and pool 
resources and share risks (Tan, 2007). Generally, sponsors hold a smaller share of 
the equity in comparison to other third-party equity investors who may also directly 
invest into the project15. Equity capital can be sourced from investment trusts, 
insurance companies, pension funds, trade union funds, Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REIT) or wealthy individuals who own a portfolio of assets (Tan, 2007)16. Post 
construction, it is not uncommon for Equity Sponsors and Debt Funders to sell off 
shares to a secondary market or refinance their investments at lower interest rates 
following the reduction in risk (Demirag et al., 2015).  
• Construction Contractors (BuildCo) work to an output specification and are granted 
the freedom to design innovative solutions. Typically, their roles and responsibilities 
include collaborating with the Authority and other ProjCo members to design and 
construct the facility (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). BuildCo usually has short term 
                                                          
15 In some instances, the public-sector may also contribute an equity share. This can be a commitment 
display as well as a result of the ability to acquire land, or in an effort hasten the regulatory bottleneck 
(Tan, 2007). This may also be in an effort to increase day-to-day control as well as to grant access to 
accounts. It should be noted this may be viewed unfavourably by the private-sector and discourage 
bidding (World Bank et al., 2016). Private Finance 2 (PF2) will now also see the inclusion of a central 
public-sector equity stakeholder positioned directly within ProjCo and on ProjCo’s Board of Directors 
(HM Treasury, 2012). 
16 More on these financial SIS organisations is discussed in section 2.4 of chapter two.  
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objectives, seeking to maximise profits and the flexibility to move onto other 
projects post construction (Demirag et al., 2015).  
• Service Provider (FMCo) roles incorporates inputting into the design and liaising with 
BuildCo, collaborating with the Authority, and ultimately being entrusted with the 
responsibility of the management, operations and provision of the infrastructure 
service in the operations phase. FMCo can be comprised of hard and soft FM 
organisations as well as other operational services providers such as IT (Hardcastle 
and Boothroyd, 2003). It should be noted that with the introduction of PF2, soft FM 
services are now optionable. 
Having identified the key SIS as the public-sector Authority and the private-sector ProjCo and 
its constituent members, the research will now examine the partnership through the 
application of the power/urgency dyad as proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997).  
Within PPP literature, it is widely agreed, SIS dynamics are transient. Applying power and 
urgency to the PPP project lifecycle that was delineated in chapter three, figures 4.1 has been 
constructed to depict the transitional boundary specification in a PPP project. Transcending 
the initiation, procurement, and commissioning phases, the partnership is identified as 
shifting predominantly in the tendering process as the private-sector enters the project, at 
financial close as the agreement is formalised, in the construction as BuildCo develops the 
facility, and in the operations and maintenance as FMCo provides the service. 
Inherent to the PPP lifecycle, two levels of the partnerships have been determined. This is 
the inter-sectoral macro partnership which constitutes the nexus between the Authority and 
ProjCo. This is represented by the arrowed line. In addition to this, micro inter-sectoral 
partnerships were identified in literature. These secondary relationships are between ProjCo 
members, their relationship to the SPV, and between ProjCo members and the Authority. 
This is signified by a single line.  
The research will now assess the SIS boundary specification using the attributes of power 
and urgency to understand how the dynamics of these partnerships transform across the 
PPP lifecycle predicated on the findings from literature. 
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4.4. Assessing the Partnership Boundary Specification 
 
Figure 4.1: PPP Boundary Specification  
4.4.1. Inter-sectoral Partnership 
The macro partnership is the nexus between the public and private-sectors and constitutes 
the public-private Project Agreement (PA) between the focal SIS, i.e. the Authority and 
ProjCo. This is an on-going partnership that will span the duration of the project, though 
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literature signposts the principal dynamic shift in this relationship occurs at financial close as 
partners become formally contractually bound (Chinyere and Xu, 2013). Pre-financial close, 
the nature of the environment is commercially charged as the Authority seeks to encourage 
competition to maximise VfM (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008). This is represented 
through the broken arrowed line.  
Prior to financial close, the Authority is responsible for undertaking tasks in the initiation 
phase including: defining the required service, appraising of project viability and evaluating 
alternatives, producing a business case, and commencing the project development17 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2007). SPV teams compete for the project, with a preferred bidder being 
selected to enter into contract negotiations (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008). Leading up 
to financial close in the tendering stage, as the urgency of ProjCo increases, the nature of the 
PPP environment is tentative, with little security of project progression. However, as both 
partners approach contractual agreement, the platforms of the purchaser/provider together 
with the dynamics transition (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008).Power and urgency is shared 
equally between these focal organisations. Previously, both partners are separate entities, 
nevertheless, by formalising the agreement through signing the PA, both SIS agree to enter 
into a partnership for the collective delivery and management of the project with funding 
supplied by the private-sector. From this point, the construction of sustainable partnership 
becomes critical as these SIS are now co-dependent on each to fulfil their contractual 
obligations and therein secure the delivery the project. This is indicated through the 
solidifying of the broken arrowed line.  
4.4.2. Intra-sectoral Partnership 
While the macro level partnership is relatively straightforward, comparatively, the 
organisational partnerships are much more intricate and complex. Under threat of 
potentially incurring monetary penalties for poor asset provision, the nature of the internal 
ProjCo relationships are performance orientated. Pursuing economic advantage, 
consequently, all SIS actions affect all other ProjCo SIS. Though there is continual interaction 
between all organisations across all stages of the project, to understand the shifting 
dynamics it is pertinent to contextualise these dynamics through the findings of Roehrich 
and Caldwell (2012) who identified that ProjCo will unbundle roles and responsibilities 
contingent upon the project phase. By virtue of this unbundling of tasks, the power and 
urgency dynamics will transition, therein determining SIS involvement not only inherent to 
                                                          
17 See section 3.5.1 in chapter three. 
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ProjCo, but also corresponding to the Authority as these SIS become the outward looking 
‘face’ of the SPV.  
In the procurement phase, though BuildCo and FMCo are involved, literature indicates they 
are lesser roles compared to the front-ended financier involvement (Zheng et al., 2008). 
Comprised of Debt Funders and Equity Shareholders, literature points to the Debt Funders 
being distinctly instrumental in the procurement phase. This heavy early involvement can be 
explained by the high levels of uncertainty and risks in the procurement phase prior to 
financial close (Chinyere and Xu, 2013). This is pertinent when coupled with Demirag et al. 
(2015) who claimed that conventionally Debt Funders are risk averse; seeking to balance 
risk/reward profiles. Chinyere and Xu (2013) asserted financial SIS; both Debt Funders and 
Equity Shareholders, in the earlier phases are instrumental in undertaking strong supervisory 
roles comprising organising ProjCo, negotiating arrangements with the Authority, and 
identifying and appointing partnering SIS. On these grounds, allied with the knowledge that 
these SIS are committing to the largest resource outlay in capital terms, the financial 
stakeholders; in particular the Debt Funders, are deemed to possess high levels of both 
power and urgency. This dimension is reflected through the solid line between the financiers, 
ProjCo, and the Authority in figure 4.1. The lesser constituent roles of the SPV, i.e. BuildCo 
and FMCo are represented through the broken lines on the grounds that these SIS are not 
yet directly involved in the provision and delivery of the service and therefore possess lower 
levels of urgency.  
Following financial close, the dynamics of the partnership shift as the project enters 
construction. Having secured the project, financier interests lessens as progression 
uncertainty is reduced; though there are still high levels of risk during the construction phase. 
These can be managed through fixed price contracts (Demirag et al., 2015; Burke and 
Demirag, 2017). It is also noteworthy, when a risk of delay is presented, the interests of 
financiers can shift which will be manifested through the exertion of pressure onto BuildCo; 
this is also the case during operations. In this regard, literature suggests it is the financial SIS 
who hold the highest levels of power in the partnership (Zheng et al., 2008).  
Different to the procurement phase, BuildCo are now directly involved and possess higher 
levels of urgency. BuildCo are typically responsible for the construction and commissioning 
of the asset and are now directly cooperating with the Authority and ProjCo to construct the 
asset on time and within budget (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012). During construction, again 
similar to the procurement phase, FMCo may have input into the design although they have 
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no direct involvement in the construction of the asset. These dimensions are reflected in 
figure 4.1. The solid lines between BuildCo, the Authority and ProjCo indicate these dynamics 
in the construction phase. Also, the broken line between financial SIS and ProjCo and the 
Authority represents less involvement on the part of these organisations. 
Having completed its remit of designing and building the facility, the project will progress to 
the operations and maintenance phase. FMCo interests increase and therefore so does its 
position as the outward facing SIS responsible for the performance of the service and asset 
provision. This is portrayed by the changing dynamics between FMCo, ProjCo and the 
Authority (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012). Following construction, the profile for risk is 
dramatically reduced. There is resultantly less requirement for direct financial involvement, 
and thus, interest on the part of the financial SIS again wanes. However, with the 
aforementioned caveat concerning returns. It is also common for Debt Funders and Equity 
Shareholders to refinance their investment or sell off their shares to a secondary market 
(Demirag et al., 2015). With a permeable boundary specification, it is common for bond 
shareholders such as pension or insurance funds to enter a project, replacing primary 
financiers. Identified in chapter two, these SIS are typically risk averse, preferring not to 
invest until the asset is operational (brownfield) thereby avoiding construction risks 
(Buchanan et al., 2014). Equity shares are also often sold by BuildCo sponsors to other SIS or 
to less active third-party equity investors as they seek to recycle funds in an effort to grant 
them the freedom to move onto other projects (Demirag et al., 2015). Reduced risk, little 
involvement, re-financing as well as the entering of secondary market SIS, direct interests in 
the provision of the asset of financiers remain low and as such this is represented through 
the staggered line with the Authority. However, the relationships and interests within this 
SIS group are changing. This dynamic is represented through the solid line between Debt 
Funders, Equity Shareholders and ProjCo. Furthermore,  by selling off their equity 
investments and moving onto other projects, BuildCo have been removed from the 
diagram18.  
At this juncture, the research has defined the PPP boundary specification. It has identified 
the key SIS and determined how they are involved across the PPP project lifecycle. The 
                                                          
18 It should be noted, usually the PA is wrapped by a deed which requires BuildCo to remain involved 
for a twelve-year period after asset mobilisation to address latent defects. This has not been 
included in the diagram as this is not always the case, and it is also similar to a ‘bolt-on’ to the main 
contract. 
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research will now critically examine this PPP boundary specification to identify the inherent 
sources of poor PPP SIS collaboration. 
4.5. Critical Examination of the Partnership Boundary Specification 
Noted in chapter three, PPP by its very nature is a complex investment framework. Deriving 
out of this complexity, many have suggested there has been an innate failure to cultivate a 
collective environment which has been manifested through a plethora of inherent barriers 
to collaboration. Moreover, the high specificity of infrastructure provision and PPP more 
specifically has meant it is difficult to learn lessons from these transactions and develop best-
practice collaborative frameworks (Pretorious et al. 2008). 
One of the fundamental challenges of PPP is that it conjoins diverse organisations. These 
organisations have disparate project objectives, skills and resources. Equally, SIS remits 
significantly vary within the confines of the project. Stemming from this; in the absence of 
collaboration, SIS have pursued their own project objectives which has transpired in 
autonomous behaviour (Zou et al., 2013; O Nolan and Reeves, 2017). This autonomous 
behaviour has been replete through all phases of the PPP project life and thereby affects all 
aspects of the partnership.  
When acting autonomously, the construct of power, and its authoritarian ownership has 
been a mechanism to enforce and fulfil heterogeneous SIS objectives. Lonsdale (2005), 
evaluating PPP from a resource theory and transaction cost economics approach, reported 
power asymmetry, often has derived from resources imbalances. This has detracted 
particularly from the macro inter-sectoral partnership. Literature suggests that ultimately it 
is Debt Funders who hold the greatest levels of power premised on their capital 
contributions. This disproportionate distribution has undermined the equal partnering ethos 
of PPP as one partner’s platform becomes more authoritative. This asymmetrical imbalance 
has been particularly apparent during early years of PFI where these arrangements were 
often referred to as ‘the only show in town’ and were utilised as a mechanism to 
circumnavigate governmental capital constraints (Hare, 2013).  
In addition to capital imbalances, research identifies a skills imbalance between the public 
and private-sectors as a source of poor collaboration. The complexity of PPP means that 
stakeholder organisations require a portfolio of infrastructure provision skills. However, 
literature suggests that the public-sector has not possessed this expertise in-house. To 
mitigate against these shortfalls, the Authority has often had to employ and rely on the 
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expertise of external consultants and advisors. This is problematic in a number of areas. 
Firstly, it adds to project costs. Secondly, with their own project objectives, Hall (2015) 
queried the intentions of these organisations. Moreover, employment of these external 
consultants has also been a problem on the grounds that the over-reliance on external 
advisors has obfuscated decision-making as well as accountability (Reynaers and de Graaf, 
2014). Driven by VfM, others have suggested the Authority lacks the commercial expertise 
necessary for PPP.  
Allied with in-house skills and resource shortages, DeSchepper et al. (2014) argued that the 
multiple institutional levels within the public-sector dilutes accountability and fuels 
opportunism. Others have been critical of the public-sector culture, maintaining that the 
engagement processes of the Authority were not conducive to PPP collaboration. Being rule 
bound, risk averse, as well as resistant to change, the public-sector has little experience and 
understanding of the true essence of collaborative partnering. Instead, the Authority has 
relied upon the contract to govern stakeholder engagement (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012). 
These deficiencies have been compounded by the high staff turnover and the failure to retain 
knowledge across the project lifecycle and between ventures (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012).  
Aforementioned, a barrier to collaboration has been poor accountability. Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) asserted that there is a pertinent need for greater accountability on 
all sides of a PPP project. Shaoul et al. (2013) attributed poor PPP accountability to three 
pillars: the role of private finance; relationships and organisational structures; and, 
performance measures. On the public-sector side, there have been issues of accountability 
particularly in the project appraisal stage. It is essential that accountability spans all 
organisational levels of the decision-making process at the initiation phase (Shaoul et al., 
2013). Others have equally argued that the hybrid nature of PPP, which dissects the public 
and private-sectors, convolutes accountability. Comprising a large network of stakeholder 
organisations on both the public and private-sector sides, there remains concerns of poor 
accountability across all aspects of the project provision (Grossi and Thomasson, 2015). 
Moreover, the utilisation of private financing and private-sector provision, in contrast to 
conventional public procurement models, means that expenditure sits outside the scope of 
the public-sector and is instead governed by a system of ‘decision-useful reporting’.  
In line with this, Shaoul et al. (2013) argued that there needs to be greater public accessibility 
to the information shared between project partners. Poor information sharing and 
transparency has meant that, according to NAO (2018), there are prevailing contention over 
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the long-term project performance of PPP which has brought about VfM questions. As well 
as performance measurement, the opaqueness of PPP has been a source of poor 
collaboration on the grounds that continuous learning is important for a sustainable 
partnership. However, stemming from this information void, it has not been possible to 
ascertain the inefficiencies of these frameworks, which has served to constrain the evolution 
of the partnership.  
Transcending multiple phases and decades, as the dynamics of the project shift, the 
partnership should be malleable to these transformations. Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016) contended that there is a need to develop a strategy by which to retain experience 
and knowledge on a project as a means to bolster performance and streamline the project. 
Roehrich et al. (2014) agreed, remarking that a failure to centralise and retain intellectual 
capital has meant lessons learnt from previous partnerships have not been shared within 
and across projects and organisations. Nonetheless, while the notion of improved 
transparency and information sharing has been promoted across literature, it remains a 
source of poor collaboration. 
Risk transfer has been an important justification for PPP over other mechanisms. Premised 
on the view that PFI has been an outsourcing arrangement, it has been recorded in literature 
that the Authority has conventionally preferred to transfer all project risk away from the 
public-sector onto the SPV to permit off-balance sheet accounting (Hall, 2015). This 
wholesale transfer has been detrimental to collaborative partnering as SIS within ProjCo 
have been acquiesced into accepting risk which may be better positioned elsewhere (Barlow 
and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008). Subsequently, these risks have been mismanaged and mispriced 
which has transpired in reduced efficiencies and increased project prices. This has permitted 
the private-sector to have disproportionately gained. Demirag et al. (2015) explained that 
derived from the perceived prominence of construction risk, the private-sector has been 
willing to absorb project risks in return for a premium. This has served to engender distrust 
of the private-sector and has added to the poor reputation of PPP and intensified the 
politicisation of the model. 
For some time, the concept of governance in PPP has been debated. Earlier research by 
Teisman and Klijn (2003) opined the governance structures historically in PPP were 
predicated on the contract. Zheng et al. (2008) and Demirel et al. (2017) shared this view and 
argued there is a need for greater emphasis placed on collaborative governance. Yet, noted 
in chapter three, across an extended 25+ year venture, it is impossible to predict all 
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unforeseen events. Over reliance on the contractual governance, combined with ambiguity 
in the contract, has culminated in the breakdown of partnerships, as SIS have turned to the 
incomplete contract to resolve disputes. To address this, several have considered proactive 
and collaborative governance. Liu and Wilkinson (2014) asserted that relational governance 
structures and a partnership-based consortium was instrumental in driving PPP project 
success. Moreover, Demirel et al. (2017) suggested that it was fundamental for project 
managers to understand the complexity of the PPP environment and have contingencies in 
place to cope with eventualities. Cruz and Marques (2013) argued PPP should adopt a pro-
active approach to addressing changes rather than a reactive response predicated on the 
contract.  
Lending to the contractual governance, others have claimed that the poor flexibility and 
incompleteness of the contract has stifled collaboration. Inevitably, the dynamics of the 
project will evolve. This can be induced by a number of factors such as the introduction of 
new technologies, changes in the service requirements, or the introduction of new SIS. 
Hence, it is important that the PPP contract is sufficiently malleable to adapt to these 
manifestations (Hertogh and Westerveld, 2010; Shaoul et al., 2013). Notwithstanding this, 
poor flexibility in the contract has prevented the partnership from adapting as the dynamics 
have shifted and thus insufficient contract flexibility remains a prominent concern among 
researchers.  
One of the most commonly cited barriers to PPP collaboration has been the procurement 
process. The procurement process has been characterised as being unnecessarily elongated, 
associated with high transaction costs, lacking competition and exhibiting poor 
transparency. To address these prominent criticisms, one of the fundamental changes 
introduced through PF2 has been the implementation of an 18-month timeframe to achieve 
financial close. Also, some in literature have offered contributions in an effort to improve the 
procurement process. Tang and Shen (2013) considered the briefing stage of PPP 
procurement and conducted survey questionnaires to gather perceptions of factors 
necessary to streamline and improve the efficiencies of this process. Ng et al. (2012) analysed 
the feasibility stage and carried out interviews to develop a tripartite comparison of the 
factors to improve the assessment process. Nonetheless, interviews carried out by Liu et al. 
(2016) reveal the procurement process still requires significant streamlining and cost 
reductions. Moreover, Zheng et al. (2008) claimed that, deriving out of the uncertainty in the 
procurement phase, the private-sector has been unwilling to commit and allocate resources 
to the venture without assurances of the contract. Consequentially, the procurement phase 
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has been identified as one of the foremost barriers to PPP collaboration (Demirag et al., 
2015; DeSchepper et al., 2015).  
Others have argued that a lack of trust has detracted from collaborative partnering 
(Henjewele et al., 2013; Rwelamila et al., 2014). An absence of trust in both the macro and 
micro partnerships has been identified as a prominent source of poor project performance. 
Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2008) argued that there is little trust exhibited between the 
Authority and ProjCo. Equally, in their case-study, their research found that rather than 
promoting collaboration, ProjCo was untrusting of the micro partnerships between SIS and 
the Authority. As such, ProjCo set about fragmenting these relationships by channelling all 
communication through the SPV. Consequentially, BuildCo’s loyalties were torn between 
ProjCo and their ability to design a facility to best suit the Authority. Others found trust issues 
stemmed from a failure to engage and include all SIS early during the decision-making. This 
transpired as limited buy-in, in both macro and micro partnerships and gave rise to feeling 
excluded from the decision-making (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012). By doing so, this 
engendered scepticism of the project and culminated in distrust among all relationships in 
the partnership.  
Soomro and Zhang, (2014) identified how the failure to involve all SIS early and throughout 
the decision-making resulted in not only the fragmentation of the partnership but also in 
teams working to different agendas. This disconnect was prevalent within ProjCo concerning 
BuildCo and FMCo (Patel and Robinson, 2010). A failure to communicate and agree to the 
project brief culminated in myopia as SIS followed their own project remits as opposed to a 
collective long-term integrated solution (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012).  
Poor communication and engagement among SIS has engendered problems downstream in 
the lifecycle as a failure to involve all SIS has served to convolute roles and responsibilities 
as well as misalign project goals. Unsure of the ultimate aim of the project, poor 
communication has detracted from the decision-making process and has resulted in 
disagreement of the project brief. Demirag et al. (2015) described how Debt Lenders have 
been unwilling to engage with the project. Instead, they have preferred to remain remote 
and therein displayed poor commitment, reflective of an arm’s length involvement. This 
remoteness, together with their lack of knowledge about the underlying project created 
uncertainty among Equity Shareholders. Likewise, Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2008) 
reported that in some instances there has been also a reluctance from the Authority to 
participate in the delivery. Their investigation indicated that while the Authority displayed 
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interest in the asset acquisition, they were uncommitted, unwilling or unable to participate 
to the extent desired by ProjCo, especially during the construction phase. Moreover, viewing 
the project as an outsourcing arrangement, Authorities did not deem they were obligated to 
participate in the decision-making. 
Table 4.3: PPP SIS Collaboration Gaps 
Attribute Author(s) 
Absence of trust Henjewele et al. (2014); Rwelamila et al. (2014) 
Advisor obstruction Reynaers (2013) 
Complexity Cantarelli et al. (2012); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) 
Contract incompleteness 
and poor flexibility 
HM Treasury (2012); Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Reynaers 
(2013); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016); Demirel et al. (2017) 
Failure to agree project 
brief 
Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Tang and Shen (2013) 
High staff turnover Roehrich and Caldwell (2012) 
Inadequate communication Foo et al. (2011); Wang et al. (2013); Love et al. (2015) 
Ineffective risk transfer Roehrich et al. (2014); Demirag et al. (2015); Hall (2015) 
Insufficient accountability Reynaers (2013); Shaoul et al. (2013); Grossi and Thomasson 
(2015); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016)  
Insufficient Authority 
resources, skills and 
expertise 
Patel and Robinson (2010); Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Reynaers 
(2013) 
Lack of early and collective 
stakeholder involvement 
Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Chen et al. (2013); Henjewele et al. 
(2014); Rwelamila et al. (2014); Soomro and Zhang (2014) 
Poor governance and 
management 
Cruz and Marques (2013); Reynaers (2013); Demirel et al. (2017) 
Poor information and 
transparency 
Reynaers (2013); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016); 
Mukhopadhyay (2016) 
Poor knowledge 
management and lessons 
learnt 
Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Roehrich et al. (2014); Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) 
Power asymmetry Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Chen et al. (2013); Reynaers (2013); 
DeSchepper et al. (2014); Henjewele et al. (2014); Rwelamila et al. 
(2014) 
Procurement process Ng et al. (2012): Zhang et al. (2012); Tang and Shen (2013); Demirag 
et al. (2015); DeSchepper et al. (2015); Liu et al. (2016); O’Nolan 
and Reeves (2017) 
Project heterogeneity Pretorious et al. (2008); Buchanan et al. (2014) 
Public-sector bureaucracy 
and culture 
Reynears (2013); DeSchepper et al. (2014) 
Public-sector hierarchy and 
structure 
Zou et al. (2013); DeSchepper et al. (2014) 
ProjCo progression 
insecurity 
Roehrich and Caldwell (2012) 
SIS autonomy and self-
serving behaviour 
Tang and Shen (2013); Zou et al. (2013); O’Nolan and Reeves (2017) 
SIS values and objective 
misalignment 
Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Tang and Shen (2013); World Bank 
et al. (2016) 
Undefined roles and 
responsibilities 
Patel and Robinson (2010); Reynaers (2013) 
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Collectively, from this critical examination of the PPP SIS boundary specification, the research 
has identified 23 PPP collaboration gaps. These findings are an important component of 
improving PPP stakeholder collaboration. Table 4.3 identifies these collaboration gaps 
together with their corresponding authors. 
4.6. Summary  
Chapter three identified that there is a need for collaboration in PPP for social infrastructure 
provision. Despite the importance of this concept, this chapter has unearthed that there is 
much discord in research as to who are the key SIS organisations worthy of inclusion in the 
collaborative process, as well as disagreement regarding mechanisms for understanding how 
they are involved in the project. The purpose of this chapter was to address this information 
gap by determining the partnership boundary specification.  
To do this, the research examined stakeholder theory and identified the attributes of 
legitimacy, power and urgency by which to develop a boundary specification framework. This 
was then applied to the PPP context. This framework enabled this study to identify five 
organisations as the key SIS and understand the dynamics of their involvement over the 
duration of the venture. In doing so, the research developed a nomenclature of PPP SIS 
organisations. 
Inherent to this partnership boundary specification, two dynamics were identified. Firstly, 
there was the macro inter-sectoral public-private partnership which exists between the two 
focal SIS. Also, secondary micro intra-sectoral partnerships were determined which exist 
between ProjCo members, ProjCo and the Authority. It was found that the dynamics of these 
relationships fundamentally shift at financial close as the agreement is formalised, in the 
construction as BuildCo develops the facility, and in the operations and maintenance as 
FMCo provides the service.  
Having defined the partnership boundary specification, the research then undertook a 
critical examination of these relationships and identified 23 PPP collaboration gaps. In doing 
so, this fulfilled objective three of the research which was intended to critically examine 
collaboration between SIS within UK PPP social infrastructure provision. These findings will 
therefore now be carried forward to chapter five and used to inform the PPP stakeholder 
collaboration investigation.   
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5. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration 
5.1. Introduction 
In chapter three the research identified that attempts have already been undertaken to 
improve collaboration in the built environment and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). 
Despite these efforts, there is a pertinent knowledge gap. Hence, this research argues that 
there are grounds to look beyond the built environment to address these shortcomings and 
specifically to the collaboration concept to better understand collaboration and to identify 
the attributes of PPP stakeholder collaboration. Having determined the PPP partnership 
boundary specification in chapter four, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate PPP 
stakeholder collaboration.  
In this chapter, chapter five, the research turns its attention to collaboration theory to widen 
the research’s understanding of the collaboration concept. This comprises conceptualising 
collaboration, defining collaboration and identifying the motivations to collaborate. 
Following this, predicated on the findings of chapter four, combined with additional PPP 
literature and collaboration theory literature, this chapter identifies the attributes of PPP 
stakeholder collaboration which are to be the basis of the empirical investigation delineated 
in chapter six. This chapter is hence structured as follows: 
• An exploration of collaboration theory; 
• Defining collaboration;  
• An examination of the motivations to collaborate; and 
• The identification of PPP stakeholder collaboration attributes. 
 
5.2. An Overview of Collaboration  
Along with the arrival of stakeholder theory, so too emerged the value of nurturing 
relationships, not only inside the firm, but also inter-organisationally. Collaboration is a 
specific dimension of inter-organisational relationships that derived out of the need to 
manage the complexity of the organisational environment (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992). 
Fundamentally, collaboration seeks to synergise organisations around the notion of common 
goals in an effort to cultivate a community-like environment whereby stakeholder 
organisations work together as part of a venture to provide a superior outcome (Huxham 
and Vangen, 2001). Huxham and Vangen (2001) attribute this shift to cooperative project 
delivery to the need to improve production efficiency, as well as the increasing role of the 
private-sector in public service provision. Subsequently, emanating out of this more inclusive 
103 
 
 
 
mind-set, the notions of relationships, partnering and alliancing have gained traction and has 
witnessed increased popularity, proliferating out of organisational management literature 
particularly during the 80s and 90s (see Gray, 1985; Huxham and Macdonald, 1992). Falling 
under many synonyms such as partnering, cooperation, coordination, networks, alliances, 
bridges, and joint-working among many others (Jones and Thomas, 2007), much research 
has investigated the structures of collaboration and the associated advantages which come 
with it (see Huxham and Macdonald, 1992; Hardy et al., 2003; Huxham and Vangen, 2005). 
Accordingly, as awareness grows of its potential benefits, inter-organisational collaboration 
has been exported beyond strictly organisational studies and is now gathering momentum 
within the construction industry, and more pertinently, PPP (see Smyth and Pryke, 2008; Co 
and Barro, 2009; Chinyio and Olomolaiye, 2010; Bouchlaghem, 2012; Herazo and Lizzarlde, 
2015).  
Gazley (2017) conducted a systematic literature review of collaborative literature. According 
to her findings, collaboration has undergone a resurgence recently and has been re-
popularised as the notion of cross-sectoral alliancing continues to gather momentum. As part 
of her state-of-the-art analysis, Gazley (2017) found that over time, as a result of its 
complexity, collaboration has over time been examined across all levels of the organisation. 
Also, to further its understanding, it has equally been scrutinised through multiple 
theoretical lenses. Noteworthy examples of this includes Alexander (2000) who considered 
collaboration through a matrix of sociological, institutional and economic theories. Equally, 
Conner et al. (2015) adopted cultural theory to investigate the motivations of public 
managers to collaborate. Reflective of this adaptability, Gazley (2017) found that a third of 
investigations are now approaching collaboration through theories and disciplines which do 
not include institutional and organisational dynamics. Thus, collaboration has transcended 
the conventional disciplines of policy, economics and management in an effort to bridge 
knowledge gaps.  
Derived from this popularity, literature has identified that there is an increasing number of 
collaborative forms. Collaborative arrangements have been developed both in cross-
organisational and cross-sectoral arrangements. This includes between government bodies 
and the for-profit sector (Fischbacher-Smith, 2015), within the for-profit sector (Co and 
Barro, 2009; Tantalo and Priem, 2014), between for-profit and non-profit (Smith and 
Wohlstetter, 2006), and between non-profit organisations (Hands, 2010). Accordingly, there 
are differences in literature as to the number and types of collaborative forms. Kanter (1994) 
proposed that there are three principal collaborative arrangements, namely; mutual service 
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criteria, value chain partnerships and joint ventures. Comparatively, Barringer and Harrison 
(2000) suggested there are six collaborative dimensions which are dependent on the degree 
of which bodies are inter-linked. These are joint ventures, networks, consortia, alliances, 
trade associations and interlocking directorates.  
As the many forms of collaboration have come to light, coupled with their relative 
complexity, literatures points towards the need for formal and informal structures to 
produce the environment necessary by which to constitute its development. Blanchard 
(2012) suggested collaboration should comprise ‘form’ and ‘essence’ in organisational 
management. Essence can be characterised as the central values of collaboration, while form 
is the framework as to how it is undertaken. Alternatively, Thomson and Perry (2006) 
identified six antecedent attributes which determine the type of collaboration. These were 
the level of interdependence, the need for resources and risk sharing, resource availability, 
collaborative experience, complexity, and partner’s access to resources. Adding to these 
findings, Diaz-Kope et al. (2015) furthered this contribution by including institutional 
structures. Despite these nuances, it has become apparent that ultimately to engender 
collaboration, literature alludes in many forms to the symbiotic dyad of formal and informal 
structures. 
Notwithstanding the richness of collaborative literature, Gazley (2017) was critical of 
collaborative research across three pillars. She concluded as part of her critical review that 
collaborative literature has primarily focused on qualitative studies and failed to offer 
generalisable outputs. Also, much of the research has been undertaken unilaterally and 
therein failed to consider the research of others within related fields. In line with this, Kozuch 
and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek (2016) similarly highlighted the need for greater quantitative 
studies which determine the factors contributing to inter-organisational collaboration. 
Thirdly, Gazley (2017) suggested there has been a sparsity of elongated studies which 
consider collaboration dynamics over time. Nevertheless, in-spite of these shortcomings, 
collaborations ubiquitous arrival into multiple disciplines and its prevalence throughout 
organisational arrangements indicates its proclivity for superior project performance. 
5.3. Defining Collaboration 
Having transcended multiple fields including commercial, social, economic, institutional and 
political, a plethora of worldviews have all been instrumental in framing collaboration. Victim 
of this popularity, many interpretations of what defines collaboration are proffered 
throughout literature and while some have presented definitions stemming from strategic 
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advantages, knowledge creation and outcomes, others have been more concerned with the 
systems, actions and processes in which to foster collaboration (Barringer and Harrison, 
2000; Hardy et al., 2003).  
Nevertheless, despite these disparate submissions, there are consistent normative themes 
apparent throughout these bodies. These themes centre on collectiveness, working together 
to achieve something which could not be obtained otherwise, a shared purpose or objective, 
resource sharing, and communication and information sharing (see Gray, 1989; Kanter, 
1994; Keyton et al., 2008; Bouchlaghem and Shelbourn, 2012). Combining these findings, 
collaboration can be defined as organisations working together and cooperating to achieve 
a mutual objective, combining interests, and varied skills, resources and experience in a co-
ordinated effort to deliver an outcome that could not be achieved otherwise by a solitary 
organisation (Gray 1985; Kanter, 1994; Tsasis et al., 2015).  
5.4. Motivations to Collaborate  
Borrowed heavily from Waddock (1989), Savage et al. (2011) opined collaboration has been 
extolled for its capacity in bringing together organisations to solve what can be described as 
social or macro-environmental problems. These are problems which cannot be solved by any 
one organisation, but rather require a joint effort. Being inter-dependent, the objective of a 
collaborative alliance is collectiveness (Wilson et al., 2010). Still, while there is merit in 
terming these problems on a macro level, others have felt they fail to encapsulate 
collaborations aptitude in addressing what have been dubbed ‘wicked’ problems. Emanating 
out of social policy, the coining of wicked problems can be attributed to the idea that a 
scientific-rationale cannot be applied within social confines. Wicked problems are those that 
cannot be or are difficult to solve because they are neither defined, nor easily understood 
(Rittel and Webber, 1973). Different from simple and complex problems, wicked problems 
are distinguishable, in that there is no consensus on the true nature of the problem, nor is 
there any agreement of how to resolve it (Denning, 2009). These problems typically involve 
many organisations, and thus there are many perspectives, and equally many different 
potential approaches to collaboration and their resolution (Roberts, 2000). Wicked problems 
include preventing a pandemic, delivering quality high school education, battling poverty, 
improving health care problems, combating global warming, and preventing terrorist attacks 
(Denning, 2009). To overcome wicked problems, Roberts (2000) suggested three coping 
mechanisms; authoritative, competitive and collaborative strategies. Within an 
organisational context, though it is difficult to determine a definitive outcome to wicked 
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problems, collaboration allows organisations to collectively achieve something that would 
otherwise be difficult or impossible to obtain by a single organisation (Savage et al., 2011). 
Hence, collaboration offers an interesting solution to wicked problems, in that essentially, at 
its core, it provides a ‘win-win’ approach to problem solving, with each partner benefiting 
from the arrangement (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
A fundamental reward from collaboration, is what many refer to as achieving ‘collaborative 
advantage’. In short, this is described as being in a better position than would be if done 
individually (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992; Huxham and Vangen, 2004). This ability to offer 
superior rewards has led to large cross-sectoral organisations engaging in collaborative 
relationships. Tsasis et al. (2015) explored collaboration in HIV/AIDs prevention, while Hands 
(2010) found collaboration is effective in bringing together schools to improve education. 
Collaboration has also been used in developing business links (Uztel and Martin, 1998), 
enhancing nature-based tourism (Plummer et al., 2006), tackling mental health problems 
(Jones et al. 2004), battling poverty (Brown and Ashman, 1996), and in promoting multi-
agency working in social policy (Asthana et al., 2002).  
Others have displayed enthusiasm to collaborate predicated on its aptitude in forging cross-
sector links, providing access to other technologies, products and markets (Wilson et al., 
2010). Doz and Hamel (1998) promoted collaboration for its capacity to facilitate access to 
foreign markets, as well as allowing organisations to combine and pool resources that are 
not available internally (Lewis et al., 2010). Hardy et al. (2003) deemed collaboration is an 
effective vehicle for knowledge exchange and the creation of new knowledge, while others 
have displayed eagerness premised on its propensity to improve an organisations 
competitive position through complimentary skill-sets (Savage et al., 2011). Erridge and 
Greer (2002) commended collaboration for its ability to handle complex situations, whereas 
Savage et al. (2010) opined it encouraged long-term innovation and learning by sharing 
information. Aldrich (1976) found collaboration is an effective tool for resolving conflict and 
navigating through environmental turbulence. Likewise, Hardy et al. (2003) reckoned 
collaboration can enhance an organisation’s position relative to other competing 
organisations. Other motives may include diversification, overcoming legal barriers or 
market seeking (Todeva and Knoke, 2005). Specific to construction research and 
infrastructure development, Cannings (2014) suggested built environment collaboration can 
lead to: 
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• Meeting stated objectives on time leading to greater predictability of time, cost and 
quality; 
• A long-term relationship through mutual trust; 
• Removes restrictions on solutions design and thinking through stronger 
relationships; 
• Reduces waste (surplus, duplication and generated); 
• Reconciliation of uncertainty; 
• Allows organisations to gain competitive advantage; 
• Offers better design management through whole life understanding; 
• Can engender a rewarding environment for individuals; 
• Adds values through risk allocation and management, and economies of scale; and 
• Exploits knowledge for value creation. 
From this, it is apparent there are many benefits to collaboration which underpin its 
importance in PPP. Notwithstanding the plethora of research promoting collaboration and 
its popularity, it should be noted that there are caveats and not all experiences have been 
positive. Barringer and Harrison (2000) articulated several barriers to collaborative 
relationships. Reiterating sentiments displayed by Culpan, (1993), Doz and Hamel (1998), 
Hatfield and Pearce (1994), and Niederkofler (1991), they suggested the benefits of 
collaboration may fall short of those expected. Also, collaborative partnerships can be 
difficult to manage as a consequence of misaligned cultures between separate entities. 
Huxham and Vangen (2004) caveated the magnitude of undertaking a collaboration. 
Moreover, DeSchepper et al. (2014) warned for collaboration to be effective, it is critical 
there is acceptance and awareness from stakeholders of the resource intense nature of 
undertaking the development of these relationships. Others pointed out that rather than 
encouraging inter-organisational collectiveness, there is a risk that smaller silo networks 
often form within the collaboration to achieve their own goals which are misaligned from 
the mission statement (Erridge and Greer, 2002). Equally, DeSchepper et al. (2014) and Patel 
and Robinson (2010) cautioned that improper structures and systems involved in the 
development of the relationship can cause delays.  
At this juncture, the research has examined collaboration theory. It has identified that 
collaboration is a complexity of formal and informal attributes. It has also established there 
are different forms of collaboration which is contingent on the organisations involved and 
the purpose of the partnership. The research has also reviewed the motivations to 
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collaborate. Having done so, the thesis will now turn its attention to PPP stakeholder 
collaboration. 
5.5. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration 
Grounded in a cross-sectoral partnership, throughout literature and industry, the 
importance of collaboration there has been accumulating and there subsequently is now 
greater awareness over the centrality this concept must play in steering long-term project 
success. Suggested by its very name, Public-Private Partnerships, the collaborative ethos is 
an inherent ideal in these arrangements. It is therefore no surprise that many definitions 
presented in PPP literature adhere to this cooperative philosophy. Burke and Demirag (2017) 
characterised PPP as a durable cooperation between the public and private-sectors where 
stakeholders develop mutual facilities and/or services whereby risks, rewards and benefits 
are shared. Waring et al. (2013) likewise described PPP as a formalised collaboration 
between the public and private-sectors to meet public goals, premised on the ideology that 
collaboration combines resources and risk sharing skills to co-deliver a public service.  
In this sense, these descriptions promote shared objectives, the sharing of risks and 
resources and integrated business processes. However, this is not always the case. 
Historically, PPP via PFI has been utilised as an outsourcing arrangement for alternative 
motivations. This interpretation is evidenced through several definitions of PPP such as that 
of HM Treasury (2003) which branded PFI as an arrangement whereby the public-sector 
purchases capital services from the private-sector. Similarly, Hardcastle and Boothroyd 
(2003) defined PFI as a long-term contractual arrangement in which the private-sectors 
resources are utilised to provide an infrastructure and deliver a public service. 
Comparatively, Zhang (2006) termed PFI as an agreement between the government and the 
private-sector whereby a private firm delivers an asset or service in exchange for a payment 
which is predicated on the provision quality or an output delivery. 
Subsequently, a divide has emerged in literature which differentiates between a 
collaborative partnership and contractual outsourcing arrangements. Such examples of this 
include Smith and Wohlstetter (2006) who distinguished between formal and informational 
partnerships; Teisman and Klijn (2003) asserted there were cooperative and contractual 
partnering governance structures in PPP; Zheng et al. (2008) determined contractual versus 
relational governance in PPP; Leiringer (2003) differentiated between contractual and 
cooperative PPP; and, Waring et al. (2013) who classified PPP as either ‘tight’ and ‘loose’ 
arrangements.  
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Accordingly, the need to reconcile this disparate between the previous contracted ‘PFI-
esque’ interpretation to more modern collaborative PPP interpretations has emerged. 
Indeed, the importance of collaboration in partnering is not a new phenomenon. As far back 
as the 1990s it was noted that there was a need for a behavioural shift towards the 
collaborative philosophy to overcome the adversarial and fragmented nature of the built 
environment in the UK. Latham (1994), as part of the ‘Constructing the Team’ report, is often 
cited for his pivotal contribution which encouraged collaboration and the use of 
collaborative partnering in PFI to bring together large networks of diverse disciplines who 
have not worked together before. This landmark report called for behavioural change in the 
construction industry in addition to also highlighting the salience of the client in driving this 
ideological revolution. Yet, PFI was still in its infancy with limited mobilisation, which meant 
that there was inadequate understanding of this mechanism, the means to engender 
collaboration, and the importance of collaboration in ensuring long-term success.  
Since then many have contributed efforts to progress this body of knowledge. Nine years 
after, in 2003, the Strategic Forums (2003) ‘Accelerating Change’ report underpinned and 
reinforced the importance of collaboration; though on this occasion, greater emphasis was 
ascribed not just to the client in fostering collaboration but also highlighted the need for 
inclusion of the wider stakeholder network and the systems for stakeholder integration. This 
document promoted delivering on a shared-vision and teamworking centric procurement to 
enhance innovation and deliver continuous improvement.  
Moving forward, the identification of collaboration as a facilitator in a network of 
organisations continued to gather momentum and later that year the Strategic Forum (2003) 
published a toolkit categorising the constituent components of collaboration. This emergent 
toolkit identified the attributes of collaboration as: committed leadership; culture and 
values; and processes, tools and commercial arrangements.  
More recently, Constructing Excellence (2011) has furthered the built environments 
understanding of collaboration by distilling collaboration into six CSF: early involvement; 
selection by value; aligned commercial arrangements; common processes and tools; 
performance measurement; and long-term relationships. Moreover, the introduction of 
British Standard 11000 has been a watershed for collaborative business relationships (BSI 
Group, 2013). However, despite observable progress, the prevalence of this concept in 
literature indicates there is still a prevailing knowledge gap.  
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In conjunction with industry, several academics have undertaken investigations to add to the 
PPP collaboration stock of knowledge. McErlane et al. (2016) identified the need for 
collaboration in PPP to improve project performance through greater understanding of 
stakeholders. Equally, as HM Treasury (2012) points towards the changes in PF2 as a strategy 
to improve collaboration in PPP, McErlane et al. (2017) invited UK PPP organisations to 
evaluate these policy reforms. In the main, respondents were uncertain of these changes.  
Also, Clifton and Duffield (2006) investigated performance improvements in Australian PPP 
projects through the incorporation of Alliancing principles into the concession agreement. 
Their study aimed to offer improved governance pertaining to the contract structure, risk 
management and features of the concession agreement which influence the service 
performance. However, over a decade ago, in tandem with the monumental changes in the 
UK PPP market, this research is arguably dated and no longer relevant to current PPP 
mechanisms.  
Smyth and Edkins (2007) explored the partnership through the lens of relational contracting 
and relationship management (RM). Determined by the parameters of trust and confidence, 
they measured thirty relational dynamics adapted from Gummesson (2001) in the 
partnership. Their article highlighted poor and weak relationships widespread throughout 
the PPP environment, though notably it was most prevalent at the public-private interface. 
Although insightful, Smyth and Edkins (2007) captured input from a single SPV and failed to 
gather views from the public-sector.  
Zou et al. (2013) also sought to identify the CSF of RM in PPP. The authors deemed the top 
four CSF were commitment, defining objectives, integration and multidisciplinary skills. 
However, these CSF pertain to in Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects. Jefferies et al. 
(2014) identified sixteen CSF of alliancing contracts in Australia using a case-study approach. 
Liu et al. (2014) investigated CSF in both economic and social infrastructure PPP projects. The 
authors were of the opinion traditional CSF failed to encapsulate the complexity of PPP and 
thus they argued attributes are dependent upon the project phases. While there is merit in 
this approach, elements of their study appear complex, for example, during the partnership 
phase, factors such as effective contract management are vague and undefined. Hence, to 
simply amalgamate these phases which equate to 25+ years, it is argued that these findings 
fail to effectively account for the changing dynamics across the construction and operational 
periods.  
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Even so, the built environment has often been criticised as being slow to adapt and keep 
pace with other industries. In spite of the prominence of collaborative partnering in PPP, it 
is argued the built environment has yet to reconcile this information void between the 
confrontational culture of infrastructure development and the collaborative philosophy 
necessary for PPP. These assertions are underpinned by the plethora of studies which 
continue to identify the partnership as a primary source of poor project performance (Zou 
et al., 2013; Jefferies et al., 2014; Jefferies and Rowlinson, 2016; Burke and Demirag, 2017; 
O’Nolan and Reeves, 2017). The next of this research is therefore to consolidate literature to 
identify the attributes for PPP stakeholder collaboration. 
5.6. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Attributes 
Predicated on the findings of the foregoing, together with the research’s understanding of 
PPP, this investigation defines PPP stakeholder collaboration as a long-term partnership 
between the public-sector Authority and the private-sector Project Company (ProjCo) and 
its constituent members whereby equal partners share risks, rewards and resources to 
deliver infrastructure in a cooperative and joint working manner. Fundamentally, it is this 
sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities on equal platforms whereby all partners participate 
that distinguishes collaborative PPP from contractual outsourcing arrangements whereby, 
all risks and responsibilities of the service provision are transferred to the private-sector in 
exchange for a charge which is underpinned by an incomplete contract when conflict arises. 
Having defined PPP stakeholder collaboration, the research now identifies the attributes of 
PPP stakeholder collaboration. To do so, it combines the findings of chapter four, together 
with collaboration theory, and PPP literature. 
5.6.1. Accountability 
In section 4.5, this research already identified multiple issues with accountability deriving 
out of the blurred boundaries associated with PPP. These accountability gaps are prevalent 
on both the public and private-sector sides. Indeed, Shaoul et al. (2013) described 
accountability as a multi-faceted concept which comprises account giving, holding 
organisations to account, analysis of accountability and applying sanctions, and being 
responsive to the public. Accountability is important for collaboration in that it represents a 
commitment to the project and therein can foster trust. Also, accountability holds 
organisations responsible for their actions and is instrumental in decision-making. 
Comprising multiple layers across the partnership, it is essential that accountability spans all 
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levels, and for this reason, it is often coupled with the skilled leadership (Archer and 
Cameron, 2013). 
5.6.2. Agreement of Project Brief 
Messy problems are those which cannot be tackled alone, thus, collaboration is unique in 
that it is a juxtaposition between self-interested goals and a shared vision. Nevertheless, by 
collectively defining a problem and agreeing the approach to address this problem, this 
creates a sense of ‘we’ as opposed to autonomous behaviour (Denning, 2009). It is important 
that all Social Infrastructure Stakeholders (SIS) agree to the purpose of the project and sign-
off on the mission statement. This encourages early buy-in and also promotes active 
participation. Furthermore, this can enhance the integrated solution development. With 
shared understanding of the task at hand, all SIS can work together to develop an innovative 
service that would not have been available otherwise. It is hence important that all SIS agree 
to the project brief early in the project, determine and agree on the success criteria and 
identify the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure the productivity of the 
collaboration (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012; Chinyere, 2013; Tang and Shen, 2013; Zou et al., 
2013; Wong et al., 2015; Leviäkangas et al., 2016). 
5.6.3. Appropriate Risk Sharing 
According to Archer and Cameron (2013), it is inevitable a collaboration will encounter risks. 
Nevertheless, Walker et al. (2017) found that collaboration in infrastructure projects can lead 
to reduced project risks and can also unlock better risk coping strategies. Collaboration 
theory suggests that the level of risk sharing is reflective of an organisations willingness to 
collaborate (Alter and Hage, 1993). In the same vein, risk sharing has been an important 
influencer on PPP SIS partnerships (English and Baxter, 2010).  
It is fundamental that risk is shared and retained by the SIS best able to manage it rather 
than be used as a mechanism to facilitate ‘off-balance sheet’ accounting. This is in contrast 
with previous undertakings where the partnership has been contractual in nature whereby 
the private-sector has typically adsorbed all risks in exchange for a premium. Already, this 
research has shown risk transfer and risk sharing has been a source of poor PPP 
collaboration. Adding credence to this, the on-going prevalence of risk in PPP literature 
suggests it continues to be a prominent concern (Loosemore and Cheung, 2015; Xiong et al., 
2017). Indeed, Burke and Demirag (2017) considered the nexus between risk allocation and 
stakeholder relationships. In doing so, they found that a collaborative project is more likely 
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to be more tolerable of risks and that risks which are addressed in a cooperative manner are 
less reliant on the contract.  
5.6.4. Authority Experience 
For collaborative success, it is fundamental that the public-sector can contribute as an equal 
partner. To do so, the Authority must possess in-house skills and not be so reliant on external 
advisors and consultants. That said, the critical examination of the PPP collaboration gaps 
found that the heterogenous nature of PPP and the scale of these ventures has meant that 
there is limited scope for repeatability. This has curtailed the development of best-practice 
experience which has detracted from the development of collaboration (Pretorious et al., 
2008). The Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) is the expertise center in the United 
Kingdom (UK) designed to support the successful delivery of social and economic 
infrastructure and major projects through the development of the overall project delivery 
system (HM Treasury, 2017). It is critical for collaboration that the IPA is instrumental in 
shepherding and overseeing the development of the partnership particularly in the earlier 
phases. Moreover, structures should be implemented to share and develop Authority 
experience as the project progresses to mitigate against the impact of staff turnover.  
5.6.5. Authority In-house Resources and Skills 
In line with Authority Experience, prevailing skills and resources shortages confronting the 
Authority has directly transpired in a power imbalance between the Authority and ProjCo. 
This has detracted from the Authority’s negotiating position and it has also been an obstacle 
to stakeholder collaboration. Successful collaborations manufacture win-win scenarios. By 
upskilling, Authorities are empowered to effectively input into arrangements and lead the 
collaborative ideology. Moreover, equal platforms can provide stakeholders with the 
capacity and confidence to by-pass bureaucracy and can culture an informal arrangement 
which is less dependent on the contract. For this reason, Authority in-house skills and 
resources are deemed to be a necessary PPP collaborative attribute (Roehrich and Caldwell, 
2012; Reynaers, 2013; Zou et al., 2013). 
5.6.6. Balance of Stakeholder Needs and Expectations 
An attribute of PPP stakeholder collaboration discerned from literature is the need to 
balance stakeholder needs and expectations. Comprising a matrix of diverse organisations, 
it is significant that all SIS derive benefits from the collaboration. If gaining from the 
arrangement, this will safeguard the sustainability of the partnership (Smyth and Pryke, 
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2008). In this context, it is important that an assessment is undertaken early in the project 
to identify the advantages of collaboration and the disadvantages of not collaborating. This 
incentivises collaboration. In addition to this, any profits or rewards emanating from the 
project should benefit all SIS. This will reduce autonomous behaviour (Archer and Cameron, 
2013; Tang and Shen, 2013). 
5.6.7. Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities 
From literature, the research identified the PPP stakeholder collaborative attribute of 
clarifying roles and responsibilities. Premised on the complexity of organisations, it is 
important there is clarity of roles and responsibilities of SIS. This is significant for the 
identification of gaps in the project as well as to determine overlaps and ultimately design a 
plan to address these gaps (Kanter, 1994; Huxham, 2003; Vangen and Huxham, 2003). Shaoul 
et al. (2013) maintained that clarification of roles and responsibilities can improve 
accountability. Likewise, Tang and Shen (2013), Aerts et al. (2014) and Wong et al. (2015) all 
identify this collaborative attribute as an important critical success factor (CSF).  
5.6.8. Clear Governance Structures 
Liu and Wilkinson (2014) deemed that effective governance structures and a collaborative 
consortium were instrumental in driving PPP project success. Equally, Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) advocated for collaboration to underpin the governance structures. 
Still, research signifies that the nature of PPP has been contractual as opposed to 
collaborative. Demirel et al. (2017) suggested that historically SIS have relied upon the 
contract to determine the control framework for the project. Yet, it is impossible to predict 
all unforeseen eventualities in PPP. Over-reliance on contractual governance has culminated 
in the breakdown of the partnership as SIS have turned to the incomplete contract to resolve 
disputes. It is therefore important that the governance structures in PPP are collaborative 
and thereby negate the need to depend on the incomplete contract to determine the 
outcome of unforeseen conflicts (Zheng et al. 2008).  
5.6.9. Collective Stakeholder Planning and Decision-Making 
Prevalent in collaborative theory is the attribute of collective stakeholder planning and 
decision-making (Gray, 1985; Gray, 1989; Butterfield et al., 2004). Equally, in PPP literature 
this attribute has been well recognised (Chinyere, 2013; Henjewele et al., 2013; Tang and 
Shen, 2013). Collective stakeholder planning and decision-making is an important attribute 
of PPP stakeholder collaboration. Failures to ensure collective stakeholder planning and 
115 
 
 
 
decision-making has been well documented in literature. Demirag et al. (2015) found that 
the reluctance of the Debt Funders to participate in the decision-making had hindered 
collaboration and eroded project trust. Moreover, resistance on the part of Authorities to 
participate in the decision-making has in the past transpired in a contractual outsourcing 
arrangement (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008). Furthermore, Soomro and Zhang, (2014) 
highlighted how the failure to include the Service Provider (FMCo) had engendered 
contractual relationships as opposed to a partnership.   
5.6.10. Conflict Resolution Structures 
According to Archer and Cameron (2013), conflict is inevitable in collaborative arrangements. 
With this in mind, leaders have an important role in managing conflict. Moreover, project 
managers play an integral part in early identification of conflict. Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 
(2016) asserted that conflict resolution structures should focus on delivering a cooperative 
solution as opposed to apportioning blame. Likewise, Demirel et al. (2017) put forward the 
notion of incorporating a change procedure into the contract to deal with unforeseen events 
during the contractual period. They purported that it was fundamental that project 
managers understand the complexity of the PPP environment and have contingencies in 
place to cope with unforeseen eventualities. 
5.6.11. Contract Flexibility 
With a life-cycle of 25+ years, and a complexity of contracts among organisations, it is 
impossible to predict all outcomes or manifestations across a PPP venture. PPP contracts are 
thus considered incomplete on the basis they cannot stipulate for every unforeseen 
eventuality. Shaoul et al. (2013) suggested that the main sources of project change were 
brought about by project stakeholders. They asserted that it is inevitable that services or 
physical facilities will be altered to reflect the transformative needs of the service. Hence, 
there is a need for formalised collaborative contracting protocols together with suitable 
safeguards and transparency (Akintoye and Kumaraswamy, 2016) to ensure the contract is 
flexible to these changes. Through greater collaboration, as unforeseen circumstances arise, 
SIS are less reliant upon the contract to determine the outcome but instead conflict can be 
resolved in an equitable manner. Notably, one of the prominent provisions implemented 
through Private Finance 2 (PF2) has been the removal of the soft-services from the contract 
to facilitate greater flexibility (HM Treasury, 2012). 
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5.6.12. Early Establishment of Collaboration 
It is well documented in collaborative research that collaboration should be fostered early in 
the project (Huxham, 2003; Vangen and Huxham, 2004). Soomro and Zhang (2014) found 
that it is important to establish collaboration early in a PPP project. This can prevent the 
manifestation of other latent sources of poor performance. Patel and Robinson (2010) 
suggested that early establishment of collaboration establishes a collaborative base and sets 
the trajectory of the partnership onto a sustainable path. This is critical premised on the 
duration of the operations phase, the manifestation of unforeseen events and the 
incompleteness of the contract. Early collaboration encourages early stakeholder buy-in. 
Also, research suggests that it is more difficult to develop collaboration downstream. 
However, it was determined that due to the competitive nature of the procurement process, 
historically, collaboration has been absent from this process. 
5.6.13. Early, Defined and Collective Stakeholder Involvement and Consultation 
Early, defined and collective involvement and consultation encourages inclusiveness and 
creates an environment which stakeholder’s buy into (Tang and Shen, 2013; Wang et al., 
2013; Demirag et al., 2015). Yet, it has been reported, stemming from the failure to include 
all SIS early in the arrangement, there has, on some occasions, been curtailed long-term 
synergy between organisations which has eventually transpiring in the collapse of the 
partnership (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012). Early involvement allows stakeholders to develop 
a shared vision of the project. Also, collective decision-making can prevent autonomous SIS 
behaviour, provides a superior integrated solution and also can reduce conflict. These 
engagement processes should be clearly defined and structured. 
5.6.14. Effective Communication 
To some in collaborative literature, communication is tantamount to this concept (Lewis, 
2006). To others, it is a mechanism to further understanding. Communication and its various 
forms are common practice for bringing organisations together (Henjewele et al., 2013; Tang 
and Shen, 2013; Wang et al., 2013; Aerts et al., 2014). Through information exchange, 
dialogue, idea sharing, brain-storming, bargaining and so on, communication is the exchange 
channels and structures to nurture these alliances. Communication should be transparent, 
inclusive, and regular (O’Leary and Vij, 2012). Notwithstanding its importance, it has been 
reported poor communication has been a concern in PPP. Failure to communicate early in 
the project has led to long-term issues emerging in the operations. Communication must be 
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effective, collective and on-going throughout the project among all SIS. All SIS should be 
involved early in communication channels to maximise the integrated solution provision. 
Already some have considered how the use of Information Technology (IT) and Building 
Information Modelling (BIM) can improve communication among SIS. Love et al. (2015) 
promoted BIM to measure long-term performance and Wang et al. (2013) proposed a 
framework for earlier FMCo involvement in the design phase also with BIM.  
5.6.15. Financial and Technical Exchange and Support / Stipend 
Some have considered the nature of the PPP procurement phase as a barrier to early 
collaboration. The failure to cultivate early collaboration has detracted from the long-term 
performance as short-term objectives have been prioritised over an integrated innovative 
process. To overcome this barrier, by providing support; both technical and financial or a 
stipend, SIS are encouraged to commit earlier to the project. This display of resource 
exchange indicates appetite for a collaborative partnership. Also, by exchanging resources 
this can lead to greater innovation as well as improve the overall performance of the project 
(Ho and Hsu, 2014; Wong et al., 2015). 
5.6.16. Identifying Individual and Shared Objectives 
One of the primary reasons to collaborate is to acquire skills not available internally. Upshot 
from this, organisations will possess different values, norms, and objectives, culminating in 
disparate stakeholder objectives. This misalignment of interests has heavily encouraged the 
autonomous behaviour of stakeholders. To minimise the impact of these differences, 
SIS should identify shared commonalities and recognise the need to work together (Denning, 
2009). By identifying commonalities, a shared aim for the project can be agreed. 
Furthermore, heterogeneous objectives should be shared to improve understanding. 
Through shared understanding of the standpoint of each organisation this enables informed 
collective decision-making and togetherness. Ultimately, this can foster an atmosphere that 
is win-win for everyone (Eden and Huxham, 2001; Hardy et al., 2003; Huxham and Vangen, 
2004; Chinyere, 2013; Zou et al., 2013; Tsasis et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015; Davis, 2016; 
Leviäkangas et al., 2016; Burke and Demirag, 2017). 
5.6.17. Information Sharing and Transparency 
Information sharing and transparency, has been put forward as an attribute of PPP 
stakeholder collaboration (Eden and Huxham, 2001; Hardy et al., 2003; Huxham and Vangen, 
2004; Chinyere, 2013; Zou et al., 2013; Tsasis et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015; Leviäkangas et 
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al., 2016; Burke and Demirag, 2017). Through collaborative information sharing and 
transparency, the performance of the partnership can be measured to ascertain the 
performance of the project, calculate the efficacy of risk transfer and ultimately determine 
Value for Money (VfM). Additionally, transparency and information sharing enable more 
accurate forecasting, and therein promotes informed decision-making and greater 
accountability which is often convoluted as a result of the complexity of PPP. Mukhopadhyay 
(2016) investigated the concept of a nested framework for transparency and information 
sharing in PPP. The authors suggested this attribute should be a two-way flow of information 
among SIS and it is fundamental early in the project to capitalise on efficient decision-
making.  
5.6.18. Information Technology 
IT supports information sharing, communication and the construction of trust through active 
stakeholder involvement. Social software such as email, conferencing, blogs, wiki’s and 
discussion boards are now universal and encourage the formation of a community like 
environment. IT, advantageously, can circumnavigate geographical and logistical barriers. 
Furthermore, IT can be utilised for other processes including modelling, planning, 
programming and forecasting. In line with this, BIM is now being activity encouraged as a 
concept for promoting long-term success in PPP arrangements. BIM can complement other 
collaborative attributes such as collective decision-making and communication (Wang et al., 
2013; Love et al., 2015) and can aid stakeholders to develop and maintain the facility. 
Moreover, BIM and IT can be used to retain knowledge and measure the performance of the 
collaborative partnership (MGI, 2017). 
5.6.19. Innovation 
An attribute of collaboration which is often overlooked is innovation (Roumboutsos and 
Saussier, 2014). For a collaboration to be sustainable, all SIS must benefit. Thus, innovation 
is an important attribute of collaboration on the grounds it can enhance long-term value 
creation. According to McKinsey Global Institute (MGI, 2017) innovation in collaboration can 
improve the service provision through the application of new technologies and systems 
thinking. By doing so, the service provision can be refined and recalibrated. Moreover, as the 
partnership evolves, through continuous innovation, performance can be improved (MGI, 
2017).  
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5.6.20. Knowledge Retention 
Knowledge retention has been identified as an attribute of PPP stakeholder collaboration 
(Aerts et al., 2014; Burke and Demirag, 2017). Attributable to the seismic undertaking in PPP 
projects, Authorities are typically involved in a small number of schemes. Thus, systems and 
structures should be installed to retain best-practice knowledge which can be exchanged 
across organisations. Additionally, transcending multiple phases and decades, Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) indicated there is a need to develop a strategy by which to retain 
experience and knowledge capital captured to bolster the sustainability of the partnership. 
Roehrich et al. (2014) agreed, remarking a failure to centralise and retain intellectual capital 
has meant lessons learnt from previous stakeholder collaborations have not been shared 
within and across projects and organisations. 
5.6.21. Power Sharing 
Many have asserted that control and power sharing is central to PPP collaboration (Chen et 
al., 2013; Tang and Shen, 2013; Zou et al., 2013; Aerts et al. 2014; DeSchepper et al., 2014; 
Henjewele et al., 2014; Rwelamila et al., 2014; Burke and Demirag, 2017). Archer and 
Cameron (2013) maintained that without power sharing, the interdependent philosophy of 
collaboration is undermined which would culminate in no one succeeding. It is critical all 
project leaders understand the importance of equal power sharing and project control. 
Furthermore, power sharing is pivotal in these arrangements as a combined effort permits 
not only heterogeneous problem solving, but also it encourages others to influence 
problems. Chapter four has shown how power sharing is intrinsically linked to the possession 
of skills, experiences, and resources. However, shortcomings particularly on the side of 
Authorities has detracted from the performance of the partnership. To ensure power 
sharing, all SIS should have access to the required skills and resources to participate on an 
equal platform. 
5.6.22. Processual Change 
Collaboration is an on-going, dynamic and evolving process. Moreover, identified in section 
4.4 the boundary specification of PPP is permeable, thus, nascent SIS may enter the project, 
while others may also exit. In this respect, the ability to continually learn and evolve, in 
tandem with the dissolving of old, and building of new alliances is critical. Bringing together 
organisations with different project objectives, as stakeholder involvement and priorities 
shift over time, collaborative arrangements must be capable of correspondingly maturing. 
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Despite the pertinence for evolving arrangements, literature indicates PPP partnerships have 
failed to evolve and develop as projects progress. To combat this, it is important that the 
performance of the partnership is continually monitored, measured and managed to 
determine efficacy against the predefined performance targets. Through processual change, 
the partnership can adapt reflective of feedback for improved productivity (Cruz and 
Marques, 2013; Wong et al., 2015; Demirel et al., 2017).  
5.6.23. Skilled Leadership 
According to Vangen and Huxham (2003), leadership is the person who is charged with the 
responsibility of ‘making things happen’ and can facilitate decision-making, support conflict 
resolution as well as reinforce the collaborative agenda. Geddes (2012) described 
collaborative leadership as the joint management structures which glue the disparate 
aspects of the partnership together. In the context of PPP, this is particularly important 
because of the permeable boundary. Metcalfe (1993) identified leadership as salient for 
strengthening the interface among organisations. Likewise, Shaoul et al. (2013) suggested 
leadership is required to oversee and manage the project systems such as communication 
and involvement. Premised on the myriad of relationships, organisations and misaligned 
project objectives, skilled leadership is critical in steering the project in a direction that is 
agreeable to all SIS to circumnavigate autonomous behaviour (Akintoye and Kumaraswamy, 
2016). Indeed, ULI (2016) reiterated the importance of leadership as a core principle of 
successful PPP initiatives in developing a shared vision among project stakeholders. For the 
public-sector to participate as an equal partner, the project leader, according to World Bank 
et al. (2016), should have diverse expertise in technical, environmental, economic, financial 
and legal aspects of the project, can manage the decision-making process and can coordinate 
external advisors together with the Authority. A failure to meet these requirements has been 
a common source of project failure.  
5.6.24. Social Capital / Inter-personal Relationships 
Although considered distinct from inter-organisational collaboration, many have asserted an 
important attribute for collaboration is the development of inter-personal 
collaboration. Inter-personal social capital exists between the individuals responsible for the 
day to day undertaking and execution of the arrangement. However, consequent of the 
longevity and bundled approach of PPP, high staff turnover is associated with these 
arrangements. It has been recorded social capital can facilitate the development of shared 
norms, rules, and expectations of interactions as well as complimenting equality. Likewise, 
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social capital enables collaboration at an organisational level to shift allegiances from 
individuality to a mutual shared obligation and expectations. Efforts such as workshops and 
social events are important in fostering social capital (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012; Tsasis et 
al., 2015) 
5.6.25. Project Company Experience 
World Bank et al. (2016) were of the view, strong technical capacity and experience is a key 
component of project success. Similarly, Li et al. (2005a) identified that a strong consortium 
with a positive reputation was important for project success. In their research, they 
suggested that SIS with similar objectives could further the performance in that it reduced 
the likelihood of conflict and autonomous behaviour. World Bank et al. (2016) suggested 
that, premised on the scale of infrastructure investment and PPP, consortium experience 
was an important factor in managing the complexities and challenges of these ventures. 
Through experience, others have argued that a strong consortium can implement best-
practice systems, apply new technologies and therein improve the performance of the 
partnership and the reliability of the service (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012; Tang and Shen, 
2013; Zou et al., 2013; Aerts et al., 2014). According to the World Bank et al. (2016), the 
Authority should ensure the winning bidder is qualified with construction experience, 
operation and maintenance experience and PPP management.  
5.6.26. Stakeholder Commitment 
Several authors; both in PPP and collaborative literature, maintain commitment is critical for 
collaboration (Huxham, 1993; Eden and Huxham, 2001; Zou et al., 2013; Chinyere, 2013; 
Tang and Shen, 2013; Aerts et al., 2014; Wong et al., 2015). Commitment must be exhibited 
by all SIS and be a top-down approach, starting at senior level management. A failure to 
engender collaborative commitment at the highest level brings about a superficial 
arrangement (Kanter, 1994). Commitment can be demonstrated through sharing of 
resources, information or personnel exchanges. Equally, it can be encouraged through active 
inclusion and participation. Some have considered the nature of PPP procurement as a 
barrier to early collaboration. Wong et al. (2015) suggested to overcome this barrier, by 
providing support either in the form of resources or a stipend, SIS are encouraged to commit 
earlier to collaboration. Nonetheless, it has been identified that a lack of commitment 
exhibited by the Authority frustrated ProjCo, particularly in the design and construction 
phase. Likewise, commitment problems have surfaced within micro partnering dynamics 
pertaining to Debt Funders. Remaining distant, some have queried the commitment of these 
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SIS as a result of viewing the infrastructure only from a financial perspective. This has 
generated distrust in the project (Demirag et al., 2015). 
5.6.27. Trust and Respect 
Trust is one of the foremost attributes commonly correlated to collaborative success 
(Vangen and Huxham, 2003; Smyth and Edkins, 2007; Harrison et al., 2010; Tang and Shen, 
2013; Zou et al., 2013; Tantalo and Priem, 2014; Wong et al., 2015; Burke and Demirag, 
2017). Trust has been explored in many fields including psychology, economics, sociology 
and organisational science. Blanchard et al. (2013) in their book, presented four normative 
components of trust, encapsulated within the acronym “ABCD”: 
A. Able – confidence in the capacity and wherewithal of an organisation to complete 
tasks; 
B. Believable - refers to integrity and confidence that what is being stated is the truth; 
C. Connected – identifies the significance of social capital and inter-personal 
relationships in creating trust; and 
D. Dependability – discusses the importance of being able to rely on someone or an 
organisation in delivering on commitments. 
Given the significance of trust, in the context it has perhaps been the collaborative attribute 
to have received most attention. In earlier research conducted by Smyth and Edkins (2007), 
they considered relationship management through the lens of trust. In doing so, they were 
able to map thirty dimensions of relationship management in an SPV for collaborative 
working and identified the salience of proactive management of relationships. Henjewele et 
al. (2013) found that trust in PPP was best built through dialogue and an integrative strategy. 
Likewise, Tantalo and Priem (2014) asserted that trust is an effective means of overcoming 
barriers and enables the sharing of multi-attribute utility functions. This develops a better 
understanding and can unlock greater value creation and improve strategic advantage. Like 
communication, trust is considered by many as a catalyst and utility attribute for other 
aspects of collaboration. As a result, it is often coupled with leadership (Tantalo and Priem, 
2014). In an effort to cultivate trust, Mineo (2014) recognised the importance of a leader in 
acting as a champion to drive forward the philosophies of trust.   
Allied with trust, all organisations should be considered equal and thus deserve to 
be respected and heard. It is important that trust and respect are established early in the 
project. Even so, many have articulated how there has been a failure to build and establish 
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trust and respect in PPP projects. It has been identified that the competitive nature of the 
procurement phase has hindered the early fostering of trust which in turn has long-term 
implications for the dynamics of the partnership (Zheng et al., 2008). To negate this, other 
attributes such as resource exchange and communication are important factors in the 
development of trust.  
Table 5.1 is a summary of the 27 PPP stakeholder attributes identified from literature along 
with the corresponding authors. These attributes will now be used in the empirical 
investigation for the development of the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. This will 
be the next stage of this study. 
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Table 5.1: PPP SIS Collaborative Attributes 
Attribute Author(s)  
Accountability Vangen and Huxham (2003); Patel and Robinson (2010); O’Leary 
and Vij (2012); Archer and Cameron (2013); Shaoul et al. (2013); 
Grossi and Thomasson (2015); Tsasis et al. (2015); Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016); Wu et al. (2016) 
Agreement of Project Brief Gray (1985); Gray (1989); Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Chinyere 
(2013); Tang and Shen (2013); Zou et al. (2013); Wong et al. (2015); 
Davis (2016); Leviäkangas et al. (2016) 
Appropriate Risk Sharing Archer and Cameron (2013); Chang (2013); Cheung et al. (2013); 
Aerts et al. (2014); Loosemore and Cheung (2015); Burke and 
Demirag (2017); Xiong et al. (2017) 
Authority Experience Tang and Shen (2013) 
Authority In-house 
Resources / Skills 
Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Reynaers (2013); Zou et al. (2013) 
Balance of Stakeholder 
Needs and Expectations 
Archer and Cameron (2013); Tang and Shen (2013) 
Clarifying of Roles and 
Responsibilities 
Kanter (1994); Huxham (2003); Huxham and Vangen (2004); Shaoul 
et al. (2013); Tang and Shen (2013); Aerts et al. (2014); Wong et al. 
(2015) 
Clear Governance 
Structures 
Hall et al. (1977); Gray (1985); Huxham (2003); Huxham and 
Vangen (2004); Thomson and Perry (2006); Archer and Cameron 
(2013); Shaoul et al. (2013); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016); 
Demirel et al. (2017) 
Collective Stakeholder 
Planning and Decision-
Making 
Gray (1989); Gray (1985); Applegate, 2004; Butterfield et al. (2004); 
Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2008); Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); 
Chinyere (2013); Henjewele et al. (2013); Tang and Shen (2013); 
Soomro and Zhang (2014); Demirag et al. (2015) 
Conflict Resolutions 
Structures 
Archer and Cameron (2013); Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016); 
Demirel et al. (2017) 
Contract Flexibility Javed et al. (2014); Lam and Javed (2014); Wong et al. (2015); 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016); Burke and Demirag (2017); 
Demirel et al. (2017) 
Early Establishment of 
Collaboration 
Little et al. (1995); Kelly et al. (2002); Soomro and Zhang (2014) 
Early, defined and collective 
Stakeholder Involvement 
and Consultation 
Carley and Christie (1992); El-Gohary et al. (2006); Roehrich and 
Caldwell (2012); Tang and Shen (2013); Wang et al. (2013); Demirag 
et al. (2015) 
Effective Communication Lewis (2006); O’Leary and Vij (2012); Henjewele et al. (2013); Wang 
et al. (2013); Aerts et al. (2014); Tang and Shen (2013); Zou et al. 
(2013); Love et al. (2015) 
Financial and Technical 
Exchange and Support / 
Stipend 
Ho and Hsu (2014); Wong et al. (2015) 
Identifying Individual and 
Shared Objectives 
Eden and Huxham (2001); Hardy et al. (2003); Huxham and Vangen 
(2004); Denning (2009); Chinyere (2013); Zou et al. (2013); Tsasis 
et al. (2015); Zhang et al. (2015); Davis (2016); Leviäkangas et al. 
(2016); Burke and Demirag (2017) 
Information Sharing and 
Transparency 
Kanter (1994); Bouchlaghem (2012); Zou et al. (2013); DeSchepper 
et al. (2014); Wong et al. (2015); Mukhopadhyay (2016) 
Information Technology Wang et al. (2013); Love et al. (2015); MGI (2017) 
Innovation Roumboutsos and Saussier (2014); MGI (2017) 
Knowledge Retention Aerts et al. (2014); Roehrich et al. (2014); Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016); Burke and Demirag (2017) 
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Power Sharing Gray (1989); Applegate, 2004; Huxham and Vangen (2004); O’Leary 
and Vij (2012); Chen et al. (2013); Tang and Shen (2013); Zou et al. 
(2013); Aerts et al. (2014); DeSchepper et al. (2014); Henjewele et 
al. (2014); Rwelamila et al. (2014); Burke and Demirag (2017) 
Processual Change Doz (1996); Huxham (2003); Huxham and Vangen (2004); Wong et 
al. (2015); Demirel et al. (2017) 
Skilled Leadership Foster-Fishman et al. (2001); Huxham (2003); Archer and Cameron 
(2013); Shaoul et al. (2013); Tang and Shen (2013); Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) 
Social Capital / Inter-
personal Relationships 
Agranoff and McGuire (2003); Waugh and Streib (2006); Roehrich 
and Caldwell (2012); Tsasis et al. (2015) 
ProjCo Experience Roehrich and Caldwell (2012); Tang and Shen (2013); Zou et al. 
(2013); Aerts et al. (2014); World Bank et al. (2016) 
Stakeholder Commitment Huxham (1993); Eden and Huxham (2001); Zou et al. (2013); 
Chinyere (2013); Tang and Shen (2013); Aerts et al. (2014); Demirag 
et al. (2015); Wong et al. (2015) 
Trust and Respect Zaheer et al. (1998); Clegg and McNulty (2002); Vangen and 
Huxham (2003); Smyth and Edkins (2007); Harrison et al. (2010); 
Tang and Shen (2013); Zou et al. (2013); Tantalo and Priem (2014); 
Wong et al. (2015); Burke and Demirag (2017) 
 
5.7. Summary 
The remit of this chapter was to consider the collaboration concept and to identify the 
attributes of PPP stakeholder collaboration which will form the basis of the empirical 
investigation. Determined in chapter three, already, efforts have been undertaken to 
address collaboration in the built environment and PPP. Notwithstanding these 
investigations, there remains a prevailing knowledge gap.  
To bridge this void, there were pertinent grounds to look beyond the confines of the built 
environment and into collaboration theory to extract the attributes of collaboration. 
Accordingly, the research conducted an in-depth exploration of collaboration theory. It 
defined collaboration, considered the motivations to collaborate and ultimately it identified 
27 PPP stakeholder collaboration attributes which will be used to develop the PPP 
stakeholder collaboration framework. The methodological design to be implemented for this 
framework development is delineated in the next chapter, chapter six.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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6. Research Methodology 
6.1. Introduction 
In the critical literature review, it was determined in chapter two that social infrastructure 
provision in the United Kingdom (UK) must be addressed bi-laterally: through the 
identification of more alternative sources of finance and by improving the performance of 
existing provision frameworks by addressing inherent inefficiencies.  
A provision framework which has been extolled for as a vehicle for ‘more and better’ 
infrastructure is Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). Internationally, the UK is considered a 
pioneer of these cross-sectoral partnerships. Yet, since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), the UK PPP marketplace has exhibited tapered levels of activity. Stemming from acute 
transformations in the financing markets as well as forthcoming concerns over the true 
extent of Value for Money (VfM) for the taxpayer as a result of inherent deficiencies, 
confidence in PPP frameworks has been undermined. Nevertheless, PPP has been identified 
as a mechanism which will continue to be used where offering better VfM. To address the 
inherent inefficiencies of these partnering frameworks and to stimulate wider capital 
sources, the UK government has undertaken steps to strategically reform UK PPP 
arrangements. Despite this overhaul, there remains noteworthy uncertainty regarding the 
future of UK PPP with legitimate concerns as to whether these modifications have indeed 
addressed the inherent inefficiencies of the previous models.  
There is now the acknowledgement that there is a need for greater collaboration to underpin 
and safeguard the performance and sustainability of these partnerships as well as to 
encourage increased participation from nascent financial social infrastructure stakeholders 
(SIS). Notwithstanding the need for collaboration, literature indicates that the nature of PPP 
ventures has been contractual as opposed to collaborative. It is hence argued there is a 
forthcoming knowledge gap as to how to best foster PPP stakeholder collaboration. To 
address this knowledge gap, the research conducted an analysis of stakeholder collaboration 
in PPP. Ultimately, derived from this detailed critical literature review, the research identified 
a list of 27 PPP stakeholder collaborative attributes for empirical investigation.  
This chapter serves to determine the research structure by which to empirically develop the 
PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. In addition to this framework development, 
premised on the findings of chapter three, the research also undertakes a PPP social 
infrastructure market analysis. The remit of this contemporary analysis is to provide an 
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insights into market activity to add contemporary credibility to the research. Holding a 
positivist epistemological and objectivist ontological stance, this chapter explains the bi-
quantitative research design. This consists of a PPP social infrastructure market analysis using 
secondary datasets as well as the deductive quantitative survey questionnaires which are to 
be used for the development of the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework .  
This chapter is organised as follows: 
• Research paradigm; 
• Research strategy; 
• Research methods; 
• Research design; 
• Survey design; 
• Statistical analysis; and 
• Framework development. 
 
6.2. The Research Paradigm 
Creswell (2009) suggests a research design is a cross-section comprised of three 
components:  
a. Research philosophy; 
b. Strategies of inquiry; and  
c. Research methods.  
When planning a study, it is critical a researcher considers how their study fits into the 
theoretical perspective of research, the strategy that correlates to this theory and the 
procedures by which to carry out the practice. The research will therefore, according to this 
structure, investigate these three components before deciding on a research design for this 
study.  
6.2.1. Research Philosophy 
Guba (1990) and Knight and Ruddock (2008) similarly described philosophy as the rationale 
which underlies a research methodology. Within literature there are several names for this; 
Creswell (2009) dubbed research philosophy as worldviews whereas Mertens (1998) referred 
to this as research paradigms. Consequently, within literature there are inconsistencies 
pertaining to this theoretical underpinning. Notwithstanding this disparity, Creswell (2009) 
identified four worldviews, equally, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) recognised five; however, 
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more broadly this philosophical theory seems to be subsumed into epistemological and 
ontological considerations (Dainty, 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2015).  
Understanding competing theoretical viewpoints is fundamental to understanding how 
research contributes to knowledge. Just like any theory, research philosophy is subject to 
interpretation. Different stances will create different approaches to knowledge contribution 
and thus will be deterministic of the type of data collected, the methods by which to do so 
and the steps to analyse said data. Nevertheless, by linking the research methods and 
strategy to the larger theory, Creswell (2009) is of the opinion that this adds to research value 
in that it explicates and justifies the researchers design. This investigation will therefore now 
explore into epistemology and ontology to determine the perspective appropriate to this 
research. 
6.2.1.1. Epistemological Consideration 
James Frederick Ferrier, a Scottish philosopher coined the term epistemology in 1856. 
Originating from the Greek word epistēmē meaning ‘knowledge’ and ‘logos’, epistemology 
can be defined as the theory of knowledge especially that pertaining to validity, methods 
and scope (Knight and Turnbull, 2008). Epistemology discerns what acceptable knowledge 
is, and if the social world is accountable to the same principles of that in natural sciences 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). In other words, epistemology is concerned with how a researcher 
may discover knowledge. Inherent to epistemology, there are two standpoints: positivism 
and interpretivism.  
Positivism, intelligible from its very name, advocates natural science methods in social reality 
studies. According to Creswell (2009) positivists hold a deterministic philosophy which 
explains why this viewpoint is often referred to as the scientific method or science research. 
Bryman and Bell (2015) presented five principles that positivism adheres to: 
i. Knowledge confirmed by the senses can genuinely be warranted as knowledge; 
ii. Theory serves the purpose of constructing hypotheses fit for testing and assessment; 
iii. Knowledge is founded on findings from data gathered; 
iv. Science must be objective and carried out in a means which is value free; and 
v. Scientific and normative statements are discernible, and scientific statements are 
the true domain of the scientist.  
Alternatively, epistemology can be viewed as interpretivist. While positivism is centred on 
the application of a scientific model to study the social world, others have been critical, 
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arguing the subject matter, i.e. that people and their institutions differ fundamentally from 
that of natural sciences (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Interpretivism is hence grounded in the 
notion that people are inherently different from natural sciences and thus it requires a 
decoupled approach for this type of study. Simply put, knowledge is socially subjectively 
created as opposed to being objectively apparent (Carson et al., 2001). 
6.2.1.2. Ontological Consideration 
While epistemology is the theory of knowledge, Knight and Turnbull (2008) refer to ontology 
broadly as conceptions of reality. Bryman and Bell (2015) offer the question, should social 
entities be considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors or is a 
social entity created by social actor’s perceptions and actions. Essentially, ontology concerns 
assumptions pertaining to how the world is constructed and the nature of things in it. 
Bryman and Bell (2015) suggested it can be approached from an objectivist or constructivist 
position. Objectivists hold the view that social phenomena, actions and meanings are 
autonomous of social actions, while constructivists believe social phenomena are created 
through social interactions and to that end, cannot be constant therefore necessitating 
continued revision (Bryman and Bell, 2015).  
6.2.1.3. Methodological Reasoning 
While research can be observed from an epistemological or ontological stance, Bryman and 
Bell (2015) further argue there is a third facet to the relationships of theory, research and 
reasoning, i.e. methodology. Methodological reasoning encapsulates inductive, deductive or 
abductive theory.  
Deductive theory can be described as the process of hypothesising deduced from existing 
knowledge in a theory which is subsequently scrutinised through empirical investigation 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). For this reason, deductive reasoning is commonly referred to as a 
top-down approach in that it commences at a universal or abstract level filtering to a 
concrete or actual level whereby inferences or conclusions are surmised, indicative of a 
general level. In this regard, the theory travels from the general to the specific, thus that 
which is true at the abstract level should theoretically apply to a contextual scenario. Bryman 
and Bell (2015) maintain, within a deductive approach, the hypothesis is determinant of the 
methodological design, and the data collecting process. This approach is prevalent in 
positivist quantitative research.  
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Oppositely, inductive reasoning is often referred to as a bottom-up approach. This approach 
draws inferences or conclusions from a specific phenomenon which lend to the theory on a 
universal level. Inductive theory is particularly recognisable in grounded theory which 
analyses data for the production of a theory. Much the same way deductive research is 
dominant in quantitative research, inductive research is typically prominent in interpretivist 
qualitative investigations (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Though these theories are perceptibly 
distinct, often there are elements of each approach interwoven within each other. This 
iterative process of reflection often involves the variable shifting back and forth between 
data and theory. As such, Bryman and Bell (2015) suggest these approaches ought not to be 
thought of as distinct but rather considered as tendencies.  
Notwithstanding the deductive/inductive dichotomy, there is also a middle ground. Just as 
deductive and inductive reasoning benefit from conclusions and inferences to construct 
theories, so too can abductive reasoning. Abductive reasoning compensates for inherent 
weaknesses and limitations in the deductive and inductive approaches. Unlike other 
reasoning, abductive logic selects the ‘best explanation’ to explain a puzzle which existing 
theory cannot account for (Bryman and Bell, 2015).  
6.2.2. Research Strategy 
Having examined research philosophy and described how this connects to research 
strategies, this investigation will now examine these research strategies to inform the 
research of a suitable strategy by which to undertake the empirical study. 
6.2.2.1. Quantitative Research 
Creswell (2009) asserts that quantitative research permits the objective testing of theories 
through examining measurable relationships between variables. It supports structured and 
statistical analysis characterised by a population typically deployed through a standardised 
means permitting direct comparison and generalisation (Creswell, 2009). Quantitative 
research is advantageous on the grounds it allows the study to cover a large number of cases 
within a limited timeframe, which is representative of a larger population. However, Flick 
(2011) warned relevance and context of some of the data can on occasion be potentially 
meaningless. Notwithstanding this criticism, typically quantitative research has been carried 
out via surveys or experiments (Creswell, 2009). Echoing Yin (2014), Barnham (2015) reasons 
quantitative research characteristically seeks to determine ‘what?’ questions, e.g. what 
number of, or what percentage of people prefer ‘A’ to ‘B’. Similarly, Flick (2011) considered 
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quantitative research to be an effective means to assess relations between variables, or a 
basis for events.  
6.2.2.2. Qualitative Research 
Just as a quantitative approach may be an effective strategy to formulate conclusions, it is 
restricted in the sense that it typically applies a statistical approach and is therefore 
representative of what might occur rather than what indeed did (Silverman, 2001). Others 
have considered further approaches beyond strictly quantitative research. Qualitative 
research explores into insights and observations of a problem which involves the researcher 
developing themes derived from data (Creswell, 2009). It is characterised by relationships, 
motivations, behaviours and opinions for the discovery of underlying meaning and theory 
development. Different to quantitative, qualitative research attempts to answer ‘why?’ 
questions searching for causality and motivations on a ‘deeper’ level (Barnham, 2015). These 
inductive approaches offer the advantage of flexibility in that the researcher has much more 
freedom to explore themes and relevance in its context. Nonetheless, there are drawbacks 
to this method; due to the nature of these approaches, this can be time consuming. Equally 
others have suggested it can be difficult to generalise to a wider population (Creswell, 2009). 
Within qualitative research, Creswell (2009) refers to many strategies such as ethnography 
and grounded theory. Alternatively, Dainty (2008) suggested interviews and case-studies 
have been common approaches in the built environment. Hitherto, two themes within 
research philosophy are forthcoming.  
Table 6.1: Fundamentals of Research Design (Bryman and Bell, 2015) 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Principal theoretical 
orientation in research 
Deductive; testing of theory Inductive; generation of 
theory 
Epistemological orientation Natural science model, 
particularly positivism 
Interpretivism 
Ontological orientation Objectivism Constructivism 
 
Table 6.1, created by Bryman and Bell (2011) depicts how research philosophy and research 
methods are interspersed.  
6.2.2.3. Mixed-Methods Research 
While there are arguments for and against each, Creswell (2009) points out that research 
may also undertake a combination of research strategies stemming from abductive theory. 
Mixed-methods are an extension of the previous two strategies permitting multiple 
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applications and approaches to an investigation as opposed to unilateral techniques. Mixed-
methods are complimentary and structured in sequential, concurrent or transformative 
strategies compensating for limitations and weaknesses in each singular approach (Creswell, 
2009).  
6.2.3. Research Methods 
Of the three elements considered by Creswell (2009), research methods are the means to 
collect, analyse and study data. Accordingly, selecting the appropriate methods must be 
reflective of the researcher’s intentions. Collecting data can be undertaken via several 
methods, for example, instruments can be used to elicit numerical data through experiments 
whereas interviews can deploy closed or open-ended questions to ascertain opinions and 
beliefs. Within quantitative data collection, experiments and surveys are commonly 
identified (Creswell, 2009); however, when it comes to qualitative research, methods are 
somewhat more disparate. Tesch (1990) listed 28 qualitative methods, equally Wolcott 
(2001) identified 21. Nevertheless, a review of literature indicates the following methods are 
the most commonly suggested of all research instruments (Denscombe, 2007; Knight and 
Ruddock, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2015); 
• Surveys - Creswell (2009) defines surveys as a numbered account of trends, 
perspectives or opinions of a selected population which are representative of a 
wider population. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) assert surveys are an effective 
mechanism to confirm hypotheses and map out aspects of the social world 
(Desncombe, 2007). Equally, Fowler (2009) deems surveys as an efficient approach 
to gather opinions, behaviours and social situations. Within surveys there are several 
types: listed postal questionnaires, internet surveys, face-to-face interviews, 
telephone interviews, and observations (Denscombe, 2007). 
• Experiments - Experiments test for cause-and-effect relationships between 
independent and dependent variables (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). This approach is 
rare in construction management research because of the difficulties surrounding 
organisational variables; however, when applicable, they are often commended due 
to their robustness and trustworthiness (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
• Case Study - Stake (1995) defines a case-study as a single or collection of cases to be 
investigated and analysed. Denscombe (2007) claims a case-study approach is an 
effective approach to exploring at depth an event, relationships, experiences or 
processes. Similarly, Yin (2003) described case-studies as a holistic approach which 
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affords the researcher the opportunity to investigate meaningful complex social 
phenomena in a real-life context. Within this approach there are four types (Yin, 
2014): holistic single case-study, embedded single case-study, holistic multiple case-
studies, embedded multiple case-studies. 
• Ethnography - Ethnography can be described as the study of cultures and people. 
That is to say, the research observes societal phenomena from the perspective of 
the research (Denscombe, 2007). Stemming from anthropology, ethnography has 
been assimilated into social science research and is typically implemented to 
holistically interpret cultural issues (Heider, 2009). 
• Grounded Theory - Hunter and Kelly (2008) describe grounded theory as the process 
of constructing theory derived from data. This methodology was introduced by 
Glaser and Strauss in 1967, and since then has been deployed in a two-fold fashion: 
Glaser used grounded theory to derive theory from data, whereas Strauss and Corbin 
encouraged an approach motivated by research questions (Hunter and Kelly, 2008). 
Data is typically collected in three ways; field data, interviews or by any other literary 
source. 
• Phenomenology - Farina (2014) made the claim, to define phenomenology is 
dangerous and potentially paradoxically, in that it is not a philosophical school but 
should be regarded closer to a school of thought as it is a method to overcome the 
traditional rationalism and empiricism argument. It is premised upon reality being 
constructed from objects and events, i.e. phenomena perceived by human 
consciousness, and not anything beyond. In essence, phenomenology objectively 
studies a topic that is typically subjectively analysed (Sanyal, 2014). 
• Action Research - Coined by Kurt Lewin in 1944, action research was introduced in 
his 1946 paper ‘Action Research and Minority Problems’. Action research is the 
process of strategically addressing a problem and producing a best practice 
framework or guidelines (Denscombe, 2007). According to Denscombe (2010) there 
are two themes: participatory and practical action research. Reason and Bradbury 
(2001) considered action research to be an on-going and repetitive interactive 
process to determine underlying social causality through data analysis and 
interpretation. 
6.2.4. Built Environment Research Designs 
Considered to be a new discipline relative to others, Knight and Ruddock (2008) explain there 
are consequently no pre-defined approaches to research methodologies intrinsic to the built 
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environment. Embracing contributions from social and human sciences as well as a diversity 
of domains including art, law, economics, sociology, statistics and philosophy, positivist 
studies have been popular although advocators of interpretivism have argued over the 
importance of understanding social phenomena vis-à-vis explaining it. Upshot from this, the 
built environment has displayed increased interest in qualitative research and more recently, 
mixed-methods approaches (Knight and Ruddock, 2008). 
An analysis of 30 peer-reviewed journals constituting either PPP or stakeholding over the last 
decade indicates there has been much enthusiasm primarily for qualitative research. Of 30 
papers; 23% were quantitative, 47% qualitative, 13% mixed-methods and the remainder 
undertook no empirical methodology (17%). Earlier publishing’s reveal, primarily studies 
have either been fundamentally qualitative or quantitative, for example, Li et al. (2005a) 
conducted questionnaire surveys, Grubnic and Hodges (2003) utilised case studies, while El-
Gohary et al. (2006) performed semantic interviews as part of their investigation. 
Nevertheless, trending is changing. While qualitative approaches remain popular, many 
researchers are surpassing conventional approaches and are now actively embracing mixed-
methods strategies. Notably, all mixed-methods research has been carried out post 2012; 
Zou et al. (2013) performed a triangulated mixed-methods strategy consisting of interviews 
and empirical survey questionnaires. Similarly, Ng et al. (2013) executed case studies with 
interviews, focus groups and a two-round Delphi survey whereas DeSchepper et al. (2014) 
employed a multiple case-study / focus group approach. Within these mixed-methods 
studies, a sequential structure has typically been undertaken. This transition from strictly 
quantitative / qualitative studies to mixed-methods seems to have paralleled the roll-out of 
several other data collection methods. For some time, survey questionnaires (20%), 
interviews (30%) and case-studies (37%)19 have dominated almost all approaches; however, 
several contemporary papers have welcomed others. Focus groups (7%), Delphi surveys (7%) 
and face-to-face surveys (7%) have burgeoningly grown in popularity. Furthermore, it is 
worth noting, focus groups and Delphi surveys have been used in conjunction with other 
data collection methods typically to test or validate findings. A case in point is DeSchepper 
et al. (2014) who confirmed case-study data with five stakeholders in a focus group. Likewise, 
Ng et al. (2013) validated and enhanced results with a focus group and a Delphi survey. Zou 
et al. (2013) were of the opinion deploying a mixed-methods approach is advantageous in 
                                                          
19 On occasion, percentages do not add up to 100% as some studies incorporated more than one 
approach while others had no empirical methodology.  
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that it allows an initial qualitative element to further develop and validate findings prior to 
quantitatively evaluating them.  
Notwithstanding the shifting research trends, fundamentally, a research design is contingent 
upon the research objectives and must therefore be reflective of the research’s intent. This 
research identified two areas the research design must be conducive to. These are: 
I. To offer contemporary insights into the current state of the UK PPP social 
infrastructure market following the reformation of these partnering frameworks; 
and 
II. To develop a PPP stakeholder collaboration framework for ‘more and better’ UK 
social infrastructure provision. 
This investigation will now consider the component parts of this research design by which to 
meet these research outputs. 
6.3. Contemporary United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure 
Market Analysis 
Regarded as a pioneer of PPP, the UK historically has been a global leader for partnering 
infrastructure provision. However, identified in chapter three, the UK PPP social 
infrastructure market has undergone acute policy reformations as these frameworks have 
been tarnished for being inefficient and ultimately delivering poor VfM to the UK taxpayer. 
In spite of this overhaul and commitment to PPP, literature suggests that there continues to 
be concerns encircling the viability of this procurement mechanism; one of the foremost 
being the presence of poor stakeholder collaboration. Low levels of mobilisation since the 
modification of these frameworks in tandem with low levels of confidence in the 
wherewithal of PPP to deliver VfM has severed to engender uncertainty in the marketplace 
pertaining to the future of UK PPP. Hence, the purpose of this component of the research 
design is to offer contemporary context of the UK PPP social infrastructure market. In doing 
so, this will have several important implications for the research:  
• Adds contemporary credibility to the research;  
• Underpins the salience of this research on the grounds that despite prominent steps 
already undertaken to improve the PPP mechanism, curtailed market activity 
suggests these nuances have failed to address the inherent inefficiencies; and  
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• Offers transaction clarity of the UK PPP social infrastructure market for vested and 
interested parties both in industry and academia which is currently unavailable 
elsewhere in the public domain.  
To gather these quantitative insights, datasets were sourced from Infrastructure Journal (IJ) 
Online Database. IJ depicts global infrastructure investment and PPP market activity from 
2005 to present day and supplies details on capital value, financial structures, Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) details and key actors. Access to these datasets requires an annual 
subscription. For the purpose of the UK PPP social infrastructure market analysis, datasets 
were downloaded on 31/06/2017 and was interrogated using Microsoft Excel. Having 
identified in chapter three that the devolved governments of the UK have developed their 
own nuanced models of PPP, this research will scrutinise these datasets to capture findings 
relating to the capital value of PPP ventures, deal number per year, social infrastructure 
sectoral activity, respective regional market activity in the UK and the financial structure of 
PPP transactions set against the growing appetite for greater institutional investor 
participation. 
Others have already utilised IJ in academic and industry research related to PPP and 
infrastructure investment. Haran et al. (2013) exploited IJ datasets to interrogate the 
financial structure of PPP projects globally post the GFC. IJ has also been instrumental in a 
2013 Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) report which considered PPP as a 
mechanism by which to channel private investment into infrastructure internationally (RICS, 
2013). McErlane et al. (2017) similarly utilised IJ to perform a contemporary analysis of the 
UK PPP social infrastructure paradigm in terms of capital value and deal number to 
compliment research on the roll-out of Private Finance 2 (PF2). With this in mind, IJ is 
deemed to be a credible and reliable data source.  
6.4. Development of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Survey 
This investigation will also produce a framework of PPP stakeholder collaboration. It was 
identified in the literature review that collaboration has been approached unilaterally which 
has transpired in a knowledge gap of the attributes necessary for PPP stakeholder 
collaboration. Hence, seeking to measure variables, premised on research philosophy theory 
allied with the outcome of the literature review, this research will accordingly adopt an 
epistemologically positivist and ontologically objectivist stance to be carried out 
quantitatively. A quantitative methodology enables the research to gather large amounts of 
data regarding multiple variables which can be easily generalised and quickly formulated 
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(Bryman and Bell, 2015). In studies like this which have modelled saliency or importance, 
quantitative approaches have been the predominant research design. Chou and 
Pramudawardhani (2015) employed quantitative survey questionnaires to assess critical 
success factors (CSF) in PPP projects. Tang and Shen (2013) utilised survey questionnaires to 
evaluate effectiveness and efficiency factors for analysing stakeholder needs at the briefing 
stage of PPP projects and Zou et al. (2013) evaluated the attributes of relationship 
management (RM) in Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects.  
Two quantitative methods have been identified from literature: experiments and surveys. 
Creswell (2009) regarded surveys as a numbered account of trends, perspectives or opinions 
of a selected sample which is representative of a wider population, whereas experiments 
test an outcome against controlled variables. On this basis, experiments can be discounted 
leaving surveys as the cogent choice. There are several types of surveys (Denscombe, 2010);  
• Listed postal questionnaires; 
• Electronic questionnaires; 
• Face-to-face interviews; 
• Telephone interviews; and  
• Observations.  
At this juncture of chapter six, several of these instruments can be eliminated. Observations 
can be disregarded subject to the longevity of a PPP project. Equally, financial and logistical 
barriers create problems for face-to-face and telephone interviews. What’s more, 
Denscombe (2009) is of the opinion quantitative telephone interviews can on occasion be 
unreliable and exposed to human error. Predicated on their popularity, the research also 
considered Delphi surveys; however, this method was not opted for premised on the high 
drop-out rates in other studies, particularly in PPP related research (see Kumaraswamy and 
Anvuur, 2008; Ng et al., 2013). Furthermore, the time demands for a Delphi survey would be 
challenging set against the nature of the research topic. To this end, surveys will be carried 
out via questionnaires. In related studies, there has been much enthusiasm for this 
instrument. Zou et al. (2013) elicited responses via questionnaires. Chou and 
Pramudawardhani (2015) obtained stakeholder perceptions of the CSF across several 
jurisdictions and Raisbeck and Tang (2013) conducted surveys to identify design 
development factors in Australian PPP. Accounting for their popularity in other studies, this 
research will therefore also deploy a survey questionnaire strategy by which to develop the 
PPP stakeholder collaboration framework.  
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6.4.1. Survey Questionnaire 
Knight and Ruddock (2008) define questionnaires as an instrument of measurement to 
gather attitudes. Hague (1993) termed questionnaires as a tool by which to interview people. 
Furthermore, a third definition by Gillham (2008) described questionnaires as a means of 
obtaining people’s opinions. Questionnaires facilitate a standardised, systematic, simple and 
quick approach to generating large datasets suitable for statistical analysis which are 
comprehensive and representative of the identified PPP SIS population. Gillian (2007) was of 
the opinion questionnaires practically provide more flexibility over other methods in that it 
affords the participants the freedom to participate as and when they choose.  
When developing the research questionnaire methodology, the following factors were 
considered: 
i. Stakeholder Identification; 
a. Population 
b. Sample 
ii. Bias; 
iii. Determining experts; 
iv. Questionnaire design and format; 
v. Pilot survey; 
vi. Questionnaire administration; and 
vii. Questionnaire response rate. 
 
6.4.2. Stakeholder Identification 
Figure 6.1 is an outline of the stakeholder identification process which was conducted to 
determine a sample for the survey questionnaires. The research will now discuss this 
determination process. 
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Figure 6.1: Population and Sample Selection Flow Chart from 2005 to 2016 
6.4.2.1. Population 
A population is the total collection of a group to be analysed, whereas a sample is a smaller 
selection of participants which are representative of the wider population. Sampling can be 
described as specified precision at minimal cost, meaning that through a strategic approach, 
a selected sample at lowest cost and time can be adequately precise for the research 
(Cochran, 1977). When determining a sample, Nardi (2006) recommends that the researcher 
should clearly define its unit of analysis. Through the application of stakeholder theory, 
chapter four identified five PPP SIS groups. These were the public-sector Authority, and the 
private-sector Project Company (ProjCo) constituent members, i.e. Debt Funders, Equity 
Shareholders, Construction Contractors (BuildCo), and the Service Provider (FMCo). These 
stakeholder organisations were the unit of analysis and a sample was selected according to 
this SIS classification framework.  
Still, before a sample can be derived, the research must firstly determine a population. It has 
been noted by previous researchers that access to comprehensive and standardised UK PPP 
stakeholder datasets has been problematic. Set against this gap, in an effort to identify a 
population, the research considered information that was available through public sources, 
namely, the HM Treasury (2015) PFI summary data. This is a spreadsheet which is updated 
annually and holds key PFI projects details for both economic and social infrastructure 
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projects across the UK. These datasets encapsulate public-sector departments, procuring 
Authorities, sector, project status, date of financial close, details of unitary charge payments, 
equity holders and SPV details. While these datasets do beneficially identify the Authority, 
they do not supply a comprehensive list of all private-sector organisations involved in each 
project as per the SIS boundary specification defined in chapter four. Moreover, there were 
gaps in SPV details, equally, the datasets do not specify when investments have been 
refinanced or sold on in the secondary market. These difficulties were compounded by the 
permeable nature of PPP projects with many SIS organisations entering and exiting the 
projects at different stages of the project. Accordingly, there were concerns over the 
completeness of this information. To address these shortcomings, the research had to 
undertake further interrogation of these datasets before it could be satisfied with its 
reliability. 
In order to validate this information, the research extracted all social infrastructure projects 
from the HM Treasury summary data and sought to confirm SIS involvement where identified 
in the datasets, but also to reconcile any data gaps. Using a combination of primary and 
secondary sources, this validation process comprised an extensive cross-examination of the 
datasheets set against evidence acquired from sources including but not limited to official 
government documentation, company websites, freedom of information requests, direct 
validation from SIS organisations, project documentation and other secondary sources. Still, 
predicated on the laborious and resource intensive nature of this process, it was apparent 
this task could not be comprehensively completed within the confines of a three-year PhD. 
On this basis, it was accepted that it is virtually impossible to identify the entire UK PPP social 
infrastructure population. Instead, the research set about identifying as many SIS as would 
be considerable viable to produce rigorous and robust academic findings. 
Accordingly, the research turned to literature to consider how others have filled this vacuum. 
Several academics have deployed innovative strategies, for example, Li et al. (2005a) 
determined a population by employing datasets produced by PwC and Glasgow Caledonian 
University. Zou et al. (2013) utilised a snowballing approach which initially targeted 
individuals who attended an international PPP conference, whereas, Smyth and Edkins 
(2007) captured input from a single ProjCo for their questionnaire.  
In light of this, the research likewise considered employing datasets sourced from an 
additional secondary source to compliment the shortcomings of the HM Treasury (2015) 
datasets. A number of potential suppliers were considered such as Preqin and Standard and 
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Poor’s (S&P); however, these platforms were rejected on the grounds they tended to be 
orientated towards financial outputs. Ultimately, Infrastructure Journal (IJ) Online Database 
was opted for set in the context of the success both Haran et al. (2013) and RICS (2013) 
achieved using this source. Equally, IJ is deemed by industry practitioners to be a credible 
source having worked with over 80% of the global leading project financing lenders, 90% of 
leading law firms and 85% of the world’s leading financial advisors. Hence, IJ datasets are 
mobilised on a daily basis to inform transactions around the world with key customers 
including BTMU, EDF International, Macquarie, Norton Rose and PGGM (IJ, 2017). 
However, akin to the HM Treasury (2015) datasets, there were limitations to the data. IJ is 
representative from 2005 onwards. Also, IJ data does not distinguish between divisions 
within organisations despite some organisations having several projects remits. 
Furthermore, IJ does not provide contact details or identify the individual involved. 
Information is provided as an Excel spreadsheet information download which then requires 
extensive additional interrogation and profiling to derive meaningful outputs. As well as 
these caveats, there were likewise gaps in terms of the spreadsheet itself and IJ too does not 
specify the Authority. Thus, like the HM Treasury (2015) datasets, IJ also underwent an 
extensive interrogation process using primary and secondary information. This was in an 
effort to arrive at a point whereby the research was confident it had taken all reasonable 
steps to identify as many SIS as possible and safeguard the credibility of the study. This again 
included a refinement process: 
• To verify that these private-sector organisations had indeed participated as per IJ; 
• To verify these organisations were still operational; 
• To identify the division of the company which participated and to confirm their 
project remit; and 
• To ascertain the contact details of the individual involved. 
In essence, the research sourced a population of SIS organisations from two sources:  
I. HM Treasury (2015) PPP summary data - Annually, HM Treasury produces an up-to-
date spreadsheet comprising project details of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and 
now, Private Finance 2 (PF2) transactions. However, stakeholder identification from 
this source comes with a caveat. The data pertains explicitly to PFI and PF2 
arrangements and does not constitute other nuanced PPP models. Likewise, though 
the data was adequate to identify Authorities, these datasets fail to include private-
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sector organisations. The incompleteness and inadequacy of this information meant 
this data had to be supplemented with an additional secondary source.  
II. IJ Online Database - Similar to Li et al. (2005a), datasets were obtained from an 
external source, namely; IJ. For the population identification, datasets were 
downloaded on 31/05/2016 and provided a list of 333 private-sector organisations. 
To negate time-lime differences, HM Treasury (2015) and IJ (2016) datasets were 
paralleled in terms of the timeframe: 2005 to 2015.  
In total, a population of 522 PPP SIS organisations was identified. This population was 
comprised of: 189 Authorities; 52 Debt Funders; 146 Equity Shareholders; 54 BuildCo; and 
81 FMCo. 
6.4.2.2. Sample 
While a population is the total group to be analysed, a sample is a smaller selection deemed 
to be representative of the overall group. A sample can circumnavigate accessibility 
problems as well as time and cost constraints while still being representative of the 
population. It is critical, the selection process of a sample is carried out in a strategised 
approach to ensure the research is both robust and defendable. To determine a sample from 
the known population, the following should be considered (Saunders et al., 2015): 
(i) Population Size; 
(ii) The margin of error; and 
(iii) Significance level.  
At this juncture the research identified a population of 522 SIS organisations which was 
constituted from five SIS groups. To calculate a sample from the population, the next step 
was to establish acceptable parameters for margin of error and significance level. Roscue 
(1975) believed academic research should apply a 10% margin of error. Contrarily, Wersberg 
and Bowen (1977) argued the margin of error should be closer to three or four percentile 
points for greater precision.  
Within literature, a confidence level of 95% and a margin for error of five percent (5%) 
seemingly are the most prevalent values for academic research (Bryman and Bell, 2015; 
Saunders et al., 2015). This research will therefore adopt these metrics. According to Cochran 
(1977) the sample size is determined using the following formula: 
𝑛o =
(t)² ∗ (𝑠)²
(d)²
 
144 
 
 
 
Where t is the selected alpha level, where s is the standard deviation of the population, and 
where d is the margin of error.  
Computing this formula, from a population of 522, a sample of 220 was calculated. This 
sample size concurred with Krejce and Mordgan (1970) who opined for a population of 500, 
a sample size of 217 was adaquate. Furthermore, Bartlett et al. (2001) calculated a sample 
size of 218 respondents was sufficient at 5% margin of error and 95% confidence value for a 
population of 500.  
To select the sample from the population, Nardi (2006) suggested this can be carried out by 
either probability or non-probability approaches. Probability sampling encompasses simple, 
stratified, systematic and cluster. Alternatively, non-probability sampling comprises 
convenience, purposeful, quota and snowball. The main difference between probability and 
non-probability strategies pertains to the likelihood of selection. In probability sampling, 
everyone has an equal opportunity to be selected. This approach facilitates easier 
generalisation from results, equally, there is greater reliability of population representation 
when the data is extrapolated. Alternatively, Nardi (2006) asserted, non-probability sampling 
cannot rely on the rationale of probability theory and thus it is not random. From non-
probability sampling, it is more difficult to generalise. Conventionally in research, 
investigators have opted for probability sampling due to its greater rigour and accuracy; 
however, contingent on the difficulties of conclusively determining the population there is 
an element of uncertainty that the identified organisations are conclusively representative 
of the entire PPP population. The research will accordingly employ a purposive sampling 
strategy. With purposive sampling, to ensure the sample was charachteristical of the 
population, the sample was deconstructed by SIS type and the size of each group was 
calculated pro-rata in proportion to the overall population. Organisations to be invited to 
participate were selected then through random sampling. Saunders et al. (2015) suggested 
that there is little difference between random and systematic sampling selection.  
Table 6.2: Identified SIS Sample 
 Population Pro-rata SIS Population (%) Sample Size 
Authority 189 36.4 80 
BuildCo 52 9.9 23 
Debt Funders 146 28.1 22 
Equity Shareholders 54 10.3 62 
FMCo 81 15.3 34 
Total 522 100.0 220 
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Table 6.2 displays the five SIS groups constituting the sample. 
6.4.3. Bias 
Bias can be characterised as the cognitive bases which sway responses from the accurate 
affecting validity and accuracy (Furnham, 1986). Within questionnaires, this may pertain to 
the wording of questions or the desire of the participant to answer as they view socially 
desirable (Kalton and Schuman, 1982). To mitigate response bias questions have been 
worded objectively and avoids leading questions. Moreover, the questionnaire underwent a 
pilot study to identify any potential problems or erroneous questions. In addition to this, 
participants have been selected through a justified and robust strategy. 
6.4.4. Determining Social Infrastructure Stakeholder Participants 
A review of research literature reveals there is no definitive format by which to define an 
expert participant contextual to PPP or collaborative research. To this end, to characterise 
experts, this research adopted approaches deployed in similar studies. Zou et al. (2013) 
defined their interview experts as senior managers or academics with rich experience in PPP, 
positioned within governmental departments, private companies, PPP consulting firms or 
universities. Their professional standings were senior official, senior lawyer, assistant 
professor, director, senior consultant, professor and managing director. Similarly, in their 
questionnaires, experts were those who needed to have a good knowledge of PPP, either 
with practical experience or in research. They must be positioned in a senior position and 
have hands-on experience with conducting PPP projects. Experts were also sourced from 
other groups internationally and professional groups in the PPP industry. Li et al. (2005a; 
2005b) targeted directors or managers whereas Ng et al. (2012) targeted experts with at 
least five years’ experience. Kumaraswamy and Anvuur (2008) followed Delbecq et al. (1975) 
and Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) to identify and solicit experts for a nominal group and Delphi 
processes. Ultimately, Kumaraswamy and Anvuur (2008) identified experts from a list of 
internationally regarded PPP experts which was contingent on their knowledge and 
experience in PPP involved in a 2005 conference in Hong Kong. Eventually, out of 21 
invitations, 11 participated. Seven were academics, one in government and three in private 
organisations. Smyth and Edkins (2007) sourced experts from within a PFI project. Experts 
were executives and senior managers with key decision-making powers. Kwawu et al. (2010) 
distributed questionnaires to directors, bid managers, partners, associates and procurement 
managers.  
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From a review of these studies, this research defined experts as those who are stationed in 
a management or senior position and hold at least five years’ experience positions within: 
• Public-sector councils; 
• National Health Service (NHS) trusts; 
• Housing associations; 
• Other public-sector departments; 
• Construction organisations;  
• Infrastructure developers; 
• Service Providers; and 
• Financing institutions. 
By targeting individuals which meet these criteria, it is deemed these participants possess 
both practical experience in the management of projects but also the knowledge of 
organisational relationships to effectively contribute to the study. Ethical approval for the 
research design to target these individuals was granted by Ulster university on 26/08/2016.   
6.4.5. Questionnaire Design and Format 
Questions can be administered in two formats: closed and open questions (Saunders et al. 
2015): 
• An open question asks participants a question which they are free to answer as they 
see fit. Open questions are beneficial in that respondents are offered the flexibility 
to answer as they wish. Likewise, responses beyond the obvious can be elicited, and 
thus can be useful in ascertaining new information. In addition to this, open 
questions are not suggestive of an answer and hence can tap into the participant’s 
level of understanding and interpretation. Nevertheless, there are pitfalls to this 
format; they are time consuming to analyse and code. Moreover, open questions 
can be more time and effort demanding on the participant (Nardi, 2006; Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). 
• On the other hand, closed questions furnish the respondent with predefined options 
from which they select the most appropriate option. Closed questions are favourable 
on the grounds they are straightforward. Equally, the structured answers allow for 
easy comparison between variables and respondents. They also remove researcher 
interpretation and ambiguity. By offering predefined choices, the possibility of 
participant misinterpretation is minimised as well as being easy to complete. Notably 
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however, closed questions have been criticised because they are exclusive of 
alternatives not identified. Also, participants may feel the options are not indicative 
of their viewpoint or there may be overlapping of choices (Nardi, 2006; Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to evaluate variables, i.e. collaborative attributes. For 
this reason, the questionnaire was carried out in a closed question format. Though open 
questions are beneficial insofar as they permit potential further conceptualisation of 
alternative SIS collaborative attributes, by undertaking a thorough and extensive critical 
literature, this exploratory necessity was negated.  
Closed questions typically are carried out through attitude scales such as semantic 
differential scales, Likert scales, ordinal or interval data or multiple-item scales; though 
Hoxley (2008) acknowledge semantic differential scales and Likert scales are the two most 
common. These scales were therefore further considered:  
a. The Likert scale - this design conventionally employs a symmetric five or seven-point 
scale by which respondents select their level of agreement or disagreement, and 
thus captures their range of attitudes. A Likert scale for example will offer ‘strongly 
agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neutral’, ‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’ as options (Hoxley, 
2008).  
b. The semantic differential scale - this scale was created by Osgood et al. (1957) and 
measures semantics. Using a bi-polar scale typically offering five or seven categories 
the participant is requested to select the option best representative of their position 
(Hoxley, 2008).  
Using a pre-coded scale is advantageous in that it facilitates a simple data analysis task 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). Both Dawes (2008) and Colman et al. (1997) deemed there to be 
little difference between a seven and five-point scale. A five-point scale was thus adopted 
for the closed questions again premised on its popularity (Tang and Shen, 2013; Chou and 
Pramudawardhani, 2015). 
6.4.6. Questionnaire Administration 
The survey questionnaire instrument can be administered in hard or soft formats. An 
electronic format was chosen for the research design predicated on the apparent advantages 
it offers over the traditional postal questionnaire design. Both Nardi (2006) and Bryman and 
Bell (2011) deemed electronic questionnaires to be more effective in eliciting improved 
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response rate. Furthermore, it has been argued electronic data can be aggregated quicker at 
a reduced cost as well as also lessen distribution time and minimise human error when 
transferring responses from hard to electronic format for analysis (Creswell, 2009; Saunders 
et al., 2015). In accordance with Peterson (2000) the questionnaire was clearly presented 
and suitably spacious to encourage participation. Moreover, corresponding questions were 
designed to be unbiased and objective, specific and grouped together with clear instructions 
as to how to respond.  
As suggested by Salant and Dillman (1994) and Bryman and Bell (2011), a four-step 
procedure was employed to encourage maximum participation. Central to this strategy was 
the introduction of personality to enhance response rates. Bryman and Bell (2011) advocated 
for the use of a cover letter to personalise and explain the reasons for the research. 
Accordingly, the following approach was deployed: 
1. Participants were contacted one week prior to the questionnaire in the form of a 
short information document. The document contained information pertaining to the 
researcher, the research, what is the purpose of the questionnaire and what was 
expected from the participant;  
2. The second step was the distribution of the questionnaire. This dissemination 
process was carried out and managed using SurveyMonkey; 
3. A follow-up email reminding participant of the questionnaire was sent two weeks 
after the questionnaires initial circulation. This email reasserted the importance of 
the research and its potential impact; and 
4. Finally, to maximise participation, as well as building on the previous personal 
relationship development, invitees were contacted directly by telephone one week 
after the reminder was sent. 
 
6.4.7. Pilot  
Though questionnaires are an effective instrument, there are also risks which the research 
must mitigate against. These pitfalls can generally be categorised as low response rate, poor 
quality and misinterpretation of questions (Gillham, 2007; Fowler, 2009). Creswell (2003) 
argues to circumnavigate these issues, safeguards can be set in place through a pilot scheme. 
Hoxley (2008) agreed and was of the opinion, a pilot is fundamental to the success of 
questionnaires. According to Creswell (2006) a pilot scheme should be carried out in two 
phases: pilot pre-test and pilot scheme. The purpose of this is to test the research 
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instrument, the recruitment of respondents and to determine the feasibility of the study 
(Leon et al., 2011).  
When determining a pilot size, literature varies. Connelly (2008) suggested a pilot study size 
should represent 10% of the parent study. Comparatively, Baker (1994) deemed 10 to 20% 
to be more adequate, whereas Isaac and Michael (1995) suggested 10 – 30 participants. Van 
Belle (2002) suggested 12 participants are suffice and Hill (1998) was of the opinion a pilot 
required 10 to 30 participants. Ng et al. (2012) piloted with 6 experts. Similarly, Li et al. 
(2005a; 2005b) piloted with experts from a single organisation.  
For this research, the pilot study geographically was endemic to Northern Ireland (NI) and 
carried out in two phases: pilot pre-test and pilot scheme as suggested by Bryman and Bell 
(2011). In total, 15 participants contributed in the pilot study. This was a combination of 
academic colleagues and PPP experts. Seven contributed to the pre-test and eight to the 
pilot scheme.  
6.4.7.1. Pre-Test 
The pilot pre-test invited research supervisors, research colleagues and an industry advisory 
panel consisting of two PPP experts to participate in the study. This purpose of this was to 
test the research instrument. A link to the survey together with the project information 
document was distributed. Participants were asked to consider: 
I. Project information documentation comprehensibility; 
II. Consistency of questions and answer terminology; 
III. Clarity and structure of the questionnaire; 
IV. Spelling and grammatical errors; and 
V. Functionality of the survey. 
Participants were additionally asked to verbalise their thought processes as they completed 
the questionnaire via semi-structured interviews. In doing so, participants provided insights 
into their interpretation of each question and any ambiguity was recorded. On average, the 
activity lasted around 20 minutes. Key Feedback suggested minor corrections; spelling 
mistakes and phrasing of questions. All changes were then applied to the questionnaire 
before proceeding to the pilot scheme. 
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6.4.7.2. Pilot Scheme 
Having satisfied the pre-test, the survey was piloted with PPP social infrastructure 
stakeholders. The pilot scheme, in essence, was a mock survey paralleling the procedures 
and strategies to be deployed in the parent study. The purpose of the pilot scheme was to 
test the recruitment of respondents, to determine the feasibility of the scheme and 
ultimately safeguard the quality of surveys. From the sample, eight organisations involved in 
the NI PPP market were invited. Of this eight, six organisations agreed to participate; two 
rejected invitations. All SIS groups were represented. Semi-structured interviews again were 
utilised contingent on their perceived flexibility to probe and explore. Feedback was 
provided over the telephone to facilitate geographical and logistical flexibility. Akin to the 
pre-test, participants were asked to complete the questionnaire while simultaneously 
verbalising their thoughts and interpretations of each question to uncover any ambiguities 
or concerns. The pilot scheme also provided insights into the likely effectiveness of the 
deployed strategic system by which to maximise participation and respondent recruitment.  
From the pilot scheme, it was established the survey completion time was circa 15 minutes. 
Moreover, a combined strategy of email, complimented by telephone contact was 
advantageous in encouraging participation. On average, the highest participation derived 
from a combination of a prior emailed invitation followed up by a telephone call. In terms of 
the questions, some experts opined that due to the limited use of Private Finance 2 (PF2), 
they were unable to effectively answer questions pertaining to this framework, and these 
questions should be optional. Also, it was suggested that the labels used as part of the Likert 
scale should be simplified and more consistent. All feedback was considered, and the 
appropriate changes were implemented.  
The survey questionnaire which was utilised is enclosed in appendix B. 
6.5. Statistical Data Analysis  
Having determined the research design, the final section of this chapter identifies the 
proposed data analysis to be conducted on the survey responses. In addition to this, this 
section details the framework for the framework development based on the PPP stakeholder 
collaboration attributes. Hoxley (2008) suggests that the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) is the most common and versatile analytical software for Windows based 
environments. Thus, for interrogation, data can be downloaded from SurveyMonkey in 
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Microsoft Excel format. From there, responses can be imported into SPSS from Microsoft 
Excel for analysis. 
It is proposed data analysis will be carried out through a combination of descriptive and 
inferential techniques. Descriptive is applied to describe the data through tables, charts and 
graphs, whereas inferential is used to extract meaningful inferences concerning phenomena 
from a sample to a population (Burns and Burns, 2008).  
6.5.1. Relative Importance Index 
To discern the ranking salience of the PPP collaborative attributes, a relative importance 
index (RII) will be conducted. This will provide insight into the importance of each variable 
relative to the others through the Weighted Average (WA). Moreover, it will allow for 
comparison between and among SIS groups. The RII is a regression-based form of relative 
importance analysis. This approach is particularly insightful in the context of organisational 
related studies whereby research investigates a list of variables to understand their 
importance in driving a prediction. According to Tonidandel and LeBreton (2011), an RII is 
advantageous in that it offers a more holistic understanding of the explained variance per 
variable. This approach has been popular in similar research investigations (see Chan and 
Kumaraswamy, 1997; Sambasivan and Soon, 2007; Eadie and Miller, 2013; Eadie et al., 2013; 
McCord et al., 2015).  
The RII is calculated using the following equation: 
𝑅𝐼𝐼 =
Σw
(𝐴 𝑥 𝑁)
 
Where w is the weight ascribed to each factor by SIS ranging from one to five, A is the highest 
weight (5) and N is the total number of SIS respondents.  
6.5.2. Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
Before investigating the statistical significance of the cohort holistically in preparation for 
the framework development, building on the findings of the RII, the research will consider 
the statistical significance of findings across SIS groups. To do this, the research will conduct 
an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). An ANOVA is a data analysis technique used to examine 
statistical significance among groups in a multi-factor model (Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
However, before conducting the ANOVA, there are a number of assumptions the research 
must meet in order to qualify for the parametric or nonparametric ANOVA. Typically, this is 
predicated on the normality of the datasets and can be discerned either visually by 
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interpreting a normality curve or alternatively by computing the this will be confirmed by the 
Shapiro-Wilk test -Wilk W test of normality (Field, 2013). The null hypothesis for the Shapiro-
Wilk W test is that data is normally distributed, and this can be determined through the P 
value. A P value less than 0.05 suggests that datasets are not normally distributed, and the 
null hypothesis should be rejected (H₀ = P > 0.05).  
Stemming from the disparate norms, values and beliefs of the SIS categories, it is likely the 
data will not be normally distributed and there will accordingly be different opinions. Based 
on this assumption, the research will conduct the Kruskal-Wallis H test20. Kruskal-Wallis is a 
non-parametric test used to determine stochastic dominance. In essence, it computes 
whether samples derive from the same distribution. Unlike other ANOVA tests, 
advantageously, Kruskal-Wallis accounts for unequal means and is not bound by normality 
distributions (Corder and Dale, 2009).  
There are four assumptions for the Kruskal-Wallis H test. The first is that the dependent 
variable must be either ordinal or continuous. The second is that groups are independent. 
Thirdly, the data must be independent of observations meaning there are no participant 
overlaps across or within groups. Finally, the fourth assumption is that groups should have 
the same shape (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952). By adopting this test, the research will explore 
for significantly different perceptions among SIS categories of the salience of the 
collaborative attributes. 
Literature indicates the Kruskal-Wallis H test is computed as per (Conover, 1999): 
𝐻 =  
12
𝓃(𝓃 + 1)
∑
𝑅
2
𝑖
𝓃𝑖
− 3(𝓃 + 1)
𝓀
𝒾=1
 
Where 𝓀 is the number of comparison groups, 𝓃 is the total sample size, 𝓃𝑖 is the sample 
size in the 𝑖th group, and R 𝑖 is the sum of the ranks in the 𝑖th group. 
The null hypothesis for the Kruskal-Wallis H test is that all samples derive from the same 
population (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952). To determine the null hypothesis, this is indicated 
through the alpha level (P > 0.05). A P value below 0.05 indicates the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. Accordingly, in this instance, it is unlikely that the difference between groups stems 
from random sampling, but rather the groups have different distributions (Corder and Dale, 
2009). 
                                                          
20 This will be confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test before proceeding to the Kruskal-Wallis H test. 
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6.5.2.1. Dunn’s Test 
To compliment the findings of the Kruskal-Wallis H test, the research adopted Dunn’s 
Multiple Comparison test. Dunn’s test is a post-hoc pairwise test that often follows the 
rejection of the Kruskal-Wallis test and reports on stochastic dominance. It interprets 
average rankings of each group score computed as part of the Kruskal-Wallis test and therein 
identifies differences (Dunn, 1961). The null hypothesis for Dunn’s Test is that there is no 
difference between groups, and the alternate hypothesis is there is a difference between 
groups. By conducting this test, this will enable the research to establish where SIS groups 
have significantly different perceptions of the importance of the stakeholder collaborative 
attributes.  
Dunn’s test is calculated according to the formula (Dinno, 2015): 
𝓏𝒾 =
𝑦𝑖
ℴ𝑖
 
Where 𝑖 is one of the 1 to m multiple comparisons, 𝑦𝑖  = WA – WB, and ℴ𝑖  is the standard 
deviation of 𝑦𝑖  calculated from: 
ℴ𝑖 = √{
𝑁 (𝑁 + 1)
12
−
∑ 𝑇𝑠
3−𝑇𝑠𝑟
𝑠=1
12 (𝑁 − 1)
} (
1
𝑛𝐴
+  
1
𝑛𝐵
) 
Where N is the total number of observations across all groups, r is the number of tied ranks, 
𝑇𝑠 is the number of observations tied at the sth specific tied value.  
The results of the RII, Kruskal-Wallis H and Kendell’s W are detailed in chapter eight. 
6.5.3. Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance 
While the RII is beneficial in that it provides insight into the relative importance of variables, 
and the Kruskal-Wallis H test is insightful for comparing between SIS groups, they do not 
however meet the statistical requirements necessary for the framework development. To 
satisfy this requirement, the research conducted Kendell’s Coefficient of Concordance.  
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance measures levels of agreement on a scale ranging from 
zero to one. According to Kendall and Babington-Smith (1938), Kendall’s W should be opted 
for when datasets derive from different groups or ‘judges’ and concern more than two 
variables. In similar built environment research, McCord et al. (2015) opted for Kendall’s W 
to measure agreement among four stakeholder groupings which measured many variables 
using a Likert scale.  
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Kendall’s W test is the statistical approach used to determine degrees of concordance. It is 
an estimate of the variance of the row of sums of ranks, divded by the maximum number of 
possible sum of ranks. The maximum number occurs when there is perfect agreement among 
respondents. Hence, the W value is determined on a scale between one and zero. One 
indicates perfect accordance whereas zero represents perfect disagreement among 
participants and responses were random. The null hypothesis for Kendall’s W is: 
• H₀ = There is no significant degree of agreement among participants, and responses 
are independent of each other (H₀ = 0). 
• H₁ = There is a statistically significant degree of agreement among participants (H₁ ≠ 
0). 
Literature suggests there are two approaches by which to compute Kendall’s W statistic and 
carrying out of either route will produce the same results (Legendre. 2010): 
𝑆 = ∑(𝑅ᵢ − ?̅?)²
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Or 
𝑆ᵢ = ∑ 𝑅ᵢ
² = 𝑆𝑆𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
S is the sum-of-squares over the row of sum of ranks Ri, and ?̅? is the mean of Ri values. 
Derived from these equations, the following equations can be opted for (Legendre, 2010): 
𝑊 =
12𝑆
𝑚2(𝑛3 − 𝑛) − 𝑚𝑇
 
Or  
𝑊 =
12𝑆ⁱ − 3𝑚²𝑛(𝑛 + 1)²
𝑚2(𝑛3 − 𝑛) − 𝑚𝑇
 
Where n is the number of objects and m is the number of variables, and T is a correction 
factor for the tied ranks: 
𝑇 = ∑ (𝑡 3
𝑘
− 𝑡
𝑘
)
𝑔
𝑘=1
  
Where tK is the number of tied ranks in each (k) of g group of ties. The sum is computed over 
all groups of ties found in all m variables of the data table. T = 0 when there are no tied values 
(Legendre, 2010).  
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Just as Kendell’s W is beneficial in that it offers insight into the degree of agreement or 
accordance, the P value is interpreted to indicate agreement significance (Legendre, 2010). 
The null hypothesis (H₀) states there is no significant degree of agreement among 
participants and responses are independent of each other. Conversely, the alternative 
hypothesis H₁ states there is significant agreement among participants. This is portrayed 
through the P value. Where the P value is less than 0.05 (P < 0.05), the null hypothesis (H₀) 
should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis (H₁) is accepted. Oppositely, if the P value 
is greater than 0.05 (P > 0.05), the null hypothesis of H₀ is accepted premised on there being 
inadequate information by which to support the alternative hypothesis of H₁ (Legendre, 
2005).  
6.6. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Framework Development 
While the RII advantageously can offer insight into the salience of constructs, it does not 
offer meaningful outcomes by which to understand the relationship among attributes. For 
this reason, to develop a framework, two methods were considered: Factor Analysis (FA) or 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). Hoxley (2008) described both these methods as 
effective data reduction methods capable of condensing a large group of multivariate 
variables, down to a smaller group of more meaningful dimensions. The purpose of PCA and 
FA is to summarise the maximum findings of the data and the variance within the data 
through relatively fewer components.  
Both methods are considered as effective data reduction methods; however, seemingly 
many in literature often mistakenly conflate the two techniques. Instead, there are subtle 
nuances between PCA and FA.  
Field (2013) explains, FA determines the nature of and the number of latent or underlying 
variables that account for measured variance and covariation between and among sets of 
observed indicators. In other words, FA measures hidden linkages or covariance influencing 
the variables which cannot be measured directly. For this reason, FA is commonly applied 
when there has been an antecedent assumption of relationships among variables.  
Conversely, PCA assumes there are no latent relationships and instead is the process of 
reducing a larger set of observed variables into smaller components that summarise the 
variance. Indicators do not have to be correlated and the solution is generally a means to an 
end (Suhr, 2008). The finite amount of variance is equal to the number of observed 
(measured) variables, hence the number of components extracted will be equal to the 
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observed variance (Field, 2013). Though both approaches would be equally beneficial, this 
research has opted to conduct PCA on the basis it did not identify underlying connections 
between collaborative attributes.   
The purpose of this method was to reduce the larger list of 27 PPP collaborative attributes 
to more meaningful findings reflected through several constructs. Hoxley (2008) deemed a 
list of more than 20 variables was a suitable number to undergo PCA.  
Using SPSS version 17, PCA is computed by the equation: 
𝑅𝑚𝑚 =
𝑍𝑇𝑚𝑛 𝑥 𝑍𝑚𝑛
𝑁
 
Norusis (2006) delineated the procedure of PCA into four distinguishable steps: 
1. Production of a correlation matrix comprising all variables R = {R[Rmm]} into 
standardised scores. 
2. Interpretation of the principal components to determine the component loadings. The 
first component contains the largest amount of variance, the second component 
encapsulates the second largest amount of variance and so on. 
3. Rotation of the variables to ensure each component has non-zero loadings for some of 
the variables. 
4. After the computation of the rotation, the data matrix X = (X[mn]) is transformed to a 
matrix of standardised scores (Z) determined through the mean and standard deviation 
for each row m of the data matrix where m represents the number of variables and n is 
the number of observations.  
 
6.6.1. Application of Principal Components Analysis 
To determine the number of principal components to be retained, the research applied an 
a-priori selection framework. This was constituted from the following: 
• Sample size; 
• Eigenvalue; 
• Scree test; 
• Component variance; 
• Component retention; and 
• Component scores. 
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6.6.2. Sample Size 
In literature, there is discord regarding sufficient sample size for PCA. While some have 
displayed foremost preference for the overall sample size (n), others have predicated the 
quality of their PCA on sample size case ratios.  
In terms of sample size, Osborne and Costello (2004) argued larger samples are 
advantageous in minimising errors as well as maximising generalisability. Comfrey and Lee 
(1992) attempted to codify the quality of sample sizes: 50 was very poor; 100 was poor; 200 
was fair; 300 was good; 500 was very good; and more than 1000 was excelled. Differently, 
Doloi (2009) utilised PCA on a much smaller sample size of 67 premised on the extensive 
knowledge of the participating industry experts. Similarly, McCord et al. (2015) conducted 
PCA on a sample size of 49 participants.  
Alternatively, case ratio has been adopted as a measure of sample quality. Bandalos and 
Boehm-Kaufman (2009) claimed the number of subjects should be around five to 10 times 
the number of variables. Gorsuch (1983) suggested a minimum subject ratio of 5:1 though 
higher ratios were preferable. Similarly, Nunnally (1978) encouraged the subject to item ratio 
of 10:1.  
Notwithstanding this discussion, perhaps the most widely accepted and popular means by 
which to ensure accuracy and reliability of the PCA is through the application of the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) (1970) measure of sampling adequacy. According to Field (2013), the 
KMO identifies the ratio of the squared correlation between variables and is measured 
between one and zero where zero signifies the sum of partial correlations is large relative to 
the sum of correlations. Oppositely, a value proximal to one represents that correlation 
patterns are relatively compact and should therefore produce reliable components. Kaiser 
(1974) himself recommended that values greater than 0.5 are marginally acceptable. 
Moreover, Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) suggested the following guidelines: values of 
0.90 and over were marvellous; values of 0.80 and above were meritorious; while values 
between 0.50 to 0.70 were poor to middling.  
As well as the KMO, Bartlett’s test of sphericity has also commonly been conducted to 
compare correlations between variables. Bartlett’s test of sphericity compares the observed 
correlation matrix against an identity matrix to discern if variables significantly differed 
(Field, 2013). Bartlett (1954) advised a significance value of P < 0.05.  
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Predicated on the ubiquitous adoption of the KMO and Bartlett’s tests throughout academic 
research, this investigation applied these two sampling measures to the development of the 
PCA framework.  
6.6.3. Eigenvalue 
In PCA, the eigenvalue is computed and used as an indicator of the substantive importance 
of a component. Kaiser (1960) suggested components with an eigenvalue greater than one 
should be considered as representing a substantive amount of variance. However, some in 
literature have contended this figure. Jolliffe (1972) argued an eigenvalue of one was too 
strict and instead something closer to 0.7 is optimal. Still, despite these disagreements, 
several studies continue to utilise Kaiser’s eigenvalue value of one (see Li et al., 2005a; Field, 
2013; McCord et al., 2015). This research will therefore also implement this value.  
6.6.4. Scree Test 
A scree plot is a graphical depiction of the total variance of the variables. This comprises the 
plotting of each eigenvalue (y-axis) against the value with which it is most associated (x-axis) 
(Cattell, 1966). Though it is possible for the number of components to equal the number of 
variables, by visually illustrating the variables through a graph, the salience or importance of 
each component becomes more apparent. Components range from those with the highest 
eigenvalues which typically have relatively few variables to the lowest which commonly 
comprise many variables giving the scree plot its very distinctive shape (Field, 2013). Cattell 
(1966) explains, the point of inflexion is apparent where this is an acute redirection and 
should be considered as the cut-off point. The scree plot will visually assist the statistical 
framework development.  
6.6.5. Component Variance 
As part of the PCA, a component matrix is produced which displays the cumulative variance 
of components. Field (2013) suggests components with eigenvalues above one should 
account for a minimum of 70 – 80% of the variance. Similarly, Suhr (2005) stipulated 
components should cumulatively comprise 70 - 80% of variance.  
6.6.6. Component Rotation 
Bryant and Yarnold (1995) described rotation as the process of rotating factors to achieve a 
simple structure. Yaremko et al. (1986) defined component rotation as the means to extract 
simple and interpretable components from a list of variables. Component rotation maximises 
159 
 
 
 
the loading of variables onto a component to which they relate the most whilst also 
minimising all other components. Within PCA, there are three orthogonal rotation (varimax, 
quartimax and equamax) and two oblique rotation (direct oblimin and promax) methods 
available in SPSS. These methods differ in terms of how they rotate the variables and 
therefore the output from SPSS will be dependent on the approach selected. Orthogonal 
rotation is conducted when components are considered independent, whereas oblique 
rotation is opted for when components are correlated. Field (2013) claimed orthogonal 
varimax is perhaps the most viable option in that it offers easily interpretable outputs in a 
simplified manner.  
Variables were considered to be independent, hence this research also adopted the 
orthogonal varimax method. 
6.6.7. Component Scores 
The purpose of PCA is to identify fewer linear combinations of the original variables than can 
be adopted to summaries the data. In part, this comprises the measure of the substantive 
importance of variables ascribed to each component through statistical significance. Stevens 
(2002) proposed, component significance with a value greater than 0.4 are adequate for 
interpretive purposes. Similarly, Suhr (2008) recommended a weighting of 0.4 or more is 
substantially weighted. Alternatively, Kaiser (1974) advised using a value of 0.45. This value 
was applied McClements (2013) in a relatable thesis in the built environment. The research 
will therefore also adopt a component weighted value of 0.45.  
The outcomes of the PCA are contained in chapter nine of the thesis. 
6.6.8. Reliability of Principal Components  
The most common method to test the reliability and validity of PCA results is through the 
application of Cronbach’s alpha (Cα) function. Cronbach’s alpha (Cα) is a function of the 
variance within a component, and the covariance between components (Cronbach, 1951). 
In doing so, this indicates the consistency of a set of related items as a group. Cronbach’s 
alpha was coined by Lee Cronbach in 1951 and is derived from classical test theory. 
Conceptually, it relates to the Spearman-Brown prediction formula and has subsequently 
been used in a number of domains including social sciences, business, health and medicine 
(Field, 2013).  
Cα is calculated using the following formula (Cronbach, 1951): 
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𝛼 =
 𝑘 ×  𝑐̅
?̅? + (𝑘 − 1)𝑐̅
 
Where 𝑘 refers to the number of scale items, 𝑐̅ is the average of all covariances between 
items, and ?̅? is the average variance of each item. 
The theoretically value of Cα ranges from zero to one on the basis that it is a ratio of two 
variances, and the variance is denominator is always at least as large as the variance of the 
numerator. In terms of desirable values, Doloi (2008) codified ranges within these 
parameters as:  
• A Cα value greater than 0.90 is considered as excellent;  
• Between 0.80 and 0.90 is good;  
• 0.70 and over is acceptable;  
• 0.50 to 0.70 is questionable;  
• 0.60 to 0.50 is poor; and  
• 0.50 and below is unacceptable. 
 
6.7. Summary 
This chapter has explored into research philosophy to determine an epistemological 
positivist and ontological objectivist stance to be carried out through a bi-quantitative 
research design. The research will conduct a market analysis of the UK PPP social 
infrastructure market which will be informed using datasets from IJ Online Database. The 
purpose of the market analysis is to add contemporary credibility to the investigation as well 
as to offer contemporary insights into the UK marketplace following the overhaul of these 
partnering frameworks. This market analysis is contained in chapter seven. 
This market analysis is complimented with an electronic online survey questionnaire which 
will be utilised to gather attitudes towards PPP stakeholder collaboration. The survey will be 
disseminated using the survey host; SurveyMonkey and is employed to have SIS 
organisations evaluate the salience of the 27 PPP collaborative attributes determined from 
literature. Questions will be asked in a closed-ended format to enable simplified and 
consistent comparison and responses will be evaluated by means of a five-point Likert scale.  
In addition to the design of the research methodology, this chapter has delineated the data 
analysis framework and the framework development strategy to be conducted in chapters 
eight and nine respectively. Data gathered from the surveys will be analysed to discern 
salience through a RII. The RII will be complimented with the Kruskal-Wallis H test to explore 
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for statistical differences among SIS groups. Kendell’s Coefficient of Concordance has equally 
been adopted as the statistical test to determine levels of agreement of the SIS collectively. 
Following this, the research has elected to carry out PCA as the data reduction method. This 
methodological framework provides the framework development strategy for chapters eight 
and nine to meet objectives four and five of the research which concern the identification of 
the salient attributes of PPP stakeholder collaboration and the development of the PPP 
stakeholder collaboration framework.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
UNITED KINGDOM PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
MARKET ANALYSIS  
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7. United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure Market Analysis 
7.1. Introduction 
In chapters two and three, it was determined that internationally Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPP) are being extolled as a mechanism to provide ‘more and better’ infrastructure. 
Although PPP has gained traction globally, in the United Kingdom (UK), despite being an 
instrumental mechanism for social infrastructure provision, the PPP social infrastructure 
paradigm has shifted downwards in terms of activity as this mechanism has been discredited 
for delivering poor Value for Money (VfM) to the taxpayer. However, in times of poor 
economic prosperity, even with its tarnished reputation, the UK government has declared its 
commitment to partnering arrangements and has subsequently stated that PPP will continue 
to be a viable provision model for ‘more and better’ social infrastructure.  
Considered as one of the pioneers of PPP, the UK is often regarded as one of the most mature 
and transparent markets. Nonetheless, now with several nuanced models of PPP, in the 
vacuum of a centralised or comprehensive PPP database, there is ambiguity surrounding the 
future of UK PPP and uncertainty as to whether these reformations have addressed many of 
the inherent inefficiencies of previous frameworks. Using secondary datasets, the purpose 
of this chapter is to undertake primary analysis and provide contemporary quantitative 
findings in regard to the UK PPP social infrastructure paradigm in terms of capital value, deal 
number, sectoral breakdown, UK jurisdictional markets and financial structure. To do so, as 
per chapter six, to inform these quantitative insights into current activity, datasets have been 
sourced from Infrastructure Journal (IJ) Online Database and downloaded into Microsoft 
Excel on 31/06/2017. These datasets were subsequently extensively interrogated and 
profiled to extract meaningful findings and produce the tables and graphs contained in this 
chapter.  
This chapter is accordingly structured as follows: 
• A twelve-year overview of UK PPP social infrastructure investment; 
• Consideration of PPP social infrastructure sectoral investment trends; 
• Analysis of UK jurisdictional investment;  
• Financial structure of UK PPP social infrastructure transactions; and 
• A reflection on key findings of UK PPP social infrastructure market analysis. 
Together with the literature reviewed in chapter three, the findings from this chapter will 
have an important contemporary input into this research. Furthermore, the findings from 
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this chapter will enable the research to credibly meet objective two which concerns 
evaluating the role of PPP models as a vehicle for ‘more and better’ social infrastructure 
provision in the UK.  
7.2. Twelve-Year Overview of United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social 
Infrastructure Investment 
 
Figure 7.1: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Capital Value and Deal Number 
from 2005 to 2017 (IJ, 2017) 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates UK PPP social infrastructure market activity from 2005 to 2017. In 
total, since 2005, the UK PPP social infrastructure market has accumulated a total of 
US$50.93billion (bn) of private finance, channelled into 389 projects (IJ, 2017). Demonstrably 
evident, the UK PPP social infrastructure investment paradigm has acutely declined since 
2007. As identified in chapter three, in the years preceding the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 
social infrastructure PPP ventures were systematically growing both in terms of transaction 
numbers and capital value. In 2005 and 2006, according to IJ, capital value totalled 
US$5.80bn and US$9.03bn respectively (IJ, 2017)21. However, just like other financial 
markets, the 2008/09 GFC was a watershed in the UK PPP marketplace. The mass exodus of 
banks from the marketplace allied with tightened capital regulatory requirements of those 
who remain served to curtail the availability of private capital for infrastructure lending. 
                                                          
21 The US dollar is the international currency of infrastructure investment implemented by IJ. This 
facilitates greater comparison across multi-jurisdictional markets. 
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Accordingly, this transpired in a gap between investment needs and capital supply. IJ (2017) 
figures show that in the short-term period after the GFC, the UK PPP social infrastructure 
market contracted and in capital value terms, activity eroded from US$12.74bn in 2007 to 
US$3.30bn in a single year (2008) representing a downturn of US$9.44bn. Accordingly, while 
the GFC had an acute impact on UK PPP, it is appropriate to note that the limited PPP 
investment in spite of economic improvements following 2007 indicate there are other 
inefficiencies within PPP. 
In spite of the immediate downturn in 2008, the capital value of ventures significantly grew 
in 2009 and 2010 underpinning the salience of PPP in the UK as an infrastructure provision 
framework by which to bolster and stabilise socio-economic prosperity. PPP was 
instrumental in the UK government’s stimulus package premised on its wherewithal to 
generate short-term job creation as well for medium to long-term socio-economic 
development (Haran et al., 2013). The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) specifically was used as 
a strategic mechanism by which to insulate industries such as the construction sector from 
the chronic effects of the GFC (Asenova and Beck, 2015). Accordingly, PPP deal flow 
expanded after 2008, and by 2010, investment capital had increased to US$4.53bn in 48 
ventures (IJ, 2017).  
Nonetheless, in the following period, subsequent to the removal of PFI grants and the 
cancellation of the Build Schools for the Future (BSF), PPP activity started to decline. Set 
against the background of increasing politicisation, PPP lost traction. Mounting concerns of 
VfM allied with the reduced availability of private capital culminated in a fall in both capital 
value and project numbers terms. By 2011, IJ (2017) figures show PPP social infrastructure 
provision bottomed since pre-GFC levels at US$1.80bn and as the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition government replaced Labour, UK PPP activity in effect came to a halt. 
The moratorium in market activity as the UK transitioned from PFI to nascent reformed 
frameworks explain the low levels of market activity in subsequent years to 2010.  
Against the backdrop of VfM concerns, chapter four identified that the devolved 
governments of the UK have rolled-out nuanced modalities of PPP to rectify the inherent 
inefficiencies of PFI as well as to stimulate alternative sources of capital. Notwithstanding 
these reformations, figures from IJ (2017) reveal UK PPP market activity continues to be 
muted and has failed to recover despite the introduction of newer partnering models.  
Demonstrated in figure 7.1, regardless of these changes in PPP, activity continues to be 
relatively sedate with fluctuating signs of growth. Since 2011, 2015 was the highest in terms 
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of capital value, constituting US$2.74bn levered into 13 projects, whereas 2013 was the 
highest by project number comprising 18 projects valued at US$2.60bn of private 
investment. In this year, investment capital increased by US$1.04bn from the previous year; 
2012. Similarly, in 2015, the capital value of transactions achieving financial close increased 
from US$1.13bn in 2014 to US$2.74bn.  
Still, lowest market figures have transpired in 2016 equating to US$0.84bn of outlay 
encapsulated in 15 projects. These figures represent a pronounced difference between the 
peak in 2007 and the valley in 2016 of US$11.90bn and 54 projects. Worryingly, 2016 has 
been the lowest by deal number and 2017, as of 31/06/2017 also has continued to exhibit a 
similar pattern. Identified in chapter three, one of the prominent concerns is the absence of 
a defined investment pipeline or social infrastructure investment programme. This 
information void has meant it remains unclear what are the intentions of the UK government 
for PPP which is particularly pertinent set against the fundamental changes inherent to the 
mechanism. Furthermore, as of June 2017, the government has announced it no longer 
intends to develop a pipeline but rather PPP will be utilised reactively.  
7.3. United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure Sectors 
Figure 7.2 denotes the sectoral breakdown of social infrastructure supplied through the PPP 
mechanism over the twelve-year period from 2005 to 2017. Within this twelve-year period, 
education has been the largest social sector accounting for US$22.72bn of investment into 
176 contracts. This was followed by health which has accumulated US$19.94bn of private 
investment into 132 projects.  
Ostensibly, through capital provision schemes such as the BSF and LIFT, investment into 
these two sectors has meant investment surpassed that of all other sectors. Together, 
education and health account for 83.7% of market capital and in terms of contract value, 
education projects have been smaller in scale compared to health. The average deal size of 
education contracts was valued at US$0.13bn, while health was circa US$0.16. Notably, 
though education and health have been the two most foremost sectors, they have both 
undergone acute constriction. At the peak of market activity in 2007, education, in a single 
year accounted for US$5.23bn invested in 25 agreements. In comparison, in 2016, at the 
lowest level of market activity, nine education contracts achieved financial close, valued at 
US$0.58bn. This represents a difference of US$4.65bn by capital value and 16 projects. 
Similarly, health constituted a larger portion of the market equating to a capital value of 
US$6.15bn in 32 contracts. The use of PPP to provide health facilities and services also 
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declined from the highest levels of activity in 2007 at US$6.15bn in 32 ventures to US$0.25 
in six projects.  
 
Figure 7.2: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market by Capital Value (US$m) 2005 – 2017 (IJ, 
2017) 
In comparison, as per figure 7.3, all other social sectors occupied significantly lesser presence 
in the UK PPP market. By capital value, municipal accounts for 6.7% of the market share, 
housing constitutes 5.7%, justice represents 2.1%, emergency and response encapsulates 
1.2%, and leisure and recreational captures 0.7% of the PPP social infrastructure market.  
Notably, in more recent years, except for health and education, PPP provision in all other 
sectors has all but ceased. Two leisure and recreational ventures achieved financial close in 
2014, constituting US$0.12bn. Since then, there have been no further deals in this social 
sector. The last municipal project signed was in 2012 equating to a transaction value of 
US$0.14. Similarly, the latest justice ventures agreed were in 2012 which were the Avon and 
Somerset Policy Authority redevelopment and West Yorkshire Police PPP deals which 
together comprise US$0.30bn of investment.  
Two emergency and response services agreements achieved financial close in 2013, 
constituting US$0.15bn of private capital. Since then, there has been no further activity in 
this sector. In contrast, housing has exhibited nascent signs of growth post GFC. In the 
context of a chronic housing shortage, from 2012 to 2014, average housing investment 
increased to US$0.5bn year-on-year exceeding figures pre-2007; though the last housing 
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venture to achieve financial close was in 2015, constituting a reduced capital value of 
US$0.23bn. With a massive shortfall in housing supply, the housing sector may be a credible 
area for future PPP provision growth.  
 
Figure 7.3: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Sectoral Distribution by Capital Value (%) (IJ, 2017) 
7.4. United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Jurisdictional Markets 
Figure 7.4 displays an accumulated breakdown of the four regional PPP markets in the UK, 
namely: England, Northern Ireland (NI), Scotland and Wales. Evidenced in this figure, all 
markets have in the main contracted compared to pre-GFC levels though there have been 
fluctuating and periodical signs of growth. It was determined as part of chapter three that all 
UK jurisdictions have developed their own PPP models to replace PFI. Even so, evidenced 
above market activity remains relatively sedate; though there have been some fluctuations.  
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Figure 7.4: Regional UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Capital Value (US$m) 
2005 – 2017 (IJ, 2017) 
To add further insight into these investment trends, in addition to an overview, table 7.1 
exhibits the breakdown of regional PPP markets by social infrastructure sector. The research 
will now analyse these markets individually in the following.  
Table 7.1: Sector Breakdown of Regional UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity 
(US$m) 2005-2017 (IJ, 2017) 
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England 14.59 0.60 14.67 2.92 0.91 0.32 3.23 37.23 
Northern 
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7.4.1. England 
 
Figure 7.5: English PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Capital Value (US$mn) 2005 
– 2017 (IJ, 2017) 
Figure 7.5 denotes IJ (2017) data in regard to the English PPP social infrastructure market by 
project value in the timeframe from 2005 until 2017. The English PPP market has been the 
largest of all UK regions and vastly exceeds that of other jurisdictions. Of the UK markets, 
since 2005, the English PPP market has constituted US$37.23bn of investment, equating to 
a 73.1% share of the total market value (IJ, 2017). Like the UK market generally, English PPP 
ventures were expanding in the years leading up to the GFC, valued at US$4.55bn in 2005 
and US$6.94bn in 2006 before cresting in 2007 at US$7.71bn. Private investment plunged to 
US$2.25bn in 2008, representing a difference of US$5.46bn from 2007 to 2008. In the short-
term period thereafter, investment systematically increased from 2008 to 2010 as was 
earlier explained. Since this second peak in 2010, the English market has failed to re-establish 
itself to previous levels. Ultimately, a constrained lending environment allied with concerns 
pertaining to the PFI has culminated in 2013 to the Coalition government launching Private 
Finance 2 (PF2).  
One of the fundamental differences between PF2 and PFI has been the introduction of the 
public-sector as an equity co-investor. By directly investing into the project, it is anticipated 
this will cultivate greater stakeholder collaboration reflected through an improved 
partnership between contractual stakeholders (Read, 2013). Indeed, the salient emphasis 
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attached to collaboration in this framework adds credibility to the value of this work. Still, 
despite the reformed PF2 framework, the English market continues to exhibit tapered 
market activity and instead of growing, it has bottomed in 2016, comprising US$0.19bn of 
private capital. There are several sticking points preventing the augmentation of the English 
market. Literature points towards the equity funding competition as a barrier to market 
growth. Also, the introduction of the public-sector equity co-investment has created 
scepticism; however, most pertinently, the politicisation of the PPP mechanism as well as 
the absence of a defined pipeline has perhaps engendered the greatest concerns. 
Shown in table 7.1, education and health have and continue to dominate English PPP outlay. 
In capital value terms, health has accumulated the greatest transactions capital, valued at 
US$14.67bn. Education ranked second encapsulating a capital value of US$14.59bn from 
2005 to 2017. Comparatively, all other social infrastructure sectors have displayed muted 
provision. Municipal ranked third largest, constituting US$3.23bn which reveals a seismic gap 
from second and third of US$11.37bn. It is also noteworthy; the English market has exhibited 
burgeoning traction for housing PPP arrangements identified earlier in this chapter.  
Being the largest market, the UK government has been fundamental in driving growth; 
however, PPP, now heavily tarnished has meant there has been little political will for these 
frameworks despite the curtailed availability of public capital in the current economic 
landscape. Instead, economic infrastructure continues to take precedence and large-scale 
projects such as High Speed 2 (HS2) amongst others continues to be prioritised by the English 
government.  
7.4.2. Northern Ireland 
The NI PPP market is the smallest of the jurisdictions in terms of capital value, equating to 
US$1.18bn or 2.3% of overall UK market value. IJ (2017) data indicates market activity has all 
but ceased in NI and over the twelve-year period from 2005 to 2017, activity has been 
intermittent. The last transaction agreed in NI was in 2014 which was the Windsor Park 
Stadium Redevelopment. This was preceded by a three-year activity moratorium from 2011 
which constituted two education ventures, namely; Lagan College PPP and Tor Bank School 
PPP.  
Since 2005, PPP investment has been channelled into education, health, leisure and 
recreational and municipal transactions. Much like the wider UK market, education and 
health respectively have been the predominant sectors for PPP utilisation since 2005. 
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Education constitutes 56.7% (US$0.67bn) of the market by capital value and health 
encapsulates 36.1% (US$0.43bn) equating to 92.8%. There have been no agreements to 
achieve financial close in justice, housing and emergency and response projects in the 
twelve-year period from 2005 to 2017. Unlike other UK regions which peaked in 2007, the 
NI market (US$0.6bn) exhibited the greatest levels of activity in 2009 in the immediate period 
post GFC. As the NI Executive sought to reduce public-sector expenditure per head to mirror 
that of the rest of the UK, PFI was a method by which to bolster private-sector activity in the 
NI economy (Hellowell et al., 2009). In total, these transactions comprised the agreement of 
three education contracts and one health arrangement.  
 
Figure 7.6: Northern Irish PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Project Value (US$m) 
2005 – 2017 (IJ, 2017) 
Like the rest of the UK jurisdiction, NI also has developed its own PPP framework to replace 
PFI. The Third-Party Developer (3PD) was introduced in 2015; however, with no ventures yet 
to achieve financial close, it is unclear if this reformed framework has addressed the concerns 
encircling PFI. NI is heavily dependent upon the annual block-grant capital transfer from the 
UK government and as a result in the main it has preferred to opt for traditionally procured 
social infrastructure. Because of this, the long-term commitment of PPP has meant that NI 
has been unwilling to commit to these partnerships. Furthermore, the limited mobilisation 
of PPP in NI and political uncertainty are major barriers to increased private-sector 
participation.  
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7.4.3. Scotland 
 
Figure 7.7: Scottish PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Project Value (US$m) 2005 
– 2017 (IJ, 2017) 
The Scottish social infrastructure PPP market was valued at US$11.23bn equating to 22.0% 
of UK PPP market capital investment between 2005 and 2017. The Scottish market is ranked 
second in the UK according to capital value and like all other UK jurisdictions, PPP in Scotland 
was expanding both in terms of capital value and deal number leading up to the GFC. In 2005, 
the Scottish PPP social infrastructure market was valued at US$1.29bn. This increased in 
2006 to US$1.88bn and significantly jumped to US$4.08bn in 2007. The Scottish market 
peaked in 2007 encapsulating US$11.23bn of capital outlay. Post GFC, mirroring wider 
market activity, Scottish PPP appetite has been remarkably tapered in the short-term period 
thereafter. The market bottomed in 2012 with no ventures achieving financial close which 
coincided with the cancellation of the PFI. Since this nadir, evidenced in figure 7.7, Scotland 
has exhibited a burgeoning revival and in 2016 it surpassed England for the first time in 
capital value terms, ranking it as the leading market in the UK. In this year, Scotland invested 
US$0.65bn whereas England invested US$0.19bn. 
Against the backdrop of new investment frameworks, since 2012, Scottish PPP investment 
has consistently increased annually and peaked in 2015 at US$0.87bn. In 2016, though the 
same capital value was not replicated, as a proportion of the UK market, Scotland’s presence 
has grown; of the 15 PPP projects signed in 2016 across all UK markets, 14 were agreed in 
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Scotland constituting 93.3% of all UK PPP deals. Projects have emanated from both the hub 
initiatives and the NPD model. Despite these positive signs, it is noteworthy that the market 
continues to underperform in comparison to levels recorded pre-GFC.  
Primarily, Scottish PPP investment has been encapsulated within education and health 
projects as well as minor portions appropriated to justice and municipal. More recently, the 
Scottish government has focused on PPP to provide explicitly either health or education with 
little appetite for other social infrastructure sectors with the last exception being municipal 
PPP ventures in 2011. Since 2005, education has accounted for a share of the Scottish market 
of 62.7% (US$7.04bn). Health has accrued 34.6% of capital outlay (US$3.89bn), whereas 
justice represents 1.45% of the Scottish market at US$0.16bn and municipal 1.26% at 
US$0.14bn. In contrast to the other UK markets, fundamentally, the appointment of the SFT 
as well as a clear declaration of commitment to PPP has meant there is relative confidence 
in the Scottish PPP market. This may explain its growth over the previous seven years. 
Moreover, the Scottish government has announced PPP will continue to be a credible model 
for health and education provision.  
7.4.4. Wales 
 
Figure 7.8: Welsh PPP Social Infrastructure Market Activity by Project Value (US$m) 2005 
– 2017 (IJ, 2017) 
Finally, the last of the four regional markets is Wales. Figure 7.8 shows Welsh PPP market 
activity from 2005 to 2017. Since 2005, all Welsh PPP ventures have comprised of either 
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education or health contracts. Education accounts for a capital value of US$0.34bn, equating 
to 26.2% and health constitutes 73.8% at US$0.95bn.  
Akin to the rest of the UK market, though relatively smaller compared to England and 
Scotland, Wales likewise was expanding in the period preceding the GFC. Capital value 
increased almost tenfold in the two-year period from 2005 to 2007 equating to a growth 
from US$0.09bn to US$0.95bn of private investment. Of all Welsh social infrastructure PPP 
activity over the last twelve-years, 73.6% of it was recorded in 2007 which equalled 
US$0.95bn of the US$1.29bn total. Having also developed its own Mutual Investment Model 
(MIM) in 2017, the Welsh Assembly has displayed renewed interest in cross-sectoral 
partnering; however, like NI, still in its infancy, it remains unclear if this reformed mechanism 
has addressed many of the inherent criticisms of PFI.  
7.5. Financial Structure of United Kingdom United Public-Private Partnerships Social 
Infrastructure Transactions 
Identified in chapters two and three, the financial landscape of infrastructure investment has 
undergone profound transformations over the previous decade. it is accordingly worthwhile 
to consider how this has affected the financial structure of PPP arrangements. Premised on 
IJ (2017) data, total debt financing from 2005 to 2017 has accumulated US$45.34bn of 
private investment and equity capital has totalled US$5.59bn. These compiled figures reveal 
the market averaged a debt-equity ratio of 89:11, closely correlating with literature which 
stated PFI arrangements were typically highly geared circa 90:10 debt-equity. 
Table 7.2: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Debt-Equity Composition (IJ, 2017) 
Year 
Debt 
(US$bn) 
Equity (US$bn) Debt-Equity Ratio 
2005 5.04 0.92 85:15 
2006 8.42 0.62 93:7 
2007 11.72 1.02 92:8 
2008 2.99 0.31 91:9 
2009 3.62 0.51 88:12 
2010 4.00 0.53 88:12 
2011 1.64 0.16 91:9 
2012 1.37 0.19 88:12 
2013 2.09 0.51 80:20 
2014 1.04 0.08 93:7 
2015 2.19 0.55 80:20 
2016 0.74 0.10 89:11 
2017 0.48 0.08 85:15 
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Figure 7.9: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Market Gearing Composition by Sector (US$bn) 
2005 – 2017 (IJ, 2017) 
Table 7.2 exhibits the deconstruction of the annual financial structuring of UK PPP social 
ventures in terms of debt-equity capital over the twelve-year period from 2005 to 2017. This 
is complimented with figure 7.9 which illustrates the financial composition per social 
infrastructure sector in percentile points together with capital value over the same twelve-
year period. 
In the two-year period post the GFC, in 2009 and 2010, debt-equity ratios dropped to 88:12. 
This may be explained by reduced debt contributions resultant of illiquidity in the markets 
and the need to offset reduced private capital from banks through increased shareholder 
contributions. Following this, figures returned to relative normality again in 2011 with 
greater debt filtration into projects, expressed through financial structuring of 91:9 debt-
equity. In the following year; 2012, debt lending again lessened before an acute constriction 
in 2013. In 2013 and 2015, the financial structure of transactions dropped to 80:20 debt-
equity, while in 2014, the ratios increased to 93:7.  
Principally, these trends can be attributed to the differences between the financial 
structuring in the English and Scottish markets and the influence of different market activity. 
With the Scottish markets increasingly holding a greater presence in the PPP private finance 
sphere, the high leveraging ratios had significant influence on these proportions. Scottish 
PPP ventures were recorded as being leveraged at 91:9, with debt apportioning US$10.17bn 
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and equity accounting for US$1.07 of private outlay. Alternatively, in England, the 
composition of arrangements has been less consistent. Fundamentally, English PPP 
transactions have been highly leveraged circa 88:12 across the twelve years. Debt lending 
has constituted US$33.03bn of private outlay and equity investment comprises US$4.20bn 
of private finance. Still, more recent IJ (2017) data highlights remarkable shifting trends. In 
2013, lower levels of market activity stemming out of the transition from PFI to PF2, has 
culminated in several lower geared contracts. This included the Royal Liverpool University 
hospital was 54:46 debt-equity, the Woking housing PFI deal which was geared as 47:53 
debt-equity, University of Hertfordshire student housing gearing was 77:23 debt-equity and 
the London Fire Brigade PFI was 74:26. In the following year, i.e. 2014, the leveraging of UK 
PPP climbed. With reduced activity in 2014 in England (exhibited in figure 7.9), the higher 
gearing is attributable to several projects in Scotland which were purely debt financed 
(100%).  
In 2015, while the Scottish market continued to expand, so too did the English market, also 
exhibiting somewhat of a resurgence. Several notable housing and health transactions 
achieved financial close constituting a capital value growth from US$0.60bn in 2014 to 
US$1.87bn in 2015. Many of these deals averaged much lower leveraging arrangements. The 
Midland Metropolitan Hospital PPP and New Papworth Hospital PPP in England were both 
structured as 62:38 debt-equity. Furthermore, the signed Hull extra care housing deal was 
40:60 debt-equity which also contributed to the difference in this year. Since then, there 
have been no English health PPP deals for further comparison.  
NI PPP arrangements were also leveraged at an average of 88:12 debt-equity akin to England. 
Debt lending comprised US$1.04bn of private capital, while equity was recorded at US$0.14. 
However, it remains unclear how developments in the infrastructure financing market will 
affect the financial structure of future NI PPP transactions.  
Similarly, Welsh PPP ventures were determined as debt-equity ratios at 86:14. Debt lending 
to Welsh PPP projects has encapsulated private investment circa US$1.1bn and equity 
US$0.18bn.  
Per social infrastructure sector (table 7.3), justice PPP deals had the highest gearing at 93:7 
debt-equity. Debt finance accounted for US$0.33bn and equity totalled US$0.03bn. This was 
followed by leisure and recreational which had a structural composition of 92:8, equating to 
US$0.33bn debt and US$0.03bn equity. Education ventures were arranged as 90:10 debt-
equity, consistent with literature. Debt in education deals was valued at US$20.32bn and 
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equity amassed US$2.32bn of private investment. Similarly, health was leveraged as 89:11 
debt-equity.  
Table 7.3: Sectoral Breakdown of Debt-Equity Financial Structure According to UK PPP 
Social Infrastructure Regional Market (US$bn) 2005 – 2017 (IJ, 2017) 
Region England Northern Ireland Scotland Wales 
 Debt  Equity Debt Equity Debt Equity Debt Equity 
Education 13.13 1.46 0.58 0.09 6.30 0.74 0.31 0.03 
Emergency 
& Response 0.53 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Health 12.97 1.70 0.38 0.05 3.59 0.30 0.80 0.15 
Housing 2.44 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Justice 0.84 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Leisure & 
Recreational 0.29 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Municipal 2.83 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Total 33.03 4.20 1.04 0.14 10.17 1.07 1.12 0.18 
 
Debt investment was determined as US$17.74bn and equity was valued at US$2.20bn. 
Emergency and response followed health. Debt accounted for US$0.53bn outlay and equity, 
US$0.07bn, expressed through a debt-equity ratio of 88:12. Municipal projects were 
structured 87:13 with debt encompassing US$2.98bn and equity US$0.43bn. The lowest 
gearing was ascribed to housing ventures. With most of the housing market expansion 
occurring post GFC in the context of curtailed lending capacity, it is unsurprising equity 
constituted a larger portion of these agreements. The debt-equity structure averaged 84:16 
with debt valuing US$2.44bn and equity US$0.48bn. 
7.6. Reflection on the Key Findings of the United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships 
Social Infrastructure Market Analysis 
Having examined the datasets sourced from IJ, the research now reflects on the key insights 
derived from this contemporary market analysis. The PPP social infrastructure market 
analysis has identified that health and education have been the major sectors of social 
infrastructure for PPP provision and continue to be the two sectors preferred for PPP 
provision. Moreover, the market analysis has determined that the UK market has undergone 
profound changes over the last decade as was detailed in the literature. In the period leading 
up to 2008, PPP was growing exponentially. However, it was also determined that the UK 
PPP market has been remarkably impacted by the GFC. Recognised in chapters two and 
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three, the appetite of conventional lenders for infrastructure financing has been eroded and 
therein has left a capital void in the PPP lending space.  
To fill this space, there is growing interest for increased investment from institutional 
investors. With long-term objectives, infrastructure investment is an attractive proposition 
for institutional investors; however, risk averse, it is yet unclear how to unlock this additional 
source of finance. The high gearing in Scotland suggests there continues to be an over-
reliance on debt to provide most of private capital to PPP ventures which in the main derives 
from commercial banks. In contrast, in England, the lower ratios indicate that there are 
noticeable levels of appetite for PF2 on the part of shareholders. Though with the relatively 
small sample, it is difficult to conclusively determine if this is the case.   
As per chapter three, there are many barriers prohibiting market growth. In part this can be 
attributed to the absence of a defined pipeline which this has cultivated uncertainty 
particularly within the private-sector community. An obvious example of this is the paradigm 
shifts between Scotland and England. Through the SFT and the introduction of the NPD and 
hub initiatives, the Scottish government has outlain its commitment to PPP. As a result, the 
Scottish market has exhibited signs of a resurgence. Comparatively, the absence of a pipeline 
in England has been reflected through low levels of market activity, with little signs of 
expansion. This is also the case for Wales and NI. Thus, one of the key findings from this 
market quantification is the pertinence for the UK government to provide a transparent deal 
flow. It was identified in chapter three, by doing so, this can return confidence to the private-
sector and reduce transaction costs and increase competition.  
In the context of stakeholder collaboration, literature points towards the degeneration of 
the partnership as a primary source of poor project performance. Unsurprisingly, many of 
the inherent modifications of these frameworks have been introduced to address these 
partnering shortcomings. Nonetheless, the low levels of market activity; despite the 
introduction of nuanced frameworks suggests that these transformations have failed to 
remedy the criticisms of PFI. A noteworthy concern, is that these reformed frameworks are 
in fact permutations of PFI and have failed to implement any mechanisms that embrace the 
ethos of collaboration. Fundamentally grounded in a partnering ethos, collaboration should 
be a core component of these arrangements. Even so, the disparate ideologies of the public 
and private-sectors has been and arguably remains a barrier to ‘more and better’ PPP social 
infrastructure provision.  
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7.7. Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter, chapter seven, was to offer contemporary insights into the UK 
PPP social infrastructure paradigm. Having declared its commitment to partnership-based 
procurement, the UK government has introduced reformed mechanisms to be used for 
future social infrastructure provision where offering best VfM. Yet, low levels of market 
activity suggest there remains meaningful doubt over the performance of these frameworks. 
This consolidates with a recent National Audit Office report which identified a number of 
inefficiencies continuing to confront the up-take of PPP. 
Literature points towards collaboration as a primary source of poor project performance. 
Moreover, many of the changes introduced as part of these nuanced frameworks have been 
with the intention of bolstering collaboration. As alternative sources of capital and nascent 
stakeholders continue to enter the PPP market, there is also a need for greater collaboration.  
Having completed the market analysis, the purpose of the next chapter is to analyse the 
findings of the social infrastructure stakeholder (SIS) survey and therein identify the relative 
salience and statistical significance of the collaborative attributes in preparation for the 
framework development.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES  
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8. Analysis of Survey Questionnaires 
8.1. Introduction 
In chapter six, the research designed and delineated the research methodology which is to 
be undertaken to develop the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. It was determined 
survey questionnaires would be the research instrument utilised to capture social 
infrastructure stakeholder (SIS) opinions and views of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 
stakeholder collaboration. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to analyse and 
interrogate the results of these datasets in preparation for the framework development. The 
findings from this chapter will provide the data necessary by which to formulate this 
framework. Moreover, it will be interrogated to determine the ranking salience of these 
collaborative attributes. Premised on the research methodology delineated in chapter six, 
survey responses are to be interrogated and analysed through the application of descriptive 
and inferential statistical techniques conducted through the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) software. This is to ascertain statistical significance as well as ranking salience 
to achieve objective four.  
Chapter eight is structured as follows: 
• Stakeholder demographic; 
• PPP social infrastructure provision; and 
• PPP stakeholder collaboration. 
8.2. Response Rate 
In total, the research received 109 responses. Of this figure, 36 were incomplete, culminating 
in 73 completed and useable responses. From a sample of 220, 73 completed surveys 
equated to a 33% response rate. This was deemed robust, surpassing similar research: Li et 
al. (2005a) received a 12.2% response rate achieved through 51 usable responses; Dulaimi 
et al. (2003) received 5.91% responses which equated to 58 usable questionnaires; Salman 
et al. (2007) recorded a 9.4% rate; Yuan et al. (2009) elicited a response rate of 13.02%; 19 
respondents completed Abdul-Aziz’s (2012) questionnaire (10.3%); and Yong and Mustaffa 
(2013) received a 9.83% response rate derived from 48 returned questionnaires. Tang and 
Shen (2013) acquired 122 responses equating to a response rate of 24.4% and Raisbeck and 
Tang (2013) recorded a 18.9% response rate ascertained from 36 responses. 
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8.3. Stakeholder Demographic 
Section A of the questionnaire entitled ‘Stakeholder Demographic’ was designed to discern 
participant background information and their experience with social infrastructure PPP 
projects. Of the 73 completed responses, depicted in table 8.1, 18 (24.7%) were received 
from the public-sector and 55 (75.3%) from the private-sector. This closely reflected Li et al. 
(2005a) who received 26.2% participation from the public-sector and 73.8% private-sector 
responses.  
In terms of per SIS group, of the 80 Authorities, 18 responded equating to 22.5% of the 
sample. Sixteen out of 23 Construction Contractors (BuildCo) replied representing 69.6% of 
the identified sample. Of the Debt Funders sample, 27.3% responded. Sixteen out of a 
sample of 62 Equity Shareholders answered equating to 25.8%. Finally, half of the Service 
Providers (FMCo) sample responded equivalent to 50.0%. All participants met the 
requirements to be considered an expert as stipulated in chapter six, i.e. a minimum of five 
years’ experience in practicing PPP and in a management position or above. Thus, the sample 
was composed as 24.7% Authorities, 23.3% by FMCo, 21.9% equally by BuildCo and Equity 
Shareholders, and finally 8.2% by Debt Funders. Predicated on the population composition 
determined in chapter six, it was deemed that these response rates were representative of 
the identified PPP SIS population. 
Table 8.1: SIS Response Profile 
 Pro-rata SIS 
Population (%) 
Sample 
Size 
Number 
of 
Responses 
Sample 
Response 
Percentage 
(%) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Responses 
(%) 
Authority 36.4 80 18 22.5 24.7 
BuildCo 9.9 23 16 69.6 21.9 
Debt Funders 28.1 22 6 27.3 8.2 
Equity Shareholders 10.3 62 16 25.8 21.9 
FMCo 15.3 34 17 50.0 23.3 
Total 100.0 220 73 33.2 100.0 
 
8.3.1. Respondent Experience of Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure 
Sectors 
Section A of the survey requested participants to indicate their experience of PPP in the 
different social infrastructure sectors. Evidenced in figure 8.1 below, there was a distinct 
disparity in terms of experience. Mostly, SIS had experience of education and health projects. 
Of the 73 participants, around two thirds had experience of education ventures (65.7%) and 
184 
 
 
 
71.2% had been involved in PPP health provision. In contrast, in the housing, justice, 
emergency and response services, leisure and recreational, and municipal PPP sectors, there 
was noticeably less provision experience. Eighteen (24.7%) participants out of the 73 SIS 
respondents had experience of emergency and response services provision. Likewise, 18 
(24.7%) were experienced in housing deals. Sixteen (21.9%) had been involved in leisure and 
recreational infrastructure PPP deals and 15 (20.6%) in justice. This correlated with literature 
and the findings of chapter seven which identified health and education as the two largest 
PPP social infrastructure sectors.  
 
Figure 8.1: SIS experience of PPP in Sectoral Terms  
When further unpacked per SIS group, this trend continued. Education and health were the 
predominant sectors across all SIS groups. The widest experience base was that of Debt 
Funders. In six of the seven social infrastructure sectors, at least half the Debt Funder sample 
had experience; with the exception being municipal. It should be caveated that this was the 
smallest SIS group. All other SIS groups had some levels of experience in all social 
infrastructure sectors with one exception; no Authority respondents had experience of 
justice PPP transactions. The respondent sample was therefore considered to be 
representative. 
8.3.2. Respondent Experience of Public-Private Partnerships Modalities 
In addition to social infrastructure sectors, SIS were requested to provide information of their 
experience with specific PPP frameworks, programmes and schemes. Identified in chapter 
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three, there are four essential PPP modalities in the UK which operate under the Design, 
Build, Finance and Manage / Operate (DBFM/O) contract: The Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
Private Finance 2 (PF2), the Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) hub initiative and the Non-Profit 
Distribution (NPD) model. Though there is also the Third-Party Development (3PD) model in 
Northern Ireland (NI) and the Mutual Investment Model (MIM) in Wales, currently no 
projects have yet to achieve financial close via these frameworks and therefore have not 
been included in this analysis. 
Table 8.2: SIS Experience of UK PPP Modalities 
 Not at all 
experienced 
(%) 
Slightly 
experienced 
(%) 
Moderately 
experienced 
(%) 
Very 
experience 
(%) 
Extremely 
experienced 
(%) 
Private Finance 
Initiative 2.7 4.1 9.6 41.1 42.5 
Building Schools for 
the Future 38.4 9.6 8.2 27.4 16.4 
Local Improvement 
Finance Trust and 
express LIFT  46.6 16.4 13.7 11.0 12.3 
Private Finance 2 46.6 17.8 11.0 13.7 11.0 
Non-Profit 
Distribution model 63.0 9.6 15.1 5.5 6.8 
Priority School 
Building 
Programme 65.8 11.0 11.0 6.8 5.5 
Scottish Futures 
Trust Hub Initiative 72.6 11.0 6.8 2.7 6.8 
 
These frameworks have been nuanced to function as part of capital delivery programmes 
and schemes. PFI has been instrumental in the Building schools for the Future (BSF) and the 
National Health Service (NHS) local improvement finance trust (LIFT) and express LIFT (eLIFT) 
schemes. Similarly, PF2 is instrumental in the Priority School Building Programme (PSBP). 
Shown in table 8.2, survey participants were requested to indicate their experience with 
these PPP modalities by means of a five-point Likert scale. The response categories spanned:  
• 1-not at all experienced;  
• 2-slightly experienced;  
• 3-moderately experienced;  
• 4-very experienced; and  
• 5-extremely experienced. 
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As would be expected, the frameworks which have had the longest operational roll-out have 
had the most experience. Conversely, experienced of the newer frameworks remains 
limited.  
8.3.2.1. Private Finance Initiative 
Being the archetypal PPP modality, predictably almost all SIS had extensive experience of 
PFI. In total, 97.3% of all SIS had some level of experience of PFI. Further unpacked, 42.5% 
were extremely experienced and 41.1% were very experienced. Collectively, this accounted 
for 83.6% suggesting generally SIS groups were extremely familiar with PFI.  
8.3.2.2. Building Schools for the Future 
Following PFI, the BSF was the second ranking modality by experience. Over sixty percent 
(61.6%) had experience of the BSF scheme. These findings indicate that across all groups 
there were moderate levels of experience. Introduced to upgrade, replace and redevelop 
schools across the UK, the BSF has been instrumental in the provision of education facilities. 
These findings are expected when coupled with earlier sectoral experience and market 
mobilisation of educational PPP ventures discussed in chapter three.  
8.3.2.3. Local Improvement Finance Trust / Express LIFT 
PPP has also been instrumental in the provision of healthcare facilities through the LIFT and 
eLIFT schemes. Positioning third, a majority of 53.4% were experienced in LIFT and eLIFT 
schemes. Levels of experience were somewhat more uniform across SIS compared to the BSF 
programme. Yet, the mean score indicates in general participants were only slightly familiar 
with LIFT and eLIFT.  
8.3.2.4. Private Finance 2 
PF2 was introduced to replace PFI. Market figures revealed as part of chapter seven indicate 
PF2’s uptake to date has been muted. Still, despite its limited roll-out, over half the recipients 
had experience of PF2 (53.4%).  
8.3.2.5. Priority School Building Programme 
This muted usage of PF2 coincides with the limited operationalisation of the PSBP. The PSBP 
was developed to replace the cancelled BSF scheme and implements the PF2 framework as 
the provision mechanism. Still, despite being introduced in 2011, 65.8% of SIS had no 
experience at all of the PSBP programme. Financial stakeholders (Debt Funders and Equity 
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Shareholders) had the highest levels of experience, though these were also somewhat 
curtailed, equivocal to slightly experienced.   
8.3.2.6. Non-Profit Distribution 
In Scotland, the NPD model was developed to replace PFI. Despite a resurgence of PPP 
activity endemic to this region, the SIS sample experience was minor; only 27.4% had 
participated in the NPD model. Debt Funders were the most experienced; 16.7% had no 
experience at all, 50% were moderately experienced and a further third (33.3%) were very 
experienced.  
8.3.2.7. Scottish-Futures-Trust Hub Initiative 
Scotland also utilises the SFT hub initiative. Almost three quarters of SIS had no experience 
at all (72.6%) of this partnering strategy. Those who did have experience had disparate levels, 
though the highest response category after not at all experienced was slightly experienced. 
Still considered to be in infancy, these results coincide with literature and the findings of 
chapter seven. 
8.4. Public-Private Partnerships Social Infrastructure Provision 
Having discerned the key SIS variables for the survey, section B of the questionnaire was 
intended to evaluate PPP as a framework for ‘more and better’ social infrastructure 
provision. Throughout literature, the UK is considered one of the pioneers of PPP and it is 
also regarded as one of the most sophisticated and mature markets globally. Even so, in more 
recent years, this research has revealed through literature and the UK PPP social 
infrastructure market analysis that market activity has substantially waned. Against this 
backdrop, section B of the survey was designed to offer contemporary consideration of PPP 
for UK social infrastructure. This section was thus structured as follows: 
• UK PPP macro-environment;  
• SIS perceptions of the PPP concept; 
• social infrastructure sectors conducive to PPP provision; and 
• future use of PPP. 
 
8.4.1. United Kingdom Public-Private Partnerships Macro-environment 
To determine if the macro environment was favourable to PPP social infrastructure 
provision, SIS were asked if they agreed that the current UK policy and legislative framework, 
the political landscape and economic climate were conducive to PPP use.  
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Fundamentally, respondents agreed the UK currently has the necessary policy and legislative 
framework. Over two-thirds of the sample responded as either agree or strongly agree 
(75.3%). Likewise, most SIS agreed that the current economic climate was conducive (63.0%) 
to PPP mobilisation. Contrastingly, SIS were uncertain of the political support. This was 
expressed through disparate responses. The two most forthcoming response categories 
were agree and disagree, constituting 34.2% of replies alike. An additional, 24.7% were 
unsure.  
8.4.2. The Public-Private Partnerships Concept 
Respondents were asked of their perceptions of PPP as a social infrastructure provision 
concept. Respondents exhibited remarkable satisfaction across all SIS groups. Ranging on a 
scale from very bad to very good, 83.6% of the collective sample viewed PPP as either a good 
or a very good framework. Within this, it is noteworthy, despite PPP models having been 
heavily criticised for delivering poor Value for Money (VfM) to the taxpayer, Authority 
respondents generally were enthusiastic about PPP. A majority opined PPP was a good 
(61.1%) or very good (5.6%) provision mechanism.  
8.4.3. Social Infrastructure Sectors Conducive to Public-Private Partnerships 
Provision 
While PPP was considered to be a proficient provision mechanism, the survey was 
additionally used to harness views on which social infrastructure sectors were most 
conducive to PPP provision. Responses were captured via a five-point Likert-scale spanning: 
1. Strongly disagree; 
2. disagree; 
3. unsure; 
4. agree; and 
5. strongly agree. 
Scores were ranked according to a Relative Importance Index (RII). The highest-ranking score 
indicates most conducive. The findings are depicted in table 8.3 below.  
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Table 8.3: SIS Perceptions of Sectors Conducive to PPP 
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Unsurprisingly, education and health were the two foremost favoured sectors. This mirrors 
the findings in chapters three and seven in that these have been the sectors to have most 
widely utilised PPP. That said, there were some nuanced opinions. Despite education and 
health respectively ranking first and second overall, Authorities and BuildCo respondents 
considered municipal as the social infrastructure sector most conducive to PPP provision. 
This is pertinent on the grounds that as part of chapter seven, it was revealed that activity 
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within this sector has all but ceased; however, these findings suggest this may be a potential 
future growth area. 
8.4.4. Future Use of Public-Private Partnerships 
Looking forward, SIS were asked if they intended to participate in future UK PPP social 
infrastructure projects. All participants in the main exhibited appetite for future utility of PPP 
except for a minority of 2.7%. Markedly, almost two-thirds were either very interested 
(30.1%) or extremely interested (31.5%). These findings indicate that despite the negative 
connotations associated with PPP frameworks suggested in literature, SIS responded with 
enthusiasm.  
From these findings, the research has determined from the survey responses, PPP is an 
attractive social infrastructure provision mechanism. Moreover, it has identified education 
and health are the two social infrastructure sectors most conducive to PPP provision. All SIS 
groups remain interested in future use of PPP for social infrastructure provision. Of the 
macro-environmental considerations, generally SIS believed the UK possessed a conducive 
economic climate as well as the necessary policy and legislative framework. However, SIS 
were uncertain as to whether there was the required political backing critical for future 
mobilisation of PPP frameworks.     
8.5. Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration 
This research defines PPP stakeholder collaboration as a long-term partnership between the 
public-sector Authority and the private-sector Project Company (ProjCo) and its constituent 
members whereby equal partners share risks, rewards and resources to deliver 
infrastructure in a cooperative and joint working manner. As its prominence in PPP and the 
built environment continues to gather momentum, section C of the survey was designed to 
determine participants’ perceptions and opinions of PPP stakeholder collaboration. 
Moreover, it was developed to garner SIS insights into the salience of attributes by which to 
engineer collaborative advantage. The findings from this section will supply the empirical 
data for the framework development and is structured as follows: 
• Conduciveness of PPP frameworks to collaboration; 
• Salience of PPP stakeholder collaboration; and 
• Analysis of PPP stakeholder collaborative attributes. 
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8.5.1. Conduciveness of Public-Private Partnerships Frameworks to 
Collaboration 
Participants were invited to evaluate the conduciveness of PPP frameworks to the formation 
of collaborative relationships. Predominantly, SIS opined UK PPP frameworks were 
conducive to collaboration. A minority of 6.8% opined PPP was not at all conducive. It has 
been suggested in literature that the nature and complexity of PPP encourages autonomous 
stakeholder behaviour; however, encouragingly, these findings suggest there is still 
appropriate capacity within the PPP mechanism to foster collaboration. 
Within collaboration theory it has been argued that the disproportionate distribution of 
resources among stakeholders skews the true nature of partnering as one partner becomes 
dominant. This has served to undermine the development of a win-win environment. 
Interestingly, SIS fundamentally disagreed with this. Instead, SIS generally agreed it was 
possible for PPP stakeholders to nurture a win-win environment whereby all stakeholders 
collectively benefited. The largest response category was likely, accounting for 54.8% and a 
further 30.1% agreed that it was extremely likely. Of those who disagreed, this emanated 
from Authorities and BuildCo; a minority of Authorities regarded it as unlikely (11.1%) 
whereas 6.3% of BuildCo felt it was extremely unlikely. These findings suggest that the 
construction phase of a PPP is particularly problematic for collaboration. 
8.5.2. Salience of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration 
Survey participants were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that through 
the adoption and integration of collaborative attributes, partnering could develop 
collaborative advantage. Principally, all SIS agreed or strongly agreed (97.7%). A minority 
portion of 2.7% were unsure. This minority was constituted from one Authority and one 
FMCo. When compared per SIS, the highest frequency response for all groups was the agree 
response category barring FMCo where a majority of 64.7% strongly agreed. Unsurprisingly, 
opinions were in the main uniform across social infrastructure sectors.  
In line with the foregoing, SIS were asked if they agreed or disagreed that improved 
stakeholder collaboration would improve PPP social infrastructure provision. Over half of the 
SIS sample agreed with this statement (58.9%) and an additional 27.4% strongly agreed. This 
correlated with literature which argued that collaborative advantage can improve the 
performance of PPP frameworks. A minority of 13.7% were unsure.  
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SIS were also queried to discern if improved stakeholder collaboration would increase the 
likelihood of their future involvement in PPP social infrastructure provision. Almost three 
quarters (74.0%) of the SIS sample believed improved stakeholder collaboration would 
increase their likelihood of future involvement. Equally, SIS opined that a successful 
partnership with another organisation would increase the likelihood of a repeat future 
collaborative working. Comprising 90.4% of sample, SIS responded that it would either likely 
(43.8%) or be extremely likely (46.6%). These figures were homogenous across sectors and 
SIS classes. These findings underpin the importance of this investigation. 
8.5.3. Analysis of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaborative 
Attributes 
Predicated on the salience of stakeholder collaboration, the survey was designed to evaluate 
a list of 27 collaborative attributes which have been identified for PPP SIS stakeholder 
collaboration. Participants were requested to evaluate these attributes using a five-point 
Likert-scale to ascertain their relative salience. The Likert-scale ranged as per:  
1. Not at all important;  
2. Slightly important; 
3. Moderately important;  
4. Very important; and 
5. Extremely important.  
Data was analysed using SPSS. A RII was conducted to determine the relative ranking salience 
of each attribute. Equally, the Kruskal-Wallis H test was carried out to investigate if there 
were significant differences between respondent groups. The outcomes of these statistical 
calculations are detailed below. 
8.5.3.1. Ranking Salience of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder 
Collaborative Attributes 
Table 8.4 exhibits the findings derived from the RII. Attributes were ranked from highest to 
lowest, and those ranked highest were of most importance. The attributes were ranked 
according to the WA of the respondent cohort, as well as per SIS group. This is insightful on 
the grounds it provides an overall collective ranking of the attributes but equally offers 
nuanced perceptions between SIS groups. 
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Table 8.4: Ranking of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
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The highest-ranking collaborative attribute was ‘trust and respect’ with an RII WA of 0.836. 
This collaborative attribute ranked highly among all SIS. Authorities ranked ‘trust and 
respect’ first (RII = 0.944), as did BuildCo (RII = 0.913), Debt Funders positioned it fourth (RII 
= 0.767), Equity Shareholders rated it as the foremost important attribute of collaboration 
in first (RII = 0.950), and similarly, FMCo deemed it to be second in terms of salience (RII = 
0.941). In literature, the importance of trust as a collaborative attribute has been well 
documented in both collaboration and PPP literature. Smyth and Edkins (2007) examined 
trust as part of stakeholder management in PPP. Likewise, Tantalo and Priem (2014) argued 
the cultivation of trust is critical on the grounds it is a catalyst by which to further unlock 
other utility functions and helps to reduce uncertainty from the project. Trust is important 
as it can foster more effective communcation and also it can produce an environment where 
organisations will go above and beyond their contractual obligations. These findings 
consolidate the prevailing salience of trust already identified in literature (Zou et al., 2013; 
Wong et al., 2015).  
The second ranked attribute was ‘effective communication’ with an RII WA value of 0.896. 
Authorities ranked ‘effective communication’ as the second most important collaborative 
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attribute (RII = 0.878), BuildCo positioned it third (RII = 0.863), Debt Funders regarded it as 
the most prominent attribute, rating it first (RII = 0.867), Equity Shareholders considered it 
second (RII = 0.900), and FMCo placed it first (RII = 0.953). These findings reaffirm the 
prominence of communication in both PPP related studies as well as in collaboration theory. 
Prevalent in collaborative management research, O’Leary and Vij (2012) identified the need 
for more consistent interpretations of communication. Equally, Lewis (2006) believed 
communication was tantamount to collaboration. In regard to PPP, it has been reported poor 
communication early in the project has resulted in many problems arising later in the project 
in the operations phase. In response, Love et al. (2015) considered Building Information 
Modelling (BIM) as a long-term communication concept in PPP. Similarly, Wang et al. (2013) 
sought to determine a framework to encourage earlier FMCo involvement in the design 
phase. Like ‘trust and respect’, ‘effective communication’ is a conduit for other functions.   
The third most important attribute for collaboration with an RII WA value of 0.858 was 
‘skilled leadership’. This attribute was considered extremely important by all SIS except for 
Debt Funders. Authorities ranked this attribute fourth (RII = 0.856), BuildCo positioned it fifth 
(RII = 0.850), Equity Shareholders considered it to be the fourth most important attribute (RII 
= 0.850), and FMCo regarded it third (RII = 0.929). Differently, Debt Funders placed it twelfth 
(RII = 0.700). The high ranking of this attribute reaffirms the findings from the literature by 
Huxham and Vangen (2005) who asserted, in collaboration theory, leadership is the 
responsibility of ‘making things happen’, as well as ensuring the framework for other 
attributes such as communication and involvement are installed and effective. In this regard, 
it has been claimed that ‘skilled leadership’ is fundamental in PPP (Shaoul et al., 2013). 
Premised on the myriad of relationships, organisations and misaligned project objectives, 
‘skilled leadership’ is critical in steering the project in a direction that is agreeable to all SIS 
in order to circumnavigate autonomous behaviour (Akintoye and Kumaraswamy, 2016).  
Ranked fourth, determined through an RII WA of 0.849, was the collaborative attribute of 
‘agreement of project brief’. This attribute was rated highly among all SIS. Authorities 
considered it third in terms of importance (RII = 0.867), BuildCo regarded it as eighth (RII = 
0.825), Debt Funders placed it in second (RII = 0.800), Equity Shareholders ranked it fifth (RII 
= 0.838) and FMCo positioned it fourth (RII = 0.882). The salience of this attribute in the 
survey correlate with the importance of an ‘agreed project brief’ suggested in the literature 
(Chinyere, 2013; Tang and Shen, 2013). Collaboration is unique insofar as it is a paradox 
between self-interested goals, and a shared vision. However, by sharing a common definition 
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of the problem through an agreed project brief, SIS can pool skillsets to tackle messy 
problems (Wong et al., 2015).  
The fifth highest-ranked collaborative attribute with an RII WA value of 0.833, was 
‘stakeholder commitment’. This attribute was ranked highly among all SIS though notably 
less by BuildCo. Allocated an RII value of 0.789, Authorities ranked this attribute sixth in 
terms of importance. Debt Funders placed it fourth (RII = 0.767), Equity Shareholders rated 
it third (RII = 0.875) and FMCo considered it to be the fourth most prominent attribute of 
PPP collaboration (RII = 0.882). Differently, BuildCo ranked it eleventh (RII = 0.813). The 
pertinence of ‘stakeholder commitment’ in the survey correlates with its prominence in PPP 
research (Zou et al., 2013; Chinyere, 2013; Tang and Shen, 2013; Wong et al., 2015). 
Commitment must be a top-down approach. Moreover, it should be engendered as early in 
the project as reasonably possible to encourage stakeholder buy-in. In regard to PPP, to 
inspire commitment prior to financial close, the Authority should consider some form of 
stipend or resource exchange as a display of intent (Wong et al., 2015).  
Contrastingly, the collaborative attribute of ‘Information Technology (IT)’ was ranked the 
least important attribute for stakeholder collaboration. The SIS sample ascribed an RII WA 
value of (0.611) ranking this attribute twenty-seventh. Authorities ranked IT of least 
importance in twenty-seventh with an RII value of (0.589), equally as did Debt Funders (RII = 
0.588). BuildCo considered IT to be of relatively low importance attaching an RII value of 
0.688, placing it twenty-fifth. Equity Shareholders positioned it twenty-sixth (RII = 0.588) 
whereas FMCo viewed ‘IT’ as marginally more important, ranking it twentieth with an RII 
score of (0.776). These findings are remarkable insofar as, in literature, IT is critical in 
supporting other attributes of collaboration. Love et al. (2015) and Wang et al. (2013) 
asserted IT supported information sharing, communication and the building of trust through 
active stakeholder involvement. Yet, while the attributes of ‘trust and respect’ and ‘effective 
communication’ positioned first and second in terms of importance, IT was the least 
important. Moreover, as the built environment continues to exhibit appetite for BIM, 
seemingly its enthusiasm as an attribute to develop collaboration is somewhat muted within 
the confines of PPP. BIM is a complex concept which is still rapidly developing. Thus, still 
somewhat unrefined, this may explicate the low prominence of this attribute.  
The second lowest ranking collaborative attribute was ‘processual change’ with an RII WA 
value of 0.660. This was considered to be of lesser importance consistent across all SIS. 
Authorities positioned it in twenty-sixth (RII = 0.633), BuildCo regarded it twenty-second (RII 
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= 0.725), Debt Funders deemed it twenty-fifth (RII = 0.533), Equity Shareholders rated it 
twenty-seventh (RII = 0.575) and FMCo ranked it twenty-fourth (RII = 0.753). In literature, it 
was suggested, predicated on the long-term life of a PPP contract and its evolving nature, 
the dynamics of the partnership must be able to correspondingly transform and mature (Cruz 
and Marques, 2013). However, while the attribute of ‘processual change’ is replete in 
collaboration theory, it remains relatively unexplored in the confines of PPP. The lack of 
awareness of this collaborative attribute may therefore explain its low ranking.  
Ranked twenty-fifth, making it the third lowest attribute was ‘innovation’. Allocated an RII 
WA of 0.671, ‘innovation’ was considered of relatively low importance for PPP collaboration. 
This attribute was considered of lower importance consistently across all SIS groups. 
Authorities positioned it in twenty-fifth (RII = 0.667), as did BuildCo (RII = 0.688). Debt 
Funders rated it twenty-sixth (RII = 0.500), Equity Shareholders deemed it twenty-fourth (RII 
= 0.613) and FMCo positioned it notably higher in twentieth (RII = 0.776). The literature 
review found that ‘innovation’ in collaboration can expedite and improve existing processes 
through the application of new technologies and systems thinking (MGI, 2017). However, as 
a result of problems associated with contract incompleteness and flexibility identified above, 
these shortcomings associated with the project may explain the low ranking of this attribute.  
In terms of per SIS group, the five highest-ranked attributes of collaboration by the Authority 
in descending order were, ‘trust and respect’ (RII = 0.944), ‘effective communication’ (RII = 
0.878), ‘agreement of project brief’ (RII = 0.867), ‘skilled leadership’ (RII = 0.856) and ‘social 
capital / inter-personal relationships’ (RII = 0.800). Alternatively, the five lowest ranked PPP 
collaborative attributes by the Authority were from the lowest upward, ‘IT’ (RII = 0.589), 
‘processual change’ (RII = 0.633), ‘innovation’ (RII = 0.667), ‘power sharing’ (RII = 0.689), and 
‘information sharing and transparency’ (RII = 0.700). The difference between the foremost 
attribute and last ranked was an RII value of 0.355 which suggests there was a notable 
importance difference among the attributes. Interestingly, ‘trust and respect’ was valued 
markedly higher than the second rated attribute. These findings indicate that many of the 
attributes which the Authority considers as important for collaboration pertain to the 
governance structures. It was noted in the literature review, as well as reaffirmed above that 
the Authority has heavily relied on the contract to guide and steer the PPP environment 
because of insufficient resources (Zheng et al., 2008). In light of these findings, it can be 
suggested collaboration must be incorporated into the contract (Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy, 2016) and is complimented with greater access to resources and skills in the 
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public-sector. Allied with this, despite ‘information sharing and transparency’ being 
considered as an important barrier for PPP, it was ranked relatively low for PPP collaboration.  
The highest-ranked PPP collaboration attribute by BuildCo was ‘trust and respect’ with an RII 
value of 0.913. This was followed by ‘early establishment of collaboration’ (RII = 0.875), 
‘effective communication’ (RII = 0.863) and ‘early, defined and collective stakeholder 
involvement and consultation’ equally, and ‘skilled leaderships’ (RII = 0.850). Comparatively, 
the five least important attributes of collaboration were considered to be ‘Information 
Technology’ (RII = 0.688), ‘innovation’ (RII = 0.688), ‘knowledge retention’ (RII = 0.688), 
‘power sharing’ (RII = 0.700), and tied in twenty-second ‘financial and technical exchange 
and support / stipend’ and ‘processual change’ (RII = 0.725). The RII value disparity between 
highest and lowest ranked attributes was 0.225. Indicated from these findings, for 
collaboration to be successful, BuildCo have emphasised the pertinence of ‘early and 
collective decision-making’. Indeed, literature has flagged that on occasion there has been a 
failure to effectively involve all organisations which has served to detract from project 
synergy (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012). With the shortest involvement, expectedly, the 
majority of high ranking collaborative attributes are orientated to the front-end of the 
project and promote transparent identification and establishment of project responsibilities.  
Debt Funders deemed the five highest-ranked PPP collaborative attributes in descending 
order as ‘effective communication’ (RII = 0.867), ‘agreement of project brief’ (RII = 0.800) 
and ‘appropriate risk sharing’ (RII = 0.800), ‘stakeholder commitment’ (RII = 0.767) and ‘trust 
and respect’ (RII = 0.767). Alternatively, the lowest Debt Funders rated attribute was ‘IT’ (RII 
= 0.467). This was followed in ascending order by ‘innovation’ (RII = 0.500)’, ‘processual 
change’ (RII = 0.522), and tied in twentieth; ‘power sharing’ (RII = 0.600), ‘knowledge 
retention’ (RII = 0.600), ‘Authority in-house resources and skills’ (RII = 0.600) and ‘Authority 
experience’ (RII = 0.600). The RII value difference between the foremost and lowest ranked 
attributes was 0.400 which signifies substantial variance of the attribute importance. Like all 
other SIS, ‘effective communication’, ‘trust and respect’, and ‘agreement of the project brief’ 
ranked highly. Still, it is also worth noting, unlike other SIS, Debt Funders regarded ‘conflict 
resolution structures’ as extremely important for PPP collaboration. Ranking it fourth, it has 
already been identified, the incompleteness of the contract has been a source of conflict in 
PPP. Moreover, it was established in chapter four, Debt Funder objectives in the project 
pertain to their investment with little relative interest in the service delivery. Principally 
involved in the contract negotiations with the public-sector, following financial close, Debt 
Funders have occupied a remote and dormant position in the project (Demirag et al., 2015). 
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In this regard, the correlation between the ‘conflict resolution structures’ and the 
safeguarding of returns may explain the scoring rank.  
The highest-ranked PPP collaborative attribute by Equity Shareholders was ‘trust and 
respect’ with an RII value of 0.950. In second in terms of importance was ‘effective 
communication’ (RII = 0.900), then ‘stakeholder commitment’ (RII = 0.875), ‘skilled 
leadership’ (RII = 0.850), and ‘agreement of project brief’ (RII = 0.838). Comparatively, the 
five least important attributes in ascending order were ‘processual change’ (RII = 0.575), 
‘Information Technology’ (RII = 0.588), ‘power sharing’ (RII = 0.600), ‘innovation’ (RII = 0.613) 
and ‘knowledge retention’ (RII = 0.688). From this, it was determined the RII value difference 
from the highest ranked collaborative attribute and the lowest was 0.375 which signifies 
notable weighted difference in terms of attribute important. In the main, Equity 
Shareholders perceptions of the attributes for PPP collaboration paralleled other SIS groups. 
However, of all private-sector SIS, this group deemed ‘social-capital and inter-personal 
relationships’ as important for better collaboration, ranking it similar to Authorities.   
FMCo ranked the foremost attributes noticeably higher than other SIS groups. The five 
highest ranked collaborative attributes from this SIS group were in first ‘effective 
communication’ (RII = 0.953), followed by ‘trust and respect’ (RII = 0.941), ‘skilled leadership’ 
(RII = 0.929), and ‘agreement of project brief’ (RII = 0.882), ‘stakeholder commitment’ (RII = 
0.882), ‘early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement and consultation,’ (RII = 0.882) 
and ‘information sharing and transparency’ (0.882) respectively tied in fourth. In contrast, 
the lowest PPP collaborative attribute was ‘Authority in-house resources and skills’ with an 
RII value of 0.659. In ascending order, this was followed up ‘Authority experience’ (RII = 
0.729), ‘ProjCo experience’ (RII = 0.753) and ‘processual change’ (RII = 0.753), and equally 
tied in twentieth ‘social capital / inter-personal relationships’ (RII = 0.776), ‘power sharing’ 
(RII = 0.776), ‘innovation’ (RII = 0.776) and ‘Information Technology’ (RII = 0.776). Thus, the 
RII disparity value was calculated as 0.294, indicating notable differences in the attribute 
importance. It was also discernible, in general, FMCo displayed greater enthusiasm for these 
collaborative attributes with an overall higher importance values. Like other SIS, FMCo 
deemed the salient attributes of collaboration pertain to the governance framework; 
however, notably they also included ‘information sharing and transparency’. With a 
recorded breakdown in the relationship between the construction and operational phases, 
many of the prominent FMCo attributes call for greater clarification surrounding roles and 
responsibilities. Moreover, they promote greater FMCo involvement in the project. Indeed, 
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several have identified how FMCo have been overlooked in previous PPP ventures already 
mentioned.  
In summary, from this analysis, it was found, that despite the different roles, responsibilities 
and motivations for entering a PPP project, there were key thematic similarities among SIS 
in regard to the salient attributes of collaboration. As mentioned as part of the Authority 
analysis, the most prominent PPP collaborative attributes predominantly related to the 
governance structures of the project, though the attribute of ‘trust and respect’ ranked in 
the top five in terms of salience for all SIS. Interestingly, trust is a collaborative attribute 
which has been perhaps the most widely explored in the context of collaboration and indeed 
the importance of this attribute has been reaffirmed through participant responses. Like 
‘trust and respect’, ‘effective communication’ was also ranked as critical for collaboration. 
Conversely, ‘information technology’ was ranked as the least important attribute. These 
findings are important on the grounds that they establish there are thematic communal 
collaborative perceptions whereby all SIS have been in agreement. Also, interestingly, the 
research has identified nuanced opinions between SIS. These findings equally make an 
important contribution to knowledge in that they provide a direction of travel for future 
research which can be undertaken in an effort to reconcile these nuanced views. 
8.6. Statistical Testing of Collaborative Attribute Perceptions Between Social 
Infrastructure Stakeholder Groups 
Having completed the RII and determined the ranking salience of the collaborative 
attributes, this section contains the outputs from computation of the statistical tests used to 
determine significance between SIS groups and across the SIS respondent group holistically. 
8.6.1. Analysis of Variance 
Stemming from the diversity of SIS perceptions of the PPP stakeholder collaborative 
attributes, research undertook additional tests to determine if there were statistically 
significant differences between SIS groups. To do this, the research conducted an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). An ANOVA advantageously allows research to consider the scores 
between groups and in the context of this investigation it was conducted to offer further 
insights into the perceived differences between SIS categories. The procedure for this is 
outline in chapter six.   
In chapter six, the research noted that the responses per SIS group were unlikely to be 
homogenous and therefore the data would not be normally distributed. Hence, the first step 
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of the ANOVA procedure was to confirm the normality of the replies. To determine if the 
participant categories were normally distributed, the Shapiro-Wilk W test was undertaken. 
Table 8.5 displays the outcome of the Shapiro-Wilk W test. 
Table 8.5: Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Accountability .809 17 .003 
Agreement of project brief .752 17 .000 
Appropriate risk sharing .733 17 .000 
Authority experience .871 17 .023 
Authority in-house resources / skills .869 17 .021 
Balance of stakeholder needs and expectations .774 17 .001 
Clarifying of roles and responsibilities .733 17 .000 
Clear governance structures .799 17 .002 
Collective stakeholder planning and decision-making .776 17 .001 
Conflict resolution structures .792 17 .002 
Contract flexibility .785 17 .001 
Early establishment of collaboration .752 17 .000 
Early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement and 
consultation 
.752 17 .000 
Effective communication .533 17 .000 
Financial and technical exchange and support / stipend .819 17 .004 
Identifying individual and shared objectives .757 17 .001 
Information sharing and transparency .754 17 .001 
Information Technology (IT) .872 17 .023 
Innovation .873 17 .024 
Knowledge retention .829 17 .005 
Power sharing .872 17 .023 
Processual change .848 17 .010 
ProjCo experience .611 17 .000 
Skilled leadership .872 17 .023 
Social capital / Inter-personal relationships .774 17 .001 
Stakeholder commitment .754 17 .001 
Trust and respect .579 17 .000 
 
The null hypothesis (H₁) for the Shapiro-Wilk W test is that datasets are normally distributed, 
and it is accepted when the P value is greater than 0.05 (P > 0.05). Oppositely, when the P is 
less than 0.05 (P < 0.05), the population is deemed not to be normally distributed and the 
null hypothesis should be rejected. Evidenced in table 8.5, all attributes had a P value of less 
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than 0.05 (P > 0.05). These findings show that the datasets were not normally distributed, 
and the null hypothesis should therefore be rejected. Failing to satisfy the data normality 
assumption, the research proceeded to conduct the non-parametric ANOVA, which is not 
bound by normality distribution. This was carried out through the Kruskal-Wallis H test.  
Table 8.6: Kruskal-Wallis H Test 
 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
Accountability 3.826 4 .430 
Agreement of project brief 3.498 4 .478 
Appropriate risk sharing 2.233 4 .693 
Authority experience 5.664 4 .226 
Authority in-house resources / skills 6.600 4 .159 
Balance of stakeholder needs and expectations 5.163 4 .271 
Clarifying of roles and responsibilities 8.530 4 .074 
Clear governance structures 6.602 4 .158 
Collective stakeholder planning and decision-making 7.389 4 .117 
Conflict resolution structures 6.894 4 .142 
Contract flexibility 6.112 4 .191 
Early establishment of collaboration 8.683 4 .070 
Early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement 
and consultation 
8.374 4 .079 
Effective communication 6.399 4 .171 
Financial and technical exchange and support / stipend 2.670 4 .614 
Identifying individual and shared objectives 10.421 4 .034 
Information sharing and transparency 8.572 4 .073 
Information Technology (IT) 14.504 4 .006 
Innovation 11.130 4 .025 
Knowledge retention 6.194 4 .185 
Power sharing 8.069 4 .089 
Processual change 9.242 4 .055 
ProjCo experience 2.538 4 .638 
Skilled leadership 11.099 4 .025 
Social capital / Inter-personal relationships 3.262 4 .515 
Stakeholder commitment 4.595 4 .331 
Trust and respect 13.474 4 .009 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test is an extension of the Mann-Whitney U test and is applied to 
determine if datasets originate from the same population. Like the parametric ANOVA 
equivalent, Kruskal-Wallis is an omnibus test which is typically complimented with Dunn’s 
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post-hoc test to determine the source of statistically significant differences between and 
among groups. Table 8.6 displays the findings of the Kruskal-Wallis H test. 
As per chapter six, an alpha value below 0.05 indicates levels of statistically significant 
differences. Identified in table 8.6 above, there were four collaborative attributes with P 
values less than 0.05, namely: ‘identifying individual and shared objectives’ (ꭓ² (4) = 10.421, 
P = 0.034); ‘innovation’ (ꭓ² (4) = 11.130, P = 0.025); ‘skilled leadership’ (ꭓ² (4) = 11.099, P = 
0.025); and ‘trust and respect’ (ꭓ² (4) = 13.474, P = 0.009). To identify the source of the 
perceived differences, the research conducted Dunn’s multiple comparison post-hoc test on 
each of the four attributes. The outcome of these tests is contained in tables 8.7 to 8.10 and 
the statistically significant different opinions are highlighted in red. 
Table 8.7: Dunn’s Test for Identifying Individual and Shared Objectives 
 Test 
Statistic 
Std. Error Std. Test 
Statistic 
Sig. Adj. Sig. 
Debt Funders / BuildCo 13.281 8.536 1.556 .120 1.000 
Debt Funders / Equity Shareholders -16.469 8.536 -1.929 .054 .537 
Debt Funders / Authority 18.083 8.406 2.151 .031 .314 
Debt Funders / FMCo -25.853 8.467 -3.053 .002 .023 
BuildCo / Equity Shareholders -3.188 6.304 -.506 .613 1.000 
BuildCo / Authority 4.802 6.127 .784 .433 1.000 
BuildCo / FMCo -12.572 6.211 -2.024 .043 .430 
Equity Shareholders / Authority 1.615 6.127 .264 .792 1.000 
Equity Shareholders / FMCo -9.384 6.211 -1.511 .131 1.000 
Authority / Equity Shareholders -7.770 6.030 -1.288 .198 1.000 
 
Evidenced in table 8.7, there was a statistically significant difference between SIS 
respondents in reference to the salience of ‘identifying individual and shared objectives’. The 
P value of 0.023 shows there was a perceived difference between Debt Funders and FMCo, 
and the null hypothesis should therefore be rejected. This correlates with the findings of the 
RII wherein Debt Funders ranked this attribute sixteenth with a value of 0.667; whereas, in 
comparison, FMCo positioned it ninth with a score of 0.871.  This difference between Debt 
Funders and FMCo may originate from the arms-length involvement usually occupied by 
Debt Funding institutions. Following financial close, the research found from literature that 
Debt Funder involvement diminishes, and their participation is reduced unless there is a fear 
of reduced returns. Allied with this, Debt Funders have the largest up-front financial 
contribution to the project, and ostensibly opined it was of lesser importance to identify the 
objectives of others. This commercial perspective on the part of Debt Funders may explain 
the misaligned views between these two SIS.  
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Table 8.8: Dunn’s Test for Innovation 
 Test 
Statistic 
Std. Error Std. Test 
Statistic 
Sig. Adj. Sig. 
Debt Funders / BuildCo -10.635 9.661 -1.101 .271 1.000 
Debt Funders / Equity Shareholders 17.278 9.513 1.816 .069 .693 
Debt Funders / Authority 19.667 9.661 2.036 .042 .418 
Debt Funders / FMCo -27.975 9.583 -2.919 .004 .035 
BuildCo / Equity Shareholders 6.642 6.934 .958 .338 1.000 
BuildCo / Authority 9.031 7.135 1.266 .206 1.000 
BuildCo / FMCo -17.340 7.029 -2.467 .014 .136 
Equity Shareholders / Authority -2.389 6.934 -.345 .730 1.000 
Equity Shareholders / FMCo -10.698 6.825 -1.567 .117 1.000 
Authority / Equity Shareholders -8.309 7.029 -1.182 .237 1.000 
 
Identified in table 8.8, the null hypothesis for Dunn’s test can again be rejected and there 
was a statistically significant view pertaining to the importance of ‘innovation’ for PPP 
stakeholder collaboration. Akin to ‘identifying individual and shared objectives’, this 
disagreement derives from Debt Funders and FMCo. This is represented through the P value 
of 0.035. As part of the RII, FMCo ranked ‘innovation’ twentieth (RII = 0.776), while Debt 
Funders deemed it of lesser importance, placing it in twenty-sixth (RII = 0.500). This variance 
may derive from the risk averse nature of Debt Funders who prefer to safeguard their 
investment through utilisation of established approaches as opposed to unquantified 
options. In turn, this mindset curtails risk taking behaviour, which may be linked to 
innovation. In comparison, the research found that most changes in the project stem from 
evolving stakeholder requirements. Hence, as project requirements transform, FMCo, who 
are responsible for the services provision, felt innovation was an important enabler for 
collaboration to manage these manifestations.  
Table 8.9: Dunn’s Test for Skilled Leadership 
 Test 
Statistic 
Std. Error Std. Test 
Statistic 
Sig. Adj. Sig. 
Debt Funders / BuildCo -16.719 9.123 -1.833 .067 .668 
Debt Funders / Equity Shareholders 17.438 9.123 1.911 .056 .559 
Debt Funders / Authority 18.194 8.983 2.025 .043 .428 
Debt Funders / FMCo -29.103 9.049 -3.216 .001 .013 
BuildCo / Equity Shareholders .719 6.737 .107 .915 1.000 
BuildCo / Authority 1.476 6.548 .225 .822 1.000 
BuildCo / FMCo -12.384 6.638 -1.866 .062 .621 
Equity Shareholders / Authority .757 6.548 .116 .908 1.000 
Equity Shareholders / FMCo -11.665 6.638 -1.757 .079 .788 
Authority / Equity Shareholders -10.908 6.445 -1.693 .091 .905 
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Contained in table 8.9, the research was able to determine a statistically significant 
difference again between Debt Funders and FMCo, this time in regard to the importance of 
‘skilled leadership’ (P = 0.13). Debt Funders rated ‘skilled leadership’ twelfth in the RII 
(0.700). In contrast, FMCo positioned this attribute in third (RII = 0.929). Aforementioned, 
with remote involvement following financial close unless returns are jeopardised, the 
disparate views between FMCO and Debt Funders may stem from the curtailed participation 
of Debt Funders in the infrastructure construction and the provision of the service. 
Interestingly, this attribute is often linked with trust, which Debt Funders likewise considered 
to be of lesser importance than other SIS. 
Table 8.10: Dunn’s Test for Trust and Respect 
 Test 
Statistic 
Std. Error Std. Test 
Statistic 
Sig. Adj. Sig. 
Debt Funders / BuildCo 23.542 8.484 2.775 .006 .055 
Debt Funders / Equity Shareholders -27.225 8.416 -3.235 .001 .012 
Debt Funders / Authority 27.806 8.354 3.328 .001 .009 
Debt Funders / FMCo -28.792 8.484 -3.394 .001 .007 
BuildCo / Equity Shareholders -3.684 6.173 -.597 .552 1.000 
BuildCo / Authority 4.264 6.089 .700 .484 1.000 
BuildCo / FMCo -5.250 6.266 -.838 .402 1.000 
Equity Shareholders / Authority .580 5.994 .097 .923 1.000 
Equity Shareholders / FMCo 1.566 6.173 .254 .800 1.000 
Authority / Equity Shareholders -.986 6.089 -.162 .871 1.000 
 
The fourth collaborative attribute where there was an opinion difference was in regard to 
‘trust and respect’. Table 8.10 signifies that Debt Funders significantly disagreed over the 
importance of ‘trust and respect’ with Equity Shareholders (P = 0.12), Authorities (P = 0.009) 
and FMCo (P = 0.007). Indeed, in the RII, Debt Funders ranked this attribute fourth with an 
RII value of 0.767. Differently, Equity Shareholders and Authorities placed it first respectively 
(RII = 0.950; RII = 0.944) and FMCo positioned it second with an RII score of 0.941. Although 
‘trust and respect’ was ranked highly by Debt Funders, as noted previously, it is likely this 
derives from the limited direct involvement in the provision of the infrastructure. Instead, 
Debt Funder investment is protected by equity and the attributes of ‘effective 
communication’, ‘agreement of the project brief’ and ‘appropriate risk sharing’ were 
accordingly considered to be more important for collaboration for this group. From these 
findings, broadly, it can be inferred that Debt Funders view on collaboration tends to be 
commercially driven which correlates with literature. Comparatively, FMCo’s view of 
collaboration align with what Blanchard (2012) described as the core values of partnering. 
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Having completed the RII, in addition to satisfying the Kruskal-Wallis H test, the research will 
now proceed onto Kendell’s Coefficient of Concordance. 
8.6.2. Kendell’s Coefficient of Concordance 
In the literature review, the research discerned that the partnership comprises a diversity of 
organisations. This diverse network brings with it different values, norms and qualities. As 
such, the research conducted a RII to discern the relative significance of the collaborative 
attributes. As part of the RII, it was identified that there were noteworthy nuances relative 
to the collaborative attributes. Accordingly, to further interrogate SIS responses, the 
research carried out an ANOVA to investigate for significant opinion differences between SIS 
groups. These findings have made a valuable contribution to knowledge.  
However, the purpose of the research is to determine the attributes of stakeholder 
collaboration within all key SIS. Hence, as denoted in chapter six (section 6.4.8.2), prior to 
development of the PPP stakeholder collaborative framework, the research will accordingly 
also conduct Kendell’s Coefficient of Concordance as a precursor to discern if there is 
appropriate statistical agreement within the SIS cohort to develop the stakeholder 
collaboration framework. In doing so, the research will safeguard the validity of the Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) and ultimately facilitate the development of the framework. 
Kendall’s W determines levels of accordance and/or discordance by dividing the variance 
over the column total by the maximum possible variance over column totals. Legendre et al. 
(2005) suggest that where the p value is less than 0.05 (P < 0.05), the null hypothesis (H₀) 
should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis (H₁) is accepted. Oppositely, if the P value 
is greater than 0.05 (P > 0.05), the null hypothesis of H₀ is accepted premised on there being 
inadequate information by which to support the alternative hypothesis of H₁. Table 8.11 
displays the results of the Kendall’s W test.  
Table 8.11: Results of Kendall’s W Test of PPP Collaborative Attributes 
N 73 
Kendall's Wa .223 
Chi-Square 424.008 
Df 26 
Asymp. Sig. .000 
a. Kendall's Coefficient of 
Concordance 
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Evidenced in table 8.11, the Kendall’s W value was determined as 0.223. Despite an absence 
of definitive or conclusive agreement pertaining to the codification of values spanning zero 
to one, generally it is considered, a value above 0.20 indicates fair levels of agreement. 
Furthermore, a P value of 0.00 (P = 0.00) was determined22. This signifies the null hypothesis 
(H₀) should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis (H₁) should be accepted. By doing so, 
this value showed there were significant levels of agreement among SIS respondents of the 
collaborative attributes.  
8.7. Summary 
In chapter three, the research identified that appetite for UK PPP has markedly eroded since 
the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Comprising a partnership between the public 
and private-sectors, it was found that nature of PPP arrangements has been contractual 
rather than collaborative, culminating in poor project performance. Yet, despite the 
concerns of poor stakeholder collaboration, it was identified that there is a pertinent 
knowledge gap. To address this knowledge gap, a list of 27 PPP stakeholder collaboration 
attributes were identified from literature. With this list, in chapter six, the framework for the 
research design and the framework development was determined. This constituted 
conducting survey questionnaires to evaluate the salience of these attributes. The results of 
the survey questionnaire were analysed in chapter eight. This was to fulfil objective four of 
the research.  
A RII was conducted to determine the ranking importance of these 27 PPP stakeholder 
collaborative attributes. The RII determined the most important attributes for improved PPP 
stakeholder collaboration was ‘trust and respect’, followed by ‘effective communication’, 
‘skilled leadership’, ‘agreement of the project brief’ and ‘stakeholder commitment’. In 
contrast, the least salient attribute was ‘IT’, preceded by ‘processual change’ and 
‘innovation’. Responses in the main were homogenous and all SIS emphasised the 
importance of early and collective participation and communication.  
The RII was complimented with an ANOVA to investigate statistical differences within the SIS 
cohort. As part of the ANOVA, four attributes were found to have a statistically significant 
difference between SIS groups. These attributes were ‘identifying individual and shared 
objectives’, ‘innovation’, ‘skilled leadership’, and ‘trust and respect’.  
                                                          
22 Actual value for Kendall’s W is 0.0018528. 
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Set against these findings, in preparation for the framework development, Kendell’s 
Coefficient of Concordance was conducted to verify the degree of statistical significance 
among SIS of this collaborative list. A P value of 0.000 indicated statistical significance. Having 
satisfied the Kendell’s W test, these attributes will therefore be carried forward to the next 
step of the framework development. The findings in this chapter have made an original 
contribution to knowledge. 
At this juncture in the research, this thesis has identified the salient attributes of PPP 
stakeholder collaboration and satisfied objective four of the research, this investigation will 
proceed onto the PCA of these collaborative attributes in chapter nine in order to develop 
the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. This is to meet the strategic aim of this 
investigation, fulfil objective five and offer an additional empirical contribution to 
knowledge.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION 
FRAMEWORK 
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9. Development of the Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Framework 
9.1. Introduction 
Chapter six of this investigation delineated the research methodology to be adopted. 
Chapter eight; derived from the social infrastructure stakeholder (SIS) survey questionnaire 
analysis, identified the ranking salience of the stakeholder collaboration attributes by which 
improve project performance in Public-Private Partnerships (PPP).  
Chapter nine, this chapter, comprises the application of the Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) to evaluate and test these attributes and present them in a way which is more 
meaningful. This constituted the analysis of the larger dataset which was determined from 
literature, to extract the key themes which can accordingly produce more meaningful 
findings for digestible interpretation.  
These findings are subsequently contextualized to literature to produce the PPP stakeholder 
collaboration framework. To develop this framework, in chapter six, the research defined 
the framework by which to conduct the PCA. This was comprised from the following criteria: 
• Sample size; 
• Eigenvalue; 
• Scree test; 
• Component variance; 
• Component retention; and 
• Component scores. 
By undertaking this component analysis, this enabled the research to achieve objective five. 
9.2. Determining Data Suitability  
Table 9.1: KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity of Collaborative Attributes 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .826 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1213.548 
df 351 
Sig. .000 
 
Initially, to safeguard the reliability and accuracy of the PCA, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity were applied to test the sample size suitability. Tables 9.1 
denotes the application of these tests to the PPP stakeholder collaborative attributes. 
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Premised on the suggestions of Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) and Kaiser (1974), the value 
of 0.826 is considered very satisfactory for PCA. Likewise, the P value = 0.00 indicates the R 
matrix is not an identity matrix and is highly significant (P < 0.05). Together, these tests 
indicate the datasets are highly appropriate for PCA. 
9.3. Principal Components Analysis - Extraction of Public-Private Partnerships 
Collaborative Attributes 
Table 9.2: Communalities of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
  Initial Extraction 
1 Accountability 1.000 .718 
2 Agreement of project brief 1.000 .699 
3 Appropriate risk sharing 1.000 .779 
4 Authority experience 1.000 .836 
5 Authority in-house resources / skills 1.000 .781 
6 Balance of stakeholder needs and expectations 1.000 .590 
7 Clarifying of roles and responsibilities 1.000 .676 
8 Clear governance structures 1.000 .738 
9 Collective stakeholder planning and decision-making 1.000 .562 
10 Conflict resolution structures 1.000 .594 
11 Contract flexibility 1.000 .664 
12 Early establishment of collaboration 1.000 .726 
13 Early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement and consultation 1.000 .697 
14 Effective communication 1.000 .674 
15 Financial and technical exchange and support / stipend 1.000 .494 
16 Identifying individual and shared objectives 1.000 .751 
17 Information sharing and transparency 1.000 .674 
18 Information Technology (IT) 1.000 .702 
19 Innovation 1.000 .686 
20 Knowledge retention 1.000 .732 
21 Power sharing 1.000 .701 
22 Processual change 1.000 .806 
23 Skilled leadership 1.000 .657 
24 Social capital / Inter-personal relationships 1.000 .725 
25 ProjCo experience 1.000 .499 
26 Stakeholder commitment 1.000 .617 
27 Trust and respect 1.000 .689 
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 9.2 shows the findings from the table of communalities for the PPP collaborative 
attributes. In this table, the amount of variance in each variable is accounted for by the 
extracted components. Almost 74% of the variance is accounted for in ‘clear governance 
structures’, while only 50% of the variance is accounted for in ‘ProjCo experience’. 
In addition to this, table 9.3 displays all the components which are extractable from the PCA. 
Evidenced in the table are the component eigenvalues, variation percentages and rotated 
cumulative variance loading. In total, the PCA identified six components with an eigenvalue 
greater than one which satisfied the suggestions of both Kaiser (1960) and Jolliffe (1972). 
The corresponding six cumulative components represented 68.392% of the total variance. 
Though this figure was below the recommended 70% by Field (2013) and Suhr (2005), this 
was marginal. Burns and Burns (2008), in their worked example considered a total variance 
loading of 58.55% as acceptable. Similarly, Li et al. (2005a) accepted a lower total loading 
value. Therefore, the cumulative components value of 68.392% was deemed satisfactory 
premised on these findings.  
The variance explained by the six principal components were: component one - 39.94%; 
component two - 8.09%; component three - 6.67%; component four - 5.26%; component 
five - 4.43%; and, component six - 3.99%. All other components accounted for only a small 
amount of variance and are not significant. Cumulatively, these components account for 
31.61% of the variance. 
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Table 9.3: Total Variance of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
Comp. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Var. 
Cumul. 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumul. 
% Total % of Var. 
Cumulative 
% 
1 10.785 39.943 39.943 10.785 39.943 39.943 4.901 18.150 18.150 
2 2.185 8.091 48.034 2.185 8.091 48.034 4.654 17.237 35.387 
3 1.801 6.671 54.705 1.801 6.671 54.705 2.671 9.894 45.281 
4 1.421 5.263 59.968 1.421 5.263 59.968 2.216 8.206 53.488 
5 1.197 4.433 64.402 1.197 4.433 64.402 2.133 7.899 61.387 
6 1.077 3.991 68.392 1.077 3.991 68.392 1.891 7.005 68.392 
7 .885 3.277 71.669       
8 .860 3.186 74.855       
9 .767 2.842 77.697       
10 .691 2.559 80.256       
11 .633 2.346 82.602       
12 .551 2.042 84.643       
13 .521 1.931 86.574       
14 .489 1.810 88.385       
15 .451 1.672 90.057       
16 .417 1.545 91.602       
17 .370 1.372 92.974       
18 .347 1.284 94.258       
19 .316 1.172 95.429       
20 .243 .900 96.330       
21 .228 .846 97.176       
22 .183 .677 97.853       
23 .172 .638 98.492       
24 .147 .546 99.038       
25 .112 .416 99.454       
26 .082 .303 99.757       
27 .066 .243 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Figure 9.1 is the scree plot of the component eigenvalues. From the graph, there are two 
points of inflection or ‘elbows’. These occur at components two and seven. Still, as suggested 
by Cattell (1966), components with an eigenvalue greater than one should be retained. 
Evidenced in the scree plot, there were six components to be retained.  
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Figure 9.1: Scree Plot of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
9.4. Identification of Principal Components for Public-Private Partnerships 
Collaborative Attributes 
As suggested by Norusis (2006), the final step of the PCA procedure is the computation of 
the rotated components. Table 9.4 depicts the rotated component matrix of the PPP 
collaborative attributes. The variables were rotated using an orthogonal varimax method as 
per Field (2013). Components with loadings less than 0.45 were suppressed as explained in 
chapter six (6.4.9.7), ensuring the weighted strength of the components. 
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Table 9.4: Rotated Component Matrix for PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Knowledge retention .799      
Processual change .766      
Power sharing .741      
Information Technology (IT) .731      
Innovation .718      
Early establishment of collaboration .624      
Early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement 
and consultation 
.492  .488    
ProjCo experience       
Social capital / Inter-personal relationships  .755     
Trust and respect  .699     
Identifying individual and shared objectives  .695     
Skilled leadership  .668     
Effective communication  .665     
Information sharing and transparency  .660     
Stakeholder commitment  .650     
Balance of stakeholder needs and expectations  .462     
Clear governance structures   .794    
Contract flexibility .502  .629    
Clarifying of roles and responsibilities   .510    
Collective stakeholder planning and decision-making   .505    
Appropriate risk sharing    .734   
Financial and technical exchange and support / stipend    .552   
Conflict resolution structures    .548   
Authority in-house resources / skills     .818  
Authority experience     .803  
Accountability      .762 
Agreement of project brief      .686 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
 
9.5. Analysis of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaborative Principal 
Components 
Table 9.5 exhibits a summary of the extracted principal components, the attributes which 
constitute each principal component, and the percentage of variance explained by each 
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component. By doing so, the research has been able to distil this larger list of variables into 
the key themes of PPP stakeholder collaboration. 
Table 9.5: Extracted PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Principal Components 
Principal Component Attributes % of Total Variance 
Component one Knowledge retention; processual change; 
power sharing; Information Technology 
(IT); innovation; early establishment of 
collaboration; early, defined and collective 
stakeholder involvement and consultation 
39.94% 
Component two Social capital / inter-personal 
relationships; trust and respect; identifying 
individual and shared objectives; skilled 
leadership; effective communication; 
information sharing and transparency; 
stakeholder commitment; balance of 
stakeholder needs and expectations 
8.09% 
Component three Clear governance structures; contract 
flexibility; clarifying roles and 
responsibilities; collective stakeholder 
planning and decision-making 
6.67% 
Component four Appropriate risk sharing; financial and 
technical exchange and support / stipend; 
conflict resolution structures 
5.26% 
Component five Authority in-house resources / skills; 
Authority experience 
4.43% 
Component six Accountability; agreement of project brief 3.99% 
 
While the RII is important for measuring salience, it does not measure the relationship 
between variables. Through interpretation of the principal components, the research can 
discern the correlation between variables and the components they are most strongly 
related to. PCA enables research to identify the clustering effect of variables and has a 
prominent role in multivariate techniques for exploration and analysis. By conducting the 
PCA, the research can understand the composite inter-relationships of the collaborative 
attributes and can be represented as thematic components. 
Cumulatively, the principal components encapsulate 68.39% of the latent variance that 
determines SIS perceptions of PPP stakeholder collaboration. From the list of 27 
collaborative attributes, variables with a component loading less than 0.45 were considered 
to not be significantly importance and therefore not displayed in the rotated component 
matrix (table 9.4).  
Premised on this, one attribute has been suppressed, with 26 attributes remaining in the 
PCA. This attribute was ‘ProjCo experience’ (Zheng et al., 2008; Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012; 
Tang and Shen, 2013). Within literature, it was remarked, rather than inadequate ProjCo 
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experience, instead, as noted by Grubnic and Hodges (2003), negative ProjCo experiences 
have been a more significant source of collaborative inertia. In line with this, it is suggested 
that the nature of ProjCo experience is key for collaboration success. Moreover, ProjCo 
experience ranked twentieth in the relative importance index (RII), indicating relatively low 
importance among SIS. Predicated on these considerations, together with the insufficient 
variable loading (0.387), there were justified grounds on which to exclude ‘ProjCo 
experience’ from the PCA.  
The research will now interpret the principal components in regard to the loading values 
deemed significant, which will then contextualised to the literature review. Components 
were ranked in order of the total variance explained which indicates the strength of 
relationships amongst data dimensions. 
9.5.1. Component One 
Component one accounted for 39.94% of the total variance and strongly correlated with 
seven PPP collaborative attributes, namely: ‘knowledge retention’; ‘processual change’; 
‘power sharing’; ‘Information Technology (IT)’; ‘innovation’; ‘early establishment of 
collaboration’; and, ‘early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement and consultation’. 
Component loading from highest to lowest, ranged 0.799 to 0.492. The top three highest 
loading collaborative attributes were ‘knowledge retention’ (0.799), ‘processual change’ 
(0.766) and ‘power sharing’ (0.741). In terms of the RII, these attributes ranked twenty-third, 
twenty-sixth and twenty-fourth respectively, signifying they were of very low importance for 
SIS collaboration23.  
From this component, the PCA reveals that the five highest loading variables are all of similar 
loading and will vary together. Hence, determined from this component, in line with 
literature, this component identifies the correlating attributes of long-term sustainable 
partnering. Indeed, research identifies that the partnership must be dynamic over time and 
adapt to the changing requirements of the project. Added to this challenge, is the permeable 
boundary of PPP. To ensure long-term collaboration, Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) 
suggested there is a need to centralise and retain knowledge capital to inform decision-
making. Moreover, this research has shown that the long-term nature of PPP projects has 
                                                          
23 Interestingly, while these attributes ranked lower in terms of importance in the RII but had the 
highest loading values, this can be explained on the basis that components are extracted to explain 
variance of the variables and identify patterns within the dataset. It can hence be discerned that while 
the RII is used to explain ranking salience, the purpose of the PCA is to explain the distribution and 
correlation of variables. 
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been problematic for the sustainability of collaboration as stakeholder involvement shifts 
over time; conventional SIS organisations may exit from the project, while other new 
partners may decide to enter. With these transformative dynamics, the partnership must be 
adaptable as well as sustainable to this fluctuating environment.   
Many in literature have likewise pointed to how power asymmetry has culminated in 
autonomous SIS behaviour (Chen et al., 2013; DeSchepper et al., 2014; Henjewele et al., 
2014; Rwelamila et al., 2014). The perceived ownership of power; often derived out of 
resource imbalances, has been expressed as an authoritarian attribute enforced by SIS 
striving to achieve their heterogenous objectives. These findings are consistent with a 
growing body of PPP and collaboration theory literature which places ‘power sharing’ as a 
central attribute of collaborative partnering. Hence, for sustainable partnering, all partners 
should be able to bring something to the project and should be considered as equals. 
9.5.2. Component Two 
This component represented 8.09% of the total variance and was composed from eight SIS 
collaborative attributes. The component loading for these attributes spanned from 0.755 to 
0.462 and was constituted from: ‘social capital / inter-personal relationships’ (0.755); ‘trust 
and respect’ (0.699); ‘identifying individual and shared objectives’ (0.695); ‘skilled 
leadership’ (0.668); ‘effective communication’ (0.665); ‘information sharing and 
transparency’ (0.660); ‘stakeholder commitment’ (0.650); ‘balance of stakeholder needs and 
expectations’ (0.462). The three highest loading attributes on this component were ‘social 
capital / inter-personal relationships’ with a loading value of 0.755, followed by ‘trust and 
respect’ (0.699), and ‘identifying individual and shared objectives’ accounting for a loading 
value of 0.699.  
In terms of the RII, the importance of these three attributes ran from sixteenth to first, 
reflecting moderately to the highest degrees of importance. Also, interestingly, of the four 
attributes which significant differences identified in the Kruskal-Wallis test, three loaded 
onto this component. The collaborative attribute of ‘social capital / inter-personal 
relationships’ was the highest loading variable onto this component. In the main, the 
majority of these variables were all within a similar correlating range, indicating that as the 
importance of one variable increases, so too will the importance of the others.  
Derived from these constituent loading variables, the research can identify strong 
correlation between many of attributes which Blanchard (2012) termed as the essence of 
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partnering. These are the ‘softer’ attributes of collaboration in that they cannot be measured 
or formally agreed to. Nonetheless, these attributes should be located at the core of the 
partnership. 
In literature, the recognition of ‘social capital and inter-personal relationships’ is indeed 
gaining traction (Tsasis et al., 2015). Inter-personal social capital exists among the personnel 
entrusted with the daily management of the project. Nevertheless, predicated on the 
longevity and bundled design of these ventures, PPP is associated with high staff turnover, 
which is serving to undermine the cultivation of inter-personal social capital (Roehrich and 
Caldwell, 2012).  
In addition to this, the findings of this component are consistent with literature on the basis 
trust has been identified a central component of collaboration, and hence has been popular 
in collaboration and PPP literature. Zou et al. (2013) identified trust as an important attribute 
for relationship management (RM). Similarly, Wong et al. (2015) identified trust as the 
foremost factor for partnership building in PPP. Still, despite its prominence in ontological 
investigations, exploratory research concerning trust in PPP has lost momentum over time. 
The last notable offering identified was a decade ago (see Smyth and Edkins, 2007).  
As well as ‘trust and respect’, communally, a PPP project is a synergy of diverse organisations; 
each offering unique skills and expertise. Upshot from this, SIS will possess different values, 
norms, and objectives, which often culminates in the misalignment of objectives serving to 
engender ‘messiness’. Organisations should identify their heterogeneous project objectives 
but also identify shared commonalities which can be used to foster collaboration through an 
agreed project aim (Davis, 2016; Leviäkangas et al., 2016). This exchange of information 
provides an understanding of one another, promoting informed decision-making and an 
environment of collectiveness (Zou et al., 2013). Greater transparency and dialogue among 
SIS, facilitated by trust, can cultivate higher performing projects. 
9.5.3. Component Three 
Component three explained 6.67% of the total variance of the linear components and was 
constructed from four collaborative attributes: ‘clear governance structures’; ‘contract 
flexibility’; ‘clarifying roles and responsibilities’; and ‘collective stakeholder planning and 
decision-making’.  The component loading ranged from 0.794 to 0.505 and the top three 
loading variables were: ‘clear governance structures’ (0.794), ‘contract flexibility’ (0.629), 
and ‘clarifying roles and responsibilities’ (0.510). These attributes were ranked eleventh, 
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eighteenth and thirteenth respectively in the RII and were therefore considered to be 
moderately important by SIS respondents. The importance of this component increases with 
four attributes. The two highest loading variables are ‘clear governance structures’ and 
‘contract flexibility’ which suggest this component is strongly associated with the formalised 
framework of PPP. 
Indeed, the highest loading variable on component three was ‘clear governance structures’. 
Thomson and Perry (2006) considered governance as the systematic approach to creating a 
union or ‘jointness’. In doing so, this comprised delineation of the decision-making structures 
and the framework for executing actions.  
Still, it has been contended, governance structures conventionally have been contractually 
orientated rather than collaborative. Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) called for further 
investigation of PPP governance and the introduction of collaborative contracting. Demirel 
et al., (2017) asserted, conventionally, PPP governance has been predicated on the contract 
which itself has been criticised for being incomplete and inflexible. As a result, when disputes 
arise, the contract has been pivotal in characterising these exchanges. However, rather than 
suppling a resolution, the incompleteness and absence of sound guidance has fuelled a 
conflictual dynamic as SIS have defended their own position. It therefore no surprise that 
one of the primary criticisms of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has been poor contract 
flexibility particularly in the operational phase as Authority requirements have changed. 
Through the removal of soft services from the contract, Private Finance 2 (PF2) affords 
greater flexibility than other PPP frameworks.  
It is also pertinent that the third highest loading variable on this component was ‘clarifying 
roles and responsibilities’. Roehrich and Caldwell (2012) noted how a failure to collectively 
include all SIS in the decision-making has been manifest through ambiguity regarding roles 
and responsibilities in the project. As a result, the failure to define roles and responsibilities 
has culminated in greater occurrences of dispute which has been exacerbated by the 
incompleteness of the contract. Thus, through greater clarity, SIS are in an informed position 
of not only their roles, but also of the responsibilities of others which can be reflected 
through improved provision.  
9.5.4. Component Four 
This component was composed of three variables which can be collapsed into: ‘appropriate 
risk sharing’; ‘financial and technical exchange and support / stipend’; and ‘conflict resolution 
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structures’. The component loading ranged 0.734 to 0.548 and accounted for 5.26% of the 
linear variance.  
In terms of the RII, SIS ranked these three attributes eighth, nineteenth and seventeenth 
respectively, indicating these attributes were moderately to very important for PPP 
collaboration. Discerned from these findings, ‘appropriate risk sharing’ had a notably higher 
loading significance than the other two attributes, and hence this component principally 
relates to risk. 
In PPP literature, risk has been a prominent discussion point. On many occasions, the 
decision to proceed with PPP over conventional provision mechanisms has been predicated 
on superior risk management allegedly offered in partnering arrangements. In theory, risk 
should be retained by the SIS best able to manage it to deliver optimal investment impact. 
However, Li et al. (2001), as early as 2001, noted concerns over the mismanagement and 
mispricing of risk transpiring in reduced efficiencies and increased project prices. This has 
permitted the private-sector to have disproportionately gained. Over the course of the 
following decade, risk continued to be a major concern and was ultimately one of the 
prevalent criticisms of PFI following a National Audit Office (NAO) investigation in 2011 (NAO, 
2011). More recent research suggests, through allocation of risks to the organisation best 
able to manage it, this will benefit all SIS and improve project performance (Chang, 2013; 
Loosemore and Cheung, 2015; Xiong et al., 2017).  
In addition to this, some have considered the procurement phase as a barrier to 
collaboration (Tang and Shen, 2013; Demirag et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016). With little 
guarantee of project award, the nature of the procurement phase is competitive and 
uncertain. However, Wong et al. (2015) suggested, by providing support or a stipend, SIS are 
encouraged to buy into and commit to the project earlier. This exchange early in the project 
can produce benefits downstream and can also lead to appropriate risk sharing. 
Furthermore, unknown indigenous and exogenous factors can influence the project 
provision. When disputes arise, it is essential, the essential ‘conflict resolution structures’ 
are in-situ (Savage et al, 2010). It has been commented that in the wake of dispute, the 
inability to collectively resolve problems has ended in the fragmentation of the partnership. 
9.5.5. Component Five 
The fifth component identified contained two attributes with a total variance loading of 
4.43%. Both variables had high component loadings: ‘Authority in-house resources / skills’ 
223 
 
 
 
accounted for a component loading of 0.818 and ‘Authority experience’ similarly had a 
component loading of 0.803. The RII of the PPP collaborative attributes indicated the SIS 
sample considered these attributes slightly important, respectively ranking them twenty-
second and twentieth. The high loading values indicate there are similar degrees of 
importance of both attributes on this component and hence this component is significantly 
related to both ‘Authority in-house resources / skills’ and ‘Authority experience’. 
Already, many in literature have presented findings to demonstrate the relationship 
between skills deficiencies on the part of the Authority and poor collaborative relationships 
(Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012; Reynaers, 2013). Authorities have relied on advisors to fill 
expertise gaps and accordingly, these skillset shortfalls have served to undermine the 
Authority platform. Some have argued greater access to resources can empower Authorities, 
enabling them to equitably input into the project. Moreover, equal stakeholder platforms 
can advantageously culture an informal, and more pronounced collaborative environment 
(Tang and Shen, 2013; Zou et al., 2013).   
Allied with this, Authority experience is an important attribute of collaboration. The limited 
repeatability of projects earlier mentioned in regard to component one, impacts the 
Authority’s ability to develop skills and share knowledge. This has transpired in a partnership 
between two partners; one which is highly skilled with previous experience, and another 
who is underequipped to collaboratively deliver project success (Roehrich and Caldwell, 
2012; Chen et al., 2013). It is fundamental all SIS are considered equal for collaboration to 
function.   
9.5.6. Component Six 
Finally, the sixth collaboration component consisted of two variables which were 
‘accountability’ and ‘agreement of project brief’. Together, these attributes explained 3.99% 
of the total variance. The component loading of the variables respectively were 0.762 and 
0.686 indicating this component related most significantly to accountability. Even so, the 
small margin between the two attributes indicate that the importance of each attribute will 
almost equally increase in line with the other. 
In terms of the RII, these attributes were considered moderately to extremely important. 
The attribute of ‘accountability’ ranked fourteenth and ‘agreement of project brief’ was 
ranked fourth.  
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In research literature, Reynaers (2013) remarked how over reliance on advisors and 
consultants by Authorities has masked ‘accountability’. Demirag et al. (2015) observed how 
the remoteness and lack of ‘accountability’ of Debt Funders engendered uncertainty among 
SIS, while DeSchepper et al. (2014) and Reynears (2013) claimed the multiple institutional 
levels within the public-sector diluted accountability.  
Literature has also illustrated how a failure to ‘agree the project brief’ has transpired in poor 
stakeholder collaboration. Roehrich and Caldwell (2012) described how the failure to 
collectively agree the project brief early in the project has prevented the establishment of 
roles and responsibilities. Predicated on an absence of an ultimate project aim, this has 
undermined the decision-making and project provision. In collaboration theory, Morris and 
Miller-Stevens (2015) suggested that by sharing a common definition of the problem, 
partners can define a problem and strategically development a project brief premised on 
mutually agreed success criteria. By defining the project success criteria, this should prevent 
autonomous behaviour which has been identified in literature as an outcome of poor 
stakeholder collaboration. The findings of this component support the suggestions from 
literature of PPP collaboration.  
9.6. Reliability and Validity of PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Components  
The PCA procedure determined six collaborative components. Contained within these 
components, the research identified the salient attributes (variables) with the highest 
loading values onto these components. Following the identification of the components, the 
next step in the framework development is to test the validity and reliability of the 
questionnaire. According to Field (2013), the purpose of testing the reliability is to ensure 
the consistency of the data over time.  As defined in chapter six, this was computed using 
Cronbach’s alpha (Cα) function. Cα is a measure used to determine reliability or internal 
consistency of the survey questions against the computed principal components.  
Table 9.6: Reliability Analysis of PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Components 
Principal Component Number of Attributes Cronbach’s alpha (Cα) 
Component one 7 0.91 
Component two 8 0.89 
Component three 4 0.76 
Component four 3 0.63 
Component five 2 0.79 
Component six 2 0.67 
Total PPP Collaborative Components 26 0.78 
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Table 9.6 display the outcomes of the Cα test on the extracted components. As per Doloi 
(2008), the results of the Cronbach’s alpha (Cα) test indicated the collaboration components 
were of acceptable values. Overall, the value determined for the PPP stakeholder 
collaborative components was Cα = 0.78. This value was deemed acceptable as suggested by 
Doloi (2008).  
Having validated the reliability of the extracted PPP stakeholder collaboration components 
from the PCA, the research will now contextualise these findings to the PPP project lifecycle 
in order to produce the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. This is undertaken in the 
next section.  
9.7. Development of the Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration 
Framework 
In the foregoing, the research extracted six principal components from the PCA. The purpose 
of this section is therefore to contextualise these findings to the PPP project by applying the 
findings of the literature review. By doing so, the thesis will name each of the principal 
components and ultimately produce a PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. This 
framework therefore is informed from two sources:  
I. Firstly, the findings of the literature review; and  
II. Secondly, best-practice guidance informed by SIS perceptions for policy-makers and 
industry practitioners.  
 
By doing so, the research provides meaningful empirical results which have been 
authenticated by experts and contextualised by literature. These findings can accordingly be 
used to inform both policy and business models and therein improve project performance. 
9.7.1. Initiation 
There are two defining stages in the initiation phase. This comprises the identification of the 
project and consideration of the PPP mechanism, and, the project appraisal and preparation 
of the contract documents. Many of the tasks in this phase pertain to the preparation and 
development of the project prior to tendering and contract award.   
Collaboration should be established early in the project and being the only SIS involved at 
this point, the locus of responsibility falls upon the Authority to implement the collaborative 
ethos. The Authority must undertake decisive actions to commit to collaboration and this 
should be reflected through the preparation of a collaborative governance framework, a 
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collaborative procurement strategy and collaborative contracting. It is critical that all 
personnel inherent to the public-sector buy into the collaboration ideology and this agenda 
should be agreed and established within the Authority as well as across central government. 
Requiring a cultural overhaul, the collaborative PPP approach must be a top-down 
commitment which is driven through strong leadership. It is important that the Authority has 
access to the necessary skills, expertise and resources to participate as a partner, build 
collaborative capacity, develop a knowledge retention plan and appoint a skilled project 
manager.  
In the initiation phase, an assessment of PPP should be undertaken to determine future 
resource outlay. These procedures should be overseen and guided by the Infrastructure and 
Projects Authority (IPA). Being the knowledge-capital hub located in central government, the 
IPA can provide best-practice expertise and supply additional resources where appropriate 
to the Authority. This will reduce the need for external consultants and in this regard, it is 
also pertinent that the IPA procure and upskills their PPP stakeholder collaboration 
expertise. The importance of component five will accordingly be pronounced in the initiation 
phase. 
9.7.2. Procurement 
Proceeding the initiation phase, the PPP will transition into the procurement phase. The 
development of collaboration in the procurement phase is the lynchpin of collaborative 
advantage in that for the long-term continuity of collaboration, it is fundamental it is instilled 
early in the project. This dynamic is expressed through the prevalence of many of the PPP 
stakeholder collaborative attributes. The procurement phase is comprised of the structuring 
and drafting of the contract, as well as the execution of the tendering procedures which 
culminates in contract award.  
The structuring and preparation stage, in essence, incorporates the preparation and 
finalisation of the documentation for the tendering process, and contract award protocols. 
In this stage, the Authority continues to be the only SIS involved in the project. Key tasks 
include the structuring and drafting the Request for Quotation (RFQ), the Request for 
Proposal (RFP) and the PPP agreement. In the preparation of this documentation, the 
Authority must determine a strategy to incentivise private-sector participation and buy-in. 
This may be a performance/reward system premised on the commercial objectives of the 
private-sector, or it may alternatively be a cost reimbursement strategy. Rewards should be 
designed to benefit and incentivise the collective cohort rather than individual SIS 
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organisations on the grounds that rewarding a single SIS encourages autonomous behaviour. 
Also, in the circumstances where the incentivisation policy fails to achieve the desired 
outcomes, the formalised structures and systems should be embedded within the 
governance framework as a method to reinforce the collaborative ideology.  
Along these lines, it is important to establish the project success criteria predicated on the 
point that these measures will be used to determine and track the productivity of the 
partnership. Furthermore, in preparation for the tendering process, the Authority should 
evaluate potentially offering a form of resource exchange, support or stipend to stimulate 
wider private-sector participation and remove barriers to entry. This resource exchange 
encourages earlier stakeholder buy-in to the collaboration. Also, with a limited number of 
organisations who possess the capacity to undertake a PPP venture, it should be articulated 
that PPP will be collaborative going forward. Under risk of an uncollaborative reputation, the 
Authority can use this as a negotiating tool to drive this agenda. 
As the project progresses into the tendering procedure, the dynamics in the project will shift 
premised on intensified activity at the public-private macro partnership interface. In the 
tendering process, all SIS participate and the prominence of the component two will increase 
as consultation commences between the Authority and private-sector bidders. The nature 
of the tendering phase is competitive as private-sector cohorts compete to secure the 
project. As a result, the procurement strategy and governance frameworks will be 
instrumental in underpinning collaboration. Moreover, to temper the competitive 
environment a non-vested third-party collaboration manager with the responsibility of 
overseeing and steering the procurement process should be appointed. It is important in this 
stage, that all SIS have opportunities to be involved and are consulted. Likewise, particularly 
among the Project Company (ProjCo) cohort, collective SIS planning and decision-making is 
central to enhanced collaborative advantage. In this context, there should be greater 
consideration of, and participation from the service delivery SIS organisations in the 
tendering process to improve the integrated solution design.  
By treating all SIS with respect and including them in the decision-making process, this can 
cultivate trust. Also, advantageously, this can offer superior understanding and informed 
decision-making. This encourages these service provision SIS to buy into the collaboration 
earlier and therefore they are more likely to commit resources earlier. To ensure 
transparency and clarity, the argument for collaboration should be explained and promoted 
by the Authority to the private-sector. By doing so, the core values of collaboration can be 
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agreed upon, and a base can be established for the long-term arrangement. Each bidding 
stakeholder will bring their own objectives to the table. It is essential that SIS identify and 
share their project goals as well as familiarise themselves with the desired outcomes of 
others during the negotiations as part of the tendering process through dialogue and active 
engagement. This promotes understanding and informed decision-making among SIS 
organisations. Moreover, it enables partners to agree mutual and communal goals. By 
recognising synergistic objectives, SIS can align under these outputs, and jointly drive the 
project performance. This conducive environment can be unlocked through effective 
communication, information sharing and transparency.  
To ensure collaboration, it is important risk is retained by the SIS best able to manage it; 
whether this be in either the public or private-sectors. Moreover, in addition to risks already 
identified, a joint framework should also be agreed among partners as to how unforeseen 
risks will be managed. These concerns should be addressed, and response approaches should 
also be agreed at this juncture of the project. Coupled with this, while collaboration 
ideologically is premised on teamwork and cooperation, the inherent qualities of business 
dictates that it is inevitable disputes will arise at some point in the contract. Relational 
conflict resolution structures should be prioritised when this occurs. These mechanisms must 
focus on identifying solutions rather than apportioning blame, also joint efforts should be 
undertaken for the early identification of unforeseen events.  
In addition to formalised structures, efforts should also be undertaken to cultivate informal 
relationships as it has been shown that inter-personal relationships can negate the necessity 
of formalised systems. Collaborative workshops and social events can be instrumental in 
developing this informal nexus. Ultimately, it is the public-sector who selects the partner to 
enter the project with and in this vein, it is essential that the Authority selects the partner 
which fits and buys into to the collaborative agenda.  
9.7.3. Commissioning and Contract Management 
At financial close, the macro inter-sectoral partnership and micro intra-sectoral partnerships 
are formalised and the dynamics of the collaboration transform as the project enters the 
commissioning and contract management phase. This recalibration is reflected through the 
shift towards the sustainability of the collaborative partnership and emphasis shift towards 
optimal project performance. Constituting the construction and commissioning, and 
operations, maintenance and handback, key tasks from this phase include the construction 
of the infrastructure facility and the long-term management of the service. 
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In the construction and commission stage, interactions between the Authority, the 
Construction Contractor (BuildCo) and ProjCo intensify. Under time and cost constraints with 
significant risk exposure, the construction phase is highly pressurised which coincides with 
the prominence of the dialogue and engagement components. When designing the 
integrated solution, it is central to the sustainability of the project, that all SIS contribute to 
the solution design. Moreover, to avoid disputes after handover, it is important that the 
Service Provider (FMCo) approves the design and agrees to the defined roles and 
responsibilities. It is also significant that financial SIS partake in the decision-making 
processes in construction and continue to do so in the operations. To fully appreciate 
efficiencies, Debt Funders and Equity Shareholders should remain involved in the service 
delivery to optimise decision-making particularly in the face of unforeseen circumstances. IT 
can be integrated to facilitate these processes. Also, BIM is effective in engineering a team 
environment through information sharing and transparency, defined communication, 
accountability and encouraging involvement. These protocols should be managed by a BIM 
champion which may increase the scale of the front-end investment; however, this should 
ultimately transpire in greater long-term efficiencies across the lifecycle.  
As construction completes and the facility is commissioned, the contract enters the 
operations, maintenance and handback stage. As BuildCo’s responsibilities decrease, FMCo 
takes over the operations and maintenance of the asset. Being the longest stage of the 
venture, it is critical that many of the core foundations of collaboration have been 
implemented and cemented at this point of the project. Even so, there are additional 
distinctive collaborative attributes characteristic to operations, maintenance and handback. 
In this stage, it is pertinent that the all aspects of the partnership can grow and evolve. This 
is reflected through the importance of the manage component determined in the PCA. This 
derives out of several factors. Over time, the objectives of SIS organisations can alter.  
Moreover, as new technologies are developed, and business models transform, the 
partnership must be able to adapt accordingly. A fluid SIS collaboration can lessen the need 
for conflict resolution and formalised structures. Coupled with this, a flexible partnership can 
respond to inefficiencies. The performance of the arrangement should be continually 
evaluated against the predetermined criteria defined by the Authority and agreed to by 
ProjCo. Where performance is declining, the partnership should be modified where needed 
to enhance productivity. On going innovation is critical in this regard, to enable the continual 
development of the partnership as well as to ensure the continuity of value creation; the 
governance frameworks and contract must be conducive to this. Most likely to be 
230 
 
 
 
immediately affected by poor project performance, it is important that FMCo, Equity 
Shareholders and the Authority work closely to cooperatively deliver the service. Moreover, 
Debt Lenders should be continually informed of any potential problems as well as the 
manifestations of potential issues. 
As well as the existing partnership, the permeable boundary of PPP means that the 
organisations which constituted the original partnership may exit the project. As investments 
are recycled, refinanced and traded in the secondary market, new SIS organisations may 
enter the project. Typically, these are third-party investors with little direct interest in the 
day to day service provision. Instead these SIS tend to be involved on a ‘by-exception’ basis. 
Nonetheless, it is important to map their involvement and activity. Concerted efforts should 
also be implemented to align cooperative personnel on projects as well as to retain best-
practices knowledge throughout the course of the venture. The final element of the PPP 
collaborative lifecycle is the termination of the contract and the exit strategy. The contract 
is central in defining the responsibility boundaries in account of the length of the project 
lifecycle. This transition can be facilitated through trust and respect and inter-personal 
relationships.  
9.7.4.  Component Naming 
Consolidating the findings of this thesis, this section applies these findings to the principal 
components to appropriately name each component according to their relationship with 
stakeholder collaboration. The outcome of this naming process is informed by the discussion 
above with the key findings feeding into table 9.7 which is the PPP stakeholder collaboration 
framework. 
9.7.4.1. Component One – Dynamic Partnering 
Previously, it was determined that collaboration is dynamic. In order to ensure long-term 
collaboration, it is important that collaboration is fostered early in the project and that this 
ideology carries through to the remainder of the project life. Research indicates that it is 
difficult to develop collaboration later in the project and as a result, the procurement phase 
has been identified as the lynchpin of a sustainable partnership. This is reflected through the 
discussion above which recorded that, derived from the long-term nature of these projects, 
the dynamics and requirements of the project will evolve according to the changing needs 
of the organisations involved. It is fundamental that the partnership can grow concomitantly. 
Hence, with the loading attributes of component one pointing towards the need to establish 
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collaboration early, combined with the attributes which enable the partnership to evolve 
overtime, component one has been called ‘dynamic partnering. 
9.7.4.2. Component Two – Partnership Core Values 
Literature suggests that for collaboration to be effective, it should be a dyad of formal and 
informal structures. With this in mind, many of the attributes loading onto component two 
can be considered as ‘softer’ collaborative attributes. Blanchard (2012) characterised these 
attributes as the core values of collaboration in that they should form the essence of the 
partnership. Being central to the partnership, many of these loading attributes emerge in the 
procurement phase as ProjCo enters the project and will thereon carry forward into 
commissioning.  Set against this backdrop, component two has been labelled ‘partnership 
core values’ on the basis these attributes should embody the ethos of the partnership. 
9.7.4.3. Component Three – Formal Governance Structures 
In line with component two, for the partnership to function collaboratively, a critical aspect 
of this is the formalisation of institutional structures. Akin to component two, these loading 
attributes fundamentally will increase in importance in the procurement phase. They will be 
instrumental in defining the nature of the engagement between SIS and should define the 
collaborative relationship for the duration of the partnership. The research identified that 
governance structures are a key component of this and indeed this is the highest loading 
attribute onto component three. Equally, the contract historically has been critical in 
defining the nature of the partnership. Derived out of its incompleteness and rigidity, many 
problems have emerged; however, by increasing contractual flexibility, this should lead to a 
stronger partnership whereby SIS subsequently becomes less dependent on the contract. 
For these reasons, component three has been identified as ‘formal governance structures’ 
and has been accordingly termed so in table 9.7. 
9.7.4.4. Component Four – Risk Management 
Based on the contextualisation of literature to the extracted components, component four 
is particularly prevalent in the procurement phase. In literature, it was identified that risk 
and its allocation to the SIS best able to manage it, has been a key justification for the use of 
PPP over other procurement strategies. It is hence no surprise that the attribute of 
‘appropriate risk sharing’ is the highest loading variable on component four.  
Indeed, risk is prevalent throughout the entire lifecycle of a PPP project and its appropriate 
allocation is a fundamental determinant of VfM. This risk sharing process is determined 
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during the procurement phase. Accordingly, although this component should be a key area 
of focus across all phases, risk sharing, and risk allocation will be decided as part of the 
procurement process.  
As part of this negotiation process, to optimise risk sharing and therein maximise VfM, 
decision-making can be facilitated through a ‘financial and technical exchange and support / 
stipend’. By doing so, this encourages buy-in into the collaborative philosophy.  
Moreover, just as risk allocation is prominent in the procurement process, risk is also 
prevalent across the lifecycle. Hence, when unforeseen risks manifest, it is important that 
these issues are addressed collaboratively through cooperative ‘conflict resolution 
structures’. With these attributes all correlating to risk and the salience of risk management 
in PPP literature, component four has been termed ‘risk management’. These findings have 
been depicted in the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework below. 
9.7.4.5. Component Five – Authority Leadership 
From the findings above, the research identified the prevalence of component five early in 
the project. Being the only SIS involved in the project at this point of the project, emphasis 
is placed on the Authority to promote the collaborative agenda in the initiation phase, and 
the attributes of ‘Authority in-house resources / skills’ and ‘Authority experience’ are 
fundamental to this. For this reason, component five has been labelled ‘Authority 
leadership’. 
9.7.4.6. Component Six – Mission Statement 
Wicked problems are those whereby there is no true consensus on the true nature of the 
problem, nor is there any agreement of how to resolve it. Collaboration has been extolled 
for its capacity to address wicked problems through a combined effort of organisations. 
However, in the context of PPP, this network of SIS has served to blur the boundaries 
between SIS which has detracted from the accountability within the project. As a result of 
having multiple organisations involved, there are a number of different potential approaches 
by which to collaborate in an effort to resolve wicked problems. This culminates in no clear 
project aim. Nevertheless, the research has shown that by agreeing the project brief through 
a mission statement, this ensures there is a singular outlook on the problem and a unilateral 
approach can be defined by which to resolve the problem. In turn, this enables SIS to agree 
roles and responsibilities and therefore can improve accountability.  
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Akin to the other components, component six is particularly important in the procurement 
stage as the contract is signed which determines the future path of travel for the project. 
Derived from this, component six has been determined as ‘mission statement’ on the 
grounds it is the banner which enables all SIS to define the ultimate goal of the project and 
equally establish accountability in achieving this project brief. 
The findings from this section are reflected in table 9.7. This table shows the dynamism of 
the 26 collaborative attributes, together with their loading correlation onto each 
component. The table also displays the partnership boundary specification and how this 
changes across all phases of the PPP project. 
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Table 9.7: PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Framework 
Project Phase Initiation Procurement Commissioning 
Key Stages and Project Objectives 
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PPP Partnership Boundary Specification Auth. Auth. Auth. All SIS 
Auth. / 
ProjCo / 
BuildCo 
Auth. / 
ProjCo / 
FMCo / 
Finan. 
Component 1 – Dynamic partnering       
Knowledge retention ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Processual change     ✓  ✓  
Power sharing    ✓  ✓  ✓  
Information Technology (IT) ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Innovation     ✓  ✓  
Early establishment of collaboration ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓    
Early, defined and collective stakeholder 
involvement and consultation 
   ✓    
Component 2 – Partnership core values       
Social capital / inter-personal 
relationships 
   ✓  ✓  ✓  
Trust and respect    ✓  ✓  ✓  
Identifying individual and shared 
objectives 
   ✓    
Skilled leadership ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Effective communication   ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Information sharing and transparency    ✓  ✓  ✓  
Stakeholder commitment ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Balance of stakeholder needs and 
expectations 
   ✓    
Component 3 – Formal governance 
structures 
      
Clear governance structures ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Contract flexibility   ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Clarifying roles and responsibilities    ✓  ✓   
Collective stakeholder planning and 
decision-making 
   ✓  ✓  ✓  
Component 4 – Risk management       
Appropriate risk sharing ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Financial and technical exchange and 
support / stipend 
  ✓  ✓    
Conflict resolution structures    ✓  ✓  ✓  
Component 5 – Authority leadership       
Authority in-house resources / skills ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Authority experience ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Component 6 – Mission statement       
Accountability ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Agreement of project brief    ✓  ✓   
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9.8. Summary 
The purpose of this chapter, chapter nine, was to develop the PPP stakeholder collaboration 
framework. This comprised reducing the larger number of 27 stakeholder collaboration 
attributes into smaller, more meaningful components through the application of PCA.  
Extracted from the PCA, six components were identified which constitute PPP stakeholder 
collaboration. These components were ‘dynamic partnering’, ‘partnership core values’, 
‘formal governance structures’, ‘risk management, ‘Authority leadership’, and ‘mission 
statement’. The highest-loading component was ‘dynamic partnering’ which underpinned 
the necessity for continuous and on-going cultivation of collaboration. Moreover, the 
constituent variables of this component emphasised and promoted the need for early 
establishment of collaboration which historically has been absent, premised on the 
competitive nature of the procurement phase. This component highlighted the importance 
of on-going review and continual assessment.  
With these findings, the research contextualised the extracted PCA components to PPP 
literature to produce the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. As part of this 
development process, the research provided a discussion which can be used to inform policy 
and industry. The findings from this chapter have fulfilled objective five of the research. 
Furthermore, through the application of PCA, this research has made an empirical 
contribution to knowledge.  
Having done so, the research will proceed to chapter ten where it will discuss these findings 
along with the implications of this investigation and how it has contributed to knowledge. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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10. Conclusions 
10.1. Introduction 
This thesis set out to develop a framework for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) stakeholder 
collaboration in United Kingdom (UK) social infrastructure provision. To meet this research 
aim, five objectives were strategically determined which were centred around the 
infrastructure investment challenge, the role of PPP as a ‘more and better’ provision 
framework, and the development of a PPP stakeholder collaboration framework for 
improved project performance. These objectives have been comprehensively addressed in 
the foregoing chapters. By doing so, the research has made an empirical contribution to 
knowledge to enhance stakeholder collaboration in UK PPP social infrastructure provision.  
The final chapter, chapter ten, revisits and presents the key findings from this investigation 
ascertained from both the critical literature review and the empirical research. Moreover, 
drawing together the outcomes of the work, this chapter considers the implications of the 
research both for policy, academia and industry alike. To finish, the study concludes with a 
discussion of the research limitations and the potential areas for future investigation.  
Chapter ten is framed as follows: 
• Key findings from the research; 
• Knowledge contribution and research implications; 
• Recommendations; 
• Research limitations; and 
• Further research.  
 
10.2. A Reflection on the Key Findings from the Research 
The aim of this investigation was to investigate stakeholder collaboration in UK PPP social 
infrastructure provision and therein develop a PPP stakeholder collaboration framework. 
Underpinning the development of this stakeholder collaboration framework, this research 
considered the infrastructure concept. Objective one was premised on critically appraising 
infrastructure as a vehicle for socio-economic development. When investigating objective 
one, it was determined that infrastructure can be classified as social or economic. 
Notwithstanding this dichotomy, the research unearthed that infrastructure systems are 
symbiotic and therefore should be considered holistically. Moreover, this investigation 
served to detail the magnitude of the multiplier effect on investment and conveyed a 
consensus that infrastructure provision has a positive output in terms of GDP growth. 
238 
 
 
 
This research established social infrastructure is a myriad of explicit and implicit contributors, 
and thus the benefits can be much more latent and tacit. As well as this, the research found 
that infrastructure investment has been used as a catalyst for socio-economic development 
in response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Infrastructure investment can be beneficial 
in the short-term through job creation, and influential in the medium to long-term through 
the wider benefits and externalities derived from its provision. In this regard, infrastructure 
investment is a cornerstone of a functioning and vibrant society. Yet, despite its significance, 
the research highlighted how a legacy of underinvestment has meant governments have 
failed to keep pace with investment demands. Moreover, it was determined that in the 
context of acute capital retrenchment, future infrastructure investment is confronted with 
the need for more alternative sources of finance as well as the pertinence of improving the 
performance of existing frameworks for better provision. To alleviate these demands and 
therein provide ‘more and better’ infrastructure, it was found there is now greater appetite 
for increased private-sector participation in infrastructure provision.  
A procurement framework which has been extolled for to meet the infrastructure 
investment challenge is PPP. Although only constituting a marginal portion of infrastructure 
provision in the UK, circa 10 to 14%, overall, PPP has already played a pivotal role in social 
infrastructure provision. Objective two of this investigation was predicated on critically 
evaluating the role of PPP as a vehicle for social infrastructure provision in the UK. This 
investigation found that since the onset of the GFC, the UK PPP marketplace has exhibited a 
significant decline in terms of activity attributable to the acute transformations in the 
financing markets as well as forthcoming concerns over the true extent of VfM for the 
taxpayer premised on inherent framework inefficiencies. The UK government has 
undertaken steps to strategically reform UK PPP arrangements. Notwithstanding these 
nuances, the research identified that these changes have failed to address the inherent 
inefficiencies of these mechanisms. In total, the research determined 19 inefficiencies which 
continue to confront the mobilisation of PPP. To address these inefficiencies, the concept of 
collaboration has been touted throughout PPP literature and was identified as a pertinent 
knowledge gap. 
In these long-term arrangements where the cross-sectoral partnership is the fulcrum of 
project success, there is now the collective realisation that these frameworks must operate 
under a banner of communal problem-solving and collectivism; all of which equates to 
stakeholder collaboration. Notwithstanding this, the research unearthed weaknesses in the 
current understanding of how to best foster PPP stakeholder collaboration. The literature 
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review found that rather than being a collaborative partnership, traditionally PPP has been 
equivocal to a contractual outsourcing arrangement. Furthermore, the research highlighted 
how the permeation of new organisations, derived out of the necessity for alternative 
sources of finance, has transpired in a need for greater collaboration to unlock these 
additional capital resources.  
Against this backdrop, objective three was premised on examining collaboration among PPP 
social infrastructure stakeholders (SIS). The research found that collaboration has evolved 
over the previous thirty years; however, despite noteworthy progress, there remains a 
prominent knowledge gap. The research found that a key component to fostering 
collaboration is the establishment of a boundary specification. Despite being central to 
collaboration, it was determined that an approach by which to determine the boundary 
specification has yet to be defined in the context of PPP. In response to this, the research 
considered stakeholder theory and the constructs of legitimacy, power and urgency to 
identify and understand key social infrastructure stakeholder (SIS) involvement in UK PPP 
social infrastructure provision. Premised on legitimacy and an organisations relationship 
with the contract, the research proposed a nomenclature of PPP stakeholder organisations 
comprising normative, derivative and non-stakeholders. The key PPP SIS for collaboration 
were found to be the Authority, Debt Funders, Equity Shareholders, Construction 
Contractors (BuildCo) and Service Provider (FMCo). While all other stakeholders were still 
considered worthy of inclusion, the research argued a stakeholder management approach 
would be more appropriate on the grounds these bodies have no contractual authority.  
Having identified the SIS, utilising the constructs of power and urgency, the research set 
about understanding the involvement of these organisations and how their positions 
transitioned across the PPP project lifecycle. It was identified that SIS involvement is 
transient and fundamentally shifts at financial close, construction completion and in the 
operations. This was reflected through two partnership dynamics. The first was the macro 
public-private inter-sectoral partnership which transitions at financial close through the 
formalising of the agreement. This exists between the Authority and the Project Company 
(ProjCo). Secondary inter-sectoral micro partnership derived out of the transforming roles 
and responsibilities inherent to ProjCo and the relationships between these constituent 
private-sector SIS, the Authority, and ProjCo. A critical examination of this level of the 
partnership unearthed 23 inherent PPP collaboration gaps. It was found there were 
collaborative gaps both within and between sectors. Moreover, sources of poor 
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collaboration emanated from all phases of the project. These findings were used to inform 
the identification of the PPP collaborative attributes. 
Predicated on this PPP SIS boundary specification, the research examined collaboration 
theory to determine the attributes of PPP stakeholder collaboration for improved partnering 
and to engender enhanced performance in the project. The research considered the 
motivations to partner and likewise identified that it is a complex concept. As part of this 
consideration, the research also recognised the importance of formalised structures as well 
as informal constructs in fostering collaboration. For long-term arrangements such as PPP, 
the research identified that collaboration is fundamental to the long-term sustainability of 
the partnership. Collaborations must be flexible to evolve over time as the inherent project 
dynamics change. Likewise, equal power-sharing should be reflected through the sharing of 
roles, risks and responsibilities. Ultimately, from this examination, a list of 27 PPP 
stakeholder collaborative attributes were identified for empirical investigation.  
The purpose of the empirical phase was to develop the key findings from the literature into 
a more meaningful PPP stakeholder collaboration framework premised on the inputs from 
SIS organisations and therein meet objectives four and five. The research design for this 
framework development consisted of quantitative electronic survey questionnaires which 
were disseminated to PPP SIS organisations, coupled with a Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) which was conducted on the collected data to extract the principal components to 
inform the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework.  
However, prior to this, the research undertook a contemporary analysis of the UK PPP social 
infrastructure market. The purpose of this quantitative analysis was to provide transaction 
clarity around the PPP social infrastructure investment paradigm and thereby set the 
contemporary context of the research. To inform this analysis, the research utilised datasets 
sourced from Infrastructure Journal (IJ) Online Database. From this analysis, the research 
identified that Health and Education continue to be the two preferred social infrastructure 
sectors which mobilise PPP. Of the four jurisdictional markets, all have been acutely 
impacted by the GFC and despite policy reformations, activity in the main remains relatively 
muted; though there are burgeoning signs of growth in Scotland. 
In accordance with objective four, survey questionnaires were conducted to have SIS 
organisations evaluate the salience of the collaborative attributes identified from literature 
and therein furnish the research with the empirical data by which to develop the PPP 
stakeholder collaboration framework. The data gathered as part of this methodological 
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approach was analysed to determine the ranked salience of the PPP stakeholder 
collaborative attributes by means of a Relative Importance Index (RII). Equally, statistical 
analysis conducted by the Kruskal-Wallis H test identified significant levels of disagreement 
between SIS organisations in regard to four of the collaboration attributes. Nevertheless, 
there was significant levels of agreement among the cohort of the collaborative attributes 
to carry forward into the framework development. This was determined through Kendell’s 
Coefficient of Concordance. Ultimately, from these statistical tests, the research was able to 
determine how the attributes were ranked by the respondent sample as per the cohort, as 
well as per SIS category. These findings have made an original contribution to knowledge by 
indicating attribute salience.  
PCA was utilised to reduce the larger number of attributes into a smaller number of more 
meaningful constructs. In doing so, this enabled the research to meet objective five. Through 
the PCA, six PPP stakeholder collaboration components were determined, which were 
subsequently contextualised to the literature review to produce the PPP stakeholder 
collaboration framework. The attribute of ‘ProjCo experience’ fell below the minimum 
loading value benchmark and was excluded from the PCA. The remaining 26 attributes 
collectively represented 68.39% of the latent variance and were categorised into: ‘dynamic 
partnering’, ‘partnership core values’, ‘formal governance structures’, ‘risk management, 
‘Authority leadership’, and ‘mission statement’. 
1. Dynamic partnering - accounted for 39.94% of the total variance and was comprised of 
seven attributes. These were: ‘knowledge retention’; ‘processual change’; ‘power 
sharing’; ‘Information Technology (IT)’; ‘innovation’; ‘early establishment of 
collaboration’; and ‘early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement and 
consultation’. Notably, despite representing the most variance, ‘knowledge retention’, 
‘processual change’, ‘power sharing’, ‘Information Technology (IT)’, and ‘innovation’ all 
were considered of relatively lower importance for collaboration, ranking from twenty-
third to twenty-seventh. Comparatively, ‘early establishment of collaboration’ and 
‘early, defined and collectively stakeholder involvement and consultation’ ranked sixth 
and seventh respectively. Literature signposts that the dynamic partnering component 
was particularly prevalent in the commissioning stages of the project after the 
partnership has been formalised at financial close.  
2. Partnership core values - represented 8.09% of the total variance and was composed 
from eight SIS collaborative attributes, namely: ‘social capital / inter-personal 
relationships’; ‘trust and respect’; ‘identifying individual and shared objectives’; ‘skilled 
242 
 
 
 
leadership’; ‘effective communication’; ‘information sharing and transparency’; 
‘stakeholder commitment’; and ‘balance of stakeholder needs and expectations’. The 
salience of these attributes ranged from sixteenth to first which indicated moderate to 
foremost importance. Highlighted in chapter nine, the partnership core values 
component is fundamental in the tendering stage of procurement, especially to facilitate 
a shared vision of the project requirements and solution. 
3. Formal governance structures - explained 6.67% of the total variance of the linear 
components and was constructed from four collaborative attributes: ‘clear governance 
structures’; ‘contract flexibility’; ‘clarifying roles and responsibilities’; and ‘collective 
stakeholder planning and decision-making’. The collaborative attributes ranked 
eleventh, eighteenth and thirteenth respectively and were accordingly considered to be 
moderately to very important. This component was determined to be central in defining 
the governance structures and participation frameworks when executing actions. In this 
regard, the PPP stakeholder collaboration framework discussion stressed that the 
governance structures and contract must be instrumental in driving the collaborative 
policy and requires strong leadership from the Authority in the promotion of this 
ideology. 
4. Risk management - accounted for 5.26% of the linear variance and contained three 
variables: ‘appropriate risk sharing’; ‘financial and technical exchange and support / 
stipend’; and ‘conflict resolution structures’. These three attributes were rated eighth, 
nineteenth and seventeenth respectively suggesting they were moderately to very 
important for PPP collaboration. Throughout PPP and construction literature, risk and 
uncertainty are prevailing discussion points. However, for collaboration to be successful 
literature reveals that risks should be allocated to the SIS most capable of managing 
them. Moreover, when unforeseen risks arise, resolution structures should focus on a 
solution rather than apportioning blame. 
5. Authority leadership – represented 4.43% of the total variance and was constituted from 
two attributes: ‘Authority in-house resources / skills’; and ‘Authority experience’. In the 
RII, these attributes ranked twenty-second and twentieth respectively; however, the 
Authority considered them sixth and twelfth respectively; much higher than other SIS 
groups. Identified in collaboration theory, to foster collaborative advantage, all 
stakeholder organisations must be considered equal, contribute and share power. For 
collaboration to be engineered across the lifecycle, the Authority must be well equipped 
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to lead from the front, drive the collaborative ideology and participate as a collaborative 
partner. 
6. Mission statement – encapsulated 3.99% of the variance and constituted: 
‘accountability’; and ‘agreement of project brief’. These attributes were ranked 
fourteenth and fourth signifying they were of moderate to extreme important. The 
research has shown accountability must span all organisational levels and is a prominent 
consideration in governance strategies. Also, by agreeing the project brief, this promotes 
other attributes such as stakeholder commitment and buy-in as well as a mutual 
understanding of the project goals and a shared mission statement.  
The production of this PPP stakeholder collaboration framework has made an empirical 
contribution to knowledge. It has determined the salience of these collaborative attributes 
informed by SIS organisations. Moreover, this thesis has extracted key themes from this list 
of attributes and reconstructed them to produce more meaningful components for easier 
interpretations. These findings have been discussed in the context of the PPP project lifecycle 
and can be beneficial to both policy-makers and private-sector PPP organisations alike. 
10.3. Knowledge Contributions and Research Implications 
At a time when the cash strapped governments continue to promulgate private financing of 
infrastructure as a means to alleviate the gap between demand and supply, it is anticipated 
PPP will continue to be utilised in the current global economic climate. UK PPP is regarded 
as a pioneer internationally both in terms of sophistication and maturity. Undeniably, it has 
been an international pioneer and has provided much of the institutional and regulatory 
foundations for many others. Thus, this research will have an impact internationally as well 
as domestically. In essence, the research has made six theoretical and practical 
contributions: 
 
1. The research has contributed to the infrastructure paradigm. It has identified and 
considered the salient socio-economic implications derived from infrastructure 
provision. Moreover, it has examined the infrastructure investment paradigm as well 
as underpinned the necessity for a holistic perspective towards infrastructure 
provision. As well as this, while many have focused on economic infrastructure 
provision, differently, this research has added to the infrastructure stock of 
knowledge by considering and raising awareness pertaining to the need for social 
infrastructure provision. 
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2. Using IJ datasets, the research has conducted a state-of-the-art investigation into 
the UK PPP social infrastructure market. The findings from this offer contemporary 
insights into the UK PPP market in terms of deal number, capital value, regional 
market trends, deal structure and financial composition, and sectoral breakdown. 
From this investigation, it was determined that health and education continue to be 
the preferred social infrastructure sectors for PPP provision. Moreover, it was 
identified that the newer PPP frameworks which were introduced to improve 
productivity have been subject to low levels of roll-out. In doing so, the research has 
underpinned the importance of addressing shortcomings in UK PPP. Moreover, it 
also suggested that despite the efforts to improve stakeholder collaboration in 
newer modalities, low market activity may indicate these nuances have failed to 
reconcile the inherent inefficiencies. These findings are important on the grounds 
the underpin the importance of improving collaboration therein to improve project 
performance and return confidence to UK PPP as a credible framework for social 
infrastructure provision. Also, the findings of this assessment can be beneficial to 
industry in that it offers transaction clarity of the UK PPP marketplace which is 
currently unavailable elsewhere in the public domain.  
3. Grounded in stakeholder theory, this investigation has developed a theoretical 
boundary specification framework for PPP SIS. This PPP framework enables research 
to identify and understand SIS involvement across the PPP lifecycle. Predicated on 
an organisations relationship with the contract, PPP stakeholders can be categorised 
as normative, derivative or non-stakeholders. Furthermore, through the adoption of 
the power and urgency attributes, the dynamics of the partnership can be delineated 
across the PPP project lifecycle. Utilising this partnership boundary specification, this 
research has identified two dynamics or levels of the partnership as well as 
determined 23 collaboration gaps inherent to these partnerships. This contribution 
provides the essential building blocks to inform future research. Also, by 
incorporating attributes as opposed to the production of a definitive list, this 
boundary specification can accommodate future changes. Moreover, 
advantageously, the usage of attributes means this framework can be applied to 
economic infrastructure as well as international PPP ventures.  
4. This investigation has determined the salient attributes of PPP stakeholder 
collaboration. Combining the 23 PPP collaboration gaps together with additional PPP 
literature and Collaboration theory literature, the thesis has determined 27 PPP 
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stakeholder collaborative attributes which have been evaluated by SIS organisations 
by means of survey questionnaires. Empirically, through the application of the RII, 
the research has presented a salience list which ranks these attributes in terms of 
their importance for improved PPP stakeholder collaboration. The research has 
equally investigated for statistical significance between SIS groups by conducting the 
Kruskal-Wallis H test. Thus, the importance of these attributes has been considered 
both in terms of the SIS collective cohort sample as well as per SIS classification. In 
doing so, these findings have made an original contribution to knowledge.   
5. The research has extracted six principal components of stakeholder collaboration 
through the application of PCA. These six collaborative components which 
fundamentally encapsulate PPP stakeholder collaboration again have made an 
empirical contribution to the PPP stock of knowledge.  
6. Finally, the empirical findings of the extracted stakeholder collaboration 
components have been applied to literature to develop a PPP stakeholder 
collaboration framework. By delineating the shifting dynamics of PPP stakeholder 
collaboration through the six principal components, along with the list of 27 
collaborative attributes, the research has contributed best-practice 
recommendations which have been informed by SIS organisations. Through the 
application of these findings, stakeholder collaboration can be improved in 
partnering mechanisms for both policy and practice. This can enhance productivity 
in provision frameworks and therein return confidence to PPP frameworks. 
Potentially, this can lead to future provision and delivery of social infrastructure in 
the UK through PPP which enable the UK government to enhance socio-economic 
development. 
This research is also important on the grounds that while the future of PPP in the format of 
PFI may be uncertain, this does not detract from the growing appetite for greater private-
sector participation. This means that there remains a need for better understanding of 
collaboration between the public and private-sectors whether it be in the format of PFI or 
whether it be via other cross-sectoral partnering arrangements which have emerged into the 
PPP sphere. Accordingly, this research is important in that it offers greater understanding of 
the organisations involved in partnering and provides insights into what specifies 
collaboration in the broader context of PPP.  
Similarly, premised on the limited number of organisations with the wherewithal to 
undertake PPP projects, many of these stakeholders abridge both social and economic assets 
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in the UK and abroad. Hence the findings of this research are transposable beyond strictly 
social infrastructure provision in the UK. Rather, these findings are equally valuable for 
economic infrastructure partnering as well as other cross-sectoral arrangements in UK and 
international jurisdictions.  
10.4. Application of Public-Private Partnerships Stakeholder Collaboration Framework 
This research has made several empirical contributions to knowledge though ultimately it 
has produced a six component PPP stakeholder collaboration framework for improved 
partnering. The PCA extracted components and the corresponding PPP stakeholder 
collaboration framework can be beneficial to both public and private-sector organisations to 
enhance PPP stakeholder collaboration. The research now reviews the relevance of these 
findings and how they can contribute to the enhancement of PPP policy and industry 
practice. 
10.4.1. Policy 
Already the UK government has undertaken strategic steps to improve collaboration in PPP 
frameworks. Thus, this research comes in a timely manner for policy-makers. The key 
findings from this research should serve as a framework to inform and enhance PPP policy 
across the UK. The developed PPP stakeholder collaboration framework can act as a guide 
or roadmap for policy-makers as to how collaboration transforms throughout the course of 
the project. Moreover, the framework and attribute list additionally offer understanding of 
the nuanced opinions among SIS organisations. Policy-makers can utilise this information to 
calibrate and align the contract and governance frameworks to SIS perceptions of PPP 
stakeholder collaboration. Furthermore, this research acts as a bridge between central 
government policy-makers such as the Infrastructure and Procuring Authority (IPA) and local 
Authorities directly involved in the infrastructure delivery. Hence, as the notions of 
relationships, relationship management (RM) and collaboration continue to gather 
momentum, this research provides a rich foundation for further policy and academic 
development.  
In addition to this, this research has important implications for central UK government as 
well as for Authority stakeholders in that it emphasises the importance of the public-sector 
in participating as an active and engaged partner in these arrangements as opposed to a 
client who outsources a service; which has been the case in previous ventures. Moreover, it 
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raises awareness of the importance of the Authority in promoting, implementing and driving 
the collaborative ideology, through both formal and informal systems. 
10.4.2. Industry Practitioners 
This research also has several important implications for industry practitioners. Firstly, the 
research serves to highlight and elevate collaboration in mainstream discussion boards. This 
is pertinent because generally industry is motivated by financial and commercial gains and 
the benefits and motivations of collaboration are often lost and convoluted in the built 
environment. Furthermore, the high staff turnover and elongated nature of PPP means it is 
difficult to develop best-practice solutions. This research acts as a knowledge centre on the 
grounds it encapsulates the entirety of a PPP venture from the initiation phase through to 
facility handback. Moreover, it comprises input from all the key SIS organisations. In this 
regard, this investigation is beneficial in that it considers and promotes collaboration not just 
between sectors but also inherent within sectors, and more specifically; ProjCo.  
10.5. Recommendations 
Predicated on the findings from this investigation, the following recommendations are 
proposed by the research for implementation to enhance the delivery of PPP social 
infrastructure: 
• Shown in chapter seven, there continues to be low levels of market activity. 
Following acute transformations in UK PPP in the wake of the GFC, there is low 
confidence in the ability of partnering frameworks to deliver VfM. This has been 
reflected through the limited number of projects which have emerged into the 
marketplace. Consequently, this has generated uncertainty among key SIS as to the 
future of PPP in the UK. To alleviate these concerns, there is a need for the 
development of a transparent pipeline of social infrastructure projects. This display 
of commitment to PPP on the part of the government should increase confidence in 
the market and therein bolster investor confidence as well as augment the 
willingness of SIS to engage in collaboration. This will enable SIS to build capacity as 
well as act as a flagship to the wider business community and public of the 
importance of infrastructure. 
• One of the prominent findings of the literature review was that of those projects 
which have emerged onto the market, there are several barriers blocking the stream 
of private capital from alternative financing sources into infrastructure. There is thus 
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a pertinent necessity for innovative financial vehicles capable of levering the 
requisite capital into the market. The research advocates for greater engagement 
and collaboration between policy-makers and the financial community to align 
interests to develop bankable and mutually equitable projects for all SIS 
organisations. 
• It is further recommended that the findings from this thesis are made known to all 
SIS organisations. The dissemination of these findings can facilitate a shared 
understanding of the salient attributes of collaboration. Moreover, they also provide 
insights into the nuances between SIS groups. The PPP stakeholder collaboration 
framework developed through the course of this thesis should be used to inform 
business models and policy. 
• An additional recommendation made by this research is the appointment of a 
collaboration champion; similar to that of a Building Information Modelling (BIM) 
champion. This champion should be a disinterested or non-vested third-party to the 
venture and is appointed with the remit of implementing and overseeing 
collaboration across the project. Their involvement will be essential in the earlier 
phases particularly in the tendering process which is highly competitive.  
• The research suggests that to underpin and promote the importance of collaborative 
partnering, efforts should be undertaken to gauge and benchmark the added 
benefits of collaboration for both the public and private-sectors. This should 
comprise a combination of quantitative measures such as time, cost and quality 
indicators as well as wider holistic qualitative metrics including transparency, 
accountability, communication in addition to other considerations such as would the 
infrastructure be available through other mechanisms.  
• An additional recommendation the research offers for PPP social infrastructure 
provision is that the UK government must fundamentally improve its systems when 
dealing and engaging with the private-sector as a means to improve efficiencies and 
decision-making. As far back as the 90s, the importance of strong client leadership 
in procurement was noted. Despite this, institutional capacity remains a prevailing 
concern in PPP and the built environment.  
• Now heavily politicised and discredited, the final recommendation the research 
advocates for repackaging of the Public-Private Partnerships concept. This 
rebranding should reflect and promote cross sectoral collaboration and 
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collectiveness. Thus, the research suggests the name of the ‘Collaborative 
Stakeholder Provision Strategy’ (CSPS).  
While there is still much work to be done to return confidence to UK PPP frameworks, if this 
mechanism is to continue to play an instrumental role in social infrastructure provision, this 
research believes through the adoption and implementation of these recommendations, this 
will enhance project performance in partnering mechanism in the UK. 
10.6. Limitations 
Despite concerted efforts to safeguard holistic representation and accuracy, the research 
was not without its limitations. The research will now discuss the limitations encountered: 
1. The permeable boundary of a PPP projects means that it is impossible to ensure that all 
SIS organisations were included in the IJ datasets. Until there is a comprehensive 
database produced and maintained by the UK government accessible to interested 
parties, this will continue to be an issue for academics.   
2. Comprising multiple phases coupled with the high staff turnover in PPP, perceptions of 
collaboration may differ inherent to SIS organisations across the project lifecycle. To 
negate this issue, the research implemented participation criteria which targeted 
strategic level management.   
3. The negative connotations currently associated with PPP in the UK meant that in some 
instances SIS organisations were unwilling to participate in the survey questionnaire 
despite being assured full confidentiality.  
Though there were limitations encountered in the study, strategic steps were undertaken in 
response to minimise or mitigate their impact on the research. Regardless of these 
limitations, this have not impacted the accuracy of the investigation nor the original 
contribution of the study. 
10.7. Further Research 
Funded as a three-year project, this PhD was bound by time and resources constraints. As 
such, throughout the course of this investigation, the research has identified several 
additional prominent areas which justify further research. These potential areas include: 
1. A PPP transaction is associated with a matrix of stakeholders and interested 
organisations including the supply chain, facility users, staff and so on. Premised on 
the stakeholder nomenclature presented in chapter four, a stakeholder 
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management model should be developed to identify the mechanisms and success 
factors to understand derivative stakeholder involvement, participation and 
influence in a PPP venture.  
2. Research could benefit from an exploration of how collaboration can be developed 
between the key stakeholders and the supply chain. With a wide range of sub-
contractors involved in the solution provision, research could consider how 
collaboration can be constituted between these sub-contractors, suppliers and the 
key stakeholders for improved project performance.  
3. One of the principle changes implemented through Private Finance 2 (PF2) has been 
the introduction of a public-sector co-investor into the equity. This includes 
positioning a manager on ProjCo board of directions. Yet, with muted 
operationalisation, there is still limited information and understanding as to how this 
innovation will affect the dynamics of ProjCo. Research should consider this, 
including an exploration of how this stakeholder’s objectives align with the 
Authority, and what are the dynamics of this relationship. 
4. Discussed as part of the PPP stakeholder collaboration lifecycle checklist, the 
research emphasised the importance of the governance structures and the contract 
in underpinning collaboration. Considering this, further research should consider the 
concept of collaborative contracts, and how they may be implemented within the 
confines of PPP.  
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Appendix A – Table of SIS Identification Summary 
Social 
Infrastructure 
Stakeholder 
Identified 
Population 
Deduct 
Pilot 
Study 
SIS 
Percentages 
Sample 
Size 
Responses Percentage 
Coverage 
Authority 189 188 36.43% 80 18 25% 
Debt Funders 52 51 9.88% 22 6 8% 
Equity 
Shareholders 
146 145 28.10% 62 16 22% 
BuildCo 54 53 10.27% 23 16 22% 
FMCo 81 79 15.31% 34 17 23% 
Total 522 516 100.00% 220 73 100% 
Margin of 
Error 
 5%     
Confidence 
Level 
 95%     
Sample Size  220     
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Appendix B – Electronic PPP Stakeholder Collaboration Survey 
Stakeholder Collaboration in UK Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 
social infrastructure projects. 
 
Welcome to my survey on PPP social infrastructure provision in the UK. Thank you for 
participating in my expert survey. Your feedback is critical to the success of this study. This 
survey has been designed to elicit from you, information to develop a stakeholder 
collaboration model for the provision and delivery of ‘more and better’ UK Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) social infrastructure. The purpose of this model is to engender better 
understanding between stakeholders on the salient attributes of collaborative relationships, 
necessary for improved project performance. 
 
Please note, all questions pertain to UK PPP social infrastructure provision. Social 
infrastructure comprises municipal, education, emergency services, health, housing, justice 
and recreational assets which facilitate human development, quality of life and living 
standards. 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are defined as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) or 
nuanced modalities whereby a private-sector partner is responsible for the long-term service 
provision; capitalising on private-sector management and finance resources. This includes 
concessions and franchises where a private-sector partner is responsible for some, or all of 
the constructing, redevelopment and maintaining of a public service infrastructure.  
PPP stakeholder collaboration is a specific relationship dynamic whereby stakeholder 
organisations work together to achieve a shared objective, combining interests, varied skills, 
resources and experience in a coordinated effort to deliver a mutually beneficial outcome 
that could not be achieved otherwise, by a solitary organisation.  
 
This survey has been designed in five sections: 
A. Stakeholder Demographic  
B. PPP Social Infrastructure Provision 
C. PPP Stakeholder Collaboration  
D. Survey Results 
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Full anonymity is guaranteed. All participant information will remain confidential and 
stored securely. This survey will take approximately 10 to 15 minutes. There are 37 
questions. I would be obliged if you could complete all sections as soon as possible. Should 
you wish, findings from this survey will be available after the completion of the study. 
 
 
Section A: Stakeholder Demographic 
Section A is designed to ascertain participant background information, and experience with 
social infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). 
Predicated upon the application of stakeholder theory, this investigation defines a PPP 
stakeholder as the private-sector ProjCo, and its constituent members: financiers (Debt 
Funders and Equity Shareholders), Construction Contractors (BuildCo), and Service Providers 
(FMCo); and the public-sector Authority. 
 
1. Organisations may fulfil several stakeholder roles within a project, for example, an 
organisation may be the contractor and an equity shareholders. With this in mind, 
please select a stakeholder role typified by your involvement capacity. 
 
☐ Authority 
☐ BuildCo 
☐ Debt Funders 
☐ Equity Shareholders 
☐ FMCo 
 
2. In which PPP social infrastructure sector(s) do you have experience? 
 
☐ Education 
☐ Emergency and Response services 
☐ Health 
☐ Housing 
☐ Justice 
☐ Leisure and Recreational 
☐ Municipal 
 
3. Of which PPP initiatives / programmes, do you have experience? 
Not at all 
experienced 
Slightly 
experienced 
Moderately 
experienced Very experienced 
Extremely 
experienced 
 
☐ Building Schools for the Future (BSF) scheme 
☐ NHS Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) and eLIFT 
☐ Not-for-Profit Distribution (NPD) model 
☐ Priority School Building Programme (PSBP) programme 
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☐ Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
☐ Private Finance 2 (PF2) 
☐ Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) Hub Initiative 
 
 
Section B: UK PPP Social Infrastructure Provision 
Section B is designed to elicit from respondents their opinions and perceptions on UK PPP as 
a vehicle for ‘more and better’ social infrastructure provision. 
 
4. Does the UK possess the necessary policy guidance and legislative framework for 
PPP projects? 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
     
 
5. Does the UK possess the necessary political support for PPP arrangements? 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
     
 
6. Does the UK economic climate facilitate PPP utilisation? 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
     
 
7. What is your perception of PPP as a social infrastructure provision mechanism? 
Very poor Poor Unsure Good Very good 
     
 
8. Do you intend to participate in future UK PPP social infrastructure projects? 
Not at all 
interested 
Slightly 
interested 
Moderately 
interested 
Very 
interested 
Extremely 
interested 
     
 
9. In your opinion, which sectors of social infrastructure are best suited to be 
delivered via PPP? 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly 
agree 
Education 
     
Emergency and 
Response services      
Health 
     
281 
 
 
 
Housing 
     
Justice 
     
Leisure and 
Recreational      
Municipal 
     
 
 
Section C: PPP Stakeholder Collaboration  
To reiterate, this investigation defines PPP stakeholder collaboration as a long-term 
partnership between the public-sector Authority and the private-sector ProjCo and its 
constituent members whereby equal partners share risks, rewards and resources to deliver 
infrastructure in a cooperate and joint working manner. 
 
10. Are UK PPP models conducive to the formation of collaborative stakeholder 
relationships? 
Not at all 
conducive 
Slightly 
conducive 
Moderately 
conducive 
Very 
conducive 
Extremely 
conducive 
     
 
11. In your opinion, is it possible for PPP stakeholders to develop effective win-win 
relationships whereby all organisations collectively benefit? 
Extremely unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely Extremely 
likely 
     
 
12. In your opinion, through the adoption and integration of these collaborative 
attributes, can PPP stakeholder relationships be improved? 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
     
 
13. By engendering greater stakeholder collaboration, would this improve PPP social 
infrastructure provision? 
Strongly disagree Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly agree 
     
 
14. If stakeholder collaboration was improved, would this increase the likelihood of 
your involvement in PPP social infrastructure provision? 
Extremely unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely Extremely 
likely 
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15. From literature, a list of 27 collaborative attributes have been identified for 
improved PPP social infrastructure stakeholder collaboration. This question is 
designed to elicit from you, your perceptions and opinions on these attributes and 
their saliency by which to improve PPP stakeholder collaboration. Please rate the 
salience of each attribute for PPP stakeholder collaboration. 
 Not at all 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Very 
important 
Strongly 
agree 
Accountability 
     
Agreement of 
project brief      
Appropriate risk 
sharing      
Authority 
experience      
Authority in-house 
resources / skills      
Balance of 
stakeholder needs 
and expertise 
     
Clarifying of roles 
and responsibilities      
Clear governance 
structures      
Collective 
stakeholder 
planning and 
decision-making 
     
Conflict resolution 
structures      
Contract flexibility 
     
Early establishment 
of collaboration      
Early, defined and 
collective 
stakeholder 
involvement and 
consultation 
     
Effective 
communication      
Financial and 
technical exchange 
and support / 
stipend 
     
283 
 
 
 
Identifying 
individual and 
shared objectives 
     
Information 
sharing and 
transparency 
     
Information 
Technology (IT)      
Innovation 
     
Knowledge 
retention      
Power sharing 
     
Processual change 
     
Skilled leadership 
     
Social capital / 
Inter-personal 
relationships 
     
ProjCo experience 
     
Stakeholder 
commitment      
Trust and respect 
     
 
Section D: Survey Results 
16. Would you like to receive the results of this survey after completion? 
Yes 
No 
Appendix C – Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance 
N 73 
Kendall's Wa .223 
Chi-Square 424.008 
df 26 
Asymp. Sig. .000 
a. Kendall's Coefficient of 
Concordance 
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Appendix D – Survey Principal Components Analysis Data 
FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES Accountability Agreementofprojectbrief 
Appropriaterisksharing Authorityexperience 
    Authorityinhouseresourcesskills 
Balanceofstakeholderneedsandexpectations 
    Clarifyingofrolesandresponsibilities Cleargovernancestructures 
    Collectivestakeholderplanninganddecisionmaking 
Conflictresolutionstructures Contractflexibility_A 
    Earlyestablishmentofcollaboration 
Earlydefinedandcollectivestakeholderinvolvementandconsultation 
    Effectivecommunication 
Financialandtechnicalexchangeandsupportstipend 
    Identifyingindividualandsharedobjectives 
Informationsharingandtransparency InformationTechnologyIT 
    Innovation Knowledgeretention Powersharing Processualchange 
Skilledleadership 
    SocialcapitalInterpersonalrelationships ProjCoexperience 
Stakeholdercommitment Trustandrespect 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS Accountability Agreementofprojectbrief 
Appropriaterisksharing Authorityexperience 
    Authorityinhouseresourcesskills 
Balanceofstakeholderneedsandexpectations 
    Clarifyingofrolesandresponsibilities Cleargovernancestructures 
    Collectivestakeholderplanninganddecisionmaking 
Conflictresolutionstructures Contractflexibility_A 
    Earlyestablishmentofcollaboration 
Earlydefinedandcollectivestakeholderinvolvementandconsultation 
    Effectivecommunication 
Financialandtechnicalexchangeandsupportstipend 
    Identifyingindividualandsharedobjectives 
Informationsharingandtransparency InformationTechnologyIT 
    Innovation Knowledgeretention Powersharing Processualchange 
Skilledleadership 
    SocialcapitalInterpersonalrelationships ProjCoexperience 
Stakeholdercommitment Trustandrespect 
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /FORMAT SORT BLANK(.45) 
  /PLOT EIGEN 
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
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Table 1: Rotated Component Matrix for PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .826 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1213.548 
df 351 
Sig. .000 
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Table 2: Communalities of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
  Initial Extraction 
1 Accountability 1.000 .718 
2 Agreement of project brief 1.000 .699 
3 Appropriate risk sharing 1.000 .779 
4 Authority experience 1.000 .836 
5 Authority in-house resources / skills 1.000 .781 
6 Balance of stakeholder needs and expectations 1.000 .590 
7 Clarifying of roles and responsibilities 1.000 .676 
8 Clear governance structures 1.000 .738 
9 Collective stakeholder planning and decision-making 1.000 .562 
10 Conflict resolution structures 1.000 .594 
11 Contract flexibility 1.000 .664 
12 Early establishment of collaboration 1.000 .726 
13 Early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement and consultation 1.000 .697 
14 Effective communication 1.000 .674 
15 Financial and technical exchange and support / stipend 1.000 .494 
16 Identifying individual and shared objectives 1.000 .751 
17 Information sharing and transparency 1.000 .674 
18 Information Technology (IT) 1.000 .702 
19 Innovation 1.000 .686 
20 Knowledge retention 1.000 .732 
21 Power sharing 1.000 .701 
22 Processual change 1.000 .806 
23 Skilled leadership 1.000 .657 
24 Social capital / Inter-personal relationships 1.000 .725 
25 ProjCo experience 1.000 .499 
26 Stakeholder commitment 1.000 .617 
27 Trust and respect 1.000 .689 
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
  
287 
 
 
 
Table 3: Total Variance of PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
Comp. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Var. 
Cumul. 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumul. 
% Total % of Var. 
Cumulative 
% 
1 10.785 39.943 39.943 10.785 39.943 39.943 4.901 18.150 18.150 
2 2.185 8.091 48.034 2.185 8.091 48.034 4.654 17.237 35.387 
3 1.801 6.671 54.705 1.801 6.671 54.705 2.671 9.894 45.281 
4 1.421 5.263 59.968 1.421 5.263 59.968 2.216 8.206 53.488 
5 1.197 4.433 64.402 1.197 4.433 64.402 2.133 7.899 61.387 
6 1.077 3.991 68.392 1.077 3.991 68.392 1.891 7.005 68.392 
7 .885 3.277 71.669       
8 .860 3.186 74.855       
9 .767 2.842 77.697       
10 .691 2.559 80.256       
11 .633 2.346 82.602       
12 .551 2.042 84.643       
13 .521 1.931 86.574       
14 .489 1.810 88.385       
15 .451 1.672 90.057       
16 .417 1.545 91.602       
17 .370 1.372 92.974       
18 .347 1.284 94.258       
19 .316 1.172 95.429       
20 .243 .900 96.330       
21 .228 .846 97.176       
22 .183 .677 97.853       
23 .172 .638 98.492       
24 .147 .546 99.038       
25 .112 .416 99.454       
26 .082 .303 99.757       
27 .066 .243 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 4: Component Matrix for PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
` 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Early establishment of collaboration .777      
Identifying individual and shared objectives .750      
Processual change .747 -.472     
Information Technology (IT) .746      
Information sharing and transparency .722      
Balance of stakeholder needs and expectations .718      
Power sharing .710      
Early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement 
and consultation 
.695      
Clarifying of roles and responsibilities .689      
Innovation .685      
Stakeholder commitment .671      
Conflict resolution structures .659      
Collective stakeholder planning and decision-making .653      
Knowledge retention .635      
Social capital / Inter-personal relationships .615      
Skilled leadership .599 .472     
Agreement of project brief .597      
Contract flexibility .573      
Authority experience .561  .508    
Effective communication .561 .472     
Financial and technical exchange and support / stipend .553      
ProjCo experience .545      
Please rate the saliency of each attribute in contributing 
to PPP stakeholder collaboration. Accountability 
.520      
Appropriate risk sharing .511    -.462  
Trust and respect .461 .606     
Authority in-house resources / skills   .738    
Clear governance structures .517   .584   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 6 components extracted. 
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Table 5: Rotated Component Matrix for PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Knowledge retention .799      
Processual change .766      
Power sharing .741      
Information Technology (IT) .731      
Innovation .718      
Early establishment of collaboration .624      
Early, defined and collective stakeholder involvement 
and consultation 
.492  .488    
ProjCo experience       
Social capital / Inter-personal relationships  .755     
Trust and respect  .699     
Identifying individual and shared objectives  .695     
Skilled leadership  .668     
Effective communication  .665     
Information sharing and transparency  .660     
Stakeholder commitment  .650     
Balance of stakeholder needs and expectations  .462     
Clear governance structures   .794    
Contract flexibility .502  .629    
Clarifying of roles and responsibilities   .510    
Collective stakeholder planning and decision-making   .505    
Appropriate risk sharing    .734   
Financial and technical exchange and support / stipend    .552   
Conflict resolution structures    .548   
Authority in-house resources / skills     .818  
Authority experience     .803  
Accountability      .762 
Agreement of project brief      .686 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
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Table 6: Component Transformation Matrix for PPP Stakeholder Collaborative Attributes 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 .584 .548 .371 .319 .241 .246 
2 -.624 .696 -.203 -.094 .105 .257 
3 -.076 -.380 -.172 .069 .805 .408 
4 -.472 -.233 .698 .386 -.163 .246 
5 .093 -.025 .415 -.850 .000 .310 
6 .181 -.125 -.363 .117 -.506 .742 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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